Demystifying Determinism

[Jarhyn]

Presented with a formalized modal argument, DBT does not address the argument itself, but rather goes a-Googling in search of someone, anyone, who will attack modal logic itself! And sure enough he succeeds; the internet is gravid with crackpots.

This tells me that DBT can’t address the argument — otherwise, he would — and that he can’t rebut modal logic, because if he could, he would do it himself, rather than seeking someone to do it for him.

Typical ad homs and dismissal of opposing ideas.

Never mind your own googling. Never mind that you ignore anything that doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.
Namely, that brain state is not chosen, yet it is brain state that determines what is thought, felt and done.

It is not philosophy or modal logic that falsifies the notion of free will, but neuroscience and physics.

What ad hom? Where did I ad hom you?

I simply pointed out that I presented you with a formal modal argument and you did not address it. That is the truth, isn’t it? No ad hom there.

My own googling? Of course I google up stuff to supprt and supplement arguments that I make in my own words. You do something quite different. You google up stuff in lieu of making an argument of your own. I am afraid you are the google champ, not I.

I presented you with a formal modal argument and you did not address it. Instead, you google up someone who does not address the argument either, but instead makes some generalized and frankly incoherent attack on modal logic, which means he is attacking logic itself. Good luck with that.

If you have a beef with modal logic, why don’t you state that beef in your own words. If you disagree with the formal modal argument I presented, why don’t you list the objections to the argument in your own words?

Man, I'm getting flashbacks from Ion again.

People really need to read The Socratic Dialogues and The Allegory of the Cave

 

[pood]

This sure looks like the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. You look at what happened, and then declare that that particular outcome was inevitable.

Let's go back to what you said about me saying, "Kylie MUST eat chicken."

I am using the word MUST in the sense of something that is required. If I want to get into the nightclub, I MUST show my ID to say that I am old enough to legally enter. If I want to legally drive a vehicle, I MUST have a license to show that I have the qualifications needed to do so safely.

So, if God (as used in your argument) knows for a fact that my eating of the chicken is 100% guaranteed to happen, then I MUST eat the chicken.

I’m sorry, this is wrong. My entire post was to show that this is a modal fallacy. All that MUST happen is that what you freely do, and what God foreknows, must MATCH. But you are free to do what you want. As I have explained, you are erroneously assigning MUST (necessity) to the consequent of the antecedent, whereas in this case MUST applies conjointly to antecedent and consequent together.

Recommended reading: Foreknowldge and Free Wiill

How many times do I have to say this?

No matter how many times you say it, it’s doesn’t make it correct.

If God knows what I will do (or any other situation you want to imagine where the future has but a single inevitable outcome that is 100% guaranteed to happen, no way to avoid it) and I am unable to change that outcome, then I am not making the choice freely!

I wonder if you read my posts, or read them carefully for comprehension. I’ve already covered this. Free will does not entail the ability to change the past, present or future. It entails only the ability to help make the past, present and future be what they were, are, and will be.

Did you read the essay I linked at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy? It goes into much more depth than I have space for.

Please try to follow the logic here. If God knows that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then certainly, Kylie WILL eat chicken. We have no disagreement there.

Our disagreement emerges when you illicitly try to convert Kylie WILL eat chicken into Kylie MUST eat chicken. This is the whole crux of the dispute between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist.

MUST means “of necessity; cannot do otherwise.”

WILL means “contingently; could have been otherwise.”

Now, to repeat, your fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie must, of necessity, eat chicken.


This argument commits the modal fallacy.

The corrected argument goes:

Necessarily, (if God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie will [but not must!] eat chicken).

Please try to attend to the clear logic here. It is not necessary for Kylie to eat chicken. What is necessary, in the presence of an omniscient God, is that what Kylie eats, and what God foreknows, must MATCH. But Kylie is free to eat steak instead of chicken. If she does, God will foreknow THAT fact instead.

I’ve explained this several times. If now you can’t grasp the logic here, or refuse to do so, there is nothing more I can add. Hopefully the lightbulb will come on at some point.

