The kind of free will we have

[ruby sparks]

From near the start of the Strawson paper PH linked to:

"I think that the point that it has to make is obvious, and that it has been
underrated in recent discussion of free will - perhaps because it admits
of no answer. I suspect that it is obvious in such a way that insisting on
it too much is likely to make it seem less obvious than it is, given the
innate contrasuggestibility of human beings in general and philosophers
in particular. But I am not worried about making it seem less obvious
than it is so long as it gets adequate attention. As far as its validity is
concerned, it can look after itself. "

and from near the end:

"The present claim, in any case, is simply this: time would be saved,
and a great deal of readily available clarity would be introduced into the
discussion of the nature of moral responsibility, if the simple point that is
established by the Basic Argument were more generally acknowledged
and clearly stated"

In other words, quit waffling, cut the crap, suck it up and get on with it.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites... of Moral Responsibility - Galen Strawson.pdf

Great title too.

 

[PyramidHead]

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

I don't think Strawson is arguing against all notions of responsibility - his target is 'true' or 'ultimate' responsibility.

Strawson says "we cannot be morally responsible in the way that many suppose". This may be true but I'm not at all convinced that this is the way most people view moral responsibility.

Strawson's argument doesn't show that anyone is "wrong about responsibility and how to assign it" (the claim I originally took issue with). It simply shows that some people may not practice what they preach.

Later in the paper, he tries to formulate what a notion of personal responsibility that does not fall prey to the Basic Argument would look like. There really isn't much left to work with beyond 'true' responsibility, except arbitrary responsibility. If a person's intention to do something is exactly as susceptible to their causal influence as the color of their eyes, any assignment of responsibility can only be a matter of the person's good or bad luck. If they had the kind of hereditary/experiential background that engendered morally praiseworthy behavior, they get praised. If their background engendered bad behavior, they get blamed. We can certainly retain moral praise and blame while conceding that it is entirely a matter of circumstance, but there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

 

[PyramidHead]

This quote from p.15 gets at The AntiChris' objection maybe more effectively than I could:

We are what we are, and we cannot be thought to have made ourselves
in such a way that we can be held to be free in our actions in such a
way that we can be held to be morally responsible for our actions in
such a way that any punishment or reward for our actions is ultimately
just or fair. Punishments and rewards may seem deeply appropriate or
intrinsically 'fitting' to us in spite of this argument, and many of the
various institutions of punishment and reward in human society appear
to be practically indispensable in both their legal and non-legal forms.
But if one takes the notion of justice that is central to our intellectual and
cultural tradition seriously, then the evident consequence of the Basic
Argument is that there is a fundamental sense in which no punishment
or reward is ever ultimately just. It is exactly as just to punish or reward
people for their actions as it is to punish or reward them for the (natural)
colour of their hair or the (natural) shape of their faces. The point
seems obvious, and yet it contradicts a fundamental part of our natural
self-conception, and there are elements in human thought that move
very deeply against it. When it comes to questions of responsibility,
we tend to feel that we are somehow responsible for the way we are.
Even more importantly, perhaps, we tend to feel that our explicit self-conscious
awareness of ourselves as agents who are able to deliberate
about what to do, in situations of choice, suffices to constitute us as
morally responsible free agents in the strongest sense, whatever the
conclusion of the Basic Argument.

 

[The AntiChris]

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

Hits the nail cleanly on the head, imo.

In other words, you think the word 'responsibility' has, and never has had, any valid (meaningful) referent (this is similar to DBT and his eliminative attitude to to any referent to the words 'free' or 'freedom' in the other thread). At what point do does it occur to you that you might not be talking about the same thing as the rest of us?

 

[PyramidHead]

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

Hits the nail cleanly on the head, imo.

In other words, you think the word 'responsibility' has, and never has had, any valid (meaningful) referent (this is similar to DBT and his eliminative attitude to to any referent to the words 'free' or 'freedom' in the other thread). At what point do does it occur to you that you might not be talking about the same thing as the rest of us?

