Demystifying Determinism

[bilby]

There is no selection because the pathway is fixed. Choice by definition requires the possibility of taking a different option.

No, it doesn't. Choice requires uncertainty about which option will be chosen.

A fixed pathway only prevents choice when that pathway is know in advance, and known to be fixed in advance.

Otherwise, choice is the necessary mechanism by which the fixed pathway is traversed. Hence the waiter's confusion if you refuse to tell him your order on the grounds that your decision is immutable.

It's not sufficient that it be immutable; It must also be chosen. That's a step you cannot skip, even if the god's eye view sees that there's no alternate pathway.

 

[DBT]

Choice within a deterministic system is being claimed.

Of course. Choice within a deterministic system is as real as walking within a deterministic system, or brushing our teeth within a deterministic system, or any other event that we objectively observe to be happening. All of these events are actually happening in empirical reality.

Events that are fixed before they happen is not choice. Each and every event must happen, not as chosen, but as determined through a progression of events fixed by antecedents. Which are not open to negotiation, modification or subject to will, wish, hope or desire.

Insisting that this is choice or free will is absurd.

What you describe is not choice, not as it is normally defined. The word choice is being asserted, an imposition.

We open the restaurant menu, consider the many things that we can order, and select the one thing that we will order. Selecting one thing from many is defined as "choosing". Moving forward using our legs and shifting our weight from one to the other is defined as "walking". Applying toothpaste to a toothbrush and rubbing it against the inside and outside surfaces of our teeth is defined as "brushing our teeth".

Given determinism as you define it, what we do, we do necessarily. Every instance of contemplation is itself set by antecedents and leads to a single inevitable action.

That is the point. Not that complex actions cannot happen, but that they happen as they must.

There's nothing complicated or mysterious about these simple empirical events. And, we may assume that each of them is reliably caused by prior events in the natural course of events. So, none of these events is contradicted by determinism.

Not merely 'reliably caused' but fixed by all prior states of the system. Non chosen states entailing non chosen states entailing non chosen states until the system runs down to its inevitable conclusion.

That is how you define determinism.

Causal necessity is not a single mechanism. It is the collection of all of the causal mechanisms. We cannot pretend that choosing is not happening any more than we can pretend that walking or brushing our teeth isn't happening.

The pretense is that the fixed progression of events of the system are a matter of choice.


''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

I don't pretend. I stay within the bounds of the given terms and references. It is the compatibilist who seeks to circumvent the terms and conditions by redefining the nature of freedom and choice...

Freedom is the ability to do something we want to do. Choosing is us deciding what we will do. When we choose for ourselves what we will do while free of coercion and undue influence, it is called "a freely chosen 'I will'" or simply "free will".

What we want to do is subject to the same inexorable process of determining action. Every step in the process of forming a want is fixed by numerous inputs and elements of which we are unaware of, and lack the agency to alter.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.'' - Cold Comfort in Compatibilism

 

[DBT]

There is no selection because the pathway is fixed.

This is false. We have extant phenomena of there being a superposition of states prior to an interaction event and only one of those states being expressed in the interaction.

It's how you defined determinism. It's how compatibilists define determinism.

No deviation. No randomness. No alternatives. There is only one state being expressed because, set by the prior states of the system, it is the only possible state the system can be in: each and every step in its evolution having no alternatives, no randomness, no alternatives.

Even if the pathway as to which one is expressed is fixed, it is still a selection.

It's not a choice. There is no possibility of an alternate action. The system doesn't operate on the principle of 'oh, look, we have action x or action y, do I take this or that, why, gosh I think this time, just for a change, I'll go with y.''

It is simply this event, then that event, no deviation, no choosing, no free will at work, pure causality. Past state determines present state which determines future state, based on the initial conditions of the system and how it develops ever after.

Choice or free will in determinism? The very notion is laughable.

 

[DBT]

There is no selection because the pathway is fixed. Choice by definition requires the possibility of taking a different option.

No, it doesn't. Choice requires uncertainty about which option will be chosen.

There is no uncertainty in the development of a deterministic system or its progression of events. Uncertainty is a mental state that lacks the necessary information about the evolution of events.

As there is no possibility of taking an alternate action within a deterministic system, our uncertainty formed by ignorance has no bearing on our inability to choose an alternate action.

A fixed pathway only prevents choice when that pathway is know in advance, and known to be fixed in advance.

There are no pathways that are not fixed. This is determinism. If you can play with it, modify its set progression of events, it is not determinism and we drift into Libertarian territory.

Otherwise, choice is the necessary mechanism by which the fixed pathway is traversed. Hence the waiter's confusion if you refuse to tell him your order on the grounds that your decision is immutable.

