Demystifying Determinism

[Kylie]

The requirement for predeterminism is that one outcome has 100% and all others have 0%. And you are sitting there trying to tell me that a 0% outcome is possible.

That's what this debate is all about. Your definition doesnt' address this issue.

What issue? You trying to claim that two completely contradictory things are true at once?

The debate is about whether or not these two things really are contradictory. To assume it's true is to take for granted the very thing that's being debated.

You surely must have understood some of what the others have been saying?

You don't seem to have understood what I've been trying to say. I would repeat myself, but it would be a waste of my time.

 

[Kylie]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

It is not unknown from the point of view of the universe.

You are AGAIN making the mistake of thinking that if we don't know about it, it must be unknowable.

The universe doesn't know things, nor does it have a point of view. You are making a category error, by attempting to take a pantheist approach to resolving the paradoxical nature of gods.

You miss my point.

I am not thinking that it must be unknowable; It's unknowable because of the nature of causality - effects do not precede causes, and so what you will order for dinner cannot be known - even to you - until after you choose what to order for dinner.

But you still say that there is one particular outcome that is inevitable.

 

[Kylie]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

Can in what context? Can if circumstances are different?

To test the logic of this, well, you can just spin up any deterministic mathematical system (like Dwarf Fortress) and ask that question, and then change circumstances in some particular way (essentially, inventing a new initial condition ala Last Thursday) and seeing if the engine of the system parses and continues parsing indefinitely, and the outcome you seek happens.

If the outcome you seek happens, you have in your hands an immediate state in which "can".

It doesn't matter what that state is.

CAN asks "of I load up a blank universe in some way, with some condition, will this result ever happen?"

Usually the question of "can I?" Assumes the condition being examined is going to be very similar to the condition present in the actual universe.

For many decisions we make, that condition examined contains the actual universe, as we process macrostates in general ways rather than microstates, and the macrostates describe a range of microstates.

When it does we call such wills, the situation where "Can I?" Is not "you may" but "you shall", "free".

You miss my point.

You are saying that if the starting point is different then the end result will be different.

I am saying that if the starting point is the same, then the end result can still be different because there are small random things which can have an effect.

 

[Kylie]

Please try to follow the logic here. If God knows that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then certainly, Kylie WILL eat chicken. We have no disagreement there.

Our disagreement emerges when you illicitly try to convert Kylie WILL eat chicken into Kylie MUST eat chicken. This is the whole crux of the dispute between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist.

MUST means “of necessity; cannot do otherwise.”

WILL means “contingently; could have been otherwise.”

Now, to repeat, your fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie must, of necessity, eat chicken.


This argument commits the modal fallacy.

Okay, so God knows I will eat chicken.

Please, tell me, as a percentage, what is the probability that I will eat the chicken. Also tell me, what is the probability that I will eat the pork? ANd what is the probability that I will eat the steak?

We‘ve already gone over this. You are groping for the answer “100 percent” but that can only ever be a posterior probability. In the case of two possible chloices, the prior probability is 50 percent.

If the chances are 50% each, how can you say a particular one of them is inevitable and you just don't know which one until it's selected?

It seems to me that you are moving the goalposts. If there was a raffle where 100 people buy a ticket and then one ticket is drawn at random, yes, it is guaranteed that SOME ticket will win, with each ticket having a 1% chance of winning. But your argument seems to be that it was always inevitable that a PARTICULAR ticket will win, with that ticket having a 100% chance and all others having a 0% chance.

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Indeed, if anyone is commiting a sharpshooter’s fallacy, it is Kylie. If you choose eggs she would gloat, “ah ha, see? It had to be eggs!” But if you choose pancakes she would gloat, “ah hah, see? It had to be pancakes!” But of course it didn’t have to be one or the other, it just had to be that a choice was made.

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

 

[bilby]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

It is not unknown from the point of view of the universe.

You are AGAIN making the mistake of thinking that if we don't know about it, it must be unknowable.

The universe doesn't know things, nor does it have a point of view. You are making a category error, by attempting to take a pantheist approach to resolving the paradoxical nature of gods.

You miss my point.

I am not thinking that it must be unknowable; It's unknowable because of the nature of causality - effects do not precede causes, and so what you will order for dinner cannot be known - even to you - until after you choose what to order for dinner.

But you still say that there is one particular outcome that is inevitable.

Well, no, I don't; But I am certain that it wouldn't matter one iota if there were, so (as I have repeatedly told you) I accept it for the sake of this discussion.

How do you think the existence of an unknown inevitable outcome changes the fact that the outcome only becomes known as a result of the choosing operation; While the existence of an unknown and variable outcome would not change that fact?

Choosing is done by people. People have incomplete knowledge. Gods don't choose, not least because they don't exist.

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

 

[bilby]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

Can in what context? Can if circumstances are different?

To test the logic of this, well, you can just spin up any deterministic mathematical system (like Dwarf Fortress) and ask that question, and then change circumstances in some particular way (essentially, inventing a new initial condition ala Last Thursday) and seeing if the engine of the system parses and continues parsing indefinitely, and the outcome you seek happens.

