A simple explanation of free will.

[bilby]

Don't be stupid; read what I responded to.

This is similar to my response. In this analogy, A is the "thought" or "action" that was affected by QM. Suppose random QM event affects A, and A has to respond. But if A is also random in nature, then A still has its own freedom/randomness. So I keep trying to tell DBT that A would have its own QM, unless we talking about some kind of duality which I don't we are.

How can randomness (of any kind), which is necessarily unguided (or it isn't random), possibly produce freedom of will?

Do you have any idea how many times you have asked this same question? Every time you ask it I answer, then you go away for a week and eventually build back up to it again. This really is going to be the last time for you.

Nothing about what I say produces free will; it is simply an interpretation of the nature of matter and consciousness. If our choices are at all a function of QM, or in other words, are probabilistic in nature, then what ever the possible outcomes are is the freedom we have.

What fucking 'freedom we have'?

It is a spatial freedom from its indeterminable behavior.

From where does this freedom come? You admit that you haven't said yet. So say.

No, I said that nothing produces free will. The free will is inherent to small systems within larger processes that we call decision making processes.

Small systems within larger processes don't have will, free or otherwise. If nothing produces free will (and I agree, nothing does), then there is no free will.

 

[ryan]

Don't be stupid; read what I responded to.

This is similar to my response. In this analogy, A is the "thought" or "action" that was affected by QM. Suppose random QM event affects A, and A has to respond. But if A is also random in nature, then A still has its own freedom/randomness. So I keep trying to tell DBT that A would have its own QM, unless we talking about some kind of duality which I don't we are.

How can randomness (of any kind), which is necessarily unguided (or it isn't random), possibly produce freedom of will?

Do you have any idea how many times you have asked this same question? Every time you ask it I answer, then you go away for a week and eventually build back up to it again. This really is going to be the last time for you.

Nothing about what I say produces free will; it is simply an interpretation of the nature of matter and consciousness. If our choices are at all a function of QM, or in other words, are probabilistic in nature, then what ever the possible outcomes are is the freedom we have.

What fucking 'freedom we have'?

It is a spatial freedom from its indeterminable behavior.

From where does this freedom come? You admit that you haven't said yet. So say.

No, I said that nothing produces free will. The free will is inherent to small systems within larger processes that we call decision making processes.

Small systems within larger processes don't have will, free or otherwise. If nothing produces free will (and I agree, nothing does), then there is no free will.

Think of will as the ability to choose something. Then add in a random variable to allow for freedom.

 

[bilby]

Don't be stupid; read what I responded to.

This is similar to my response. In this analogy, A is the "thought" or "action" that was affected by QM. Suppose random QM event affects A, and A has to respond. But if A is also random in nature, then A still has its own freedom/randomness. So I keep trying to tell DBT that A would have its own QM, unless we talking about some kind of duality which I don't we are.

How can randomness (of any kind), which is necessarily unguided (or it isn't random), possibly produce freedom of will?

Do you have any idea how many times you have asked this same question? Every time you ask it I answer, then you go away for a week and eventually build back up to it again. This really is going to be the last time for you.

Nothing about what I say produces free will; it is simply an interpretation of the nature of matter and consciousness. If our choices are at all a function of QM, or in other words, are probabilistic in nature, then what ever the possible outcomes are is the freedom we have.

What fucking 'freedom we have'?

It is a spatial freedom from its indeterminable behavior.

From where does this freedom come? You admit that you haven't said yet. So say.

No, I said that nothing produces free will. The free will is inherent to small systems within larger processes that we call decision making processes.

Small systems within larger processes don't have will, free or otherwise. If nothing produces free will (and I agree, nothing does), then there is no free will.

Think of will as the ability to choose something. Then add in a random variable to allow for freedom.

How the fuck does adding a random variable 'allow for' freedom?

Adding a random variable adds randomness. Freedom and randomness are not synonymous.

 

[ryan]

How the fuck does adding a random variable 'allow for' freedom?

Adding a random variable adds randomness. Freedom and randomness are not synonymous.

If a robot had free will to either turn left or turn right, wouldn't the outcome appear to be random?

 

[rousseau]

Free will exists because whenever I believe it doesn't exist I get tripped out.

 

[bilby]

How the fuck does adding a random variable 'allow for' freedom?