 

[pood]

If your situation is correct, then God can come to me, tell me what he knows I will do tomorrow, and either I will do something different to spite him (in which case his foreknowledge was wrong, and that can't be the case), or there is something forcing me to do what the foreseen outcome is (in which case I never had free will in the first place).

Funnily enough, every time I bring this up, people make excuses why they don't have to answer it...

Erm? Who has made excuses why they don’t have to answer it? Certainly not I. It’s the first time I’ve seen this. Can you point out the posts where others have made excuses not to answer it?

We should keep in mind that there is no God. So, in a sense, all of this is moot; however, it remains interesting as a thought experiment, because it can test modal categories like necessity, contingency, actuality, possibility, etc.

It is not logically possible for an omniscient God to have a false belief.

It is logically (and physically) possible for Kylie to eat either chicken or steak.

There is a logically possible world at which Kylie eats chicken and God foreknows chicken.

There is a logically possible world at which Kylie eats steak and God foreknows steak.

There is no logically possible world at which Kylie eats chicken and God foreknows steak.

There is no logically possible world at which Kylie eats steak and God foreknows chicken.

Now let’s suppose God decides to tell Kylie what she will eat.

There is a logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat chicken, and she eats chicken.

There is a logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat steak, and she eats steak.

BUT, given God’s omniscience:

There is no logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat chicken, and she eats steak.

There is no logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat steak, and she eats chicken.

Among those who for some reason study nonexistent entities with imaginary super-duper powers, it is generally agreed that even an omnipotent God cannot bring about a logical contradiction. For example, there is no possible world at which God creates a four-sided triangle.

Given this limit, God will know, in advance, that Kylie will do just as he tells her she will do. But he will also know, in advance, whether Kylie is contrapredictive — i.e., determined to do, other than what God tells her she will do.

In the latter case, God will not tell Kylie what she will do — indeed, cannot tell her, if God himself is bound by the laws of logic.

If God can and does tell Kylie what she will do in this case, and Kylie does the opposite, then God has the ability to bring about a logical contradiction — to know something that is false.

But, if God is omniscient of logical necessity, it follows he will not/cannot tell a contrapredictive Kylie what she will do. This is because it is not logically possible for a God who is omniscient of logical necessity to bring about a state of affairs that is logically contradictory. Before a contrapredictive Kylie, God must of logical necessity remain silent.

This entire modal analysis is strongly related to Prof. Normal Swartz’s modal analysis of whether God can create a stone that even he cannot move.

 

[DBT]

Presented with a formalized modal argument, DBT does not address the argument itself, but rather goes a-Googling in search of someone, anyone, who will attack modal logic itself! And sure enough he succeeds; the internet is gravid with crackpots.

This tells me that DBT can’t address the argument — otherwise, he would — and that he can’t rebut modal logic, because if he could, he would do it himself, rather than seeking someone to do it for him.

Typical ad homs and dismissal of opposing ideas.

Never mind your own googling. Never mind that you ignore anything that doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.
Namely, that brain state is not chosen, yet it is brain state that determines what is thought, felt and done.

It is not philosophy or modal logic that falsifies the notion of free will, but neuroscience and physics.

What ad hom? Where did I ad hom you?

Snide innuendo. Misrepresentation, false accusations. Perhaps you are not even aware of what you are doing.

Your memory is not so good either;

For example;
''At the risk of misremembering, I do believe that at one point DBT acknowledged his belief that the big bang killed JFK.'' - Pood, Post #433

I simply pointed out that I presented you with a formal modal argument and you did not address it. That is the truth, isn’t it? No ad hom there.

My own googling? Of course I google up stuff to supprt and supplement arguments that I make in my own words. You do something quite different. You google up stuff in lieu of making an argument of your own. I am afraid you are the google champ, not I.

I presented you with a formal modal argument and you did not address it. Instead, you google up someone who does not address the argument either, but instead makes some generalized and frankly incoherent attack on modal logic, which means he is attacking logic itself. Good luck with that.