It doesn't unless you can define what your word refers to, and explain why it's rational to specially refer to that thing at all, without invoking cultural inertia. Proponents of phlogiston and the luminiferous aether didn't have a leg to stand on by complaining that their opponents were saying those words never referred to anything real; they just had to abandon those ideas. The ideas that replaced them had different implications, and they weren't always able to claim the same things as they did before. That's how life works sometimes.

 

[The AntiChris]

Precisely, and that is exactly what the argument sets out to prove: that no one is responsible for anything. Objecting to the argument on the grounds that it implies its conclusion isn't really an objection!

I don't think Strawson is arguing against all notions of responsibility - his target is 'true' or 'ultimate' responsibility.

Strawson says "we cannot be morally responsible in the way that many suppose". This may be true but I'm not at all convinced that this is the way most people view moral responsibility.

Strawson's argument doesn't show that anyone is "wrong about responsibility and how to assign it" (the claim I originally took issue with). It simply shows that some people may not practice what they preach.

Later in the paper, he tries to formulate what a notion of personal responsibility that does not fall prey to the Basic Argument would look like. There really isn't much left to work with beyond 'true' responsibility, except arbitrary responsibility. If a person's intention to do something is exactly as susceptible to their causal influence as the color of their eyes, any assignment of responsibility can only be a matter of the person's good or bad luck. If they had the kind of hereditary/experiential background that engendered morally praiseworthy behavior, they get praised. If their background engendered bad behavior, they get blamed. We can certainly retain moral praise and blame while conceding that it is entirely a matter of circumstance, but there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

None of this supports the notion that the common sense notion of responsibility is "wrong". It assumes that praise and blame has no causal effect (if it did, the notion of responsibility would entirely make sense) and yet, I assume, you expect that your post will have a causal effect on me (or do you think this response was just a lucky coincidence?).

 

[The AntiChris]

In other words, you think the word 'responsibility' has, and never has had, any valid (meaningful) referent (this is similar to DBT and his eliminative attitude to to any referent to the words 'free' or 'freedom' in the other thread). At what point do does it occur to you that you might not be talking about the same thing as the rest of us?

It doesn't unless you can define what your word refers to, and explain why it's rational to specially refer to that thing at all, without invoking cultural inertia. Proponents of phlogiston and the luminiferous aether didn't have a leg to stand on by complaining that their opponents were saying those words never referred to anything real; they just had to abandon those ideas. The ideas that replaced them had different implications, and they weren't always able to claim the same things as they did before. That's how life works sometimes.

So long as human interactions entail that we know who did what and why, the concept of responsibility will persist. If you have a view of human social interaction where this becomes unnecessary then argue your case.

 

[Speakpigeon]

there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I really only need to repeat myself:

Most people do apply those conditions when assigning responsibility, but they mistakenly believe that the regress of causes terminates at an intentional behavior on the part of the actor. To use EB's words, they assume that this constitutes an "effective cause", the unstated assumption being that there is something causally special about intentional actions that permits (or even necessitates) different treatment from incidental causes like the weather or the ambient lighting.

But there is something special about the way we see other human beings. To ignore this is to ignore we think we know how people work. This would be something as stupid to do as to dismiss our belief that we know how our car work, or how the administration works, or how shopping works. We think we know how people work and so we assign responsibility, and possibly use reward and punishment, as we see fit in the expectation that the offending behaviour will stop. Just think of dogs. They look at us and somehow understand they have their next meal provided for as long as they play along. Not bad. We do something very similar with other people, about all sorts of things but also, in particular, when assigning responsibility.

The problem with this reasoning is that it closes off all discussion about whether responsibility is being reasonably allocated.

Sure, once you start reasoning like Strawson, why no continue and do it about just everything? Simplistic reasoning anyone?

