Demystifying Determinism

[bilby]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

 

[bilby]

Also, you seem to think that I am arguing that the result of my choice is not a result of me making a choice. I don't know where the hell you got that from.

Not at all. I don't know where the hell you got that from.

 

[bilby]

My argument is that my choice is NOT the single inevitable result of everything that has happened previously. There is an element of randomness to it so that it is fundamentally unpredictable. There is no "set in stone" inevitable outcome, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not.

You might well be right, but you would be wildly off-topic.

I believe that there is an element of randomness too; But it doesn't make the slightest difference to the question of free will.

Free choices aren't random. Randomness is no more conducive to freedom than is determinism.

By definition, nothing and nobody can decide what the result of a random event will be. How do you get from randomness to freedom?

 

[The AntiChris]

The requirement for predeterminism is that one outcome has 100% and all others have 0%. And you are sitting there trying to tell me that a 0% outcome is possible.

That's what this debate is all about. Your definition doesnt' address this issue.

 

[Kylie]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

It is not unknown from the point of view of the universe.

You are AGAIN making the mistake of thinking that if we don't know about it, it must be unknowable.

 

[Kylie]

My argument is that my choice is NOT the single inevitable result of everything that has happened previously. There is an element of randomness to it so that it is fundamentally unpredictable. There is no "set in stone" inevitable outcome, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not.

You might well be right, but you would be wildly off-topic.

I believe that there is an element of randomness too; But it doesn't make the slightest difference to the question of free will.

Free choices aren't random. Randomness is no more conducive to freedom than is determinism.

By definition, nothing and nobody can decide what the result of a random event will be. How do you get from randomness to freedom?

In one hour, pick a number between one and a trillion. By your logic, this choice is completely deterministic. Are you suggesting that with sufficient knowledge, I could tell right now what number you will pick?

 

[Kylie]

The requirement for predeterminism is that one outcome has 100% and all others have 0%. And you are sitting there trying to tell me that a 0% outcome is possible.

That's what this debate is all about. Your definition doesnt' address this issue.

What issue? You trying to claim that two completely contradictory things are true at once?

 

[Kylie]

Also, you seem to think that I am arguing that the result of my choice is not a result of me making a choice. I don't know where the hell you got that from.

Not at all. I don't know where the hell you got that from.

All you've done is claim you need a word to describe the event that occurs when a person points to an item on the menu and says, "I'll have this one." You pick the word "choice" and then say that since choice can be one of several different possible options, then those options must have a non-zero probability, even though you also believe the outcome is completely inevitable.

You are using a word that carries implications which are not justified in a deterministic worldview, and using those implications to prove something which is contradictory to your worldview.

 

[DBT]

That sums it up nicely.

 

[The AntiChris]

The requirement for predeterminism is that one outcome has 100% and all others have 0%. And you are sitting there trying to tell me that a 0% outcome is possible.

That's what this debate is all about. Your definition doesnt' address this issue.

What issue? You trying to claim that two completely contradictory things are true at once?

The debate is about whether or not these two things really are contradictory. To assume it's true is to take for granted the very thing that's being debated.

You surely must have understood some of what the others have been saying?

 

[bilby]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

It is not unknown from the point of view of the universe.

You are AGAIN making the mistake of thinking that if we don't know about it, it must be unknowable.

The universe doesn't know things, nor does it have a point of view. You are making a category error, by attempting to take a pantheist approach to resolving the paradoxical nature of gods.

I am not thinking that it must be unknowable; It's unknowable because of the nature of causality - effects do not precede causes, and so what you will order for dinner cannot be known - even to you - until after you choose what to order for dinner.

 

[bilby]

My argument is that my choice is NOT the single inevitable result of everything that has happened previously. There is an element of randomness to it so that it is fundamentally unpredictable. There is no "set in stone" inevitable outcome, regardless of whether we are aware of it or not.

You might well be right, but you would be wildly off-topic.

I believe that there is an element of randomness too; But it doesn't make the slightest difference to the question of free will.

Free choices aren't random. Randomness is no more conducive to freedom than is determinism.

By definition, nothing and nobody can decide what the result of a random event will be. How do you get from randomness to freedom?

In one hour, pick a number between one and a trillion. By your logic, this choice is completely deterministic.

No, that doesn't follow at all from my logic. You clearly misunderstand what I have said on this topic.

I have even stated very clearly several times (and reiterate it here) that I don't believe that the universe is deterministic anyway - only that it isn't relevant to freedom of choice whether it is or not.

Adding randomness doesn't change anything with regards to free will; randomness is not more "free" than determinism.

If your choices were random, you would be insane, not free.

Are you suggesting that with sufficient knowledge, I could tell right now what number you will pick?

No, I am not.

For a start, you are clearly incapable of correctly making inferences from the facts you have (see above), so you would probably get it wrong even if you had sufficient knowledge.

 

[Jarhyn]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

Can in what context? Can if circumstances are different?

To test the logic of this, well, you can just spin up any deterministic mathematical system (like Dwarf Fortress) and ask that question, and then change circumstances in some particular way (essentially, inventing a new initial condition ala Last Thursday) and seeing if the engine of the system parses and continues parsing indefinitely, and the outcome you seek happens.

If the outcome you seek happens, you have in your hands an immediate state in which "can".

It doesn't matter what that state is.

CAN asks "of I load up a blank universe in some way, with some condition, will this result ever happen?"

Usually the question of "can I?" Assumes the condition being examined is going to be very similar to the condition present in the actual universe.

