According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[DBT]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

Compatibilism is the claim that free will is compatible with determinism.

Whether the idea of free will is compatible with determinism, or not, depends on the given definition of free will and how that relates to determinism as compatibilists define it.

 

[bilby]

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.

Then I heartily recommend that you avoid the Religious Texts forum

 

[Politesse]

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.

Then I heartily recommend that you avoid the Religious Texts forum

I know, I know, but I keep going back for more punishment. It's a pathology.

 

[Jarhyn]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

If the positions are indistinguishable, why distinguish them?

I have no interest in defending DBTs arguments for them.

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.

Because hard determinists and libertarians both tend to use the term in a way that implies hard determinism, and that assumes free will requires magical contra-causality, and excludes the compatibilist position.

It's a distinction so as to say "determinists, but ones who have a functional model of wills and freedoms".

 

[Politesse]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

If the positions are indistinguishable, why distinguish them?

I have no interest in defending DBTs arguments for them.

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.

Because hard determinists and libertarians both tend to use the term in a way that implies hard determinism, and that assumes free will requires magical contra-causality, and excludes the compatibilist position.

It's a distinction so as to say "determinists, but ones who have a functional model of wills and freedoms".

What is functional about arbitrarily attaching prescientific labels to physiological processes?

 

[Jarhyn]

You're throwing a fit because someone wrote a book about determinism, but are also unable to meaningfully distinguish your position from determinism, except by saying vague, fiddly things like "the brain is part of the deterministic stream ... that determines its own outputs". What physical, observable process are you describing here?

Sigh. I am not ”throwing a fit.” I thought I was having a conversation. I seems you are determined to turn it into some kind of confrontation. I have no interest in that.

Let me try again. Please read carefully.

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

Got that? Finally?

Now, why don‘t you ask DBT what physical, observable processes HE is describing? You know, the process that allegedly makes a person choosing who to marry, what job to take, and what to do with the rest of his or her life, indistinguishable from a rock rolling down a hill. The process that means an improv jazz musician didn’t actually create his piece. I mean, seriously. He’s the one advancing an absurdity, not me.

Finally, if you wish to have a reasonable conversation about this topic, I will engage with you. If not, I won’t. Your choice.

If the positions are indistinguishable, why distinguish them?

I have no interest in defending DBTs arguments for them.

I'm rapidly losing interest in a thread ostensibly about a book, but one that no one has read or plans to read.

Because hard determinists and libertarians both tend to use the term in a way that implies hard determinism, and that assumes free will requires magical contra-causality, and excludes the compatibilist position.

It's a distinction so as to say "determinists, but ones who have a functional model of wills and freedoms".

What is functional about arbitrarily attaching prescientific labels to physiological processes?

Because they are important terms when discussing the concept of responsibility and the assignment is not arbitrary; people mean to discuss something specific and real when they seek to discuss freedom and their wills and whether their wills are free given some precondition which is yet to be determined by later events.

This draws the connection between the concept and the process and the other aspects concerning the ethics of some situation.

 

[Politesse]

people mean to discuss something specific and real when they seek to discuss freedom and their wills and whether their wills are free given some precondition which is yet to be determined by later events.

See, with this I agree. But what they usually mean is something very much contrary to a deterministic universe.

 

[The AntiChris]

Compatibilism is not “distinguished” from determinism. Compatibilism IS determinism.

I think I know what you're trying to say but what you say here is going to confuse a lot of people (compatibilism is not simply determinism in the literal sense).

 

[Jarhyn]

people mean to discuss something specific and real when they seek to discuss freedom and their wills and whether their wills are free given some precondition which is yet to be determined by later events.

See, with this I agree. But what they usually mean is something very much contrary to a deterministic universe.

More, they simply don't understand determinism vs fatalism and instead commit logical errors.

It's not contrary to a deterministic universe, but the logical error is made so often by some that it makes me wonder if there is a naturally occuring inability to process certain abstractions that is going on here; see also the trebuchet/pin example. It's not complicated but some people just cannot seem to recognize that you can discuss facts about something independent of it's ostensible environment.

Like, I'm talking straight up "they're the same picture" or "doesn't look like anything to me" levels of blindness happen around this problem and I find it truly bizarre.