Adding a random variable adds randomness. Freedom and randomness are not synonymous.

If a robot had free will to either turn left or turn right, wouldn't the outcome appear to be random?

Perhaps it might, if we had no knowledge of how it made its decision.

But if a robot was designed to move randomly, it would not thereby acquire free will.

Your argument is based on a fallacious assumption that if A gives the appearance of B, then B causes A. That is nonsense.

 

[ryan]

If a robot had free will to either turn left or turn right, wouldn't the outcome appear to be random?

Perhaps it might, if we had no knowledge of how it made its decision.

But if a robot was designed to move randomly, it would not thereby acquire free will.

Your argument is based on a fallacious assumption that if A gives the appearance of B, then B causes A. That is nonsense.

That is absolutely correct. Part of my argument has always been that if free will exists, then it may appear random. But I have never said that randomness implies free will.

Perceived randomness, I argue, is a property of free will. Combine that with an obvious difference between coerced will and the feeling of control (free will), then I have to say that it is a reasonable possibility.

I only argue that free will is possible.

 

[bilby]

Perhaps it might, if we had no knowledge of how it made its decision.

But if a robot was designed to move randomly, it would not thereby acquire free will.

Your argument is based on a fallacious assumption that if A gives the appearance of B, then B causes A. That is nonsense.

That is absolutely correct. Part of my argument has always been that if free will exists, then it may appear random. But I have never said that randomness implies free will.

Perceived randomness, I argue, is a property of free will. Combine that with an obvious difference between coerced will and the feeling of control (free will), then I have to say that it is a reasonable possibility.

I only argue that free will is possible.

Then you agree that a teapot orbiting the sun between Mars and Jupiter is possible?

Should we use this possibility as the basis for our future actions, or are we better served by discarding the 'possibility' because it is a valueless distraction?

Insofar as unpredictability of behaviour 'might' imply freedom of will, there remains no mechanism by which freedom of will can be caused by the mere adding of unpredictable inputs to the cognitive process.

QM uncertainty could, possibly, lead to unpredictable behaviour; and unpredictable behaviour could, possibly be a consequence of freedom of will. But there is no way for QM uncertainty to lead to freedom of will. None at all.

 

[ryan]

Insofar as unpredictability of behaviour 'might' imply freedom of will, there remains no mechanism by which freedom of will can be caused by the mere adding of unpredictable inputs to the cognitive process.

QM uncertainty could, possibly, lead to unpredictable behaviour; and unpredictable behaviour could, possibly be a consequence of freedom of will. But there is no way for QM uncertainty to lead to freedom of will. None at all.

If my will/actions have the freedom of QM, then my will is ...

 

[bilby]

Insofar as unpredictability of behaviour 'might' imply freedom of will, there remains no mechanism by which freedom of will can be caused by the mere adding of unpredictable inputs to the cognitive process.

QM uncertainty could, possibly, lead to unpredictable behaviour; and unpredictable behaviour could, possibly be a consequence of freedom of will. But there is no way for QM uncertainty to lead to freedom of will. None at all.

If my will/actions have the freedom of QM, then my will is ...

Random.

It gets dark if you put your head under the blankets. At night, it gets dark. This does not allow us to conclude that nighttime is caused by putting our heads under the blankets.

Your logic is broken.

 

[ryan]

If my will/actions have the freedom of QM, then my will is ...

Random.

It gets dark if you put your head under the blankets. At night, it gets dark. This does not allow us to conclude that nighttime is caused by putting our heads under the blankets.

Your logic is broken.

The typical feature of free will that I keep reading is for the ability of a person to have made a different choice than the choice that was made.

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck ...

 

[bilby]

Random.

It gets dark if you put your head under the blankets. At night, it gets dark. This does not allow us to conclude that nighttime is caused by putting our heads under the blankets.

Your logic is broken.

The typical feature of free will that I keep reading is for the ability of a person to have made a different choice than the choice that was made.

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck ...

Have you ever heard the phrase 'necessary but not sufficient'?

The first number drawn in the lottery last week was 25. Any number between 1 and 45 could have been drawn. This, unsurprisingly, doesn't give the lottery machine that draws the numbers free will.

You have successfully demonstrated that some randomness could be introduced to our decision making process. That you can't see the MASSIVE gulf between this and the idea of free will is truly sad.