If you have a beef with modal logic, why don’t you state that beef in your own words. If you disagree with the formal modal argument I presented, why don’t you list the objections to the argument in your own words?

The problems with compatibility, free will in relation to determinism, has been described more than enough times.

The given definition of determinism sets the terms, conditions, premises.


''However, in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

''Choosing'' is a point of contention.

Determinism as defined does not permit alternate actions, choosing or doing otherwise, what is done must be done.

Choice is defined as the act of choosing between two or more possibilities;

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Yet determinism - as defined - does not permit two or more possibilities. The mere appearance of alternate possibilities does not offer a choice between two or more possibilities, only the illusion of choice

For instance; If driver A must necessarily (determinism at work) turn left at the next intersection, he does not have the option of turning right in that instance, he must turn left. If driver B must necessarily turn right at the same intersection (determinism at work), she does not have the option of turning left in that instance, she must turn right.

One goes left, the other goes right, neither driver has a choice in that instance or any instance as the system evolves from prior to present and future states without deviation, without alternate options, without choice.

That is how determinism - as it is defined - works.

''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Consequently, causal necessity/determinism is not compatible with freedom of will or choice, where - by definition - no alternatives exist.

 

[Jarhyn]

Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments

And one of those transforms is choice: taking in several objects and emitting one of them...

Yet you seek really hard to pretend that event doesn't happen at all...

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The problems with compatibility, free will in relation to determinism, has been described more than enough times.

And the imaginary problems have been adequately answered more than enough times.

In order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.

''Choosing'' is a point of contention.
...
Choice is defined as the act of choosing between two or more possibilities;
Choice 1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Yet determinism - as defined - does not permit two or more possibilities. The mere appearance of alternate possibilities does not offer a choice between two or more possibilities, only the illusion of choice

Determinism routinely offers two or more possibilities. Where did you think possibilities came from if they were not reliably caused? Steak or Salad? Left or Right? Study or Party? Rain or Shine? Walk or Drive? Now or Later? All of these possibilities that show up in our lives are causally inevitable from any prior point in time. It is as if determinism is constantly offering us two or more possibilities, whether we want them or not.

Like Adding and Subtracting, Choosing is a logical operation performed by the brain. The fact that we can do it in our heads does not make it an "illusion". It is a real operation performed by a real brain. And it has real consequences in the real world.

For instance; If driver A must necessarily (determinism at work) turn left at the next intersection, he does not have the option of turning right in that instance, he must turn left. If driver B must necessarily turn right at the same intersection (determinism at work), she does not have the option of turning left in that instance, she must turn right.

First, determinism does not exist as an entity that goes around making things happen. Our "(determinism at work)" is metaphorical, not actual.

But Driver A actual, not metaphorical. And if he is UNCERTAIN how to get to his destination, the one thing that he is still CERTAIN about is that, he CAN turn left, he CAN turn right, and he CAN go straight ahead. While Driver A is uncertain of what he WILL do, he is very certain of what CAN do.

So, how will he resolve his three CAN's into a single WILL? He looks at his map and finds his destination relative to this intersection. He needs to turn left to get where he wants to go. And it is his own choosing process that DETERMINES which way he WILL go.

Driver B has exactly the same options as Driver A. She CAN turn left, she CAN turn right, and she CAN go straight ahead. But she already KNOWS what she WILL do. She knows that she needs to turn right to get to her destination, so she simply turns right without further thought.

Both she and he had the same three options at the intersection. They both COULD HAVE turned left, COULD HAVE turned right, and COULD HAVE gone straight ahead.

Each WOULD do the one thing they NEEDED to do in order to reach their destination. But what they WOULD do did not in any way change what they COULD do. Each COULD HAVE turned left, turned right, or driven straight ahead.

What they WOULD do was determined by their INTENTION (their deliberate "will") to reach their specific destination. He WOULD turn left. She WOULD turn right. What they each COULD do was determined by the physical structure of the intersection.

And that is how determinism works.

''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

That kind of figurative language is the source of people's confusion about what scientific determinism really means.

