Demystifying Determinism

[DBT]

The inevitable evaluation process must necessarily lead to the inevitable conclusion.

That is the point. This is not Libertarian free will.

You cannot assert Libertarian free will when the process and the conclusion is inevitable.

Nothing is being freely willed in the Libertarian sense, yet Compatibilist free will is asserted by compatibilists.

I added some words to clarify what you appear to be saying, and having done so, I find that I don't disagree with you at all, and nor do you appear to disagree with anyone else in this thread.

We all agree that Libertarian free will is nonsense.

But Compatibilist free will is sufficient to establish basic desert responsibility - if the waiter brings you a basic dessert, it's your own fault for ordering it, as long as nobody put a gun to your head.

Your choices are inevitable; But they're nevertheless yours. Only through the mechanism of your self, can the universe resolve what the future inevitably must look like.

It's your choice. You are an essential and unavoidable component of bringing it to pass, and if you do so without extraordinary external influences, you did it of your own free will, and will quite reasonably be held responsible for doing it.

Your additions do not relate to what I said, nor to incompatibilism in general. Basically, compatibilism fails because its definition neglects inner necessity.


''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. '

Because action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism, acting without external force, coercion or undue influence is not sufficient to establish the reality of free will. Trying to define free will into existence - compatibilsm in this instance - does not establish compatibility.

The decisions you make (inner necessity/entailed) are an expression of how you think.

How you think is an expression of who you are.

Who you is determined by your genetic makeup, social circumstances, family, nation, culture, life experiences, etcetera.

That's all.

 

[bilby]

Basically, compatibilism fails because its definition neglects inner necessity.

No, it just refers to "inner necessity" by its more common name "self".

Your insistence that "inner necessity" is not the same thing as "self" is just the discredited and foolish substance dualism concept warmed over.

What I do is determined by inner necessity. That is to say, what I do is determined by me.

 

[bilby]

action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism

No, it isn't.

It's completely compatible with compatiblist free will, hence the name.

 

[DBT]

The restaurant menu is the same for every customer. It lists the many dinners that every customer can order. It is up to the customers to decide for themselves what they will order.

Every customer can indeed order, but what they order in any given instance, they must necessarily order. And there are no possible alternate orders in any given instance.

That is the point. Not that customers can't order, but what they do, they do necessarily.

It is the necessity of determinism that negates choice and the notion of free will.

What is necessarily done is not freely chosen from a set of realizable alternatives, because none of the alternatives are realizable in any instance as the system evolves without deviation.

If alternate actions were possible, there would be deviations and the system would not be deterministic.

However, as we are talking about determinism, there can be no deviation in what is a singular progression of events....hence no choice and no free will.

The definition of free will as acting according to one's will, without external coercion, force, etc, fails to prove it's proposition because it ignores internal necessity. That what is thought, felt and done, is done not through choice or free will, but necessity.

Necessity does not equate to free will, hence incompatibilism.

That's all I have time for.....plus there is a tag team of four compatibilists now.

 

[bilby]

Because action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism, acting without external force, coercion or undue influence is not sufficient to establish the reality of Libertarian free will.

FTFY. Again.

Compatiblist free will need not establish the reality of the Libertarian free will that compatibilists reject. You are imposing a nonsensical requirement.

If you persist in equivocating between "Libertarian free will" and "Compatibilist free will", which are completely different things, then it is no surprise that you're horribly confused.

Perhaps you should stop using the phrase "free will" without explicitly stating which of these two different things you are talking about. That would have the unfortunate side effect of destroying your arguments, but the significant benefit of destroying your arguments.

Inner necessity is the self. That the self acts deterministically is a big problem for Libertarian free will. It's no problem whatsoever for Compatibilist free will, because all that's required by Compatibilism is that the responsibility for what is done lies within the individual who does it.

The waiter brings you the bill, because your inner necessity - that is, YOU - placed the order.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

It is the necessity of determinism that negates choice and the notion of free will.

Actually, it is the necessity of determinism that guarantees that choosing will be happening and that we will be doing it.

Universal causal necessity/inevitability doesn't actually change anything. The feeling that you're experiencing, that you must be free of cause and effect in order to be 'truly' free, is a delusion.

Every freedom that we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable causation. We are not merely the effect of prior causes, but also the causes of new effects. And, because we are members of an intelligent species, we actually get to choose what effects we will cause to happen.