You place your order according to your environment, proclivities and brain state in the moment, regardless. The waiter is not there to argue determinism or free will. What you tell the waiter is determined by what is going on in your head at the time. Because what you order or say to the waiter is fixed, as per the terms of determinism, events simply progress as they must.

It's not sufficient that it be immutable; It must also be chosen. That's a step you cannot skip, even if the god's eye view sees that there's no alternate pathway.

By definition, it is set by antecedents, not chosen. Events in the external world alter the brain in specific ways as it acquires information and responds as determined, not chosen.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Events that are fixed before they happen is not choice. Each and every event must happen, not as chosen, but as determined through a progression of events fixed by antecedents. Which are not open to negotiation, modification or subject to will, wish, hope or desire.
Insisting that this is choice or free will is absurd.

Insisting that the people in the restaurant are not choosing what they will order for dinner is absurd. We saw them walk in the door. We saw them sit at a table. We saw them open the menu. We saw them considering their options. We saw them tell the waiter what they would have for dinner.

The walking, the sitting, the opening, the considering, the choosing, the telling the waiter, all actually happened, right there in front of us.

It is absurd to say that the choosing did not happen. There were many things on the menu but only one meal was ordered. Choosing is the operation that selects one thing from many things. Choosing happened. If it didn't, then no one would have ordered dinner!

Want to know how any of these choices were made? Ask the customer who made the choice. "I saw the juicy Steak and thought I might have that for dinner. But then I remembered that I had bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch. So I decided to order the Salad for dinner instead of the Steak, because I needed more fruits and vegetables in my daily diet".

Was any of this changed by the fact of deterministic causal necessity? Nope. If we like, we can trace the history of the restaurant and the current menu they are offering today. And, we can trace the history of the customer, their genetic need for food to survive, their current health goals and how those were influenced by parents, schools, peers, culture, and their physician. There are plenty of causal chains that lead up to the person being who and what they are at the time they entered the restaurant. So, we have no lack of antecedent causes.

But it remains a fact that the customer actually did make a choice. And deterministic causal necessity assured that the customers themselves would be making those specific choices for themselves, in that specific place and time. And that they would be making these choices while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, which is all that "of their own free will" implies.

So, compatibilism, the assertion that deterministic causal necessity and free will are compatible concepts, is true.

... That is the point. Not that complex actions cannot happen, but that they happen as they must.

Yes. And sometimes actions must happen because we must choose to make them happen of our own free will. Free will is not about freedom from what must necessarily happen. Free will is about freedom from coercion and undue influence while choosing what we will do. It is not about freedom from deterministic causal necessity.

Consider the nature of free will as described in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Free Will:

2. The Nature of Free Will
2.1 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
As should be clear from this short discussion of the history of the idea of free will, free will has traditionally been conceived of as a kind of power to control one’s choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two common (and compatible) answers are: (i) up to her in the sense that she is able to choose otherwise, or at minimum that she is able not to choose or act as she does, and (ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her action.

When she enters a restaurant, she necessarily chooses a meal from the restaurant's menu, and conveys to the waiter what she will have for dinner. She is able to choose the juicy Steak but she is also able to choose the Salad. We know that she will choose the salad. But we also know that she had the ability to choose the Steak. What she is able to choose is not limited to what she will choose. And that satisfies the first sense: "(i) up to her in the sense that she is able to choose otherwise, or at a minimum that she is able not to choose or act as she does". Although she did not choose the Steak, she was able to choose it and also able to reject it.

And it is also clear that it was "(ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her action". It was she, herself, that chose to reject the Steak that she could have ordered (but rejected due to the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch), and instead decide to order the Salad.

The waiter, who took her order, recognized that she was "the source of her action". He brings the Salad and sets it on the table in front of her, and no one else, and leaves the dinner bill that she is responsible to pay before leaving.

That is the nature of free will and its relation to responsibility.

 

[Jarhyn]

No deviation. No randomness. No alternatives

No alternalities.

There is a very significant difference.

One says "alternate realities", and the other says objects of a set that may not be returned as the subset yielded by a choice function.

And here "may" means "some in this set shall..." Not "all shall". Just some. Which ones?

The ones determined by the nature of the operating choice function!!!

 

[DBT]

Events that are fixed before they happen is not choice. Each and every event must happen, not as chosen, but as determined through a progression of events fixed by antecedents. Which are not open to negotiation, modification or subject to will, wish, hope or desire.
Insisting that this is choice or free will is absurd.

Insisting that the people in the restaurant are not choosing what they will order for dinner is absurd. We saw them walk in the door. We saw them sit at a table. We saw them open the menu. We saw them considering their options. We saw them tell the waiter what they would have for dinner.

