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Demystifying Determinism

What you conveniently overlook is that selection in a deterministic system is entailed by prior states of the system.
And what you conveniently overlook is that the fastest way to find out what that entailed new state will be, is to run the system forward in time and watch what happens.

In English, we call this technique "waiting to see what choices are made".
Exactly. All we need do to discover which dinner was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity is to finish choosing it.
 
What you conveniently overlook is that selection in a deterministic system is entailed by prior states of the system.
And what you conveniently overlook is that the fastest way to find out what that entailed new state will be, is to run the system forward in time and watch what happens.

In English, we call this technique "waiting to see what choices are made".
Exactly. All we need do to discover which dinner was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity is to finish choosing it.
To be fair you also have to wait until the will you choose either meets it's requirement or misses. "Sorry, we're out of salad".

Thus freedom is defined in relation to constraint.
 
You obviously have control of yourself in many respects DBT. For instance, I didn't like the effect testosterone had on me, so I removed it.

Control is not the issue. The brain regulates behaviour. Some folks have addictive personalities, with poor impulse control, while others are the epitome of 'self control' - neither end of the spectrum choose their condition, nor do those in between.



I had circumstances of my body as a result of my birth yes, but I chose to change those aspects of myself because of... An aspect of myself.

Change is inevitable. That we change is not a matter of free will. Our everchanging circumstances change us. Feedback changes us, biochemistry changes us, we are not precisely the same from day to day, moment to moment....


Yet again, all that matters is that some process renders a subset from a set. That's what choice is. You cannot reasonably claim it is not happening, the rendering of subsets from sets, all across the universe.

You don't change because you will it. You change because something set off a storm of neural activity and train of thought, the very event that prompts the change alters you.

This definition handily still allows sensible application to derive "responsibility" so what do I care that it captures many things many people wouldn't natively recognize as such?

The same math of derivation of responsibility with respect to what people would call "inanimate" is still useful: "The shape of the tube is responsible for determining which marble was removed."

this simply means that if someone wants to respond such that the determination happens differently, the tube shape is where they must go to do that. A choice function on shapes of tubes rendered upon the tube such that the shape is a subset of the shapes that tubes may take will be responsible for changing the tube, and the new tube's shape will be responsible.

responsibility runs out when you find yourself no longer looking at something which can be responded to.

i can respond to the person ordering food with a bill, but I cannot respond to their parents, or the fact that they were born needing to eat, or to the fact that I need money to buy more food after they have eaten it. I cannot respond to a great many things. I cannot respond directly to the big bang.

But I can respond to them and ask them to pay their bill.

Of course you can respond. Nobody is saying we can't respond. It is the nature and mechanisms of response in relation to the notion of free will that is in question.
 
What you conveniently overlook is that selection in a deterministic system is entailed by prior states of the system.
And what you conveniently overlook is that the fastest way to find out what that entailed new state will be, is to run the system forward in time and watch what happens.

In English, we call this technique "waiting to see what choices are made".
What you conveniently overlook is that selection in a deterministic system is entailed by prior states of the system.
And what you conveniently overlook is that the fastest way to find out what that entailed new state will be, is to run the system forward in time and watch what happens.

In English, we call this technique "waiting to see what choices are made".
Exactly. All we need do to discover which dinner was causally necessary from any prior point in eternity is to finish choosing it.

Which has nothing to do with the nature and mechanisms of perception and response. Our waiting to see what 'decisions' or actions (not choices) are taken is not a separate process, it too is a part of a necessary progression of events. No deviation. First this, then that, followed by......

''Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

'Decisions' in this instance of course refer to necessitated action paths, not choices as in this or that could have been chosen.
 
If you accept that every step of the process of the evolution or development of the system has no alternatives, that the progression of events is fixed, you must accept that there is no choice or free will involved in the process.

I can see why someone might "think" that. But I can also see why that is not the case. It happens in empirical reality that people often encounter circumstances in which they are presented with two or more options, and that they must choose between. Everyone already agrees that "selecting", "deciding", or "choosing" are the names we will call these "events", "operations", or "processes".

It's not what I need to think. It's not about what I claim. It is precisely how you yourself define determinism.

That is what determinism means. That events proceed without deviation, as determined, therefore a matter of natural necessity, not choice


Determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

Choice, by definition, entails selecting between two or more realizable options.

Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Determinism: no deviation, no possible alternatives, no 'act of choosing between two or more realizable alternatives.'

