Demystifying Determinism

[Jarhyn]

You have yet to realize that what is fantasized is just as subject to entailment as what went before and what comes after.

Without the fantasy comes no entailment to reification of that fantasy.

The fact that the choice is entailed makes it no less a choice from a set.

This is what you keep failing to realize or accept.

Without the steak on the menu, there will be no fulfilled orders for steak. Without the work to build a menu, there is indeed no restaurant.

The entailment of certain events requires the entailment of other events.

The entailment of the order for steak requires the entailment of a decision to order the steak, a choice to be made of the menu.

If one wishes to entail towards steak, their will to find steak on the menu must be free. The will may be free IFF steak is on the menu, they see it, and they decided it is not better than any other presented option, and assuming the restauranteur has steaks in stock.

This is what entails the order of steak.

As you can see many things can entail the will unto unfreeness with respect to "have the steak on a plate in front of me"

And part of that entailment involves doing a thing that compatibilists call "choice". That part bolded.

 

[DBT]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

Definitions alone don't prove anything.

You've missed the point completely.

I don't think so. I think that may have been you.

What you're responding to was not a claim to have proven anything. The only claim I made was that whether or not X exists, depends on how one defines X.

That's where you go wrong. You may define God as the Creator of the universe, for instance, but your definition has absolutely no bearing on whether a Creator of the universe exists or not.

For instance;


Semantic arguments are not sufficient.


1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

Common perception or definitions of free will are equally meaningless:


1)Free will is the ability to make conscious decisions.
2)Conscious decision making is experienced.
3)Free will exists.



1) Free will is the ability to act in accordance with our will.
2) We are able to act in accordance with our will
3) We have free will.


This is a case of selective wording that ignores the means by which decisions are made and actions taken, a matter of internal necessitation, not freedom of will.

Inner Necessity is not an example of free will.

 

[DBT]

You have yet to realize that what is fantasized is just as subject to entailment as what went before and what comes after.

Without the fantasy comes no entailment to reification of that fantasy.

The fact that the choice is entailed makes it no less a choice from a set.

This is what you keep failing to realize or accept.

Without the steak on the menu, there will be no fulfilled orders for steak. Without the work to build a menu, there is indeed no restaurant.

The entailment of certain events requires the entailment of other events.

The entailment of the order for steak requires the entailment of a decision to order the steak, a choice to be made of the menu.

If one wishes to entail towards steak, their will to find steak on the menu must be free. The will may be free IFF steak is on the menu, they see it, and they decided it is not better than any other presented option, and assuming the restauranteur has steaks in stock.

This is what entails the order of steak.

As you can see many things can entail the will unto unfreeness with respect to "have the steak on a plate in front of me"

And part of that entailment involves doing a thing that compatibilists call "choice". That part bolded.

No, despite giving a standard definition of determinism, no randomness/no deviation, you are still running with the same erroneous idea of determinism when it comes to free will.

If steak is entailed by the state and evolution of the system, which includes the state, condition and proclivities of each and every customer, steak it must be. No randomness, no deviation, no alternatives.

That is how you define determinism.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism.

 

[DBT]

Nope, this whole 'a choice someone makes for themselves' is bogus.

An extraordinary claim would require extraordinary evidence. One cannot disprove the fact that our carpenter decided for herself that she would build the house. She discussed her idea with others. She drew up the plans that everyone can see. She hired the subcontractors, purchased the materials, and did the carpentry work herself. No one forced her to take on such a task. She decided for herself that she would do it.

It wasn't an extraordinary claim. Given determinism, there is an interaction of environment and brain. Information from the environment acts upon the brain in deterministic ways. A truck bearing down on you causes you to leap to the side, for instance.

You leapt to the side, but your action was caused by external information.

The conditions in the external world include the items on the menu, which prompts the proclivities housed in the brain

It is not one or the other, but a deterministic relationship between brain and environment.

This has been explained and supported by experiments in neuroscience.

Actions are initiated before conscious awareness, narrator function kicks in, etc.

Identifying with neurons - I am my neurons - does nothing to establish freedom of will.

Which is why Compatibilists must engage with sophistry.

''Ah, but it's us doing it'' does not equate to free will.

Neurons are information processors, not free will generators.

Acting in accordance with one's will is - if the action is determined - an inevitable action.

The decisions you make (inner necessity/entailed) are an expression of how you think.

How you think is an expression of who you are.

Who you are depends on your genetic makeup, social circumstances, family, nation, culture, life experiences.....