It is TRUE to say that determinism means "that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable".

But it is FALSE to say that "it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action". WHY is this false? Because, whenever a decision is being made, there will always be at least TWO things that we CAN do. From them we will select the SINGLE thing that we WILL do. Which leaves us with at least one other thing that we COULD HAVE DONE instead. This is a matter of logical necessity, just like a triangle having three sides.

And when they say "In other words", they give us a clue that they have switched from literal to figurative speech. They might as well have placed "In other words" in front of the first false statement.

 

[pood]

Presented with a formalized modal argument, DBT does not address the argument itself, but rather goes a-Googling in search of someone, anyone, who will attack modal logic itself! And sure enough he succeeds; the internet is gravid with crackpots.

This tells me that DBT can’t address the argument — otherwise, he would — and that he can’t rebut modal logic, because if he could, he would do it himself, rather than seeking someone to do it for him.

Typical ad homs and dismissal of opposing ideas.

Never mind your own googling. Never mind that you ignore anything that doesn't suit your belief in compatibilism.
Namely, that brain state is not chosen, yet it is brain state that determines what is thought, felt and done.

It is not philosophy or modal logic that falsifies the notion of free will, but neuroscience and physics.

What ad hom? Where did I ad hom you?

Snide innuendo. Misrepresentation, false accusations. Perhaps you are not even aware of what you are doing.

Your memory is not so good either;

For example;
''At the risk of misremembering, I do believe that at one point DBT acknowledged his belief that the big bang killed JFK.'' - Pood, Post #433

b

Examples of even one snide innuendo? One misrepresetation? One false accusation? I daresay you‘ve no examples. You’re just making shit up. We’ve already established that you don’t know what an ad hom is.

Meanwhile, you‘re the one callinig everyone here stupid. You do it practically in every post. Look to the beam in your own eye.

As to my memory, it’s just fine. You agreed that the Big Bang made it necessary that Oswald killed JKF, which is tantamount to saying that the big bang killed JFK, in my book.

 

[pood]

BTW, pre-emptively, I know DBT will point out that in agreeing with the idea that the Big Bang made it necessary for Oswald to kill JKF, he will point to Marvin’s own definition of causal necessity, as he did when he made his Oswald post. Two problems here: As I have repeatedly reminded DBT, and he has repeatedly ignored, I, personally, recognize no such modal category as “causal necessity.” Marvin and l are in substantive agreement but we do have this terminological dispute. I point out to Marvin that when Oswald killed Kennedy, he could have done otherwise; and Marvin fully agrees with me. He and I also I agree that if you replayed history with the exact same circumstances, Oswald would again kill Kennedy. So while he CAN refuse to kill JKF, he WILL NOT ever do so. Marvin and I agree on all this, but I point out to him that in these circumstances “causal necessity” is more appositely rendered “causal contingency.”

 

[Marvin Edwards]

BTW, pre-emptively, I know DBT will point out that in agreeing with the idea that the Big Bang made it necessary for Oswald to kill JKF, he will point to Marvin’s own definition of causal necessity, as he did when he made his Oswald post. Two problems here: As I have repeatedly reminded DBT, and he has repeatedly ignored, I, personally, recognize no such modal category as “causal necessity.” Marvin and l are in substantive agreement but we do have this terminological dispute. I point out to Marvin that when Oswald killed Kennedy, he could have done otherwise; and Marvin fully agrees with me. He and I also I agree that if you replayed history with the exact same circumstances, Oswald would again kill Kennedy. So while he CAN refuse to kill JKF, he WILL NOT ever do so. Marvin and I agree on all this, but I point out to him that in these circumstances “causal necessity” is more appositely rendered “causal contingency.”

Exactly. I've built my case explicitly accepting "causal necessity" and "causal inevitability", and I place contingency within necessity. Within all that is necessary and inevitable, one of the things that actually makes certain events necessary is the rational causal mechanism. Within the rational causal mechanism we find deliberate causation and its necessary notions of contingency and possibilities firmly anchored in the mechanism itself. They are cogs in the machinery that simply will not work without them.

