What kind of entity is a fictional character?

[Tom Sawyer]

What if the character thinks his dog is actually a demon but then he finds out after the sex that it's just a regular dog? Since he thought it was a demon during the sex, is that OK?

 

[Bronzeage]

What if the character thinks his dog is actually a demon but then he finds out after the sex that it's just a regular dog? Since he thought it was a demon during the sex, is that OK?

It can't be a regular dog, just like you can't just think she's 18. She has to really be 18 and it has to be a demon dog.

Don't even get me started on furries.

 

[fast]

What reasons suggest that a fictional character does exist? I mean; is anyone on that side of the argument?

My two cents is that a fictional character existed only in the original thought of it. All other thoughts of a fictional character are abstractions. What more needs to be said?

The role of context.

My friend Bugsy saw a big guy steal my bike. I suspect that this 'big guy' is someone Bugsy made up. I think he's lying and that the big guy doesn't exist.

I'm suggesting that the big guy doesn't exist, Bugsy is suggesting he does. Clear enough, right?

However, there's a problem here. I made that story up - I don't know anyone called Bugsy. Now, you can claim that fictional characters simply don't exist, and to an extent you'd be right. But you also understood my story, which means you can clearly distinguish between characters that exist and those that don't, within the context of a story. In the context of the story, some of the fictional characters exist, and some do not (Bugsy exists, but 'the big guy' probably doesn't). Outside the context of the story, none of them exist.

The key point is not whether fictional characters exist, but whether it is a logically coherent statement to say that they do. Several philosophers, including Earl Russel, have claimed that a statement to the effect that a fictional character exists, is not even a statement, but an incoherence that doesn't make sense even to the speaker. The fact that you could understand my story, and understand the difference between existent and non-existent fictional characters, suggests that Russel was wrong.

I just want to say that your clarity was awesome!

Right or wrong about it all, I ain't know. But, the ease of understanding is refreshing.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The role of context.

My friend Bugsy saw a big guy steal my bike. I suspect that this 'big guy' is someone Bugsy made up. I think he's lying and that the big guy doesn't exist.

I'm suggesting that the big guy doesn't exist, Bugsy is suggesting he does. Clear enough, right?

However, there's a problem here. I made that story up - I don't know anyone called Bugsy. Now, you can claim that fictional characters simply don't exist, and to an extent you'd be right. But you also understood my story, which means you can clearly distinguish between characters that exist and those that don't, within the context of a story. In the context of the story, some of the fictional characters exist, and some do not (Bugsy exists, but 'the big guy' probably doesn't). Outside the context of the story, none of them exist.

The key point is not whether fictional characters exist, but whether it is a logically coherent statement to say that they do. Several philosophers, including Earl Russel, have claimed that a statement to the effect that a fictional character exists, is not even a statement, but an incoherence that doesn't make sense even to the speaker. The fact that you could understand my story, and understand the difference between existent and non-existent fictional characters, suggests that Russel was wrong.

I just want to say that your clarity was awesome!

Right or wrong about it all, I ain't know. But, the ease of understanding is refreshing.

Me I think it is just a muddying of the waters.

I don't see how the notion of context could be helpful. We already have straightforward counterfactuals. If Superman existed he would wear a red cape. This is the usual way people speak and everybody understand that the statement only claims a fictional Superman, not an actual one. Notice that here we also repeat the counterfactual past: <existed> and <would wear>. It's only in the stories themselves that we drop the indications that this is a story: Superman wears a red cape. But here we know this is a story and we take it as a story and we only pretend to belive it and if it wasn't meant as a story it would be a lie. People talking of contexts just drop the requirement of announcing fictionality: It is true that Superman wears a red cape.

Fictional stories, and all non-real contexts, also come in different versions. How many versions of Santa Claus/Father Christmas/Saint Nicolas? How many versions of God/Allah/Yahweh? In effect, each human being makes up his own stories. To apply the notion of truth to fictional statements can only be misleading and I fail to see how that's a constructive perspective.
EB

 

[4321lynx]

That is not an experience, it is a physical event. An unexperienced event. For the event to be experienced requires an experiencer...a brain. The falling tree itself experiences nothing.

Got it. Yes, that's what I meant. Nice catch.

Of course we all here realise, I hope, that this blessed forest that is so often quoted and/or mentioned is a completely theoretical, fictional forest. Real forests are full of life that would experience the falling tree and would be concious of the experience, and react to that fall of the tree. I mean insects, spiders, amphibians, snakes, birds, mammals from mice and squirrels to bears and elephants -- take your choice of species and mix of them. To say that these multiple experiences do not matter is one example of anthropocentric thinking.
But if you are happy with a fictional, theoretical, non-existent forest, I shall be happy too and try my damndest to be as anthropocentric as most other humans.

 

[fromderinside]

Got it. Yes, that's what I meant. Nice catch.