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

The personal narrative

''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.''

This subset takes the form of a personal narrative, which is constantly being updated. The personal narrative exists in parallel with our personal awareness, but the latter has no influence over the former.''

 

[The AntiChris]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

Definitions alone don't prove anything.

You've missed the point completely.

I don't think so. I think that may have been you.

What you're responding to was not a claim to have proven anything. The only claim I made was that whether or not X exists, depends on how one defines X.

That's where you go wrong. You may define God as the Creator of the universe, for instance, but your definition has absolutely no bearing on whether a Creator of the universe exists or not.

That's exactly what I said in the piece you quoted : "I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, "

For instance;


Semantic arguments are not sufficient.


1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

I assume you're claiming this syllogism fails. It doesn't.

If you define God as 'love' and you accept premises 2 and 3 as true, then the conclusion (4) necessarily follows.

You can argue that the definition is not one that the majority would accept (not a claim you've made so far about compatibilist free will) but that doesn't invalidate the syllogism as it stands.

If you want to argue that the compatibilist definition of free will (as presented on this forum) is not accepted by the vast majority of people, then you need to argue your case - present evidence in support of your claim.

 

[Jarhyn]

No, despite giving a standard definition of determinism, no randomness/no deviation, you are still running with the same erroneous idea of determinism when it comes to free will.

No, I'm not.

As I have pointed out, if you had an argument, you would be able to point out the essential invocation of either randomness or deviation in the above.

As it is it has been proven that wills exist, and that freedom of instructions is an observable fact.

It has been demonstrated that fantasy exists and only following a flight of fancy may one have leave to reify that fantasy.

Quit telling people their dreams are worthless and meaningless, for they are not. Dreams and fantasies are a necessary component for entailment of reification of any proclivity.

People must dare to dream, and should they wish to see those dreams come into reality, to bound those dreams with reality's own rules.

I accept that some people are incapable of dreaming, of applying the rules of reality, and instead collapse into "lookup table logic". Such is life, but it is a low one.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Nope, this whole 'a choice someone makes for themselves' is bogus.

An extraordinary claim would require extraordinary evidence. One cannot disprove the fact that our carpenter decided for herself that she would build the house. She discussed her idea with others. She drew up the plans that everyone can see. She hired the subcontractors, purchased the materials, and did the carpentry work herself. No one forced her to take on such a task. She decided for herself that she would do it.

It wasn't an extraordinary claim. Given determinism, there is an interaction of environment and brain. Information from the environment acts upon the brain in deterministic ways. A truck bearing down on you causes you to leap to the side, for instance. You leapt to the side, but your action was caused by external information.

Indeed, a truck bearing down on a person will force the person to leap out of the way, or die. Our response is forced, by the threat of death, and not a matter of free will.

The conditions in the external world include the items on the menu, which prompts the proclivities housed in the brain. It is not one or the other, but a deterministic relationship between brain and environment.

With the menu, on the other hand, there is no such force, so we are free to choose for ourselves what will happen next. The menu lists the many meals that we can order, and our choosing determines what we will order. We are free to choose any item on the menu. They are all equally available to us. Every one of them is a realizable alternative. Every one of them is a real possibility.

That which will control our choice is us, our own brain, our own tastes, our own dietary goals. The menu is not controlling us. And the menu will not choose for us what we will have for dinner tonight. We have to do that for ourselves. And, whatever we choose, we will be expected to pay for, before we leave.

This has been explained and supported by experiments in neuroscience.

But are you accurately reporting what the neuroscientists are saying? Let's take the current example:

The personal narrative

''For example, in one study, researchers recorded the brain activity of participants when they raised their arm intentionally, when it was lifted by a pulley, and when it moved in response to a hypnotic suggestion that it was being lifted by a pulley.

Similar areas of the brain were active during the involuntary and the suggested “alien” movement, while brain activity for the intentional action was different. So, hypnotic suggestion can be seen as a means of communicating an idea or belief that, when accepted, has the power to alter a person’s perceptions or behaviour.''

''All this may leave one wondering where our thoughts, emotions and perceptions actually come from. We argue that the contents of consciousness are a subset of the experiences, emotions, thoughts and beliefs that are generated by non-conscious processes within our brains.''

This subset takes the form of a personal narrative, which is constantly being updated. The personal narrative exists in parallel with our personal awareness, but the latter has no influence over the former.''

