A simple explanation of free will.

[ryan]

I know for myself that every time I intended something to happen, barring intervention, it happened. Every textbook I have ever read about gravity says that gravity and matter are related in a similarly causal way. That's all I meant.

And that is total baloney.

When you intend to move your arm, does it move? When you intend to breath, do you breathe?

 

[Juma]

And that is total baloney.

When you intend to move your arm, does it move? When you intend to breath, do you breathe?

Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.

 

[ryan]

When you intend to move your arm, does it move? When you intend to breath, do you breathe?

Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.

Occam's Razor, are illusions more likely than our observations? They might be, but then even science would have to be under this level of scrutiny. Furthermore, my contention is that free will might exist, not that it is most likely.

 

[Juma]

Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.

Occam's Razor, are illusions more likely than our observations? They might be, but then even science would have to be under this level of scrutiny. Furthermore, my contention is that free will might exist, not that it is most likely.

What observation? Exactly what is it that you "observe"?

 

[ryan]

Occam's Razor, are illusions more likely than our observations? They might be, but then even science would have to be under this level of scrutiny. Furthermore, my contention is that free will might exist, not that it is most likely.

What observation? Exactly what is it that you "observe"?

You said, "Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.". Is it more likely that the observation of the effect from the intention is an "invention", or is it just as likely, if not more likely, that this connection is actually true? With limited models for decision making, why shouldn't we accept the possibility that we have limited free will that initiates the expected effect?

 

[bilby]

Under the "Quantum Probability Introductory Chapter" of http://mypage.iu.edu/~jbusemey/quantum/Quantum Cognition Notes.htm they have,

"This chapter has two related purposes: to generate interest in a
new and fascinating approach to understanding behavioral measures
based on quantum probability principles, and to introduce
and provide a tutorial of the basic ideas in a manner that is interesting
and easy for social and behavioral scientists to understand." .

The rest goes into more detail.

This is far from true.

That's no argument. Try to describe evolution or animal behaviour in terms of QM, for example.

Why do you have to keep taking this idea to the extreme. Obviously I know that much of what we are and how we behave is limited to classical mechanics.

Being the quantum states may be controlling the quantum states.

Oh, for heavens sake...where do you fit into this picture? Where and how does your so called free will come into play? Something that has no apparent control of QM or classical physics!

The agent with free will behaves as QM does.

This is, of course, a valueless observation. EVERYTHING behaves as QM does.

You may as well point out that 'The agent with free will behaves as General Relativity does', and posit a relativistic explanation for free will.

"Look, when that guy jumped off a skyscraper, he accelerated towards the Earth, exactly as we would expect if his decision was based on GR!"

 

[Kharakov]

The idea of the Boogie Man has had a direct influence upon your response.

And what does this have to do with the discussion?

The detection of QM phenomena has magnified the impact of those phenomena to classical levels, which is why they are present in this discussion about QM phenomena and their impact upon will.

Of course QM phenomena impact will. I tend to think that the combined QM phenomena is best expressed classically.

Yeah well that doesn't agree with the math of quantum cognition.

Something could be a function of only QM like the life or death of Schrodinger's cat. We don't know enough about the brain to rule out QM; that is all I have been arguing to DBT about.

Hmm. I suppose if you think your consciousness is so sensitive that a single electron moving 10^-43 inches to the left is going to affect it...

 

[ryan]

The idea of the Boogie Man has had a direct influence upon your response.

And what does this have to do with the discussion?

The detection of QM phenomena has magnified the impact of those phenomena to classical levels, which is why they are present in this discussion about QM phenomena and their impact upon will.

Of course QM phenomena impact will. I tend to think that the combined QM phenomena is best expressed classically.

Yeah well that doesn't agree with the math of quantum cognition.

Something could be a function of only QM like the life or death of Schrodinger's cat. We don't know enough about the brain to rule out QM; that is all I have been arguing to DBT about.

Hmm. I suppose if you think your consciousness is so sensitive that a single electron moving 10^-43 inches to the left is going to affect it...

What about trillions of electrons doing that?

 

[Juma]

What observation? Exactly what is it that you "observe"?

You said, "Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.". Is it more likely that the observation of the effect from the intention is an "invention", or is it just as likely, if not more likely, that this connection is actually true? With limited models for decision making, why shouldn't we accept the possibility that we have limited free will that initiates the expected effect?

Because it isnt needed to explain what is observed.
Because it is not logically consistent.

 

[Kharakov]

The idea of the Boogie Man has had a direct influence upon your response.

And what does this have to do with the discussion?

The detection of QM phenomena has magnified the impact of those phenomena to classical levels, which is why they are present in this discussion about QM phenomena and their impact upon will.

Of course QM phenomena impact will. I tend to think that the combined QM phenomena is best expressed classically.

Yeah well that doesn't agree with the math of quantum cognition.