And that is why we treat, "I chose the salad even though I could have chosen the steak", as a true statement in both its parts.

 

[Jarhyn]

There is an interesting interplay in which there is one population popping from argument to argument, here, and one population all orbiting the same set of ideas, some from a direction of modal logical, and others, as myself, from a perspective of semantic completion derived from direct observations of more simple deterministic systems which implement choices and wills.

It all points at the same place: that the mechanisms of the universe, of all universes which have a fixed past and fixed rules for managing that through the moment of the present towards a future, incorporate some operation which we have named "choice", and that we are a form of agent that effects it through some manner of particular organization, because of the shape of some object, which we call "a brain".

It's just sad some people wish they didn't have to do any work in contributing to it's actions.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

There is an interesting interplay in which there is one population popping from argument to argument, here, and one population all orbiting the same set of ideas, some from a direction of modal logical, and others, as myself, from a perspective of semantic completion derived from direct observations of more simple deterministic systems which implement choices and wills.

It all points at the same place: that the mechanisms of the universe, of all universes which have a fixed past and fixed rules for managing that through the moment of the present towards a future, incorporate some operation which we have named "choice", and that we are a form of agent that effects it through some manner of particular organization, because of the shape of some object, which we call "a brain".

It's just sad some people wish they didn't have to do any work in contributing to it's actions.

Well, I was all with you until you got to that last sentence. DBT has obviously done a lot of work.

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

 

[Kylie]

You've arbitrarily redefined "choice" so it no longer means choice, and you're having a go at me? Ha.

I haven't redefined anything.

The physical selection process that occurs in the customer's brain in Marvin's restaurant is what the vast majority of competent English speakers recognise as 'choosing'.

You're the one who's attempting to impose your idiosyncratic, and misguided, language rules.

From Miriam-Webster:

Definition 4 makes it clear that a number and variety are required in order for any selection to be a choice. Since in a completely deterministic universe, the single outcome is inevitable, a free choice is not possible.

 

[Kylie]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

 

[Kylie]

Please try to follow the logic here. If God knows that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then certainly, Kylie WILL eat chicken. We have no disagreement there.

Our disagreement emerges when you illicitly try to convert Kylie WILL eat chicken into Kylie MUST eat chicken. This is the whole crux of the dispute between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist.

MUST means “of necessity; cannot do otherwise.”

WILL means “contingently; could have been otherwise.”

Now, to repeat, your fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie must, of necessity, eat chicken.


This argument commits the modal fallacy.

Okay, so God knows I will eat chicken.

Please, tell me, as a percentage, what is the probability that I will eat the chicken. Also tell me, what is the probability that I will eat the pork? ANd what is the probability that I will eat the steak?

The corrected argument goes:

Necessarily, (if God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie will [but not must!] eat chicken).

Please try to attend to the clear logic here. It is not necessary for Kylie to eat chicken. What is necessary, in the presence of an omniscient God, is that what Kylie eats, and what God foreknows, must MATCH. But Kylie is free to eat steak instead of chicken. If she does, God will foreknow THAT fact instead.

I’ve explained this several times. If now you can’t grasp the logic here, or refuse to do so, there is nothing more I can add. Hopefully the lightbulb will come on at some point.

That's painting the target around the arrow after it's already stuck in the wall and claiming you hit the bullseye. It means nothing unless you can specify the target ahead of time. Any idiot can make post-dictions.

 

[Kylie]

If your situation is correct, then God can come to me, tell me what he knows I will do tomorrow, and either I will do something different to spite him (in which case his foreknowledge was wrong, and that can't be the case), or there is something forcing me to do what the foreseen outcome is (in which case I never had free will in the first place).

Funnily enough, every time I bring this up, people make excuses why they don't have to answer it...

Erm? Who has made excuses why they don’t have to answer it? Certainly not I. It’s the first time I’ve seen this. Can you point out the posts where others have made excuses not to answer it?

Did I say that I had asked you and you had made excuses?