This is the second time you've posted that article without including its authors' own conclusions at the end:

The personal narrative (Concluded, highlights mine)

"Our conclusions also raise questions about the notions of free will and personal responsibility. If our personal awareness does not control the contents of the personal narrative which reflects our thoughts, feelings, emotions, actions and decisions, then perhaps we should not be held responsible for them.

In response to this, we argue that free will and personal responsibility are notions that have been constructed by society. As such, they are built into the way we see and understand ourselves as individuals, and as a species. Because of this, they are represented within the non-conscious processes that create our personal narratives, and in the way we communicate those narratives to others.

Just because consciousness has been placed in the passenger seat, does not mean we need to dispense with important everyday notions such as free will and personal responsibility. In fact, they are embedded in the workings of our non-conscious brain systems. They have a powerful purpose in society and have a deep impact on the way we understand ourselves."

Please note that the authors themselves endorse the notions of free will and personal responsibility, and even suggest that "they are embedded in the workings of our non-conscious brain systems."

Actions are initiated before conscious awareness, narrator function kicks in, etc.

Again, you are going beyond the neuroscience with your own interpretation. The experiments by Benjamin Libet and others use the most elementary notions of choice, such as asking the subject to squeeze their fist randomly, whenever they feel like it, over a two minute period, and then comparing the timing of the readiness potential in relation to the subject's awareness of their conscious intent. And such experiments do show preconscious choosing followed by conscious awareness.

But that is not really what free will is about. Free will is a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and undue influence. For example, the person's first choice is not whether to squeeze his fist, but whether to volunteer for the experiment. If the person is forced to participate against his will, then the experiment would be unethical and invalid.

So, the unfolding of events actually begins with the subject choosing, voluntarily (of his own free will) to participate. This freely chosen intent motivates and directs his subsequent thoughts and actions. His intent (his will) causes him to pay attention to the experimenter as the apparatus, and what he is expected to do with it, is explained to him. His intent causes him to carry out those instructions when given the "go ahead" by the experimenter.

The freely chosen "I will participate in the experiment" happened long before he sat down and strapped on the apparatus, and it is the only way that he can explain to himself and others how he happens to be sitting in that chair at this moment, and doing what he was instructed to do.

That is where we find free will, not in the random squeezing of his hand, but in the causal determinants of his being there in the first place.

Identifying with neurons - I am my neurons - does nothing to establish freedom of will.

Are you claiming that free will requires that we exist separately from our central nervous system? Then you are using "freedom from our own brain" as an essential part of your definition of free will. That is certainly how some people, those who believe we are souls that operate independently of our bodies and brains, might define free will. That is the specific "free will" that neuroscience rejects.

But that is not the secular notion of free will. Free will is simply when a person chooses for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more, nothing less. It requires nothing supernatural. It does not require us to be free of our brains (our neurons) or free of cause and effect (determinism).

It only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence, things that we may reasonably conclude actually remove our control of our own choices.

Which is why Compatibilists must engage with sophistry.

Nope. The sophistry is coming from the incompatibilists. Compatibilists use pragmatism and empiricism to provide a realistic explanation for what is actually going on.

''Ah, but it's us doing it'' does not equate to free will.

Actually, it does. Free will is a choice we make for ourselves. If we are doing it, then we obviously are free to do it. The exceptions would be internal undue influences, such as a significant mental illness that subjects us to hallucinations and delusions, or subjects us to an irresistible impulse, or impairs our ability to reason. So, it is not enough that it is us, but also requires freedom from undue influences (e.g., significant mental illness).

Neurons are information processors, not free will generators.

When our central nervous system is deliberately choosing from the menu what we will order for dinner, and it is doing so while free of coercion and undue influence, it is not "generating" free will, it is simply demonstrating it.

Acting in accordance with one's will is - if the action is determined - an inevitable action.

Yes. In fact, acting in accordance with one's will is usually determined by our choosing that will in the first place. The choosing itself will be caused by our encountering a problem or issue that requires us to make a decision before we can proceed, as in the case of the restaurant, where encountering the menu requires us to choose what we will order before we can proceed to eating it.

The decisions you make (inner necessity/entailed) are an expression of how you think. How you think is an expression of who you are. Who you are depends on your genetic makeup, social circumstances, family, nation, culture, life experiences.....

Of course. And, we (our genetic makeup expressed as our body and brain) were there, participating in every interaction with our family, culture, and other social influences. We do not enter the world with a blank slate (tabula rasa) upon which the environment writes our destiny. We come into the world as a living organism with needs and interests of its own, and we negotiate with our physical (e.g. crib) and social (e.g. parents) environment for control throughout our lives.