 

[ryan]

The typical feature of free will that I keep reading is for the ability of a person to have made a different choice than the choice that was made.

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck ...

Have you ever heard the phrase 'necessary but not sufficient'?

The first number drawn in the lottery last week was 25. Any number between 1 and 45 could have been drawn. This, unsurprisingly, doesn't give the lottery machine that draws the numbers free will.

You have successfully demonstrated that some randomness could be introduced to our decision making process. That you can't see the MASSIVE gulf between this and the idea of free will is truly sad.

Free will: "On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

 

[bilby]

Have you ever heard the phrase 'necessary but not sufficient'?

The first number drawn in the lottery last week was 25. Any number between 1 and 45 could have been drawn. This, unsurprisingly, doesn't give the lottery machine that draws the numbers free will.

You have successfully demonstrated that some randomness could be introduced to our decision making process. That you can't see the MASSIVE gulf between this and the idea of free will is truly sad.

Free will: "On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Indeed. So not 'randomness' then. Quantum or otherwise.

There seem to be exactly zero reasons to include quantum effects (or any other sources of random noise) in any explanation of free will.

 

[ryan]

Free will: "On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Indeed. So not 'randomness' then. Quantum or otherwise.

There seem to be exactly zero reasons to include quantum effects (or any other sources of random noise) in any explanation of free will.

If our decision making process has many options by way of QM, then why is it that our actions agree with what we intend? Why should the randomness of QM agree with our intentions? Seems like quite the coincidence, don't ya think?

 

[bilby]

Indeed. So not 'randomness' then. Quantum or otherwise.

There seem to be exactly zero reasons to include quantum effects (or any other sources of random noise) in any explanation of free will.

If our decision making process has many options by way of QM, then why is it that our actions agree with what we intend? Why should the randomness of QM agree with our intentions? Seems like quite the coincidence, don't ya think?

I don't know; you are the one who is saying that free will would look random. If you are now coming to the realisation that this is a rather silly idea, then all I can say is that you are very late to the party.

That our actions agree with what we intend is a good reason to believe that your hypothesis that randomness (quantum or otherwise) is involved is deeply flawed.

One plausible hypothesis - that has the advantage of not leading to an obvious contradiction - is that intent is developed as a post-hoc rationale for actions taken.

 

[ryan]

If our decision making process has many options by way of QM, then why is it that our actions agree with what we intend? Why should the randomness of QM agree with our intentions? Seems like quite the coincidence, don't ya think?

That our actions agree with what we intend is a good reason to believe that your hypothesis that randomness (quantum or otherwise) is involved is deeply flawed.

Perceived randomness from other observers, it is not random for the agent.

One plausible hypothesis - that has the advantage of not leading to an obvious contradiction - is that intent is developed as a post-hoc rationale for actions taken.

We assumed QM as part of the process of the intention. We assume that the decision has not been determined until the intention is made.

 

[bilby]

That our actions agree with what we intend is a good reason to believe that your hypothesis that randomness (quantum or otherwise) is involved is deeply flawed.

Perceived randomness from other observers, it is not random for the agent.

One plausible hypothesis - that has the advantage of not leading to an obvious contradiction - is that intent is developed as a post-hoc rationale for actions taken.

We assumed QM as part of the process of the intention. We assume that the decision has not been determined until the intention is made.

What's all this 'we' business, paleface?

 

[ryan]

Perceived randomness from other observers, it is not random for the agent.

One plausible hypothesis - that has the advantage of not leading to an obvious contradiction - is that intent is developed as a post-hoc rationale for actions taken.

We assumed QM as part of the process of the intention. We assume that the decision has not been determined until the intention is made.

What's all this 'we' business, paleface?

Never mind all of that; I was tired.

If I remember correctly, you are a physicalist. So whatever mechanisms that are involved in the decision making process, is the decision making process. Like water becomes part of a plant, QM would be part of the decision making process.

Now, if you want to go down the road that has a mind being affected by QM and the decision making process, then you have a case, but you would also have dualism, specifically parallism. Like many other things in philosophy, it is possible. But what seems most possible?

 

[Kharakov]

Free will exists because whenever I believe it doesn't exist I get tripped out.

So, how do you will (intend) something without having a pre-existing goal based on your experiences?