When a person gets to choose for themselves what they will do, it is called "free will". And people will be held responsible for what they deliberately choose to do. For example, in the restaurant, you will be billed for the dinner you ordered.

What is necessarily done is not freely chosen from a set of realizable alternatives, because none of the alternatives are realizable in any instance as the system evolves without deviation.

Freely choosing what you will order for dinner, from a literal menu of realizable alternatives, is exactly how events evolved in the restaurant. Everything necessarily happened exactly as we experienced it happening, without deviation.

Pretending that these events did not happen as we observed them happening would be a self-induced hoax. A trick you're playing upon yourself by the words you're choosing to describe them.

If alternate actions were possible, there would be deviations and the system would not be deterministic.

Alternate actions are "possible", but there is no "actual" deviation from the necessary course events. If you can ever get it straight that a possibility is not an actuality then this should clear up for you.

The fact is that there are multiple "possible" futures but only one "actual" future. Within the domain of human influence, the single actual future will be chosen by us, from among the many possible future that we will imagine. (We cannot account for events outside our domain of influence).

However, as we are talking about determinism, there can be no deviation in what is a singular progression of events....hence no choice and no free will.

There "can" be deviations from the singular progression of events, but there never "will" be. If you can ever get it straight that what "can" happen is different from what "will" happen then this too will be clear to you.

The definition of free will as acting according to one's will, without external coercion, force, etc, fails to prove it's proposition because it ignores internal necessity.

The simplest example of "internal necessity" is choosing for ourselves what we will do. When we decide that we will do something, it sets our intent upon completing some task. That intention (also called our "will" or even our "will power") motivates and directs our subsequent thoughts and actions as we go about completing the task. After we're done, we decide what we will do next.

When we are free to make that choice for ourselves, specifically free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, then it is commonly known as "a choice of our own free will". But if someone or something forces us to do something that we would rather not do, then we are not free to make that choice for ourselves, thus not free will.

Inner necessity arises from our own needs and desires. As an intelligent species, we get to choose how we go about satisfying those needs and desires. When faced with the restaurant menu, many thoughts and feelings may come to mind. Our dietary goals, our taste preferences, the relative cost of different meals, what he had to eat earlier in the day, etc., may all play a part as we compare and evaluate different choices. All of these things are a part of who we are, and our own thought process will inevitably lead to a single choice. This is what "inner necessity" is about. It is something we are all familiar with, because we've all made decisions before.

Inner necessity is nothing more than who and what we are. It is not some external agent forcing us to do something against our will, but rather how we construct our own will to meet our own wants and needs.

That what is thought, felt and done, is done not through choice or free will, but necessity.

Incompatibilists present themselves with a false dichotomy, "either necessity or choosing, but never both", hence incompatibilism. That error blinds them to what everyone else objectively observes to be happening in real life.

The compatibilist sees the choosing necessarily happening within a deterministic world.

Necessity does not equate to free will, hence incompatibilism.

Universal causal necessity includes all events. There are events in which a person is free to choose for themselves, as well as events in which someone else's choice is forced upon them against their will. The notion of "free to choose" only requires freedom from coercion and undue influence. It does not require any irrational freedoms like "freedom from cause and effect".

That's all I have time for.....plus there is a tag team of four compatibilists now.

You should try Reddit then. Over there the incompatibilists have a significant majority. So, I know how your feel.

 

[Jarhyn]

That's all I have time for.....plus there is a tag team of four compatibilists now.

You should try Reddit then. Over there the incompatibilists have a significant majority. So, I know how your feel.

The thing is, it's a lot easier to assemble support for incompatibilism in a forum with plentiful religious and pseudo-religious contributors.

This is because "god's plan", "destiny", "fate", all these are just fatalism with different villains. Even "it will all turn out for the best!", is just another fatalism.

Atheist Incompatibilists are probably less common because the ones who just blame everything on mere accident is "fatalistic nihilism". The thing is... nobody likes it when people roleplay being a p-zombie all their lives.

 

[pood]

\

You have shown nothing.

Perhaps one thing; the knack of misrepresenting incompatibilism, which includes whatever I happen to say, quote or cite, even while brushing aside or rationalizing inner necessity as the ultimate restriction on choice and the notion of free will.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The patience is mine.

I see you still can’t tell us who or what made that building.