The reality is that we do spend time, energy, manpower and money to question how to assign responsibility. This is a permanent conversation and activity that we have throughout society and every area of life can provide the incentive to engage in this conversation, and that's also true of criminal justice. And yet, very nearly nobody does it on the basis of Strawson's argument. Instead, they do it because they just feel like doing it. And usually, these are people who understand the particular issues of concern in each case and try to improve the way we do things in society. We very nearly all know that's the case. The question is not to apply Strawson and stop assigning responsibility but to improve the way we assign responsibility in a pragmatic way. I guess the main point is that you should try to remember we live in society and that you, too, live in society.
EB

Nothing about tradition in there.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

I really only need to repeat myself:

As I see it, there are two basic flavors of responsibility as most people understand it: (1) intentionally causing something to happen, and (2) being accountable for the results of your choices. Strawson applies to both. The act of causing something to happen is not sufficient for responsibility if that act was itself caused by something I didn't cause to happen. So, not being the cause of any of my acts, I cannot be held accountable for their results.

I can be imprisoned or fined for my acts, but not because I deserve to be, rather because the consequences of being imprisoned/fined are desirable compared to the alternatives. Just because I am not responsible for a string of robberies I committed doesn't mean society would want the robberies to continue, so it's perfectly rational to remove me from society to prevent more robberies, without ever holding me accountable for them. It would be the same thing as removing the ammunition from a gun to prevent a murder, which in no way implies that the ammunition would be held morally responsible for the murder.

EB, you keep saying Strawson's argument does not apply to the ordinary notion of responsibility and I keep giving examples where it does. What do you think is the difference between how most people think of responsibility and the way Strawson's argument uses it? Could you give an example of a case of responsibility being assigned that would not be vulnerable to the argument?

Note: I am not asking for an example of someone ascribing responsibility incorrectly--that would just prove Strawson is right, and whoever is holding somebody responsible would just be wrong (and if they are just following the law, as in your earlier example of a judge, then it would simply be that the law does not reflect what is actually true; nothing very interesting about that, happens all the time).

Our notion of responsibility potentially applies to pretty much everything we do in life. We need to assess every case before we can assign responsibility, but, very often, our assessment is reduced to very nearly a knee-jerk reaction. If you punch me in the face, I will punch you back immediately because I will see you as responsible for the pain I felt. Things get much more protracted in a criminal trial for example but the basic principle seems to remain the same. There's no question there of going back in time to find the ultimate cause of it as Strawson's argument asks us to do. We could do something very nearly like it, and science for example may be regarded as something approaching this, but, broadly, I think we operate under the law of proportionality. You punch me, I punch you. Fraudulent financial schemes and murders seem to justify that we should spend more time, personnel, and money to try and find those responsible. In doing so, we're indeed going back in time, but humans won't ever countenance your infinite regress argument proving nobody is ever responsible of anything. And there are probably good reasons for that. The idea of responsibility is not to find the ultimate true cause of our afflictions but what we could call "the effective cause". If you punch me in the face, there would be no point about me setting up a lengthy investigation to decide what to do. The most effective thing to do is just to punch you back in the face. Again, there's always some assessment to be made, but it will be proportionate. We're not going to go into greater expenses to find an elusive true cause than we've already suffered as a victim. Very often, we don't even do anything. The harm is so little that anything we would do to make sure it doesn't happen again would be too much. A neighbour negligently dropping cigarette's stubs in the stairwell, somebody staying in the way, being rude, whatever. Most of the time, you'll leave it to other people to do something if they want. Everything I see around me in life complies with this analysis. I don't even understand why I need to explain it given it's so bloody obvious.
EB

Nothing about tradition in there.
EB

 

[bilby]

there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

LOL

 

[ruby sparks]

In other words, you think the word 'responsibility' has, and never has had, any valid (meaningful) referent (this is similar to DBT and his eliminative attitude to to any referent to the words 'free' or 'freedom' in the other thread). At what point do does it occur to you that you might not be talking about the same thing as the rest of us?