After all, people can claim morality comes from 'god' as much as they claim free will comes from contra-causal events, but both views are based on a flawed understanding that doesn't make any sense in the first place as posed by their respective believers. People can be right about there being a moral rule (or something satisfying "free will") while being wrong about where it comes from.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilists give their own definition of determinism, which provides the conditions of the system and how it works, including its implications. Some compatibilists attempt to bypass the terms that they have given by invoking 'possible worlds.' where someone 'could have done differently had conditions been different.' etcetera.

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilists give their own definition of determinism, which provides the conditions of the system and how it works, including its implications. Some compatibilists attempt to bypass the terms that they have given by invoking 'possible worlds.' where someone 'could have done differently had conditions been different.' etcetera.

No, we don't, we have the same definition that mathematicians use.

In fact in a previous thread, I do recall telling you exactly how you, for yourself, can use simulation to create a world where the rules are the same and the conditions are different (or where the rules are the same but examined at a different location), and that this simulative environment is all that is necessary to analyze "could, IF", because the rules of physics are not illusory.

You took that and apparently forgot all about it.

 

[DBT]

Compatibilists give their own definition of determinism, which provides the conditions of the system and how it works, including its implications. Some compatibilists attempt to bypass the terms that they have given by invoking 'possible worlds.' where someone 'could have done differently had conditions been different.' etcetera.

No, we don't, we have the same definition that mathematicians use.

I have quoted the given definitions, yours, Marvins, Pood and others.

In fact in a previous thread, I do recall telling you exactly how you, for yourself, can use simulation to create a world where the rules are the same and the conditions are different (or where the rules are the same but examined at a different location), and that this simulative environment is all that is necessary to analyze "could, IF", because the rules of physics are not illusory.

You took that and apparently forgot all about it.

Anything may happen in realm of dreams and imagination, you can fly, Superman leaps tall buildings, Spiderman shoots web and swings through city streets, Green Lantern, talking Ducks and Mickey Mouse, where the laws of physics don't apply in fiction, and what is imagined in flights of fancy is not real.

When compatibilists define determinism, it's in relation to fiction or imagination, but the physical world and how it works causal determinism, where past states determine current states, and current states determine future states of the system. Which includes whatever you happen to imagine, be it science fiction, comic book hero's, gods and goblins, witches or wizards......

 

[Jarhyn]

Anything may happen in realm of dreams and imagination, you can fly, Superman leaps tall buildings, Spiderman shoots web and swings through city streets, Green Lantern, talking Ducks and Mickey Mouse, where the laws of physics don't apply in fiction, and what is imagined in flights of fancy is not real.

Indeed, and it doesn't have to be "real" (although the simulation itself has to be "real" in the sense that the simulated environment has been generated as a sub-environment to the larger system).

All that is required is that the simulation enforces the same general rules while looking away from whatever bullshit nonsense you believe about the necessity of some aspects of the initial condition.

Indeed, my experience has a different initial condition than yours. They are related conditions, but they are not the same, single condition. Every point in the universe in fact has a different initial condition, so claiming anything is necessary about initial conditions is a bit spurious.

Rather the expectation is that in the mind, as you point out, the initial condition is no more necessary there than the token of superman being left on the "ground" of the hypothalamus because "gravity". It doesn't have to be "real" on the same layer of reality for the simulation to really be there and really be calculating what would happen.

Indeed there are all manners of infinite systems we have shown allow separation of some initial condition from the process by which determinations are made from that condition.

You could as easily ask "at the logically necessary location of the universe where a trebuchet appears in a hard vacuum with a pin in it, what happens in contrast to the location where a very similar trebuchet, similar in all aspects, wherein there is no pin appears?"

Even in a single world where somehow the same initial condition leads to a different configuration at all points within the system, the concept of "if" still has meaning, and allows the selection and exploration of non-illusory contingents.

It will never be the case that "I could have fired the trebuchet if I had pulled the pin" be rendered false from my not having pulled the pin, because yet again it is a recognition of what happens at ANY location containing some configuration, without actually needing to have any location contain that configuration; it is a discussion about physics, not some just-so configuration of stuff.

The rules of physics are not illusory, and there is nothing "necessary" of the initial condition to their function. They can be applied to superman in the hypothalamus as easily as they may be ignored, and the logic works out all the same.