In post 475, I said, "If God knows what I will do (or any other situation you want to imagine where the future has but a single inevitable outcome that is 100% guaranteed to happen, no way to avoid it) and I am unable to change that outcome, then I am not making the choice freely!

In post 478, Bilby replied, "What if God knows that you will freely choose the chicken?"

In post 487, I said, "Can't be done. The instant he knows, that outcome has been "locked in." It HAS to be that way, since God can't be wrong. if I am locked in to that outcome, I can't freely choose."

Bilby has yet to respond to that.

In post 253 I specifically asked, "Let's say that God knows that tomorrow I will eat the chicken. If he came to me and said, "Kylie, you're going to eat the chicken," would I be able to instead choose the steak just to spite him?"

There was no reply to that question, not from Marvin who I directly asked it to, nor anyone else.

We should keep in mind that there is no God. So, in a sense, all of this is moot; however, it remains interesting as a thought experiment, because it can test modal categories like necessity, contingency, actuality, possibility, etc.

In that I agree. But in a universe that is purely deterministic, knowledge of the future is theoretically possible, so God makes a handy analogy for some being that can actually work it out.

It is not logically possible for an omniscient God to have a false belief.

It is logically (and physically) possible for Kylie to eat either chicken or steak.

There is a logically possible world at which Kylie eats chicken and God foreknows chicken.

There is a logically possible world at which Kylie eats steak and God foreknows steak.

There is no logically possible world at which Kylie eats chicken and God foreknows steak.

There is no logically possible world at which Kylie eats steak and God foreknows chicken.

Now let’s suppose God decides to tell Kylie what she will eat.

There is a logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat chicken, and she eats chicken.

There is a logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat steak, and she eats steak.

BUT, given God’s omniscience:

There is no logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat chicken, and she eats steak.

There is no logically possible world at which God tells Kylie she will eat steak, and she eats chicken.

Among those who for some reason study nonexistent entities with imaginary super-duper powers, it is generally agreed that even an omnipotent God cannot bring about a logical contradiction. For example, there is no possible world at which God creates a four-sided triangle.

Given this limit, God will know, in advance, that Kylie will do just as he tells her she will do. But he will also know, in advance, whether Kylie is contrapredictive — i.e., determined to do, other than what God tells her she will do.

In the latter case, God will not tell Kylie what she will do — indeed, cannot tell her, if God himself is bound by the laws of logic.

If God can and does tell Kylie what she will do in this case, and Kylie does the opposite, then God has the ability to bring about a logical contradiction — to know something that is false.

But, if God is omniscient of logical necessity, it follows he will not/cannot tell a contrapredictive Kylie what she will do. This is because it is not logically possible for a God who is omniscient of logical necessity to bring about a state of affairs that is logically contradictory. Before a contrapredictive Kylie, God must of logical necessity remain silent.

This entire modal analysis is strongly related to Prof. Normal Swartz’s modal analysis of whether God can create a stone that even he cannot move.

The only way this can work is that if the universe is deterministic and the future could be worked out given sufficient knowledge and calculatory abilities, then such foreknowledge can never actually be provided. After all, if you had sufficient knowledge to figure out the future (hypothetically speaking, of course), then you could never tell me. Your own argument here makes it clear that such communication of future knowledge is impossible. You said, "In the latter case, God will not tell Kylie what she will do — indeed, cannot tell her, if God himself is bound by the laws of logic." That argument would apply to God, but it must also apply to ANY being that is able to determine future knowledge, which would also include the version of you in this hypothetical.

And how could the universe make sure you could never communicate your future knowledge to me? By making such future knowledge impossible to determine.

However, that violates the idea of a deterministic universe where each event is the unavoidable result of all previous events.

So, if the universe is completely deterministic, then you are by definition unable to prove it. And such a universe would be completely the same as a non-deterministic universe by any possible method of examination. (Please note that when I say non-deterministic, I am not saying that determinism plays zero role, I am saying that there are some things that are not deterministic in nature and so determinism alone can not explain all events.)

