Hm.. But it's not enough to declare them false, because their falsity or truth doesn't have any bearing on the case. What matters is whether they are coherent. Russel claims (from memory) are extremely strong - he claims that the idea of an existant unicorn doesn't make sense, even to the person talking about it - that it is literally non-sensical. But in the case of the story, the existance or otherwise of the characters is an essential plot point. Something coherent is being consistently communicated. We can establish, as an observed fact, that existance can coherently be treated as an attribute - within the context of a fiction. Hence my claim that Russel's position is counterfactual - people do in fact make sense of a relationship that he claims doesn't contain any.
Hello Togo, I think we're agreed that context matters in evaluating what authors do with sentences.
Here are two tries at refuting the notion that existence is a predicate of individuals. See what you think.
I will use the example of the fictional character, Anna Karenina. I assume there was no historical AK. I think it's legit to argue using an example, because if existence isn't a predicate in her case, the case would falsify the general thesis.
1 (a la Russell).
The contradiction argument.
AK is a fictional character who is presented in the novel as existing and as having a unique identity.
a. Assume ex hypothesi that a set of predicates applies to her: Russian, woman, unhappily married, exists, etc.
b. But fictional characters by definition do not exist.
Therefore a. and b. entail a contradiction.
We jettison a. because b. is established by the meaning of "fictional."
It won't help to try to undo this refutation by accusing it of equivocating on "exist." If "existence" in fiction really bears a sense different from "existence" in the real world, so that it's spelled the same but means something else like "fictionality," then the refutation still works because "Existence" becomes no longer a predicate of AK. Something else, "fictionality" or whatever, becomes the predicate, so the original thesis turns out not to satisfy truth conditions after all.
Sure, but that's doesn't mean that there isn't an equivocation between the two, nor does it mean that this equivocation isn't the problem.
As you say, there are two meanings of the term exist. In the fiction, AK is an existing character as opposed to characters that might be referenced in the fiction that are not existing. In b, a statement is made that fictional characters don't exist.
But the meaning is clearly different in each case. The predicate in a is within the context of the fiction. Within that frame of reference some objects exist and some do not, and she is in the class of the former. In b, the statement that fictional characters do not exist means that, to borrow Russel's terminonlogy, they are not instantiated in the real world. Or to put it another way, within the frame of reference of the real world, some things exist, and some do not, and fictional characters are in the class that do not.
It should be clear, comparing these two different interpretations, what the common element is. Each describes existence in terms of their frame of reference, whether the real world, or within a fictional setting.
The objection you've cited suggests that if there is an equivocation, then it must be that the fictional character's predicate of existence is false, and must be changed, but this simply begs the question. The point is that existance always refers to a frame of reference, in fiction, in mathematics, in hypotheticals, and in real life. A definition that excludes this, and pretends that all things exist or do not exist according to a single frame of reference, is going to generate logical inconsistencies when compared with how the term is actually used.
You get a similar situation with other terms. 'Inside' is one such. One might be inside or outside. You can treat 'inside' as a predicate, saying that some people are outside, and others inside. But this is clearly a relative term. If I am in a house, inside refers to those in the house, and outside refers to those out in the fresh air. If I set up a tent in my living room, and sit in it, then inside refers not to those inside or outside the house, but those inside or outside the tent. Thus, in the same way as with the term 'existance', one can be both inside and outside sumultaneously, just as a fictional character can be both existant, in the story, and non-existant, in the real world, simultaneously. This is not a logical contradiction, because the frame of reference is different in each case.
The "does no work" argument (a la Kant).
AK is a fictional object that must be distinguished from other fictional objects in the novel. AK is described by a unique set of properties, which ex hypothesi includes existence. Her husband, Karenin, is described by a different, unique set of properties, which ex hypothesi includes existence. Same for all the other objects presented in the novel. Since "existence" is a property of each of them, it does no work in describing any object; "existence" is otiose in the description. But a predicate does work of describing a thing. Therefore existence is not a predicate of an individual.
It won't help to retort that the above argument confuses identification and description. If existence is a property of all the objects in the novel, it is tautological to repeat it in an assertion about any one object. By the definition of description, the information that is given about the described object is not true of at least one other object in the relevant domain.
It may be that existence is a predicate of concepts. I am also aware that some philosophers maintain against Russell, Frege et al that existence is a predicate (or property?) of individuals. I'm waiting to be convinced!
But the term does do work. Let us say that AK, in the novel, dreams of being a child in a tall dark house. In the novel's frame of reference, she exists, and the house, being a mere fancy of her dream, does not. Later on in the novel, she comes across a tall dark house exactly like the one in her dream, and is greatly shocked. Did she grow up there? Is there some mystery in her past of which she was unaware? And so on. This scene, a fairly common literary device, depends entirely upon the idea that she is existant, and the house was assumed not to be. If you remove all references to which objects were dreamed, and which were dreaming, and the meaning of the scene is lost. The term existance does work here.
It seems easy to claim, based on a few examples of real objects, that the term existence does no work, or that it can only have meaning in circumstances other than the usual. Fish would no doubt make the same claim about the concept of 'wet'. But I don't think it stands up once you get beyond objects in the real world.