 

[DBT]

Anything may happen in realm of dreams and imagination, you can fly, Superman leaps tall buildings, Spiderman shoots web and swings through city streets, Green Lantern, talking Ducks and Mickey Mouse, where the laws of physics don't apply in fiction, and what is imagined in flights of fancy is not real.

Indeed, and it doesn't have to be "real" (although the simulation itself has to be "real" in the sense that the simulated environment has been generated as a sub-environment to the larger system).

The simulation is real, the video, the comic, the fiction is real. But the content, Superman flying through the air, is not. There is no Superman who flies though the air in this world.

All that is required is that the simulation enforces the same general rules while looking away from whatever bullshit nonsense you believe about the necessity of some aspects of the initial condition.

Fiction has no bearing on how the world works. The fictional Superman flying through the air is not relevant to how compatibilists define determinism or free will.

Instead of dealing with the compatibilist definition of free will as it relates to their definiton of determinism, you are trying to run in all directions to escape the implications.

There is your bullshit.

Indeed, my experience has a different initial condition than yours. They are related conditions, but they are not the same, single condition. Every point in the universe in fact has a different initial condition, so claiming anything is necessary about initial conditions is a bit spurious.

Everyone begins life with a different set of conditions. And everyone is also a part of the overall system, their region, nation, culture, language, education socioeconomic circumstances, etc, of which you are in no way separate from, which if deterministic, as compatibilists define it, relates to free will as compatibilists define free will.

That is the issue. And the reason why your persistent dodging, weaving and dancing around the point does not help establish free will as compatibilists define it.

That's all I have time for, the rest is just more repetitive padding.

 

[Jarhyn]

The simulation is real, the video, the comic, the fiction is real. But the content, Superman flying through the air, is not. There is no Superman who flies though the air in this world.

And yet there is a "superman" who "flies" through the "air" of the part of the world which is the hosting system of the hippocampus, where the rules of physics may be applied as easily as they are left off of it, and where it is clear that the deterministic system that is the application of those rules on some initial condition allows considering the effects of different initial conditions.

One of the nice things about Last Thursdayism and it's non-disprovability is that it's not entirely useless as a mindset, insofar as it reveals that the current moment is as much a valid initial condition, and because there is no preferred reference frame, different points of actual time can be compared as different initial conditions logically, because all conditions are valid as possible initial conditions.

Not only can we imagine to produce different initial conditions, we can as much observe that the infinite variance across time and space also allow us to exercise the same idea.

 

[DBT]

The simulation is real, the video, the comic, the fiction is real. But the content, Superman flying through the air, is not. There is no Superman who flies though the air in this world.

And yet there is a "superman" who "flies" through the "air" of the part of the world which is the hosting system of the hippocampus, where the rules of physics may be applied as easily as they are left off of it, and where it is clear that the deterministic system that is the application of those rules on some initial condition allows considering the effects of different initial conditions.

There is a fictional character, the story of Superman who comes from a fictional world called Krypton, who flies through the air, but there is no Krypton and no Superman who flies through the air in this world. Fantasy is not reality. Fantastic things imagined in fantasy do not apply to the physical world and how it works.

The compatibilist definition of determinism applies not to fantasy world, but our physical world and how it works.

Not only can we imagine to produce different initial conditions, we can as much observe that the infinite variance across time and space also allow us to exercise the same idea.

What you may imagine and what you may simulate in code, video, special effects, art, literature, etc, has no bearing on how compatibilists define free will in relation to determinism (how our physical world works).

Invoking fiction and fantasy doesn't help you establish compatibility.

 

[Jarhyn]

The simulation is real, the video, the comic, the fiction is real. But the content, Superman flying through the air, is not. There is no Superman who flies though the air in this world.

And yet there is a "superman" who "flies" through the "air" of the part of the world which is the hosting system of the hippocampus, where the rules of physics may be applied as easily as they are left off of it, and where it is clear that the deterministic system that is the application of those rules on some initial condition allows considering the effects of different initial conditions.

There is a fictional character, the story of Superman who comes from a fictional world called Krypton, who flies through the air, but there is no Krypton and no Superman who flies through the air in this world. Fantasy is not reality. Fantastic things imagined in fantasy do not apply to the physical world and how it works.

The compatibilist definition of determinism applies not to fantasy world, but our physical world and how it works.

Not only can we imagine to produce different initial conditions, we can as much observe that the infinite variance across time and space also allow us to exercise the same idea.