So long as human interactions entail that we know who did what and why, the concept of responsibility will persist. If you have a view of human social interaction where this becomes unnecessary then argue your case.

No offense, but honestly, it does seem to me that you just miss (or avoid) the point every time. That said, you are the least worst of those (I see as) doing this here, if that's any consolation.

 

[The AntiChris]

In other words, you think the word 'responsibility' has, and never has had, any valid (meaningful) referent (this is similar to DBT and his eliminative attitude to to any referent to the words 'free' or 'freedom' in the other thread). At what point do does it occur to you that you might not be talking about the same thing as the rest of us?

So long as human interactions entail that we know who did what and why, the concept of responsibility will persist. If you have a view of human social interaction where this becomes unnecessary then argue your case.

No offense, but honestly, it does seem to me that you just miss (or avoid) the point every time. That said, you are the least worst of those (I see as) doing this here, if that's any consolation.

Disagreeing with a point, and missing it, can look very similar.

 

[ruby sparks]

No offense, but honestly, it does seem to me that you just miss (or avoid) the point every time. That said, you are the least worst of those (I see as) doing this here, if that's any consolation.

Disagreeing with a point, and missing it, can look very similar.

Ok, but disagreeing with what someone else puts forward is one of the easiest debating positions to take if that's pretty much all you do, and to me it also looks as if all your questioning is a way of avoiding directly addressing the elephant in the room, which you know is there.





(And into the bargain, unless I missed it, the nearest you came to the more difficult job of instead expressing your own point was in the other thread, when, after the writer of a linked article said that while 'technical free will' did not exist, 'practical free will' did, you replied that "practical free will is (your bold) compatibilist free will". But in that article, the writer had said that 'practical free will' was the equivalent of strapping a horn onto the forehead of a horse and calling it a unicorn. So perhaps I should say that I think you are avoiding directly addressing the horse in the room).

 

[Speakpigeon]

there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

LOL

???

What do you mean?

Lord Of Love? Lot Of Lies? Labour Of Love? Lunatics On Line? Lying Out Loud? Loser On Line? Lots Of Liking?

An explanation would be much appreciated.
EB

 

[bilby]

there seems to be little justification for that beyond appealing to tradition (as Speakpigeon does in this thread).

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

LOL

???

What do you mean?

Lord Of Love? Lot Of Lies? Labour Of Love? Lunatics On Line? Lying Out Loud? Loser On Line? Lots Of Liking?

An explanation would be much appreciated.
EB

It's 'laugh out loud'. Using an appeal to tradition to justify your refusal to appeal to tradition is a good joke - in the same vein as "I don't make predictions, and I never shall".

 

[Speakpigeon]

I never appealed to tradition in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.
EB

LOL

???

What do you mean?

Lord Of Love? Lot Of Lies? Labour Of Love? Lunatics On Line? Lying Out Loud? Loser On Line? Lots Of Liking?

An explanation would be much appreciated.
EB

It's 'laugh out loud'. Using an appeal to tradition to justify your refusal to appeal to tradition is a good joke - in the same vein as "I don't make predictions, and I never shall".

It's just a little bit too far-fetched. Tiré par les cheveux.

No, it wasn't "an appeal to tradition". I would certainly not myself describe my point as an appeal to tradition. I doubt you would either use it for yourself.

Less inappropriate words would be "habit" and "custom".

Still less inappropriate would be "disposition of mind", "pattern of behaviour".

But it's nothing of the sort. I'm not following anything. I don't do it and never did it because appeal to tradition has no value to me. And if it ever did, I would do it. It's just... psychology, I guess.