Something could be a function of only QM like the life or death of Schrodinger's cat. We don't know enough about the brain to rule out QM; that is all I have been arguing to DBT about.

Hmm. I suppose if you think your consciousness is so sensitive that a single electron moving 10^-43 inches to the left is going to affect it...

What about trillions of electrons doing that?

Well, it's well below the Planck length, by a few orders of magnitude. So... what about it? I don't think it would even be detectable.

 

[ryan]

You said, "Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.". Is it more likely that the observation of the effect from the intention is an "invention", or is it just as likely, if not more likely, that this connection is actually true? With limited models for decision making, why shouldn't we accept the possibility that we have limited free will that initiates the expected effect?

Because it isnt needed to explain what is observed.

I can say the same thing about calling it an illusion.

 

[ryan]

Well, it's well below the Planck length, by a few orders of magnitude. So... what about it? I don't think it would even be detectable.

Does the flap of a butterfly wing need to be strong to cause a hurricane?

Let me cut to the chase; look into quantum cognition.

 

[Juma]

Well, it's well below the Planck length, by a few orders of magnitude. So... what about it? I don't think it would even be detectable.

Does the flap of a butterfly wing need to be strong to cause a hurricane?

Let me cut to the chase; look into quantum cognition.

If a butterly causes a hurricane then anythibg causes the hurricane. Dont really believe that the mind works like that, do you?

 

[DBT]

Under the "Quantum Probability Introductory Chapter" of http://mypage.iu.edu/~jbusemey/quantum/Quantum Cognition Notes.htm they have,

"This chapter has two related purposes: to generate interest in a
new and fascinating approach to understanding behavioral measures
based on quantum probability principles, and to introduce
and provide a tutorial of the basic ideas in a manner that is interesting
and easy for social and behavioral scientists to understand." .

The rest goes into more detail.

Ryan, simply giving a link to a line of research that's in its infant stage, still being highly speculative, doesn't support your proposition. Nor are researchers able to explain evolution using quantum equations (which break down at macro scale), which consequently can't be used to explain or predict human/animal thought and behaviour. You are clutching at straws.

But let's say that it is quantum conditions (wave collapse, expression or whatever) generate and determine the movements/motions of all macro scale objects...therefore all of your thoughts and actions: you still have absolutely no regulative control of how wavicles/particles evolve probabilistically over time. Being a puppet to quantum evolution, you have no free will, your thoughts, decisions and actions being played out on a quantum scale.

It's a dead end for your proposition of quantum free will.

 

[DBT]

Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.

Occam's Razor, are illusions more likely than our observations? They might be, but then even science would have to be under this level of scrutiny. Furthermore, my contention is that free will might exist, not that it is most likely.

It's been discussed at length in many threads. Gazzaniga's 'Narrator function' - Delgado's brain stimulation experiments where the researcher initiated a physical action through brain stimulation, to which the subjects 'narrator function' constructed a reason for the action.

Furthermore:
"A lot of the early work in this field was on conscious decision making, but most of the decisions you make aren't based on conscious reasoning," says Pouget. "You don't consciously decide to stop at a red light or steer around an obstacle in the road. Once we started looking at the decisions our brains make without our knowledge, we found that they almost always reach the right decision, given the information they had to work with."

''Subjects in this test performed exactly as if their brains were subconsciously gathering information before reaching a confidence threshold, which was then reported to the conscious mind as a definite, sure answer. The subjects, however, were never aware of the complex computations going on, instead they simply "realized" suddenly that the dots were moving in one direction or another. The characteristics of the underlying computation fit with Pouget's extensive earlier work that suggested the human brain is wired naturally to perform calculations of this kind.''

 

[Togo]

You said, "Your body moves it arm and "you" invent a reason why.". Is it more likely that the observation of the effect from the intention is an "invention", or is it just as likely, if not more likely, that this connection is actually true? With limited models for decision making, why shouldn't we accept the possibility that we have limited free will that initiates the expected effect?

Because it isnt needed to explain what is observed.

Actually, it is. Explaining human behaviour in a level of detail necessary to get useful predictions involves mental states, intentional behaviour, and most of the bag and baggage associated with conscious decision making. While people are of course free to hypothesise that one day we may be able to explain human behaviour without such things, at the moment, we can't. We still need mental states and intentions to model the full scope of what people do and how they behave.

One of the standard arguments against eliminative materialism is that it attempts to remove existing scientific models without replacing them.

Because it is not logically consistent.

What is it inconsistent with? I would have thought the only thing it's inconsistent with is determinism. Holding that as an a priori belief isn't really grounds to declare something else illogical, nor is it inconsistent to fail to support a belief that was never held in the first place.

We need to get out of the habit of using precise terms such as 'inconsistent' or 'irrelevant' without saying what they are inconsistent with, or to what topic they fail to be relevant. Otherwise you're just pushing an a priori belief, like a bible basher who claims that something is irrelevant because it's not in the Bible, or inconsistent with Christian beliefs.