Our carpenter chose for herself to become a carpenter despite the many options available to her. That conscious intent got her through trade school. And when she decided to build a house, that conscious intent got her from laying the foundation to applying the finishing touches to her new home.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Free will is not about subjective experience. It is an empirical event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. We can watch people doing it in the restaurant. Each diner opens a literal menu of alternative possibilities, considers these possibilities in terms of their own goals and interests, and tells the waiter what they will have for dinner. The logical operation that reduces a list of options to a single choice is called "choosing". And it actually happens in physical reality, right there in front of us.

Not only can we see it for ourselves, but each diner can see it for themselves as well. And it is the empirical evidence, that they saw with their own eyes, that convinces them that they just chose for themselves what they would order for dinner. Their conclusion is not based upon some subjective feeling, but upon the same objective observation we made as we also watched them doing it.

Also, the quote by Searle introduces the dualistic notion that a person's neurobiology is somehow controlling the person against their will, rather than the correct understanding that the person IS their neurobiology, such that what the neurobiology deliberately controls, the person also controls. When speaking of deliberate decision making, the person and the neurobiology are one, and the same thing.

 

[steve_bank]

I keep trying to bend th thread to my views by sheer force of willpower, but it doesn't seem to work.

May I suggest the trusty old syllogism.

P1...
P2...
P3...
C Free will therefore exists.

Wills exist: see "program; script; DNA amid proteins."
Freedom exists (with respect to lines in wills): see "proof of execution; breakpoints; output spits; logic analyzers"
The will to choose for oneself exists in various things: the line of a program to terminate ongoing activity rather than have some other programmatic element interrupt and terminate that activity is an observed phenomena.

Therefore will to choose for oneself may be free with respect to the element which identifies that freedom.

When it is, it is called "free will".

I positively can identify that I have observed such a will maintaining it's freedom through such means.

Therefore "free will", exists.

Clearly not everywhere and clearly not with respect to every instantiation but there it is.

One of the interesting parts here is that this clearly proves free will itself is not sufficient to establish ethical considerations, since ostensibly I have no obligation to ethically consider an aircraft...

Sounds like a theist argument.

Phi;psychical debate over our own attributes is inherently self referential. We have no reference points outside ourselves as physical science does.

I think god is a reference point for defining self for Christians, but that too is self referential. The Christian god is a human male patriarch.

Ehen they talk about god they are in effect talking about themselves.

 

[DBT]

Of course it's not a real free will. It is a definition.

A definition is a description of usage. Usage is what gives words their meaning. Frequently words have multiple meanings. In these cases, no single definition is the 'real' meaning.

How did you arrive at the belief that your notion of free will is the one true 'real' free will and all others are not real?

Word meaning doesn't establish the reality of something. There is plenty of word usage around 'God' or divine will, angels, demons, salvation, etc, yet none of this talk, definitions, agonizing rationales or debate establishes the reality of these things.

I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, But it depends totally on the definition.

If you define God as a supernatural entity, then many reasonable people would agree God doesn't exist. However, if God were defined as Eric Clapton, then, given that definition, God undoubtedly exists.

Similarly, if free will is defined as 'acting while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence' then, given that definition, free will undoubtedly exists (it's undeniable that people do act while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence).

It's indisputable that, given the comptatibilist definition, free will exists.

Definitions alone don't prove anything.

You've missed the point completely.

I don't think so. I think that may have been you.

What you're responding to was not a claim to have proven anything. The only claim I made was that whether or not X exists, depends on how one defines X.

That's where you go wrong. You may define God as the Creator of the universe, for instance, but your definition has absolutely no bearing on whether a Creator of the universe exists or not.

That's exactly what I said in the piece you quoted : "I guess what you're trying to say is that defining a concept doesn't establish its existence in reality and, of course, you're right, "

For instance;


Semantic arguments are not sufficient.


1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

I assume you're claiming this syllogism fails. It doesn't.

If you define God as 'love' and you accept premises 2 and 3 as true, then the conclusion (4) necessarily follows.

You can argue that the definition is not one that the majority would accept (not a claim you've made so far about compatibilist free will) but that doesn't invalidate the syllogism as it stands.

If you want to argue that the compatibilist definition of free will (as presented on this forum) is not accepted by the vast majority of people, then you need to argue your case - present evidence in support of your claim.

If the premises are flawed the conclusion may be false regardless of the fact that it follows the premises.