Just for emphesis; there are no 'two or more realizable alternatives, because determined events progress without deviation.

Goodbye choice.

Goodbye free will.
 
That we change is not a matter of free will
Yes it is. When we hold the will to change ourselves, and that will is free, change is a matter of free will.


Control is not the issue
You yourself have declared control an issue. Thus control is an issue. Unless you cede regulatory control as an issue.


neither end of the spectrum choose their condition
Clearly, I chose my condition. I'm getting up right now to choose my condition yet again rather than let something I didn't decide on decide for me yet again.

You don't change because you will it
Yes, I do. My will is "put a pill in my body". This will change my chemical composition from what it was to what it will be.


It is the nature and mechanisms of response in relation to the notion of free will that is in question
When one's will is 'to respond', and that will is free, the response is a matter of free will.

We form wills, we choose between them (taking from a developed set, a subset, and seizing on execution of that will), and then in the course of execution discover whether our wills are free or constrained.

All these are causally necessary for a large number of observed events to have happened.

Without developing the will to say "salad" please" there is no utterance of "salad, please."
 
It's not what I need to think. It's not about what I claim. It is precisely how you yourself define determinism.
That is what determinism means. That events proceed without deviation, as determined, therefore a matter of natural necessity, not choice

The problem is that you are drawing a figurative implication from determinism while I am taking it literally. If it is the case that all events proceed without deviation as a matter of natural causal necessity, then our choosing, along with every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in time.

Every aspect of that choosing is equally causally necessary, and must proceed without deviation. Each thought and feeling we experience while choosing whether to order that Steak or to order the Salad instead, is causally necessary. Each consideration as to which option best accomplishes our dietary goals is causally necessary. Each recollection of what we had for breakfast and lunch earlier in the day is causally necessary. Each value judgment we apply to our options is causally necessary. And then, finally, the choice itself is found to be the necessary result of all of these thoughts, feelings, and considerations.

This event is called "choosing". And it is a logical operation performed both locally and inevitably, in time and place, by our own brains. There is no science, neuroscience or physical science, that can validly deny that this event is actually happening, exactly as it does happen.

The notion that this event is not "really" choosing is the result of figurative thinking. But the event really and literally is choosing.

Choice, by definition, entails selecting between two or more realizable options.
Choice
1. an act of choosing between two or more possibilities.

Exactly. We objectively observe the many possibilities on the restaurant menu. The restaurant is willing and able to prepare for us any meal listed. And we are physically able to order any item we choose, by simply speaking the words, "I will have that for dinner, please", to the waiter. Every item is something that we actually can order.

Every option on the menu is realizable, even though only one will actually be realized.

Choosing is a real process that we ourselves really perform. All of the options on the menu are realizable possibilities.

Deterministic causal necessity does not actually alter any of these facts.

Determinism: no deviation, no possible alternatives, no 'act of choosing between two or more realizable alternatives.'

But there you are denying the fact of choosing, and the fact of two or more realizable alternatives. And on what do you base this denial?

Well, it seems to you that, if every event is causally necessary, then it is AS IF choosing isn't really happening. But there it is, happening right in front of us.

And it seems to you that, if every event is causally necessary, then it is AS IF the items we did not choose were never "really" possible. But the actual notion of what possibilities are, things that may happen but then again may never happen, assures us that every item on the menu was a real possibility, even if it was never going to be chosen and never would happen.

So the whole notion that deterministic causal necessity implies the absence of choosing or the absence of multiple possibilities, is based upon figurative thinking.

Just for emphasis; there are no 'two or more realizable alternatives, because determined events progress without deviation.

Just for emphasis, the fact that events progress without deviation does not eliminate any alternative or make it unrealizable. The alternative may or may not be realized. That's what "realizable" means. It does not mean that the alternative will be realized, but only that it could, under certain circumstances, be realized.

And that is really the whole point of the notion of possibilities. We don't always know in advance what will happen, but only what can happen. The notion of "can" or "possibility" accommodates that lack of foreknowledge, giving the mind a way to cope with its uncertainty in a productive way. When we do not know what will happen, we imagine the things that can happen, to prepare for what does happen.

Confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen disrupts this logical mechanism. Limiting what "can" happen to what "will" happen breaks the mechanism entirely, leaving us floundering in paradoxes. And that is what can happen if we take our figurative statements literally.
 
'Decisions' in this instance of course refer to necessitated action paths, not choices as in this or that could have been chosen.

That's a false dichotomy. Decisions are both.