What you may imagine and what you may simulate in code, video, special effects, art, literature, etc, has no bearing on how compatibilists define free will in relation to determinism (how our physical world works).

Invoking fiction and fantasy doesn't help you establish compatibility.

You're not even actually managing to argue any of my points about the separation of state and process, so you're not actually saying anything useful or making any real claims, you're at this point just waving your arms around, failing to understand, and claiming your failure to understand makes you right.

My point is that nobody needs any sort of magical whole alternality to create alternalities of limited scopes, because as you point out, "fictions" don't need to be bound to the laws of physics but neither does anything prevent them from being so bound, and so nothing prevents us from learning "what would happen if" of any given precondition, because the initial condition of the universe is different everywhere, we can logically contemplate the effects of those differences, and understand from that what actions and states need to happen to result in a postcondition so as to actually reach that postcondition by generating said preconditions before the opportunity has passed.

The gateway is no less a gateway for being latched and closed and never opened. The trebuchet is no less such that "if you pull the pin it would fire" for not pulling the pin, because those qualities are not imaginary, even if the imagination is what allows you to discover the properties.

 

[DBT]

The simulation is real, the video, the comic, the fiction is real. But the content, Superman flying through the air, is not. There is no Superman who flies though the air in this world.

And yet there is a "superman" who "flies" through the "air" of the part of the world which is the hosting system of the hippocampus, where the rules of physics may be applied as easily as they are left off of it, and where it is clear that the deterministic system that is the application of those rules on some initial condition allows considering the effects of different initial conditions.

There is a fictional character, the story of Superman who comes from a fictional world called Krypton, who flies through the air, but there is no Krypton and no Superman who flies through the air in this world. Fantasy is not reality. Fantastic things imagined in fantasy do not apply to the physical world and how it works.

The compatibilist definition of determinism applies not to fantasy world, but our physical world and how it works.

Not only can we imagine to produce different initial conditions, we can as much observe that the infinite variance across time and space also allow us to exercise the same idea.

What you may imagine and what you may simulate in code, video, special effects, art, literature, etc, has no bearing on how compatibilists define free will in relation to determinism (how our physical world works).

Invoking fiction and fantasy doesn't help you establish compatibility.

You're not even actually managing to argue any of my points about the separation of state and process, so you're not actually saying anything useful or making any real claims, you're at this point just waving your arms around, failing to understand, and claiming your failure to understand makes you right.

You haven't really made a point.

What you imagine to be points are in fact evasions, where you try to circumvent the terms of free will in relation to determinism as the compatibilist defines it.

I have pointed this out time and again.

My point is that nobody needs any sort of magical whole alternality to create alternalities of limited scopes, because as you point out, "fictions" don't need to be bound to the laws of physics but neither does anything prevent them from being so bound, and so nothing prevents us from learning "what would happen if" of any given precondition, because the initial condition of the universe is different everywhere, we can logically contemplate the effects of those differences, and understand from that what actions and states need to happen to result in a postcondition so as to actually reach that postcondition by generating said preconditions before the opportunity has passed.

It's irrelevant.

It's irrelevant because, given the terms of compatibilism as provided by the compatibilist, including yours, what you imagine in terms of fictional worlds, Batman living in Gotham city, etc, are inevitable mental events, where brain activity is not exempt from the evolution of the system. Which must include what you learn from your imaginary worlds.

If determined (as defined by the compatibilist), not only are we not prevented from speculating 'what would happen if...." but it is inevitable that we do.

There is nothing to prevent what must happen.

The gateway is no less a gateway for being latched and closed and never opened. The trebuchet is no less such that "if you pull the pin it would fire" for not pulling the pin, because those qualities are not imaginary, even if the imagination is what allows you to discover the properties.

You are running in another direction.

Keep in mind....''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.* that given a deterministic system, not only are there no constraints to keep us from doing what we want, it is inevitable that we do what we want if so determined by the evolution of the system: the world, our environment, our personal circumstances, mental and physical makeup, etcetera.

* Cold Comfort in Compatibilism article.

 

[pood]

I’ve skipped over the recent posts because they’ve become repetitive and increasingly inane.

To sum up: hard determinism is a quasi-religious doctrine which holds that the whole history of the world is pre-determined. As such, the big bang writes jazz improv pieces, erects beautiful building, writes magnificent novels, and so on. It takes the place of the Calvinistic God in this belief system.