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love or that something that may be called 'God' exists.

It means that the premises are flawed. God is not Love. Love has its own defining qualities that have nothing to do with the Creator.

This is the basic flaw of compatibilism, essentially labelling 'acting freely in accordance with one's will' as an example of free will, while disregarding the nature and drivers of action.

Consequently, in disregarding the nature and drivers of action (which is not will) the premises of compatibilism are flawed and that the conclusion follows is irrelevant.

God is not Love, Love is Love.

Unforced action is not free will, it is simple an action performed as determined.

 

[DBT]

No, despite giving a standard definition of determinism, no randomness/no deviation, you are still running with the same erroneous idea of determinism when it comes to free will.

No, I'm not.

As I have pointed out, if you had an argument, you would be able to point out the essential invocation of either randomness or deviation in the above.

The incompatibilist argument is not 'mine.' It was around long before my time. Trying to make it a personal thing, suggesting that it's something I cooked up is absurd. You reject it regardless of whether it's me describing it, or any of the authors I have quoted and cited.

Based on your comments, you either cannot understand what is being described, or you are not willing to contemplate the implications.

As it is it has been proven that wills exist, and that freedom of instructions is an observable fact.

You are muddled. Will certainly exists, but it does not instruct response. And your 'freedom of instructions' is incoherent in terms of determinism.

It has been demonstrated that fantasy exists and only following a flight of fancy may one have leave to reify that fantasy.

Your problem is that you are yet to grasp the implications of your own definition of determinism. I can't see that ever happening.

Quit telling people their dreams are worthless and meaningless, for they are not. Dreams and fantasies are a necessary component for entailment of reification of any proclivity.

Where did I say 'dreams are worthless and meaningless?' I think you are misconstruing what I said.

People must dare to dream, and should they wish to see those dreams come into reality, to bound those dreams with reality's own rules.

I accept that some people are incapable of dreaming, of applying the rules of reality, and instead collapse into "lookup table logic". Such is life, but it is a low one.

Oh, for heaven's sake. There is an example of imagination going so wild that it has virtually no relationship to anything I have said. Have you been drinking?

 

[DBT]

Nope, this whole 'a choice someone makes for themselves' is bogus.

An extraordinary claim would require extraordinary evidence. One cannot disprove the fact that our carpenter decided for herself that she would build the house. She discussed her idea with others. She drew up the plans that everyone can see. She hired the subcontractors, purchased the materials, and did the carpentry work herself. No one forced her to take on such a task. She decided for herself that she would do it.

I have made no extraordinary claims. All that I have said is supported by evidence from neuroscience and physics. Which I have supplied in abundance.

The extraordinary claim is freedom of will in relation to determinism, a system that does not permit freedom of will because outcomes are fixed prior to the action and the role of will and consciousness.

Of course. And, we (our genetic makeup expressed as our body and brain) were there, participating in every interaction with our family, culture, and other social influences. We do not enter the world with a blank slate (tabula rasa) upon which the environment writes our destiny. We come into the world as a living organism with needs and interests of its own, and we negotiate with our physical (e.g. crib) and social (e.g. parents) environment for control throughout our lives.

The point is that none of this is of our choosing, regulative control, or that our will has the freedom to make a difference.

If will has no agency, will not being able to make a difference to what are determined outcomes, will has no freedom and there is no reason to define 'will' as 'free will.'

It is simply 'will' - an urge or prompt to act (inner necessity)- inevitably followed by action (as determined).

Sorry, determinism does not permit freedom of will, only actions performed without restriction, as determined

Our carpenter chose for herself to become a carpenter despite the many options available to her. That conscious intent got her through trade school. And when she decided to build a house, that conscious intent got her from laying the foundation to applying the finishing touches to her new home.

Our Carpenter doesn't exist or operate in a vacuum. There are countless elements at work shaping the thoughts and action of our Carpenter. It's called Life and the World. And if the world is deterministic, the actions of the Carpenter are determined by the conditions and events in both the world and his immediate environment.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Free will is not about subjective experience. It is an empirical event in which a person chooses for themselves what they will do while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. We can watch people doing it in the restaurant. Each diner opens a literal menu of alternative possibilities, considers these possibilities in terms of their own goals and interests, and tells the waiter what they will have for dinner. The logical operation that reduces a list of options to a single choice is called "choosing". And it actually happens in physical reality, right there in front of us.

There is no choosing in determinism.

Again, choice requires the ability to take any of a number of options at any given time, yet your own definition of determinism does not permit alternate actions.