Decisions are choices, choices are decisions.

Determinism tells us that these choices are necessitated; It does NOT follow that they cease to be choices. Made by us.

"Inner necessity" is us.
 
That we change is not a matter of free will
Yes it is. When we hold the will to change ourselves, and that will is free, change is a matter of free will.

Oh, dear. You missed the first few trillion parts of the process of evolution.

Control is not the issue
You yourself have declared control an issue. Thus control is an issue. Unless you cede regulatory control as an issue.

I also said that 'control' is fixed, a single possible outcome. Control like decision making is a matter of natural necessity, not choice.


neither end of the spectrum choose their condition
Clearly, I chose my condition. I'm getting up right now to choose my condition yet again rather than let something I didn't decide on decide for me yet again.

Crock.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.



You don't change because you will it
Yes, I do. My will is "put a pill in my body". This will change my chemical composition from what it was to what it will be.

There you go again, you completely overlook the critical point that will itself is fixed by antecedents. That will itself is subject to natural necessity and that whatever it is you 'will' is also a matter of necessity, not choice, not free will.

That whatever it is you 'will,' there is nothing else that can can happen, what you 'will,' you must will.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane





It is the nature and mechanisms of response in relation to the notion of free will that is in question
When one's will is 'to respond', and that will is free, the response is a matter of free will.

We form wills, we choose between them (taking from a developed set, a subset, and seizing on execution of that will), and then in the course of execution discover whether our wills are free or constrained.

All these are causally necessary for a large number of observed events to have happened.

Without developing the will to say "salad" please" there is no utterance of "salad, please."

In determinism, you don't choose anything. Everything happens through natural necessity. Whatever you think, feel and do is set milliseconds before brought to awareness.

Natural necessity is not a matter of free will or choice. Everything happens as it must. That is according to how you define determinism.
 
'Decisions' in this instance of course refer to necessitated action paths, not choices as in this or that could have been chosen.

That's a false dichotomy. Decisions are both.

Decisions are choices, choices are decisions.

Determinism tells us that these choices are necessitated; It does NOT follow that they cease to be choices. Made by us.

"Inner necessity" is us.


Not in determinism. Determinism reduces the word 'decision' to a figure of speech. It has the appearance of a decision because we assume that we could have taken option B instead of A, but of course that is an illusion because there are no possible alternate actions within a deterministic system. Whatever is done, must be done, regardless of surface appearances.
 
It's not what I need to think. It's not about what I claim. It is precisely how you yourself define determinism.
That is what determinism means. That events proceed without deviation, as determined, therefore a matter of natural necessity, not choice

The problem is that you are drawing a figurative implication from determinism while I am taking it literally. If it is the case that all events proceed without deviation as a matter of natural causal necessity, then our choosing, along with every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in time.

It's the other way around. I am taking the definition of determinism literally and precisely as it is defined by you, with the exception of 'choosing,' which of course does not apply to determinism if the terms and conditions are adhered to, and not contradicted.

Every aspect of that choosing is equally causally necessary, and must proceed without deviation. Each thought and feeling we experience while choosing whether to order that Steak or to order the Salad instead, is causally necessary. Each consideration as to which option best accomplishes our dietary goals is causally necessary. Each recollection of what we had for breakfast and lunch earlier in the day is causally necessary. Each value judgment we apply to our options is causally necessary. And then, finally, the choice itself is found to be the necessary result of all of these thoughts, feelings, and considerations.

If every aspect of what happens is equally causally necessary, and of course that is true, then it is not choosing because things that must necessarily happen because they are causally necessary are clearly not freely chosen.

They are not chosen at all. They are entailed. They must happen precisely as determined.

That does not describe freedom of choice or free will.


Saturday night, going out, that's all I have time for.


Good evening.
 
Oh, dear. You missed the first few trillion parts of the process of evolution.
I think you missed the point where I did an end-run around that. Millions of years of evolution gave me gonads that spray testosterone into my blood. But still a decision of some years let's me do something different, not because humans "evolved" to chemically castrate themselves but because we "evolved" to be able to make more effective and powerful choices.


will itself is fixed by antecedents
So what? No compatibilist ever sought anything otherwise. All they did is observe that the will itself is selected through a process of observed constraints and freedoms: my will to alter myself chemically is free, today. It was not free a few months ago, constrained as it was by the rules of society and the prescription of medication.

It's rather important as a human being able to constrain our wills, to have wills which we ourselves both create, and yet do not action upon.