For many decisions we make, that condition examined contains the actual universe, as we process macrostates in general ways rather than microstates, and the macrostates describe a range of microstates.

When it does we call such wills, the situation where "Can I?" Is not "you may" but "you shall", "free".

 

[pood]

Please try to follow the logic here. If God knows that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then certainly, Kylie WILL eat chicken. We have no disagreement there.

Our disagreement emerges when you illicitly try to convert Kylie WILL eat chicken into Kylie MUST eat chicken. This is the whole crux of the dispute between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist.

MUST means “of necessity; cannot do otherwise.”

WILL means “contingently; could have been otherwise.”

Now, to repeat, your fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie must, of necessity, eat chicken.


This argument commits the modal fallacy.

Okay, so God knows I will eat chicken.

Please, tell me, as a percentage, what is the probability that I will eat the chicken. Also tell me, what is the probability that I will eat the pork? ANd what is the probability that I will eat the steak?

The corrected argument goes:

Necessarily, (if God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie will [but not must!] eat chicken).

Please try to attend to the clear logic here. It is not necessary for Kylie to eat chicken. What is necessary, in the presence of an omniscient God, is that what Kylie eats, and what God foreknows, must MATCH. But Kylie is free to eat steak instead of chicken. If she does, God will foreknow THAT fact instead.

I’ve explained this several times. If now you can’t grasp the logic here, or refuse to do so, there is nothing more I can add. Hopefully the lightbulb will come on at some point.

That's painting the target around the arrow after it's already stuck in the wall and claiming you hit the bullseye. It means nothing unless you can specify the target ahead of time. Any idiot can make post-dictions.

Given your vast lacunae in knowledge of this subject matter, it would behoove you not to insinuate that others who disagree with you are idiots.

This has nothing to do with any sharpshooter’s fallacy. I’ve already explained, in some detail, how the necessity operator in demonstrations like this must apply conjointly to antecdent and consequent, and not just to the consequent, which is where your repeated modal fallacy resides. Did you read the article I linked you to on foreknowledge and free will? Did you read the Wiki link I gave you on the modal fallacy?

 

[pood]

Please try to follow the logic here. If God knows that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then certainly, Kylie WILL eat chicken. We have no disagreement there.

Our disagreement emerges when you illicitly try to convert Kylie WILL eat chicken into Kylie MUST eat chicken. This is the whole crux of the dispute between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist.

MUST means “of necessity; cannot do otherwise.”

WILL means “contingently; could have been otherwise.”

Now, to repeat, your fallacious argument goes:

If God knows today that Kylie will eat chicken tomorrow, then Kylie must, of necessity, eat chicken.


This argument commits the modal fallacy.

Okay, so God knows I will eat chicken.

Please, tell me, as a percentage, what is the probability that I will eat the chicken. Also tell me, what is the probability that I will eat the pork? ANd what is the probability that I will eat the steak?

We‘ve already gone over this. You are groping for the answer “100 percent” but that can only ever be a posterior probability. In the case of two possible chloices, the prior probability is 50 percent.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

 

[DBT]

BTW, pre-emptively, I know DBT will point out that in agreeing with the idea that the Big Bang made it necessary for Oswald to kill JKF, he will point to Marvin’s own definition of causal necessity, as he did when he made his Oswald post. Two problems here: As I have repeatedly reminded DBT, and he has repeatedly ignored, I, personally, recognize no such modal category as “causal necessity.” Marvin and l are in substantive agreement but we do have this terminological dispute. I point out to Marvin that when Oswald killed Kennedy, he could have done otherwise; and Marvin fully agrees with me. He and I also I agree that if you replayed history with the exact same circumstances, Oswald would again kill Kennedy. So while he CAN refuse to kill JKF, he WILL NOT ever do so. Marvin and I agree on all this, but I point out to him that in these circumstances “causal necessity” is more appositely rendered “causal contingency.”

You are the one making claims and speaking on behalf of your opponent when you should be putting your energy into building a better understanding determinism as it is defined, its terms and conditions and implications for the decision-making process, action initiation and the notion of free will.

This has been explained and supported, to no avail, Which is not surprising.

 

[pood]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Indeed, if anyone is commiting a sharpshooter’s fallacy, it is Kylie. If you choose eggs she would gloat, “ah ha, see? It had to be eggs!” But if you choose pancakes she would gloat, “ah hah, see? It had to be pancakes!” But of course it didn’t have to be one or the other, it just had to be that a choice was made.

 

[DBT]

Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments

And one of those transforms is choice: taking in several objects and emitting one of them...

Yet you seek really hard to pretend that event doesn't happen at all...

What happens within a deterministic system does not involve free selection between two or more realizable options. Entailment is not choice. Fixed by antecedents does not permit multiple realizable options, just what is determined, not chosen.

If you understood the implications of your own definition of determinism, you would understand that there is no point in time where something different can happen, where something else can happen

You would understand that having two or more realizable options and the ability to choose between them would allow alternate actions, where something that has not been determined to happen, could happen.

You should understand that by insisting that there is choice, that two or more things are possible, you are contradicting your own definition, which shows that you don't understand determinism and its implications.

 

[Jarhyn]

Entailment is not choice

Entailment of a subset from a set is choice. It is exactly choice. Your acknowledgement that entailment of a subset from a set by process happens is acknowledgement of compatibilist choice. Compatibilists are wise enough to recognize this is as much choice as one needs have to discuss wills and freedom: of the set prior to the entailment, did this element end up being selected?

When it did not, we have a word that describes this state: unfreeness. When it does, we have a word for that too: freeness.