It's not an illusion to abide by the nature and terms and definitions of determinism as it defined, choice as it is defined and the function of will as brain function. It's the reasonable thing to do.
Causal Determinism is the assertion that every event is reliably caused by antecedent events. The antecedent event of choosing is our encountering the restaurant menu. The choosing process becomes the antecedent event that causally determines the choice. The choice becomes the antecedent event that causally determines what we say to the waiter. Etc. ad infinitum.
Determinism is satisfied. Choosing is satisfied. Because choosing is acknowledged by all to be a brain function, Neuroscience is satisfied. And because our choice was free of coercion and undue influence, Free Will is satisfied.
What is unreasonable is the compatibilist attempt to redefine the terms in order to suit the desired conclusion; that free will is compatible with determinism...
What is unreasonable is that the incompatibilist is still not satisfied.
Instead, the incompatibilist insists that choosing is not happening, even when it is happening right there in front of him. Instead of the diner's own brain making the choice, the incompatibilist insists the choice was made by the Big Bang.
And this confuses the Waiter, who must deliver the meal and the bill to the person responsible for the order. So, the incompatibilist then suggests that no person is ever responsible for the bill. This is clearly unreasonable!
We see people acting according to their will. This says nothing about the nature and function of will as an assumed driver of decision making (not choice), or its status.
Will is the intention that motivates and directs our actions. That's why a person declares how they want their estate distributed after they die in something called their "last will and testament". It is a declaration of the deceased person's intentions.
In common everyday usage, such as in the restaurant, "will" communicates our intention to the Waiter, as in "I will have the Peperoni Pizza, please".
In most, if not all, cases there are multiple things that we can do (simplest case is do or not do), and we select from them what we will do. Thus, choosing is the final responsible antecedent cause of our will. That's why the Waiter brings the dinner and the bill to the person responsible for the order.
Will, as shown, is not the driver, not the decision maker, will makes no difference to outcomes that are fixed by antecedents before will even comes into play.
Will is the "driver" but choosing is the "decision maker". Choosing selects the will and sets it in motion. As we act upon one will we typically encounter other circumstances requiring additional choices. For example, after we decide to drive to the restaurant we will be deciding which route to take, when to slow down, when to pass another vehicle, etc. After we get to the restaurant we will be choosing what to order for dinner. After leaving the restaurant, having satisfied both our appetite and our intent, we may ask ourselves, "What will we do now?", and the answer will set our next intent.
Not just 'reliably' but inexorably. No choice involved. No free agency is in play for will to make a difference. It is this, then that, no alternative possible.
What I just described above is exactly "this, then that". Causal determinism is satisfied.
Choosing from alternate possibilities was "inexorably" right there in the chain of events.
Because the choices were free of coercion and undue influence, the result was a "freely chosen will" or simply "free will".
As to agency, the person who placed the dinner order is the meaningful causal agent, and will be held responsible for the bill.
... Compatibilists can't get around inevitability and natural necessity ...
Compatibilists have no need to "get around" anything. We embrace inevitability and natural necessity. It was always going to be the case that I would order the Greek Salad in the restaurant. It was always going to be me, and no one and nothing else, that would be making that choice for myself. It was always going to be the case that I would be the final responsible cause of that choice.
If you don't believe me, then ask the Waiter, an objective observer, "Who ordered the Greek Salad?".
... Fixed actions, necessary actions are not a matter of choice or freedom of will. ...
Obviously, that is not the case. If it is fixed and necessary that choosing will happen then it will damn well happen! Choosing is inexorably inevitable, just like ever other thing that happens in a deterministic universe.
But, not to worry. Inexorable inevitability doesn't actually change anything. It was always going to be us ordering dinner of our own free will.
''As nouns the difference between
choice and determinism is that
choice is an option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something while
determinism is (ethics) the doctrine that all actions are determined by the current state and immutable laws of the universe, with no possibility of choice.''
determinism
English
Noun
- (ethics) The doctrine that all actions are determined by the current state and immutable laws of the universe, with no possibility of choice.
- (computing) The property of having behavior determined only by initial state and input.
choice
English
option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something.
You will certainly find many others who embrace the metaphysical notion that determinism eliminates choice. But you've now seen for yourself how that conclusion is not supported by any premises other than the presumption itself. Choosing happens, therefore choice is possible, even in a perfectly deterministic world.