In fact, I invite you to do something: see something you want to do, something that you have chosen to do and then... Don't. No matter how much you want to just... Don't. Not for emotional reasons but for cold, emotional ones.

Then, while many people have this power, I'm not going to assume you do. Not everyone is capable of abnegation, especially on an arbitrary basis.
 
The problem is that you are drawing a figurative implication from determinism while I am taking it literally. If it is the case that all events proceed without deviation as a matter of natural or causal necessity, then our choosing, along with every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in time.

It's the other way around. I am taking the definition of determinism literally and precisely as it is defined by you, with the exception of 'choosing,' which of course does not apply to determinism if the terms and conditions are adhered to, and not contradicted.

We agree that determinism literally means that all events are causally determined by prior events, such that everything that happens will inevitably happen just so, exactly as it does happen.

But we disagree as to whether choosing is an event that is so special that it must be treated differently than all other events. You insist it must be excluded. I insist it must be included.

Choosing is a logical operation performed by the brain. Like adding or subtracting, choosing actually happens.

At the beginning of a logical operation we do not yet know the result, but we may still have some notion of the limits of that result. In the restaurant our choice is limited to the items listed on the menu. These are the things that we "can" order, even if we don't order them.

If our dinner bill is outside the limits we expected, we may question the Waiter's addition, and recalculate it ourselves. Perhaps we will discover an item on the bill that we did not order, that must be subtracted to correct the bill. The notion of possibility is always present, if only in the possibility of a mistake. Mistakes, of course, are also events that can happen, even if they did not happen this time. This is the nature of a real possibility, it is something that can happen, even if it never will happen and never does happen.

A possibility is a logical token used by the mind to reference anything that can happen, but does not necessarily happen. The notion of a possibility is itself a mental event which we presume has a corresponding neurological event. And, like all events, the notion of a possibility will inevitably happen, just so, exactly as it does happen.

So, determinism must include not just our choosing, but also the multiple possibilities that play a causal role in how that choosing unfolds into our specific choice.

We cannot deterministically account for the choice without including the possibilities and the operation by which we decide which possibility we will make real.

We cannot pretend that choosing doesn't happen. We cannot pretend that multiple possibilities do not go into this choosing.

Therefore, we must reject the notion that determinism excludes choosing. Choosing is just another event that unfolds deterministically in the unbroken chain of events.

If every aspect of what happens is equally causally necessary, and of course that is true, then it is not choosing because things that must necessarily happen because they are causally necessary are clearly not freely chosen.

Whether they are "freely" chosen or not is a separate question that is addressed by answering the question, "What does choosing need to be free of in order for our choice to be considered 'freely' chosen?" (The correct answer is that choosing only needs to be free of coercion and undue influence).

What we are addressing right now is whether choosing is actually happening in a deterministic system. I claim that, because we objectively observe people choosing what they will order for dinner from the restaurant menu, that we have undeniable proof that choosing is actually happening.

They are not chosen at all. They are entailed. They must happen precisely as determined.

Your claim that choosing is not happening appears to be based upon nothing more than a false belief that choosing cannot be a deterministically entailed event. There is no evidence to support this belief.

Saturday night, going out, that's all I have time for. Good evening.

Saturday morning on this side of the globe, so, "G'day".
 
”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.
Searle is wrong twice. His claim here is generally wrong, in that higher level experiences and effects are not "really irrelevant" in any analysis of any system; And he is specifically wrong in considering the neurobiology level to be low enough that determinism is sufficient to obviate choice at that level.

Choices are an emergent property of systems that have become sufficiently complex that their outputs cannot be precisely calculated, faster than they can simply be observed.

There are few, if any, biological mechanisms that are sufficiently simple as to not exhibit this emergent behaviour. Certainly I can think of none off the top of my head - and indeed one of the contenders for a robust definition of life is its exhibiting behaviour at or above that level of complexity. Any system that's simple enough to be predicted in less than real time is merely chemistry, or physics. Any cyclic system that is of such a level of complexity can be reasonably said to be 'alive'; Similarly complex linear systems (such as weather patterns) are said to be 'chaotic'; And insufficiently complex systems are said to be 'chemical' or 'physical', or merely 'mechanical' processes.

Of course he's conveniently not here to defend his claim, so you can feel justified in rejecting my rebuttal on whatever grounds you are able to imagine he might have proposed. Which doesn't support your position, but does support your self-image as someone who's not completely wrong about this.
 