 

[Togo]

Occam's Razor, are illusions more likely than our observations? They might be, but then even science would have to be under this level of scrutiny. Furthermore, my contention is that free will might exist, not that it is most likely.

It's been discussed at length in many threads. Gazzaniga's 'Narrator function' - Delgado's brain stimulation experiments where the researcher initiated a physical action through brain stimulation, to which the subjects 'narrator function' constructed a reason for the action.

Furthermore:
"A lot of the early work in this field was on conscious decision making, but most of the decisions you make aren't based on conscious reasoning," says Pouget. "You don't consciously decide to stop at a red light or steer around an obstacle in the road. Once we started looking at the decisions our brains make without our knowledge, we found that they almost always reach the right decision, given the information they had to work with."

''Subjects in this test performed exactly as if their brains were subconsciously gathering information before reaching a confidence threshold, which was then reported to the conscious mind as a definite, sure answer. The subjects, however, were never aware of the complex computations going on, instead they simply "realized" suddenly that the dots were moving in one direction or another. The characteristics of the underlying computation fit with Pouget's extensive earlier work that suggested the human brain is wired naturally to perform calculations of this kind.''

Still violates Occam's Razor though. Pouget is proposing that many decisions are made unconsciously, and explained in conscious terms afterwards. That's fine, and an entirely sensible approach for tasks that we don't care about, don't show any of the performance characteristics of consciously controlled behaviour, and over which we don't in practice exercise any control. But demonstrating that we don't use conscious decision making for all tasks, doesn't in itself mean that consciousness is never used in making decisions. Insisting that consciousness appears to predict our actions, accompanies many of our actions, tracks precisely what we do in our actions, and even changes the performance characteristics of our actions, but never in fact plays any part in our actions, is still as thorough a violation of Occam's Razor as might reasonably be imagined.

 

[Juma]

Because it isnt needed to explain what is observed.

Actually, it is. Explaining human behaviour in a level of detail necessary to get useful predictions involves mental states, intentional behaviour, and most of the bag and baggage associated with conscious decision making. While people are of course free to hypothesise that one day we may be able to explain human behaviour without such things, at the moment, we can't. We still need mental states and intentions to model the full scope of what people do and how they behave.
.

Of course. But we do not need libertarian free will.

 

[Juma]

Because it is not logically consistent.

What is it inconsistent with? I would have thought the only thing it's inconsistent with is determinism. Holding that as an a priori belief isn't really grounds to declare something else illogical, nor is it inconsistent to fail to support a belief that was never held in the first place.

We need to get out of the habit of using precise terms such as 'inconsistent' or 'irrelevant' without saying what they are inconsistent with, or to what topic they fail to be relevant. Otherwise you're just pushing an a priori belief, like a bible basher who claims that something is irrelevant because it's not in the Bible, or inconsistent with Christian beliefs.

I have explained how lfw is logically inconsistent so many times that i have lost count...
But in short: either your decisions are rational or random. If they are rational they are not free.

 

[Togo]

Actually, it is. Explaining human behaviour in a level of detail necessary to get useful predictions involves mental states, intentional behaviour, and most of the bag and baggage associated with conscious decision making. While people are of course free to hypothesise that one day we may be able to explain human behaviour without such things, at the moment, we can't. We still need mental states and intentions to model the full scope of what people do and how they behave.
.

Of course. But we do not need libertarian free will.

Nor do we need illusory will. That hasn't stopped you from promoting it.

What is it inconsistent with? I would have thought the only thing it's inconsistent with is determinism. Holding that as an a priori belief isn't really grounds to declare something else illogical, nor is it inconsistent to fail to support a belief that was never held in the first place.

We need to get out of the habit of using precise terms such as 'inconsistent' or 'irrelevant' without saying what they are inconsistent with, or to what topic they fail to be relevant. Otherwise you're just pushing an a priori belief, like a bible basher who claims that something is irrelevant because it's not in the Bible, or inconsistent with Christian beliefs.

I have explained how lfw is logically inconsistent so many times that i have lost count...

Did you just count every time you trotted out the same explanation, or how many times people agreed with your explanation and acknowledged it's relevance?

But in short: either your decisions are rational or random.

Nonsense. Yesterday I bought a chicken dinner, and then didn't eat it. That's not rational in any useful sense, but nor was it random.

I suspect what you mean is that 'determined' decisions can not be 'free' as per LFW, which just means you're condemning LFW for being inconsistent with determinism.

If they are rational they are not free.

Why not?

Your argument appears to rest on an a priori belief that rational decision making can not by definition form a part of libertarian free will. Do have a way of demonstrating that rational decisions can not possibly be free, in the sense used in LFW?

Let's take an example. I'm reading a book. A TV program comes on. I like the TV program, I like the book. I could choose to read, or to watch the TV. Both of these appear to be entirely rational decisions. Why can't they be 'free', as per LFW?