Of course we all here realise, I hope, that this blessed forest that is so often quoted and/or mentioned is a completely theoretical, fictional forest. Real forests are full of life that would experience the falling tree and would be concious of the experience, and react to that fall of the tree. I mean insects, spiders, amphibians, snakes, birds, mammals from mice and squirrels to bears and elephants -- take your choice of species and mix of them. To say that these multiple experiences do not matter is one example of anthropocentric thinking.
But if you are happy with a fictional, theoretical, non-existent forest, I shall be happy too and try my damndest to be as anthropocentric as most other humans.

Its a forest as far as the one holding the thought is concerned. Did you see Sherlock last night? Now there's an exploration of what is real and whether it matters at all and it was fiction, entertainment.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Of course we all here realise, I hope, that this blessed forest that is so often quoted and/or mentioned is a completely theoretical, fictional forest.

This is a very good point and you should have stopped there. The only forest we actually experience is the one in our mind and we would normally agree that this is not a real forest but an imaginary one. Alternatively, we could distinguish that kind of forest from the one we think exist, we think is a real forest. However, we don't know whether it exists at all anymore that we know whether the tree fell in that forest. So, all we have is our belief that trees do fall in forests, unwitnessed. And, sure, maybe we are wrong on this. But that doesn't make us ipso facto correct when we believe we are witnessing that a tree is falling in a forest.

Real forests are full of life that would experience the falling tree and would be concious of the experience, and react to that fall of the tree. I mean insects, spiders, amphibians, snakes, birds, mammals from mice and squirrels to bears and elephants -- take your choice of species and mix of them. To say that these multiple experiences do not matter is one example of anthropocentric thinking.
But if you are happy with a fictional, theoretical, non-existent forest, I shall be happy too and try my damndest to be as anthropocentric as most other humans.

Even the little bug is bugcentric. We shouldn't apologise for seeing everything as humans do because we are in fact, it seems to me, less autocentric than any other other creature, except possibly God.

Only the British are excentric.
EB

 

[4321lynx]

This is a very good point and you should have stopped there. The only forest we actually experience is the one in our mind and we would normally agree that this is not a real forest but an imaginary one. Alternatively, we could distinguish that kind of forest from the one we think exist, we think is a real forest. However, we don't know whether it exists at all anymore that we know whether the tree fell in that forest. So, all we have is our belief that trees do fall in forests, unwitnessed. And, sure, maybe we are wrong on this. But that doesn't make us ipso facto correct when we believe we are witnessing that a tree is falling in a forest.

Real forests are full of life that would experience the falling tree and would be concious of the experience, and react to that fall of the tree. I mean insects, spiders, amphibians, snakes, birds, mammals from mice and squirrels to bears and elephants -- take your choice of species and mix of them. To say that these multiple experiences do not matter is one example of anthropocentric thinking.
But if you are happy with a fictional, theoretical, non-existent forest, I shall be happy too and try my damndest to be as anthropocentric as most other humans.

Even the little bug is bugcentric. We shouldn't apologise for seeing everything as humans do because we are in fact, it seems to me, less autocentric than any other other creature, except possibly God.

Only the British are excentric.
EB

Speak for yourself. I live fairly deep in a forest. I have seen and heard one or two trees fall when I was the only human around, and I have seen trees standing in the forest and saw them lying down fallen the very next day and am 99.99999% certain that no human witnessed or heard their fall. Pontificating on this did not and will not affect the course of the universe or of that forest, or affect the course of even my life to any great extent. But I am willing to admit that it may be a pleasant pastime, rather like a game of chess, or listening to music.

And whatevercentric you may call the human race, we have mucked up this world very sccessively by sheer weight of numbers.

And by excentric I take it you mean eccentric.

With apologies for my ill manners,

Lynx.

 

[Juma]

The only forest we actually experience is the one in our mind and we would normally agree that this is not a real forest but an imaginary one.

This needs to be straigtened out:

There is something out there.
That something is what you experiences mostly stems from and what your experiences stems from is what you experience. (the verb).
The experience (noun) is what is inside your head.

Thus if we are in a real wood we experience that real wood.
The expetience we have though is in our head.

 

[fromderinside]

The only forest we actually experience is the one in our mind and we would normally agree that this is not a real forest but an imaginary one.

This needs to be straigtened out:

There is something out there.
That something is what you experiences mostly stems from and what your experiences stems from is what you experience. (the verb).
The experience (noun) is what is inside your head.

Thus if we are in a real wood we experience that real wood.
The experience we have though is in our head.

How would one present this in 'onto' language? All the elements of set one equal all the elements of set two AND all the elements of set one map onto to all the elements of set two. If there is an identity onto relation then wouldn't the 'experience' of set two be driven directly by existence of set one while the elements of sets one and two remain separate.

 

[Juma]

This needs to be straigtened out:

There is something out there.
That something is what you experiences mostly stems from and what your experiences stems from is what you experience. (the verb).
The experience (noun) is what is inside your head.

Thus if we are in a real wood we experience that real wood.
The experience we have though is in our head.

How would one present this in 'onto' language? All the elements of set one equal all the elements of set two AND all the elements of set one map onto to all the elements of set two. If there is an identity onto relation then wouldn't the 'experience' of set two be driven directly by existence of set one while the elements of sets one and two remain separate.