Without the possibility of alternate actions, there is no choice. The option that is taken in any given instance is entailed, fixed....which, in determinism means that the decision-making process is a matter of entailment not choice.

Every action is fixed by antecedents, not freely chosen. Every step in the information processing activity of the brain is entailed by antecedents, inputs, memory, neural connectivity, dendrites, axons, synapses, and not freely chosen.

 

[Jarhyn]

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love or that something that may be called 'God' exists.

Actually, defining the utterance "god" as "love", means that "god" exists.

It just means that "god" in this semantic structure is fairly superfluous as a concept and unable to be leveraged as an personal entity.

Again, choice requires the ability to take any of a number of options at any given time, yet your own definition of determinism does not permit alternate actions.

No, choice requires the ability to take any number of options at any given time should the chooser choose to do so. This is a very different proposition to the one you pose.

The choice of steak over salad is a choice specifically because the chooser sees "IFF I want to be a fatass, I will have steak" and "IFF I don't want to be a fatass, I will have salad". These are the alternatives, created through the fantasy of doing each, with the rules of reality applied (weight gain as a function of biology and caloric and other intake)

Once the system has assembled the actions subsequent to all possible answers that may be seen in the envelope, Then the chooser unseals the envelope and asks "Do I want to be a fatass?"

How this question resolves determines which alternative is actioned. As you can see, one alternative of the fork must be "free" to entry, and the other alternative of the fork must be "constrained against entry".

Were this a will existing on a computer, the programmer could set a breakpoint (or a tracepoint) at the opening instruction of each function and physically validate that the will was free unto that entry.

The point is to identify exactly what is constraining a will when and why.

If there were no such things as wills and meaningful and relevant constraints, no software engineer in the world would be able to write programs because the whole point is to create meaningful and relevant constraints to the behavior of a machine while allowing the machine to have many degrees of provisional freedom.

 

[The AntiChris]

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love

It does to those who subscribe to that definition.

You still haven't got your head round the fact that we give words their meanings (definitions). Words themselves have no intrinsic meaning - meaning is derived exclusively from the use we make of them.

 

[Jarhyn]

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love

It does to those who subscribe to that definition.

You still haven't got your head round the fact that we give words their meanings (definitions). Words themselves have no intrinsic meaning - meaning is derived exclusively from the use we make of them.

Hmm.. so a thought here, perhaps unrelated unto a different thread.

Do you think that some words have some kind of "metaphysical concept" that they are being attached to, even if the enumeration between the two is an arbitrary one? That a rose by any other name would still (smell) just as (sweet)?

I would argue then that some usages are inappropriate, such as applying the thing used to discuss responsibility (compatibilist free will and choice in that state), with the fact that nobody is free from entailment. Entailment allows fantasy under the rules of reality to predict the outcomes of various choices before those choices are made so that the choice made results not just in the first behavior thought of but the  best behavior thought of.

People being on their first behavior rather than their best behavior is the problem compatibilists identify as needing correction.

 

[The AntiChris]

Do you think that some words have some kind of "metaphysical concept"

I'm afraid I've no idea what it might mean for a word to have some kind of "metaphysical concept".

If I were to guess, it would seem to contradict the idea that words don't have intrinsic meaning.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I have made no extraordinary claims. ...

But you're doing it right now. For example:

There is no choosing in determinism.

You've seen the people in the restaurant, choosing from the menu what they will order for dinner. To claim that choosing is not happening when it is happening right there in front of us is an extraordinary claim!

The point is that none of this is of our choosing, regulative control, ...

If the customers are not controlling what they are choosing then point to the object that is controlling their choice. There is no other object in the physical universe that is doing the choosing for them. It really is them.

The waiter, observing reality objectively, sees the customers making choices from the menu and telling him what they will have for dinner. You cannot convince the waiter that these people did not order what they ordered without extraordinary evidence. Philosophic sophistry will not cut it.

... or that our will has the freedom to make a difference. If will has no agency, will not being able to make a difference to what are determined outcomes, will has no freedom and there is no reason to define 'will' as 'free will.'

There is no such thing as a "free floating will". People choose what they will do. What they choose to do causes effects in the world around them. Will the chef be fixing us a Salad, or will the chef be cooking us a Steak? It is up to us, and only us, to decide.

That which chooses what will happen next exercises control. In the restaurant, the agency that controls what the chef will be doing is the customer who chooses what they will order for dinner.