If the outcome you seek happens, you have in your hands an immediate state in which "can".

It doesn't matter what that state is.

CAN asks "of I load up a blank universe in some way, with some condition, will this result ever happen?"

Usually the question of "can I?" Assumes the condition being examined is going to be very similar to the condition present in the actual universe.

For many decisions we make, that condition examined contains the actual universe, as we process macrostates in general ways rather than microstates, and the macrostates describe a range of microstates.

When it does we call such wills, the situation where "Can I?" Is not "you may" but "you shall", "free".

You miss my point.

You are saying that if the starting point is different then the end result will be different.

I am saying that if the starting point is the same, then the end result can still be different because there are small random things which can have an effect.

That's lovely, but it has EXACTLY zero to do with whether or not a free choice is being made. Randomness cannot create freedom.

 

[DBT]

Entailment is not choice

Entailment of a subset from a set is choice. It is exactly choice. Your acknowledgement that entailment of a subset from a set by process happens is acknowledgement of compatibilist choice. Compatibilists are wise enough to recognize this is as much choice as one needs have to discuss wills and freedom: of the set prior to the entailment, did this element end up being selected?

When it did not, we have a word that describes this state: unfreeness. When it does, we have a word for that too: freeness.

Entailment in determinism means that all events within the current state of the system are fixed by prior states of the system, which in turn entails future events. It's how you yourself defined determinism.

Necessitation;
''Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation.' - J. W. N. Watkins, "Between Analytic and Empirical," Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 121, p. 114:

Strict necessitation negates selection between options, therefore the no choice principle.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

You have no way around this. The notion of free will is incompatible with determinism for the given reasons.

 

[Jarhyn]

entails future events

Such as... Wait for it... Deterministic choice execution!

Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation

Strictly necessitating... That for any agent controlled by a central process to do anything... That central process has to look at options and actually choose one of them. If it does not, the bouncer puts them out on their ear for taking a table from paying customers.

Choices aren't irregular or spontaneous. They are regular, predictable occurrences, with ultimately regular and predictable outcomes.

Strict necessitation negates selection between options,

No, it necessitates selection between options.

There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs

That's lovely, but it has EXACTLY zero to do with whether or not a free choice is being made. Randomness cannot create freedom.

 

[pood]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

 

[pood]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Indeed, if anyone is commiting a sharpshooter’s fallacy, it is Kylie. If you choose eggs she would gloat, “ah ha, see? It had to be eggs!” But if you choose pancakes she would gloat, “ah hah, see? It had to be pancakes!” But of course it didn’t have to be one or the other, it just had to be that a choice was made.

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

Excuse me, I have “bothered to understand” your position. You’re a libertarian. I acknowledged that upthread, which you‘d know if you bothered to read my posts.

What I’m saying here is that you are imputing to the compatibilist positions he/she does not hold.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

 

[pood]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

 

[pood]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

Kylie is mooting a Laplacean conception of deterministic prediction. But becaue of quantum mechanics, the world is not Lapleacean.

Even if the world were non-quantum, no computer would be sufficiently powerful to generate flawless prediction. But because QM introduces indeterminism into the scene, then no such flawless predictions could be made even in principle.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Kylie is mooting a Laplacean conception of deterministic prediction. But because of quantum mechanics, the world is not Lapleacean.

Even if the world were non-quantum, no computer would be sufficiently powerful to generate flawless prediction. But because QM introduces indeterminism into the scene, then no such flawless predictions could be made even in principle.

The conditions set for the question were these: "Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow."

"Sufficient" intelligence, "sufficient" knowledge, and "sufficient" ability to achieve success, logically imply at least the "possibility" of success.

And my position on QM is that any "indeterminism" is a problem of prediction, and not a problem of causation. I can't prove this of course, but it seems a realistic belief that is unlikely to be disproven.

 

[Jarhyn]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

Kylie is mooting a Laplacean conception of deterministic prediction. But becaue of quantum mechanics, the world is not Lapleacean.

Even if the world were non-quantum, no computer would be sufficiently powerful to generate flawless prediction. But because QM introduces indeterminism into the scene, then no such flawless predictions could be made even in principle.

That's the thing. QM doesn't actually introduce indeterminism. It just introduced internally unpredictable behavior.

Just because the dwarves are measuring point A and comparing it to point B, and then measuring point C and knowing they can't know the position and moment at the same time doesn't mean I can't read both, because I can stop time and actually look at the exposed "velocity" number without physical measurement.

This is the whole point of why FDI brings up Superdeterminism, and why I do as well.

My point, though, was that flawless predictions of such a system are actually not predictions, they are operations and observations of the system itself.

Godel has some things to say insofar as only an external system containing this one could contain such a computer, and it could not be contained within itself. So while "it's possible within mathematics" it's also "not possible within our universe".

 

[The AntiChris]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

Right. The rationale for predicting the future in the first place is usually to give us the ability to change it if we want. So, we'll assume that I am never informed of the prediction.