Not sure what your point is (or what you try to say)

 

[Speakpigeon]

The only forest we actually experience is the one in our mind and we would normally agree that this is not a real forest but an imaginary one.

This needs to be straigtened out:

There is something out there.
That something is what you experiences mostly stems from and what your experiences stems from is what you experience. (the verb).
The experience (noun) is what is inside your head.

Thus if we are in a real wood we experience that real wood.
The expetience we have though is in our head.

Nothing to be straightened out. You have your opinion and, amazingly, you think it is correct. I have a different opinion, which is based on science and common sense. I would be happy to consider the possibility that both are wrong but until someone shows me how they are, or even how they could be, I'll stick with them.
EB

 

[Juma]

This needs to be straigtened out:

There is something out there.
That something is what you experiences mostly stems from and what your experiences stems from is what you experience. (the verb).
The experience (noun) is what is inside your head.

Thus if we are in a real wood we experience that real wood.
The expetience we have though is in our head.

Nothing to be straightened out. You have your opinion and, amazingly, you think it is correct. I have a different opinion, which is based on science and common sense. I would be happy to consider the possibility that both are wrong but until someone shows me how they are, or even how they could be, I'll stick with them.
EB

I have said nothing that goes against science.
Please show that i did.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Nothing to be straightened out. You have your opinion and, amazingly, you think it is correct. I have a different opinion, which is based on science and common sense. I would be happy to consider the possibility that both are wrong but until someone shows me how they are, or even how they could be, I'll stick with them.
EB

I have said nothing that goes against science.
Please show that i did.

And I didn't say you did.
You're wasting my time.
EB

 

[Juma]

I have said nothing that goes against science.
Please show that i did.

And I didn't say you did.
You're wasting my time.
EB

Yes, you said that youre view was based on science thereby implying that mine isnt.

 

[Speakpigeon]

And I didn't say you did.
You're wasting my time.
EB

Yes, you said that youre view was based on science thereby implying that mine isnt.

Yes?! No.

If by "imply" you mean "suggested" then this suggests a minor tendency towards paranoia on your part.

If you mean a logical implication then that suggests a poor understanding of logic.

As I said, you're wasting my time.
EB

 

[Underseer]

Well, since it is possible that the author was accidentally correct, you can't prove with absolute certainty that a fictional character doesn't exist, therefore all fictional characters exist*.

* Lampoon of a common argument used by Christian and Muslim apologists.

Your lampoon reminds me of the beliefs of soulbonders.

Tried clicking on the link and it's no longer available. Can you explain what it was?

 

[Underseer]

I'm working on fictional discourse now, so I'm into this. But my second reason for the thread was the question, can existence be a predicate? The classic refutation of the Ontological Argument that I heard in college was based on the claim that existence is not a predicate. If it is, though, what are the consequences for the Ontological Argument?

We can have a thread on that if anyone wants, but perhaps that question was done to death on the old board.

What do you mean "What are the consequences for the ontological argument"? Isn't it obvious?

Harry Potter isn't real no matter how many people read and enjoy the books. The consequence is that Harry Potter isn't real.

The ontological argument was refuted when first proposed and is only taken seriously by people desperate to accept the conclusion supported by the argument.

 

[Underseer]

This is remarkably similar to the paper I wrote in university.

The conclusion I came to reject Russel's arguement, and conclude that existance must indeed be a predicate, because the discussion not just of fictional, but even hypothetical or abstract concepts, relies heavily on granting entities that do not exist, even hypothetically, properties and characteristics. Russel's arguement really only works for physical objects.

My three arguements were:

1) Entities which we agree can not exist by their very definition, still have properties. For example a married bachelor has the property of being married, and of being a bachelor. These properties define the case we are talking about, so it is not true to claim, as Russel does, that we are talking about what properties such a person would if and only if they existed, because the case we are talking about consists entirely of those properties.

2) Lingusitically, all entities can have properties. Ask a kid in almost any modernised country to dress up as superman and they'll know exactly what to wear without further discussion. Superman has properties, these properties are demonstrably and repeatably associated with the concept, and Russel's assertion to the contrary becomes a counterfactual.

3) Existance itself can be a property.
One of my favourite examples is The Never-Ending Story, a particularly impenetrable children's book that got turned into a Disney film. (it featured a 'luck dragon', a cross between a dragon and dog). The film consists of a boy hiding out from bullies, and while doing so he finds and reads a book. The book is a fantasy adventure about the hero searching the kingdom for 'the human child' whom he must find and bring before the princess, or else the world ends. He fails, the world ends, and he finds the princess in her tower floating through space. Whereupon it is discovered that actually he has suceeded, because the human child is the one reading the book in which they appear. The reason why he can save their world is because he exists, and they don't, they're just characters in a story. By reading the story, he drives events forward, and the kingdom is recreated.

But according to Russel's argument, such a story should be incomprehensible, because existance isn't an attribute, and someone can not have the property of existing. In practice the story is quite easy to follow.

So we can only accept that Harry Potter isn't real unless we begin with the assumption that Harry Potter isn't real?

Absurd.

 

[Bronzeage]

If I think, therefore I am, if I think of something that thinks, does it also exist?