Determinism asserts that all of these events, unfold necessarily, exactly as we observed them. Every choice will have a history of reliable causes reaching back as far as anyone cares to imagine. But the meaningful and relevant causes of these choices exist locally within each diner in the restaurant. None of the diner's prior causes can participate in this choice without first becoming an integral part of who and what the diner is. It is only the diners themselves that have any causal agency at this point in time.

These are the indisputable empirical facts. And the incompatibilist has nothing other than philosophic sophistry to dispute them.

It is simply 'will' - an urge or prompt to act (inner necessity)- inevitably followed by action (as determined).

It is not always as simple as choosing a dinner. Consider our carpenter, who chooses to build herself a home. There will be hundreds of decisions as she chooses the location, the materials, the flooring, the fixtures, the subcontractors, etc. Each of these choices will control something about the house she is building and what she and the other workers will be doing.

There is no other object in the physical universe that will make these choices for her. Her own choices will control what she will do. And that remains the case in a fully deterministic universe, because it will be causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that she herself will be making exactly those choices.

Our Carpenter doesn't exist or operate in a vacuum. There are countless elements at work shaping the thoughts and action of our Carpenter. It's called Life and the World. And if the world is deterministic, the actions of the Carpenter are determined by the conditions and events in both the world and his immediate environment.

The problem with that theory is that "Life and the World" have no interest in whether the woman builds a house or not. She is the one who decided to build the house, because she has the skills and the motivation to build it. After she learned carpentry, and she worked to save up the money, and she imagined building a home for herself, and she worked out the design, and she decided it was a real possibility, and it was she that decided "I will build my house now, rather than waiting any longer". Her deliberately chosen will, to build that house for herself, motivated and directed her subsequent thoughts and actions as she carried out her intent to build it.

It was her own freely chosen intent that sustained her efforts, from driving the first nail to moving in.

The notion that "Life and the World" possessed the necessary intent, rather than her, is superstitious nonsense. It does not comply with the empirical facts of what was actually determined to happen.

 

[pood]

I have made no extraordinary claims. ...

But you're doing it right now. For example:

There is no choosing in determinism.

You've seen the people in the restaurant, choosing from the menu what they will order for dinner. To claim that choosing is not happening when it is happening right there in front of us is an extraordinary claim!

The point is that none of this is of our choosing, regulative control, ...

If the customers are not controlling what they are choosing then point to the object that is controlling their choice. There is no other object in the physical universe that is doing the choosing for them. It really is them.

The waiter, observing reality objectively, sees the customers making choices from the menu and telling him what they will have for dinner. You cannot convince the waiter that these people did not order what they ordered without extraordinary evidence. Philosophic sophistry will not cut it.

... or that our will has the freedom to make a difference. If will has no agency, will not being able to make a difference to what are determined outcomes, will has no freedom and there is no reason to define 'will' as 'free will.'

There is no such thing as a "free floating will". People choose what they will do. What they choose to do causes effects in the world around them. Will the chef be fixing us a Salad, or will the chef be cooking us a Steak? It is up to us, and only us, to decide.

That which chooses what will happen next exercises control. In the restaurant, the agency that controls what the chef will be doing is the customer who chooses what they will order for dinner.

Determinism asserts that all of these events, unfold necessarily, exactly as we observed them. Every choice will have a history of reliable causes reaching back as far as anyone cares to imagine. But the meaningful and relevant causes of these choices exist locally within each diner in the restaurant. None of the diner's prior causes can participate in this choice without first becoming an integral part of who and what the diner is. It is only the diners themselves that have any causal agency at this point in time.

These are the indisputable empirical facts. And the incompatibilist has nothing other than philosophic sophistry to dispute them.

It is simply 'will' - an urge or prompt to act (inner necessity)- inevitably followed by action (as determined).

It is not always as simple as choosing a dinner. Consider our carpenter, who chooses to build herself a home. There will be hundreds of decisions as she chooses the location, the materials, the flooring, the fixtures, the subcontractors, etc. Each of these choices will control something about the house she is building and what she and the other workers will be doing.

There is no other object in the physical universe that will make these choices for her. Her own choices will control what she will do. And that remains the case in a fully deterministic universe, because it will be causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that she herself will be making exactly those choices.

Our Carpenter doesn't exist or operate in a vacuum. There are countless elements at work shaping the thoughts and action of our Carpenter. It's called Life and the World. And if the world is deterministic, the actions of the Carpenter are determined by the conditions and events in both the world and his immediate environment.