I don't insist. I am merely pointing out that given the terms of determinism as you define it, whatevr the people in the restaurant order, they must necessarily order.

This is according to the very terms you expressed when you said;

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.

Of course determinism is not so much 'as if fixed by natural law' but 'fixed as a matter of natural law.'

Nor does it mean that people in the restaurant are unable to place their orders, but that the each and every order that is placed, is placed necessarily, it must be placed precisely as determined.

Determined is the opposite of chosen. Determinism, by definition, sets all present and future actions.

The walking, the sitting, the opening, the considering, the choosing, the telling the waiter, all actually happened, right there in front of us.

It's called performing actions. We can all act. We can all do things, we can order meals, go for a walk....but the point is that if we live in a deterministic world, it all happens necessarily, which means it can't be otherwise, which means set by antecedents, proclivities, and the state of the system as it evolves without alternate actions or choice.

It is absurd to say that the choosing did not happen. There were many things on the menu but only one meal was ordered. Choosing is the operation that selects one thing from many things. Choosing happened. If it didn't, then no one would have ordered dinner!

You are conflating action with choice. Because the action is freely carried out as determined - we see people going about their business without undue restriction - doesn't mean that alternate actions were possible.

The point is both outer and inner necessity, that things cannot be different, that nobody could have done otherwise, that the system evolves without deviation, randomness or selection of options, ie, nothing else is possible, what is done must be done.....and this is - if the world is deterministic - regardless of how we perceive events through the filter of our far from complete information about the state of the world and its objects and events as it transitions from past to present and future.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

And of course the use of the word 'decision' does not mean that it was a choice. 'No other decision or action' negates choice and reduces decisions to necessary actions.

 

[Jarhyn]

I don't insist. I am merely pointing out that given the terms of determinism as you define it, whatevr the people in the restaurant order, they must necessarily order.

This is according to the very terms you expressed when you said;

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.

Of course determinism is not so much 'as if fixed by natural law' but 'fixed as a matter of natural law.'

Nor does it mean that people in the restaurant are unable to place their orders, but that the each and every order that is placed, is placed necessarily, it must be placed precisely as determined

None of that actually implies that the order wasn't chosen by the people at the restaurant placing their orders.

You are trying to imply that because they are caused, that they are not also causal, that a->b->c is only a->c, so as to ignore the b in the middle.

Choice happens by fixed process with regards to any given event of choice, and only yields the one answer of the choice function for the inputs.

The point is that some choice functions can be modified by other choice functions upon the function of the choice function...

The tube of marbles whose choice function is "lifo.pop()" can be modified for instance to be a valve which implements "fifo.pop()".

If there is a human "tube of marbles" whose choice function on some particular thing is LIFO, and good outcomes only come from FIFO, then another of their choice functions can choose on the LIFO process and modify it to FIFO.

This is what responsibility is: recognizing humans who don't or can't self-correct, trying to teach them how to do this, and failing that, keeping them far away from the people who they harm with their failures in that regard

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I am merely pointing out that given the terms of determinism as you define it, whatever the people in the restaurant order, they must necessarily order.

And I am merely pointing out that, given the terms of determinism, the people in the restaurant must necessarily choose what they will order from a menu of items that they can order.

Of course determinism is not so much 'as if fixed by natural law' but 'fixed as a matter of natural law.'

It is actually a figurative claim, as the author of the SEP article on Causal Determinism explains in section 2.4 Laws of Nature:

In the loose statement of determinism we are working from, metaphors such as “govern” and “under the sway of” are used to indicate the strong force being attributed to the laws of nature. Part of understanding determinism—and especially, whether and why it is metaphysically important—is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature.

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical.

I love the irony when he says, "it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical". But, of course, it is metaphorical. The Earth does not consult a legal text in order to know how to orbit the Sun. The gravity between the mass of the two objects and the current trajectory assures that the orbit continues. All of the causation is accomplished by the actual objects and the actual forces between them.

And it is important to keep in mind that all events that take place in the physical universe are caused by actual objects and forces. Because, we happen to be one of those objects, which, by our nature as living organisms of an intelligent species, goes about in the world causing things to happen, and doing so for our own goals and our own reasons. When we act, we are forces of nature, felling trees, building houses, etc. Hurricanes and tornadoes also knock over trees, and our houses. We build them again, because, well, it is what we choose to do.

The metaphor "laws of nature" is used to convey the reliability of the behavior of the objects and forces themselves. It is AS IF they were following laws. But they are just doing what they naturally do.

Nor does it mean that people in the restaurant are unable to place their orders, but that the each and every order that is placed, is placed necessarily, it must be placed precisely as determined.