Nor is there any fallacy of the excluded middle in the forgoing, as DBT has claimed. His own logic leads inevitably to the conclusion that we are all helpless meat puppets of the big bang.

DBT and other hard determinists repeatedly commit the modal fallacy, as has been demonstrated so many times I’m not going to repeat myself. Charging compatibilists with the same fallacy is a new one that DBT cooked up recently, a real howler. I imagine he did it because even he gets tired of cribbing arguments off the internet, and decided for once to say something in his own words. It backfired spectacularly.

Hard determinists say that “we could not have done other than what we did.” Given that there is only one history, this straightforwardly collapses to, “we did not do, other than what we did,” a content-free tautology.

Every day, we are confronted with genuine choices. The hard determinist must not only repudiate all logic (modal fallacy) but deny the clear evidence of his/her own senses and mind to hold to the fiction that we never have any true choices.

Our brains are part of the deterministic stream. It inputs determined antecedents and outputs determined results — more commonly known as “choices.”

This isn’t a libertarian view, either — another false charge that DBT leveled against me. Libertarianism espouses a dualistic view that we are somehow completely uninfluenced by the past, that all our choices arise ex nihilo. No compatibilist argues that way, and I have never argued that way. But I guess DBT needed something to say.

Maybe I’ll peek in from time to time to see if something other than the same old bilge is on offer from hard determinists. Until then, yawn.

 

[DBT]

DBT and other hard determinists repeatedly commit the modal fallacy, as has been demonstrated so many times I’m not going to repeat myself. Charging compatibilists with the same fallacy is a new one that DBT cooked up recently, a real howler. I imagine he did it because even he gets tired of cribbing arguments off the internet, and decided for once to say something in his own words. It backfired spectacularly.

False, rather than presenting an argument for compatibilism, you offer just another lament that's riddled with accusations and denial.

The modal fallacy lies with the compatibilist, who defines the terms for determinism and free will, then proceeds to ignore the key points of their definition, or invoking 'possible worlds' when alternate possibilities do not apply to the given terms (no alternate actions possible in determinism)

Hard determinists say that “we could not have done other than what we did.” Given that there is only one history, this straightforwardly collapses to, “we did not do, other than what we did,” a content-free tautology.

Hilarious. That is defined in the definition of determinism given by compatibilists, including you with 'constant conjunction.'

You must understand the implications of constant conjunction? Or that determinism is defined by events being determined by initial conditions setting the evolution of events into motion, each event leading inevitably to the next in 'constant conjunction?'

That is your definition of determinism, the compatibilist definition. The difference for 'hard determinists' lies simply in pointing out that the compatibilist definition of free will not sufficient to prove the proposition, resulting in a quagmire of evasion, (the reasons have been given too many times)

Every day, we are confronted with genuine choices. The hard determinist must not only repudiate all logic (modal fallacy) but deny the clear evidence of his/her own senses and mind to hold to the fiction that we never have any true choices.

Given determinism, we are presented with any number of options....and given the compatibilists given terms for determinism it is the state of and condition of the decision maker that determines the selection that is made in any given instance in time.

To claim otherwise is to negate the very terms that the compatibilist himself gives. In other words, if any option can be realized at any given times, it is simply not determinism as you define it to be.

Our brains are part of the deterministic stream. It inputs determined antecedents and outputs determined results — more commonly known as “choices.”

This isn’t a libertarian view, either — another false charge that DBT leveled against me. Libertarianism espouses a dualistic view that we are somehow completely uninfluenced by the past, that all our choices arise ex nihilo. No compatibilist argues that way, and I have never argued that way. But I guess DBT needed something to say.

Maybe I’ll peek in from time to time to see if something other than the same old bilge is on offer from hard determinists. Until then, yawn.

You are all over the place. As our brains are a part of the deterministic stream, our brain can only be in a state that is determined by the system at any point in its progress from past to present and future...which is not a choice, which in turn determines the option that is taken at any point in the evolution of the deterministic stream.

And yes, this is extremely repetitive, excruciatingly repetitive, because no matter how many times it is pointed out that it is the compatibilist who sets the terms for determinism, someone tries to circumvent them.

There lies the modal fallacy, laid squarely at the feet of the compatibilist.