SimpleDon
Veteran Member
My Pfizer example is primarily an indictment of New London and only secondarily an indictment of Pfizer. Only government can apply punishment or withhold punishment. Business cannot apply punishment, so does not get similar disdain.
Kelo, et al. vs. New London was a case that tested the public use clause of the 5th amendment. It wasn't a case of outright theft as you characterized it. Pfizer already had the land for their facility, they didn't depend on the City of New London to steal the land or to otherwise obtain the land for them. The city used eminent domain to obtain property for additional speculative office and research buildings to be owned by the New London Development Corporation, a public entity, in hopes of taking advantage of any spill over effects of the Pfizer development. Most of the petitioners owned land that was intended to be a parking lot for a state park and a city owned marina, a clear public use.
But yes, the case did represent a ratcheting up of the erosion of the public use clause to strictly private use, the leasing of space in the public owned buildings for private for profit use. And as a result of the outrage over the Supreme Court decision the US Congress and 44 states enacted legislation against the practice. A reasonable reaction of democratic governments to a bad decision, even if the reaction was a bit overstated as yours was because of the confusion over the details of the case. Democracy is undeniably messy, but it works most of the time.
How does the libertarian government's judge apply the "no initiation of aggression" principle to resolve these competing claims?
Also, your post didn't address my second question, about the two separate definitions. Should I take the fact that you reiterated your "no initiation of aggression" principle to mean you're dropping your alternate definition, "maximizing rights"?
I hope you're not leading towards the perfection fallacy.
And my expanded explanation doesn't show that I'm dropping the other definition of maximizing rights, when I explicitly defined aggression as violation of rights.
You once again passed up the opportunity to demonstrate your thesis that your NAP can easily tell us what the proper libertarian position would be. Rather you say that we can't assume that the principle has to be perfect to be valid, "I hope you're not leading towards the perfection fallacy," a reasonable objection, as it is for the democratic process of government by the way.
But if the NAP doesn't help explain what property is in the pure libertarian society, what does define what property is? In our current, messy democracy it is the government that defines what property is and what property rights are. A system that you define as aggressive, which by the NAP should therefore be eliminated, but for which the NAP can't formulate a replacement. What does define property and what is it?
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