Fortunately, no one ever experiences determinism as you describe it. You are assigning causal agency to determinism and suggesting that
it is an object that exercises control, like us, but instead of us. This is a superstitious notion.

No one experiences causal necessity itself, because what we will "necessarily" do by deterministic causal necessity is exactly identical to us just being us, doing what we choose to do. It is not like someone forcing us to do something against our will. It is our own will, as it is naturally formed by our own choices.

Determined is the opposite of chosen.

No, determinism is the opposite of indeterminism. All actions that actually take place in the real world, including choosing, must be included in causal determinism. Every action is both an effect and a cause. The restaurant menu causes us to make a choice, our choice causes the waiter to bring us our dinner and the bill. It's just things happening as they normally happen.

Determinism, by definition, sets all present and future actions.

It is superstitious nonsense to suggest that determinism actually does anything. It doesn't do anything. Determinism neither causes nor determines anything. Determinism is nothing more than a comment asserting that the behavior of all of the objects and forces are perfectly reliable and can be accounted for through an understanding of how they are caused and what effects they have.

... We can all do things, we can order meals, go for a walk....but the point is that if we live in a deterministic world, it all happens necessarily, which means it can't be otherwise, which means set by antecedents, proclivities, and the state of the system as it evolves without alternate actions or choice.

So, determinism does not eliminate our ability to order a meal and our ability to go for a walk, but somehow eliminates our ability to choose whether to have dinner now or go for a walk first? I don't think so. All of these actions that we can take would be equally determined by antecedents, equally subject to our natural proclivities, and consistent with the "state of the system as it evolves".

You cannot say that there are no "alternate actions or choice" when we encounter these alternatives every day in the normal course of our lives and are routinely required to make choices between the different things that we can do.

The determinism you describe does not agree with the way that events actually evolve. So, it must be false.

You are conflating action with choice.

I am simply pointing out that choosing, like walking, is a real action that actually happens in the real world. We cannot deny choosing any more than we can deny walking.

Because the action is freely carried out as determined - we see people going about their business without undue restriction - doesn't mean that alternate actions were possible.

"Alternate" actions are possible by definition. Declaring an action to be an "alternate" logically entails that some other action is also possible. "I can have dinner now or later" are alternate actions. And they will cause us to make a choice.

The point is both outer and inner necessity, that things cannot be different, that nobody could have done otherwise...

It is always true that people could have done otherwise. It is never true that people would have done otherwise.

And of course the use of the word 'decision' does not mean that it was a choice. 'No other decision or action' negates choice and reduces decisions to necessary actions.

I cannot believe that you accuse compatibilists of "wordplay" after such a statement. Making a decision is choosing from multiple things that we can do, the single thing that we will do. Deciding and choosing are the same action.

 

[DBT]

No deviation. No randomness. No alternatives

No alternalities.

There is a very significant difference.

No 'alternalities' leaves you with no alternatives. In other words, whatever you do - order a meal, go for a run, buy an ice-cream - you do necessarily, fixed, no alternate actions possible. That is the no choice principle of determinism.

One says "alternate realities", and the other says objects of a set that may not be returned as the subset yielded by a choice function.

There are no known alternate realities, no ''alternalities.'' The alternate realities that are constructed in stories are purely fictional.

And here "may" means "some in this set shall..." Not "all shall". Just some. Which ones?

The ones determined by the nature of the operating choice function!!!

Nah, you base your conclusion on flawed premises, imaginary 'alternalities,' semantics, misrepresentation of the terms and references of determinism.

 

[DBT]

I am merely pointing out that given the terms of determinism as you define it, whatever the people in the restaurant order, they must necessarily order.

And I am merely pointing out that, given the terms of determinism, the people in the restaurant must necessarily choose what they will order from a menu of items that they can order.

It's wrong. Choice requires the possibility of taking a different option, which of course is not permitted by the terms of your definition of determinism.

You are insisting that actions fixed by antecedents are a matter of choice when clearly, given how choice is defined, it is not a matter of choosing. It is entailment.

Of course determinism is not so much 'as if fixed by natural law' but 'fixed as a matter of natural law.'

It is actually a figurative claim, as the author of the SEP article on Causal Determinism explains in section 2.4 Laws of Nature:

It is how determinism is defined. You yourself have defined it precisely in that way, which I have quoted numerous times.

If the definition is merely figurative, you can imagine it to be anything you like, add a dollop of randomness, a pint of probability, a dash of free will....gosh, make up the rules as you go along....well, why not, it's just figurative!

In the loose statement of determinism we are working from, metaphors such as “govern” and “under the sway of” are used to indicate the strong force being attributed to the laws of nature. Part of understanding determinism—and especially, whether and why it is metaphysically important—is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature.

