Lion IRC
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- Basic Beliefs
- Biblical theist
After something has occurred, we use probability judgments about competing hypotheses to select which hypothesis is most likely to be true. This proves that probability is not obliterated just because something happened in the past.
For example, suppose you wanted to know if a deck of cards in your possession was a normal deck or if it only contained face cards. You draw seven cards at random, and they are all face cards (assume none are duplicates). If you're being honest, this makes it much more likely that the deck contains only face cards, because that would have made your draw much more probable than if it were a normal deck. As more face cards are randomly drawn in succession, it becomes more and more probable that the deck contains only face cards.
Yet, drawing seven face cards is no more improbable than drawing any random series of cards. It is, of course, possible that you happened to randomly draw only the face cards contained in the normal deck. But over many iterations, you would be correct in rejecting that hypothesis more often than not, given your evidence of drawing seven face cards in a row.
In the same way, an event has already taken place: you were born. That's in the past, probability 1. But what hypothesis accounts for it? One hypothesis says your birth depended upon a chance occurrence many orders of magnitude less likely than drawing seven face cards at random from a normal deck of cards. The other hypothesis says that, in effect, all of the cards are face cards (any conscious being is you). By the same reasoning as before, you should reject the hypothesis about your existence that makes it dependent on something very improbable.
The ontological enigma is not so much whether we are looking at something which suggests real fine tuning or looking at some trompe l'oiel that our pattern seeking (presuppositional) mind has mistakenly superimposed on reality.
The enigma is why we are able to discern patterns from non-patterns.
We recognise the difference between sand dunes and sand castles.
We don't see patterns in everything.
And we can easily conceive concepts such as chaos, chance, randomness, unintentional, spontaneity, etc. So it's not as if we need to dismiss fine tuning as a presuppositional pattern-seeking ontological view.
The menu of available options for types of universes has a seemingly infinite number of
non-Goldilocks, undesigned alternatives from which to choose.
But the Big Bang gave us this one.