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'Decisions' in this instance of course refer to necessitated action paths, not choices as in this or that could have been chosen.

That's a false dichotomy. Decisions are both.

Decisions are choices, choices are decisions.

Determinism tells us that these choices are necessitated; It does NOT follow that they cease to be choices. Made by us.

"Inner necessity" is us.


Not in determinism. Determinism reduces the word 'decision' to a figure of speech. It has the appearance of a decision because we assume that we could have taken option B instead of A, but of course that is an illusion because there are no possible alternate actions within a deterministic system. Whatever is done, must be done, regardless of surface appearances.
Yes, in determinism. Determinism requires that the word 'decision' hasn't got the metaphysical meaning beloved of the proponents of libertarian free will, but that doesn't affect the compatiblist position one iota.

As nobody here is arguing for libertarian free will, your objection is irrelevant.

There are plenty of possible alternative actions in a deterministic system; Because "possible" refers to a range of outcomes in a forecast. All sufficiently complex systems can only be forecast to a probabilistic level of accuracy - to get certainty, the fastest possible path is to wait and see what actually happens, so before the choice is made, we always have alternative possibilities to which we can attach non-zero probabilities.

The problem arises because you are presuming that we can legitimately look at the past and deride as fools those who attached any probability other than zero or one to any event. But we cannot legitimately do that - having prior knowledge of the outcome is cheating.

Even I cannot predict what I will eat for dinner tonight. That literally anyone could "predict" what I would eat for dinner last night, by simply having observed it happening, is of zero value.

A future that is unpredictable contains real choices, even in a completely deterministic universe. Indeed, it's that fact that distinguishes 'future' from 'past'. The future is defined as the period of time in which the outcomes of choices are unknowable.
 
Oh, dear. You missed the first few trillion parts of the process of evolution.
I think you missed the point where I did an end-run around that. Millions of years of evolution gave me gonads that spray testosterone into my blood. But still a decision of some years let's me do something different, not because humans "evolved" to chemically castrate themselves but because we "evolved" to be able to make more effective and powerful choices.

You said - ''When we hold the will to change ourselves, and that will is free, change is a matter of free will'' - which misses the point that will itself is fixed by s determininsistic interaction of external events and underlying processes....none of which are freely willed, yet you assert that it is an example of free will.

So, yes, you miss a whole lot of crucial information in order to make an unfounded claim.
will itself is fixed by antecedents
So what? No compatibilist ever sought anything otherwise. All they did is observe that the will itself is selected through a process of observed constraints and freedoms: my will to alter myself chemically is free, today. It was not free a few months ago, constrained as it was by the rules of society and the prescription of medication.

So what? The process of event and cognitive response is not even willed, yet alone freely willed. Given the nature of the system, the claim is absurd.

''If free will does not generate movement, what does? Movement generation seems to come largely from the primary motor cortex, and its input comes primarily from premotor cortices, parts of the frontal lobe just in front of the primary motor cortex. The premotor cortices receive input from most of the brain, especially the sensory cortices (which process information from our senses), limbic cortices (the emotional part of the brain), and the prefrontal cortex (which handles many cognitive processes). If the inputs from various neurons “compete,” eventually one input wins, leading to a final behavior.'''
 
'Decisions' in this instance of course refer to necessitated action paths, not choices as in this or that could have been chosen.

That's a false dichotomy. Decisions are both.

Decisions are choices, choices are decisions.

Determinism tells us that these choices are necessitated; It does NOT follow that they cease to be choices. Made by us.

"Inner necessity" is us.


Not in determinism. Determinism reduces the word 'decision' to a figure of speech. It has the appearance of a decision because we assume that we could have taken option B instead of A, but of course that is an illusion because there are no possible alternate actions within a deterministic system. Whatever is done, must be done, regardless of surface appearances.
Yes, in determinism. Determinism requires that the word 'decision' hasn't got the metaphysical meaning beloved of the proponents of libertarian free will, but that doesn't affect the compatiblist position one iota.

Nor does it help the compatibilist position one iota. The compatibilist position relies on carefully selected terms in order to give the impression that the notion of free will is compatible with determinism....in the words of William James, a quagmire of evasion.

As nobody here is arguing for libertarian free will, your objection is irrelevant.

Nobody is arguing over LFW. The point of contention is compatibilism and the gambits being used by its supporters.

There are plenty of possible alternative actions in a deterministic system; Because "possible" refers to a range of outcomes in a forecast. All sufficiently complex systems can only be forecast to a probabilistic level of accuracy - to get certainty, the fastest possible path is to wait and see what actually happens, so before the choice is made, we always have alternative possibilities to which we can attach non-zero probabilities.