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical.

I love the irony when he says, "it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical". But, of course, it is metaphorical. The Earth does not consult a legal text in order to know how to orbit the Sun. The gravity between the mass of the two objects and the current trajectory assures that the orbit continues. All of the causation is accomplished by the actual objects and the actual forces between them.

''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein

And it is important to keep in mind that all events that take place in the physical universe are caused by actual objects and forces. Because, we happen to be one of those objects, which, by our nature as living organisms of an intelligent species, goes about in the world causing things to happen, and doing so for our own goals and our own reasons. When we act, we are forces of nature, felling trees, building houses, etc. Hurricanes and tornadoes also knock over trees, and our houses. We build them again, because, well, it is what we choose to do.

What you tend to brush over is what you call 'choosing' is also subject to the same process of necessitation as every other event within the system, that every incremental step in the decision-making process is fixed by prior states, neural architecture, inputs, memory and must lead to an inevitable conclusion: the determined thought process culminating in the inevitable action.

That is not choosing. That is natural necessity at work, a process caused by 'actual objects and forces.'

Actual objects, events and forces over which our will has no agency, being not the master but the product.

Hence, free will is incompatible with determinism.

How you think and what you do is an expression of who you are, your non-chosen physical and mental makeup.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

 

[bilby]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about?

Because chaotic systems are like that. Inevitability doesn't preclude choice, where the inevitable isn't knowable prior to its being chosen.

And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Sure, but only because the No Choice Principle is not so much a principle, as it is overly simplistic horseshit.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Choice requires the possibility of taking a different option, which of course is not permitted by the terms of your definition of determinism.

The "possibility of taking a different option" does not require that we actually take that option. It is something that we can do, not something that we must do.

If a possibility were something that we must do, then we would order every item on the menu whenever we went to the restaurant!

The menu is a list of the things that we can order, not a list of things that we will order.

You are insisting that actions fixed by antecedents are a matter of choice when clearly, given how choice is defined, it is not a matter of choosing. It is entailment.

You are insisting that choosing is not fixed by antecedents, while I point to the people reading the menu and choosing what they will order. The choosing is just as entailed as the walking in, the sitting at a table, the opening of the menu, the deciding what we will order and telling our choice to the waiter.

The walking, sitting, opening, deciding, and telling are all equally entailed by causal determinism.

If the definition is merely figurative, you can imagine it to be anything you like, add a dollop of randomness, a pint of probability, a dash of free will....gosh, make up the rules as you go along....well, why not, it's just figurative!

You've missed the point. A figurative claim is empirically false. We can compare the claim to what we observe is actually happening and immediately detect that it is not literally (actually, objectively, in reality) true.

For example, the claim that choosing is not happening in the restaurant is false. We're looking at it, as it is actually happening, and we cannot deny what we see with our own eyes.

And the claim that entailment means there is only one possible action is false. We are looking at the restaurant menu listing the many possible items we can order for dinner. The fact that only one of them will be ordered does not change the fact that any one of them can be be ordered.

How did incompatibilists get from describing things that are happening to describing things that are obviously not happening? By figurative thinking.

But we who care about the truth of things are the ones who challenge false claims.

It is probably impossible to speak without some figurative language, as many of our descriptive words are drawn from analogies. For example, I'm attempting to "rein in" figurative language to conform more to actual usage and actual meanings (as if figurative statements were a horse out of control).

''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all. So would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, watching man and his doings, smile about man's illusion that he was acting according to his own free will.'' - Albert Einstein

There you have Einstein arguing figuratively by a very tenuous analogy. But the main problem is that Einstein is using "freedom from causal necessity" as his definition of free will. He is trapped in the paradox created by that definition, which leads people to say some pretty silly things. For example, Einstein also said this:

"In a sense, we can hold no one responsible. I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will. ... Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community, I must act as if man is a responsible being."

Page 114 of "The Saturday Evening Post" article "What Life Means to Einstein" "An Interview by George Sylvester Viereck" (Oct 26, 1929)

He tells us that despite his belief that free will and responsibility cannot exist he must still act as if they did exist. It is a fine example of an "incoherent" position.

What you tend to brush over is what you call 'choosing' is also subject to the same process of necessitation as every other event within the system, that every incremental step in the decision-making process is fixed by prior states, neural architecture, inputs, memory and must lead to an inevitable conclusion: the determined thought process culminating in the inevitable action.

Nothing is "brushed over" or ignored. Every brain event, every thought and feeling, that happens within the choosing process is also causally necessary from any prior point in time.

What you are brushing over is that among these inevitable brain events you will find every possibility on the menu that the brain considered as it went about deciding what we would order for dinner. Each possibility was an inevitable mental event. And there were many possibilities that showed up for consideration in that inevitable chain of events!