No surprise. Because your hard determinism has no answer for this simple question.

I have addressed your example several times. You disappear for a while, then come back and pretend it didn't happen. Now you should go back and read what I said and instead of pretending that nothing happened, just respond to what I said. That would be the reasonable thing to do.

Even now you ignored what I quoted, addressing nothing, just more sniping.

But you didn’t address it. If you did, point me to it. Or just say it here:

Who, or what, designed and built the building, and how did that happen, if Roark was unable to make choices?

Simple question.

I addressed it several times, Nor am I searching through numerous posts in several threads to indulge you. You ignored my reply several times. Just as you ignore anything that I quote and cite.

The explanation is not difficult. It's right there in the quotes I posted a couple of days ago, which instead of reading and considering the implications of what was said in relation to your example, you simply ignored it.

As I noted, you responded, but you did not answer. Again: Roark builds a great building, requiring that he make thousands of correct choices — none of which, according to you, are actual choices. They are illusory choices, I-choices. So clearly, according to you, Roark did not build the building.

Who or what did?

Just answer the question!

What part of ''nobody is questioning our ability to plan, design and construct buildings or machinery?" It's an ability enabled by the architecture of a brain, not free will.

It doesn't happen in isolation. It is not willed. Everything we do is related to our environment and its conditions and events.

We think, plan and we act. How good we are at it is not willed or wished.

The answer to your Strawman example was always right in front of your eyes, you just don't appear make the necessary connection. Which is understandable, given your position.

'' Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Now keep in mind that ''it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did'' does not exclude the ability to think, plan and act.

Brilliant. So we can think, plan, and act, we just can’t choose.

But if we can’t CHOOSE, to ACT on the PLAN that we THOUGHT UP, what the hell good is all that thinking, planning, and acting? To act, of course, is to choose.

Did Roark design and build the building or not? Y/N. Simple yes/no question.

 

[pood]

To act is to choose. It should be obvious that if I can think, plan and act (choose) then I have free will.

Here’s how it would be without free will: I think, plan, and … as I am about to act on my choice, someone holds a gun to my head and orders me to do the opposite of what I want. We see that sometimes.

OR … here is what we never see. I think, plan and … as I am about to act on my choice, Mr. Causal Determinism steps in, says, “Nuh-huh!” and stays my hand to prevent me actuating my choice.

 

[DBT]

Because action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism, acting without external force, coercion or undue influence is not sufficient to establish the reality of Libertarian free will.

FTFY. Again.

Compatiblist free will need not establish the reality of the Libertarian free will that compatibilists reject. You are imposing a nonsensical requirement.

If you persist in equivocating between "Libertarian free will" and "Compatibilist free will", which are completely different things, then it is no surprise that you're horribly confused.

Perhaps you should stop using the phrase "free will" without explicitly stating which of these two different things you are talking about. That would have the unfortunate side effect of destroying your arguments, but the significant benefit of destroying your arguments.

Inner necessity is the self. That the self acts deterministically is a big problem for Libertarian free will. It's no problem whatsoever for Compatibilist free will, because all that's required by Compatibilism is that the responsibility for what is done lies within the individual who does it.

The waiter brings you the bill, because your inner necessity - that is, YOU - placed the order.

I'm not referring to Libertarian free will.

Nobody is referring to Libertarian free will.

The compatibilist definition of free will is basically to act without external force, coercion or undue influence, ie, to act according to one's will or wish.

It is this very definition that fails because it ignores inner necessity. Inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

Again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

 

[DBT]

To act is to choose. It should be obvious that if I can think, plan and act (choose) then I have free will.

The ability to think, plan and act has nothing to do with will, yet alone free will.

Free will is being asserted, not established as an element of the system. A flawed definition doesn't make it so.

Here’s how it would be without free will: I think, plan, and … as I am about to act on my choice, someone holds a gun to my head and orders me to do the opposite of what I want. We see that sometimes.

Determinism permits no choice. Whatever happens must necessarily happen precisely as determined by a singular progression of events.
Your ability to think, feel, plan and act is determined by the work and activity of neural architecture.

A failure of a single element of the system, memory function, and it's all over, you can no longer recognize what were familiarthings , think coherently, plan or act rationally.

The ability to think, plan and act has nothing to do with free will.