''Possible'' means that alternate events can happen. That of course contradicts the terms and conditions of determinism as compatibilists define it. ''Fixed'' by antecedents negates any possibility of alternate actions.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.



The problem arises because you are presuming that we can legitimately look at the past and deride as fools those who attached any probability other than zero or one to any event. But we cannot legitimately do that - having prior knowledge of the outcome is cheating.

The issue is compatibility of free will as defined by compatibilists in relation determinism as defined by compatibilists.

The problems with that position have been described.

Even I cannot predict what I will eat for dinner tonight. That literally anyone could "predict" what I would eat for dinner last night, by simply having observed it happening, is of zero value.

A future that is unpredictable contains real choices, even in a completely deterministic universe. Indeed, it's that fact that distinguishes 'future' from 'past'. The future is defined as the period of time in which the outcomes of choices are unknowable.

A deterministic system is inherently predictable. That we don't have access to the necessary information does not mean alternate actions or real choices are possible.

By definition, they are not;

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''
 
The problem is that you are drawing a figurative implication from determinism while I am taking it literally. If it is the case that all events proceed without deviation as a matter of natural or causal necessity, then our choosing, along with every other event, is causally necessary from any prior point in time.

It's the other way around. I am taking the definition of determinism literally and precisely as it is defined by you, with the exception of 'choosing,' which of course does not apply to determinism if the terms and conditions are adhered to, and not contradicted.

We agree that determinism literally means that all events are causally determined by prior events, such that everything that happens will inevitably happen just so, exactly as it does happen.

But we disagree as to whether choosing is an event that is so special that it must be treated differently than all other events. You insist it must be excluded. I insist it must be included.

There are no choosing events because there are no realizable alternatives to choose from. All events are fixed through a process of natural necessity/law;

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards.

Choosing is a logical operation performed by the brain. Like adding or subtracting, choosing actually happens.

What the brain does, it does necessarily. The inputs are necessarily delivered as outputs.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

What you call 'choosing' is entailment. Entailment because - according to the given terms and definitions - there are no alternate actions.




At the beginning of a logical operation we do not yet know the result, but we may still have some notion of the limits of that result. In the restaurant our choice is limited to the items listed on the menu. These are the things that we "can" order, even if we don't order them.

That we don't know the result has no bearing on the necessity of the determined result. Which is determined/fixed before it comes to the point of being physically played out.

Choosing? No, natural necessity at work.



If our dinner bill is outside the limits we expected, we may question the Waiter's addition, and recalculate it ourselves. Perhaps we will discover an item on the bill that we did not order, that must be subtracted to correct the bill. The notion of possibility is always present, if only in the possibility of a mistake. Mistakes, of course, are also events that can happen, even if they did not happen this time. This is the nature of a real possibility, it is something that can happen, even if it never will happen and never does happen.

That has no bearing on the events of the entailed process playing out precisely as they must. We don't know that, we just experience the events and our thoughts and actions that were produced by the information processing activity of the brain as it acquires and processes information and presents it in conscious form milliseconds after the event.
 
You said - ''When we hold the will to change ourselves, and that will is free, change is a matter of free will'' - which misses the point that will itself is fixed by s determininsistic interaction of external events and underlying processes....none of which are freely willed, yet you assert that it is an example of free will
Yet again you claim "the machine must build itself to build other things."

But, this machine DOES build itself in many ways, regardless.

The fixture of these events by deterministic process changes nothing of the fact that it was my will, caused by my deterministic process which... Changed my deterministic process, via deterministic process.

Which is to say, my will to change myself was free. The machine does not need to build itself to build other things. Nonetheless, the machine does modify itself.
 
I can identify the parts of the process which are aligned to eventually determine a result I don't want, and I can change their alignment before they do so that the result is not the one I don't want. So, that.

I can identify parts of the system which will be responsible for some outcome, and modify them so that they, and ultimately I, will be responsible for some different outcome.


Determinism creates "freedom and constraint" determinism creates wills.

As bilby has pointed out, indeterminism does not create free will, it creates madness.

When people insert themselves into the chain of responsibility for some event, we can observe that "the right kind of regulatory control" exists to adjust proclivities.

When someone feels guilty or contrite, even when nobody else knows of this responsibility, it means that this regulatory control indeed is possible even among a population of one.
 
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