That is not choosing. That is natural necessity at work, a process caused by 'actual objects and forces.'

Obviously natural necessity includes choosing as a real causal mechanism, just like it includes walking, talking, and chewing gum. So, it is false to claim that it is not choosing when it actually is choosing that is happening.

Actual objects, events and forces over which our will has no agency, being not the master but the product.

The will is an event. Like every other event, it is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

It's 5pm, time to go home, and I'm hungry. This causes me to consider how I might get my dinner tonight. Will I go out to a restaurant or will I go home and fix something myself? I have two things that I can choose to do. I decide that I will go out to a restaurant. My will to go the the restaurant has just been caused by prior events.

That will to have dinner at the restaurant now causes subsequent events. It causes me to get in my car, drive to the restaurant, walk in the door, sit at a table, open the menu, choose what I will order, tell the waiter what I will have. This dinner order then causes the waiter to take my order to the chef, who prepares my meal. The meal being ready causes the waiter to bring it to my table along with the bill I must pay on my way out.

The will is an event. Like every other event, it is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

As to who is the "master" of these events, the world would correctly have us believe that it is the person who placed the order, because that is the person to whom the waiter hands the bill for the dinner.

Hence, free will is incompatible with determinism.

The incompatibilist makes this claim based upon a false definition of "free will", a lack of understanding what a "will" actually is, and a flaky notion of what deterministic causal necessity is actually about.

Free will is not a choice free of causal necessity. It is simply a choice that is free of coercion and undue influence.

A person's will is not some free floating spirit, it is a person's intention to actually do something specific.

Deterministic causal necessity is not some puppet master that robs us of our freedom and control, it is nothing more than the assertion that our behavior is mostly reliably caused by us, according to our own goals and reasons, and by our own choices. We, like all other events, were reliably caused by prior events and will reliably cause subsequent events by our own choosing.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Sorry, but I have to go with the great philosopher Bilby on this one: "the No Choice Principle is not so much a principle, as it is overly simplistic horseshit." - Bilby

 

[DBT]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about?

Because chaotic systems are like that. Inevitability doesn't preclude choice, where the inevitable isn't knowable prior to its being chosen.

We are not talking about a chaotic system that is not deterministic. The issue is the compatibility of the notion of free will with determinism as compatibilists define it.

And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Sure, but only because the No Choice Principle is not so much a principle, as it is overly simplistic horseshit.

Nah....the terms of how a deterministic system works, as it is defined, excludes choice, just as choice is defined.


Hence the No choice principle of determinism.

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

That's all. Simple. Elegant. True to the given definitions.

Sorry, compatibilism doesn't work.
.

 

[DBT]

The "possibility of taking a different option" does not require that we actually take that option. It is something that we can do, not something that we mus
He tells us that despite his belief that free will and responsibility cannot exist he must still act as if they did exist. It is a fine example of an "incoherent" position.

A figure of speech. We act as we must, what we perceive to be choices is the illusion of choice.

Hence, ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that.....''

What you tend to brush over is what you call 'choosing' is also subject to the same process of necessitation as every other event within the system, that every incremental step in the decision-making process is fixed by prior states, neural architecture, inputs, memory and must lead to an inevitable conclusion: the determined thought process culminating in the inevitable action.

Nothing is "brushed over" or ignored. Every brain event, every thought and feeling, that happens within the choosing process is also causally necessary from any prior point in time.

You do it when you invoke the term 'choosing.' If all events are causally necessary - as defined - there is no choosing.

Choosing requires the possibility of other options or actions being taken.

Yet all events, being causally necessary, means that there are no realizable alternate options or actions to choose from...despite the surface appearance of options.

You have a contradiction. Or as William James puts it.......

What you are brushing over is that among these inevitable brain events you will find every possibility on the menu that the brain considered as it went about deciding what we would order for dinner. Each possibility was an inevitable mental event. And there were many possibilities that showed up for consideration in that inevitable chain of events!

That is not choosing. That is natural necessity at work, a process caused by 'actual objects and forces.'

Obviously natural necessity includes choosing as a real causal mechanism, just like it includes walking, talking, and chewing gum. So, it is false to claim that it is not choosing when it actually is choosing that is happening.

It happens because it must happen, not because it was chosen as if something else could have been selected. There are no alternate actions according to your own definition.

Actual objects, events and forces over which our will has no agency, being not the master but the product.

The will is an event. Like every other event, it is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

Of course the will' is an event. Just not an event that makes the slightest difference to what must necessarily happen.