Similarly, I don't think anyone can properly describe the fact that very nearly all human beings consistently choose to ascribe responsibility to the consequences of human acts as a tradition.
EB

tradition
1. the handing down from generation to generation of the same customs, beliefs, etc, esp by word of mouth
2. the body of customs, thought, practices, etc, belonging to a particular country, people, family, or institution over a relatively long period
3. a specific custom or practice of long standing
4. (Ecclesiastical Terms) Christianity a doctrine or body of doctrines regarded as having been established by Christ or the apostles though not contained in Scripture
5. (Judaism) (often capital) Judaism a body of laws regarded as having been handed down from Moses orally and only committed to writing in the 2nd century ad
6. (Islam) the beliefs and customs of Islam supplementing the Koran, esp as embodied in the Sunna
7. (Law) law chiefly Roman law Scots law the act of formally transferring ownership of movable property; delivery

 

[bilby]

LOL

???

What do you mean?

Lord Of Love? Lot Of Lies? Labour Of Love? Lunatics On Line? Lying Out Loud? Loser On Line? Lots Of Liking?

An explanation would be much appreciated.
EB

It's 'laugh out loud'. Using an appeal to tradition to justify your refusal to appeal to tradition is a good joke - in the same vein as "I don't make predictions, and I never shall".

It's just a little bit too far-fetched. Tiré par les cheveux.

No, it wasn't "an appeal to tradition". I would certainly not myself describe my point as an appeal to tradition. I doubt you would either use it for yourself.

Less inappropriate words would be "habit" and "custom".

Still less inappropriate would be "disposition of mind", "pattern of behaviour".

But it's nothing of the sort. I'm not following anything. I don't do it and never did it because appeal to tradition has no value to me. And if it ever did, I would do it. It's just... psychology, I guess.

Similarly, I don't think anyone can properly describe the fact that very nearly all human beings consistently choose to ascribe responsibility to the consequences of human acts as a tradition.
EB

tradition
1. the handing down from generation to generation of the same customs, beliefs, etc, esp by word of mouth
2. the body of customs, thought, practices, etc, belonging to a particular country, people, family, or institution over a relatively long period
3. a specific custom or practice of long standing
4. (Ecclesiastical Terms) Christianity a doctrine or body of doctrines regarded as having been established by Christ or the apostles though not contained in Scripture
5. (Judaism) (often capital) Judaism a body of laws regarded as having been handed down from Moses orally and only committed to writing in the 2nd century ad
6. (Islam) the beliefs and customs of Islam supplementing the Koran, esp as embodied in the Sunna
7. (Law) law chiefly Roman law Scots law the act of formally transferring ownership of movable property; delivery

Whatever; If someone says: "I never did <X> in my whole life, in any shape or form. I'm not going to start here.", then that's going to look a LOT like an appeal to tradition. If <X> is "appealed to tradition", then one is compelled to see that as an attempt at humour.

 

[fast]

I've never really given this "appeal to tradition" idea much thought. (No pun intended)

If I don't, haven't, or won't do something (or do, have, and will), and the reason behind it ties to sentiments of tradition, then that may be an appeal to tradition, but the mere fact with no reason of tradition behind the decision is unlikely an appeal to tradition.

For instance, I haven't slept with a black woman. Even if white people in my area don't do that because it's traditionally not done, the fact itself is not an appeal to tradition. If I offer that as my reason, then that is an appeal to tradition. If I say I have never slept with a black woman because it's mixing races and mixing races is unacceptable, then what's important still is the reason and whether it's tied to sentiments of tradition.

We should do it (whatever it is) because it's always how its been done, then that comes across as an appeal to tradition. Again, it's not that it's traditionally been done this way but whether the reason too (and the reason is what's important) is tied tradition sentiments.

Anyhow, that's my first thoughts on the subject never having discussed it before. Notice my reasoning isn't that it's traditionally taboo to discuss it and offer that reason for why.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes, exactly.

Appeal to tradition
Appeal to tradition is a common fallacy in which a thesis is deemed correct on the basis that it is correlated with some past or present tradition.

The appeal takes the form of "this is right because we've always done it this way."

Being "right" wasn't part of my statement.

And my statement was a statement of fact, not anything like a thesis.
EB