The problem with that theory is that "Life and the World" have no interest in whether the woman builds a house or not. She is the one who decided to build the house, because she has the skills and the motivation to build it. After she learned carpentry, and she worked to save up the money, and she imagined building a home for herself, and she worked out the design, and she decided it was a real possibility, and it was she that decided "I will build my house now, rather than waiting any longer". Her deliberately chosen will, to build that house for herself, motivated and directed her subsequent thoughts and actions as she carried out her intent to build it.

It was her own freely chosen intent that sustained her efforts, from driving the first nail to moving in.

The notion that "Life and the World" possessed the necessary intent, rather than her, is superstitious nonsense. It does not comply with the empirical facts of what was actually determined to happen.

All of this is exactly my point with my example of the architect having to make literally hundreds if not thousands of choices to build the best building possible, and each choice had to be correct in order to bring off the end product. Who designed the building? The architect, of course. DBT thinks the big bang designed it, as if the big bang were sentient, knowledgeable about architeture, and took an interest in a structure being erected more than 10 billion years in the future. I characterized my example as a reductio proving the absurdity of hard determinism, and your carpenter example is the same kind of reductio. Hard determinism is obviously false; more, it is absurd.

 

[bilby]

Hard determinism is a futile and doomed error of reductionism. It's basically like the childish assertion that you don't exist, because you are just atoms.

If you try to define a hard and permanent border that separates "me" from "everything else", you discover that this endeavour is impossible at the atomic scale; The atoms that are "me" change from instant to instant, and over a lifetime, very few specific atoms remain a part of "me". But all material objects are made of atoms, and dualism is wrong, so what is "me"?

The answer is, of course, that "me" is a dynamic pattern of atomic interactions, that is hugely complex, but easily identifiable across the timeline we call "my lifetime". Amongst those patterns are such sub-patterns as "thinking", "choosing", and "posting on web boards"; But any attempt to grasp these human scale phenomena at the atomic scale is utterly futile.

Scale is a critical concept that's frequently overlooked. It's possible to completely understand a system at large scales, without having any concept whatsoever about the underlying small scale structures. That's why it wasn't impossible for humanity to develop metallurgy thousands of years before we had chemistry, and to develop chemistry centuries before we had quantum mechanics.

To declare that choosing is impossible because humans are part of an entirely deterministic universe is to claim that facts at one scale are inseparably important to behaviour at another scale; And the entire history of science and technology is a clearly observable series of demonstrations that that claim is false.

Atoms don't choose, but people do.

Atoms also don't think, breathe, eat, sleep or fart; Yet almost nobody is daft enough to claim that, because humans are nothing other than an arrangement of atoms, they therefore cannot think, breathe, eat, sleep, or fart.

Accepting ad argumentum that atoms (or other substructures that make up a human body, such as neurons, for example) behave in a completely deterministic way, tells us nothing whatsoever about whether humans can make choices - and to expect that it should, or even might, do so is to completely fail to notice the very obvious fact that the properties of reality are completely different at different scales.

If this were not the case, we couldn't have discovered anything at all about reality without first achieving a complete understanding of quantum physics (something which we still haven't managed to attain).

 

[DBT]

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love or that something that may be called 'God' exists.

Actually, defining the utterance "god" as "love", means that "god" exists.

It just means that "god" in this semantic structure is fairly superfluous as a concept and unable to be leveraged as an personal entity.

Again, choice requires the ability to take any of a number of options at any given time, yet your own definition of determinism does not permit alternate actions.

No, choice requires the ability to take any number of options at any given time should the chooser choose to do so. This is a very different proposition to the one you pose.

That's where you go wrong. Consequently, everything that you say following that is based on that very misinterpretation of your own definition of determinism.

If someone is able to take any number of options, it's not determinism. Not as it's defined by you, Marvin or anyone with a basic understanding of the concept.

Simple as that.

Yet again:

''Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

 

[DBT]

Defining God as Love doesn't mean that God is Love

It does to those who subscribe to that definition.

You still haven't got your head round the fact that we give words their meanings (definitions). Words themselves have no intrinsic meaning - meaning is derived exclusively from the use we make of them.

It doesn't matter what they subscribe to. Some subscribe to Flat Earth Cosmology based on their interpretation of the bible, and they have verses to support what they subscribe to. It is written. People believed it. Does that mean the earth is flat? Obviously not.

Just as defining free will as actions performed without force, coercion, etc, really has nothing to do with free will. Not only does it have nothing to do with free will, it has nothing to do with the function of will.