It's 5pm, time to go home, and I'm hungry. This causes me to consider how I might get my dinner tonight. Will I go out to a restaurant or will I go home and fix something myself? I have two things that I can choose to do. I decide that I will go out to a restaurant. My will to go the the restaurant has just been caused by prior events.

That will to have dinner at the restaurant now causes subsequent events. It causes me to get in my car, drive to the restaurant, walk in the door, sit at a table, open the menu, choose what I will order, tell the waiter what I will have. This dinner order then causes the waiter to take my order to the chef, who prepares my meal. The meal being ready causes the waiter to bring it to my table along with the bill I must pay on my way out.

The will is an event. Like every other event, it is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

As to who is the "master" of these events, the world would correctly have us believe that it is the person who placed the order, because that is the person to whom the waiter hands the bill for the dinner.

None of that means a thing in terms of necessity. Everything you describe must happen without deviation, precisely as determined, not willed. Will is merely the felt prompt to act, itself a necessary part of the process/progression of the system.

Hence, free will is incompatible with determinism.

The incompatibilist makes this claim based upon a false definition of "free will", a lack of understanding what a "will" actually is, and a flaky notion of what deterministic causal necessity is actually about.

The reasons for incompatibility are clear, unambiguous and undeniable. It boils down to no free will agency. Will is unable to make a difference within a system that permits no deviation, where all events are fixed through a process of natural necessity, not choice, not thought, deliberation, not will, wish or hope.

''As nouns the difference between choice and determinism is that choice is an option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something while determinism is (ethics) the doctrine that all actions are determined by the current state and immutable laws of the universe, with no possibility of choice.''

determinism
English
Noun

• (ethics) The doctrine that all actions are determined by the current state and immutable laws of the universe, with no possibility of choice.
• (computing) The property of having behavior determined only by initial state and input.

choice
English
option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something.

Free will is not a choice free of causal necessity. It is simply a choice that is free of coercion and undue influence.

A person's will is not some free floating spirit, it is a person's intention to actually do something specific.

Deterministic causal necessity is not some puppet master that robs us of our freedom and control, it is nothing more than the assertion that our behavior is mostly reliably caused by us, according to our own goals and reasons, and by our own choices. We, like all other events, were reliably caused by prior events and will reliably cause subsequent events by our own choosing.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Sorry, but I have to go with the great philosopher Bilby on this one: "the No Choice Principle is not so much a principle, as it is overly simplistic horseshit." - Bilby

I'm not surprised that you do.

It would be shocking had you disagreed. However, agreement amongst compatibilists doesn't establish compatibility. Sorry.

 

[The AntiChris]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about?

Because chaotic systems are like that. Inevitability doesn't preclude choice, where the inevitable isn't knowable prior to its being chosen.

We are not talking about a chaotic system that is not deterministic. The issue is the compatibility of the notion of free will with determinism as compatibilists define it.

Chaotic systems are deterministic - Chaos Theory

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If all events are causally necessary - as defined - there is no choosing. Choosing requires the possibility of other options or actions being taken. Yet all events, being causally necessary, means that there are no realizable alternate options or actions to choose from...despite the surface appearance of options.

And that is how incompatibilists carefully craft the illusion that what we see happening isn't actually happening. A hoax is created by a series of false but believable suggestions.

The problem is that we can actually see people in the restaurant choosing from the menu what they will order for dinner. And we see no one forcing them to choose something they don't want, so each of them is free to make this choice for themselves.

Now, what if we stipulate that every event is reliably caused by prior events (causal determinism)? How should this assumption alter what we see happening?

The incompatibilist claims this changes everything. The compatibilist claims it changes nothing.

The incompatibilist claims that choosing, free will, and responsibility all disappear.

The compatibilist simply notes that choosing is necessarily happening, and that people deciding for themselves what they will do (or being prevented from doing so by coercion or undue influence) is necessarily happening, and that people being held responsible for their deliberate actions is also necessarily happening.

The incompatibilist asks us to believe his words.

The compatibilist asks us to believe our own eyes.

It happens because it must happen, not because it was chosen as if something else could have been selected.

The incompatibilist, using the fact that, if something cannot happen then it will not happen, attempts to reverse the direction of this constraint by suggesting to us that if something will not happen then it cannot happen. This results in the claim that a person "never could have done otherwise", that there is only one thing that we ever "can" do, and that the only "real" possibility is the single actuality.

This ignores the fact that a possibility is something that can happen and not something that necessarily will happen. There is a many-to-one relationship between "can" and "will". Many things can happen but only one thing will happen. There are many possible futures but only one actual future. The restaurant menu provides a simple example. There are many dinners that we can choose even though there is only one dinner that we will choose.