 

[The AntiChris]

From Miriam-Webster:
View attachment 39890
Definition 4 makes it clear that a number and variety are required in order for any selection to be a choice. Since in a completely deterministic universe, the single outcome is inevitable, a free choice is not possible.

No mention of determinism/indeterminism in this definition.

The requirement for indeterminism is your personal preconception.

 

[bilby]

If God knows what I will do (or any other situation you want to imagine where the future has but a single inevitable outcome that is 100% guaranteed to happen, no way to avoid it) and I am unable to change that outcome, then I am not making the choice freely!

What if God knows that you will freely choose the chicken?

Can't be done. The instant he knows, that outcome has been "locked in." It HAS to be that way, since God can't be wrong. if I am locked in to that outcome, I can't freely choose.

Anything god wishes can, by definition, be done.

If God knows that you will freely choose, then you HAVE to freely choose, since God can't be wrong.

Of course, this leads to paradoxical situations, but that's what you should expect from absurd ideas like infallible and all-knowing gods.

I suggest that we reject this pointless fiction, accept that nobody and nothing can know in advance what the future holds, and recognise that it is the deterministic act of your freely choosing that makes the fungible future into an immutable past.

Not only could you mot possibly have made a different choice, but you could not possibly have failed to make a choice; It was just as inevitable that you would choose the chicken as it was that you would then order the chicken.

To suggest that restaurant patrons order food without having chosen what to order is observably false. How else do they arrive at their orders? There's a point in time when they don't know what they will order; And a later point in time when they do know. That transition is called 'choosing', and it's entirely an internal function of the chooser's brain, not subject to outside influences.

If that's not free choice, then what is it? If it's not me that chooses what to order when I go out for a meal, then who or what is it that gets the universe from one in which I don't know what I will order, to one in which I do?

 

[Kylie]

From Miriam-Webster:
View attachment 39890
Definition 4 makes it clear that a number and variety are required in order for any selection to be a choice. Since in a completely deterministic universe, the single outcome is inevitable, a free choice is not possible.

No mention of determinism/indeterminism in this definition.

The requirement for indeterminism is your personal preconception.

The requirement for predeterminism is that one outcome has 100% and all others have 0%. And you are sitting there trying to tell me that a 0% outcome is possible.

 

[Kylie]

If God knows what I will do (or any other situation you want to imagine where the future has but a single inevitable outcome that is 100% guaranteed to happen, no way to avoid it) and I am unable to change that outcome, then I am not making the choice freely!

What if God knows that you will freely choose the chicken?

Can't be done. The instant he knows, that outcome has been "locked in." It HAS to be that way, since God can't be wrong. if I am locked in to that outcome, I can't freely choose.

Anything god wishes can, by definition, be done.

If God knows that you will freely choose, then you HAVE to freely choose, since God can't be wrong.

Of course, this leads to paradoxical situations, but that's what you should expect from absurd ideas like infallible and all-knowing gods.

I suggest that we reject this pointless fiction, accept that nobody and nothing can know in advance what the future holds, and recognise that it is the deterministic act of your freely choosing that makes the fungible future into an immutable past.

Not only could you mot possibly have made a different choice, but you could not possibly have failed to make a choice; It was just as inevitable that you would choose the chicken as it was that you would then order the chicken.

To suggest that restaurant patrons order food without having chosen what to order is observably false. How else do they arrive at their orders? There's a point in time when they don't know what they will order; And a later point in time when they do know. That transition is called 'choosing', and it's entirely an internal function of the chooser's brain, not subject to outside influences.

If that's not free choice, then what is it? If it's not me that chooses what to order when I go out for a meal, then who or what is it that gets the universe from one in which I don't know what I will order, to one in which I do?

You discount something because it leads to paradoxical situations, yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

Also, you seem to think that I am arguing that the result of my choice is not a result of me making a choice. I don't know where the hell you got that from.

My argument is that my choice is NOT the single inevitable result of everything that has happened previously. There is an element of randomness to it so that it is fundamentally unpredictable. There is no "set in stone" inevitable outcome, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not.