Suggesting that what we can do is limited to what we will do creates the illusion that we "never could have done otherwise", when causal determinism can only logically imply that we "never would have done otherwise". For example, if deciding between A and B, then "I can choose A" is true and "I can choose B" is also true. After I choose A, "I chose A" will be true and "I could have chosen B" will also be true.

What do we mean by "I could have chosen B"? It means that (a) I did not choose B and implies that (b) I only would have chosen B under different circumstances. The notions of "can" and "will" are distinctly different.

The incompatibilist, conflating "can" with "will", creates a paradox by removing the many-to-one relationship. If what we "can" order for dinner is limited to what we "will" order for dinner, then we would need to know what we will order before we could know what we can order! And that does not work in the real world.

So, conflating "can" with "will" is a false, but believable suggestion, used to support the incompatibilist's illusion.

Of course the will' is an event. Just not an event that makes the slightest difference to what must necessarily happen.

Every event makes "what must necessarily happen", necessarily happen. Sweeping the specific events under the rug of the general notion of causal necessity gives the illusion that these events are not actually happening. But that suggestion is false, even though it is made to sound believable.

Which happens again here:

It's 5pm, time to go home, and I'm hungry. This causes me to consider how I might get my dinner tonight. Will I go out to a restaurant or will I go home and fix something myself? I have two things that I can choose to do. I decide that I will go out to a restaurant. My will to go the the restaurant has just been caused by prior events.

That will to have dinner at the restaurant now causes subsequent events. It causes me to get in my car, drive to the restaurant, walk in the door, sit at a table, open the menu, choose what I will order, tell the waiter what I will have. This dinner order then causes the waiter to take my order to the chef, who prepares my meal. The meal being ready causes the waiter to bring it to my table along with the bill I must pay on my way out.

The will is an event. Like every other event, it is both an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects.

As to who is the "master" of these events, the world would correctly have us believe that it is the person who placed the order, because that is the person to whom the waiter hands the bill for the dinner.

None of that means a thing in terms of necessity. Everything you describe must happen without deviation, precisely as determined, not willed. Will is merely the felt prompt to act, itself a necessary part of the process/progression of the system.

The point is that what necessarily happens actually happens. You cannot sweep these actual events under the rug of causal necessity to make them disappear. They are all happening, and they are all necessarily happening.

We can, and should, see through these illusions, and confront the free will "versus" determinism paradox as it really is, an elaborate self-induced hoax.

 

[bilby]

We are not talking about a chaotic system that is not deterministic.

Chaotic systems are deterministic.

They're unpredictable, because the fastest way to calculate how they will behave is to watch them do it. You can work out what they will do from basic physics, but to do so always takes at least as long as the system itself takes to reach that calculated condition.

The rules that would allow you to make forecasts of the state of a chaotic system are hypersensitive to minor deviations, so any simplified ruleset might give wildly different results from those expected.

 

[Jarhyn]

We are not talking about a chaotic system that is not deterministic.

Chaotic systems are deterministic.

They're unpredictable, because the fastest way to calculate how they will behave is to watch them do it. You can work out what they will do from basic physics, but to do so always takes at least as long as the system itself takes to reach that calculated condition.

The rules that would allow you to make forecasts of the state of a chaotic system are hypersensitive to minor deviations, so any simplified ruleset might give wildly different results from those expected.

This is correct. Hence my previous posts about the difference between "inevitability" and just plain old "evitability".

One is such that it is predictable despite chaotic elements and the other is such that it is unpredictable despite deterministic function.

This unpredictability despite deterministic function is exactly what causes the need for predictions to account for unpredictable elements with branching logics. Of course only one thing is going to happen, but to have a better-than-random-chance chance of getting to the goal despite the unknowns, accounting for what you don't know is necessary.

Sometimes what you don't know, can't know until you do it, is "what you will do in the future". And you figure it out by figuring out what "can be done if you will it in the future", and then deciding of what "can be done if willed", what one option "will be willed".

Nothing will be willed to be done without at least one iteration of figuring out what can be done, nor will it happen without willing to do that which can be done to actually be done.

There may be among us some unfortunate souls who merely walk like zombies forward repeating things because they worked in the past endlessly, without sight of a goal thought out because repeating these endless cycles seems to just work... But such creatures are what might be discussed of as philosophical zombies.

Though this is indeed what it seems half this discussion has evolved to become... Curious that.

 

[DBT]

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about?

Because chaotic systems are like that. Inevitability doesn't preclude choice, where the inevitable isn't knowable prior to its being chosen.

We are not talking about a chaotic system that is not deterministic. The issue is the compatibility of the notion of free will with determinism as compatibilists define it.

Chaotic systems are deterministic - Chaos Theory

Please read what I said.