OR … here is what we never see. I think, plan and … as I am about to act on my choice, Mr. Causal Determinism steps in, says, “Nuh-huh!” and stays my hand to prevent me actuating my choice.

What you overlook are all the unconscious elements that form your thoughts and initiate your action milliseconds before they are experienced consciously. Which of course - you guessed it - progress without deviation.

That is not ''Mr Causal Determinism'' dictating the terms, just how the world works if it is a deterministic system, as defined by compatibilists.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation).'' - Marvin Edwards.

 

[DBT]

It is the necessity of determinism that negates choice and the notion of free will.

Actually, it is the necessity of determinism that guarantees that choosing will be happening and that we will be doing it.

If it must happen as determined, no alternative actions, there no choice involved.

A single necessary action in any given instance does not meet the criteria of 'choice.'

Choice is still being asserted in contradiction of how choice is defined.

Therefore, choice within a deterministic system has not been demonstrated.

Neither choice or free will is compatible with determinism.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Universal causal necessity/inevitability doesn't actually change anything. The feeling that you're experiencing, that you must be free of cause and effect in order to be 'truly' free, is a delusion.

Inevitability can't change anything. That is the definition and nature 'inevitable.' That's the point.

in·ev·it·able

1: certain to happen; unavoidable:

Every freedom that we have, to do anything at all, requires reliable causation. We are not merely the effect of prior causes, but also the causes of new effects. And, because we are members of an intelligent species, we actually get to choose what effects we will cause to happen.

Actions that are performed freely are performed necessarily. It cannot be otherwise.

Actions that are performed freely as determined, being necessary and fixed by antecedents are niether freely willed or chosen.

Determinism: given the state of the world at any moment in time, there is only one way it can be at the next moment.

When a person gets to choose for themselves what they will do, it is called "free will". And people will be held responsible for what they deliberately choose to do. For example, in the restaurant, you will be billed for the dinner you ordered.

What a person does in any given instance is determined by all the events that brought them to that time and place and state of mind and the related response.

Which is neither chosen or freely willed.

That is the nature of determinism.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

 

[Marvin Edwards]

If it must happen as determined, no alternative actions, there no choice involved.

We observe the people in the restaurant making choices. So, obviously choice is necessarily involved.

A single necessary action in any given instance does not meet the criteria of 'choice.'

We consider the many items on the menu that we "can" choose and select the single necessary thing that we "will" choose. That is exactly the criteria of choice: "1.a. The act of choosing; preferential determination between things proposed; selection, election." (OED)

Choice is still being asserted in contradiction of how choice is defined.

There's the definition. The action of selecting from the menu what we will order exactly matches the definition. The claim of contradiction is false.

Therefore, choice within a deterministic system has not been demonstrated.

It is demonstrated every time that a person selects a meal from the restaurant menu. It is delusional to deny that choosing is happening.

The incompatibilist argument attempts to talk us out of what we see with our own eyes. They claim that we are having an illusion when we notice what is happening right in front of us.

Neither choice or free will is compatible with determinism.

Free will is demonstrated every time that a person is free of coercion and undue influence as they decide for themselves what they will order from the menu. Since this is actually happening right in front of us, we must assume that it necessarily happens and that it is compatible with a deterministic view of reality.

''How could I have a choice about anything that is an inevitable consequence of something I have no choice about? And yet ...the compatibilist must deny the No Choice Principle.” - Van Inwagen

Listen, Peter Van Inwagen, stop arguing that you have no choice. Either you choose something from the menu or you can go to bed without any dinner. Grow up kid.

in·ev·it·able 1: certain to happen; unavoidable:

That's right. And if you don't order something from the menu then it is inevitable that you will have no dinner tonight. So, what is inevitable, in this case, is entirely up to you. It is your own choosing that will finally reveal what was always going to happen. Dinner or No Dinner? What's it gonna be, Pete? How about you DBT?

Actions that are performed freely are performed necessarily. It cannot be otherwise.

Actions that are performed necessarily will not be otherwise, even though they could have been otherwise. You're still tripping up because you refuse to acknowledge the difference between "can" and "will", between possibilities and actualities.

Ironically, it turns out that the incompatibilists are the ones "playing word games", taking their own figurative statements literally, and ending up miles away from the truth.

Compatibilists untangle their riddles, test their claims against physical reality, and restore common sense.

 

[pood]

To act is to choose. It should be obvious that if I can think, plan and act (choose) then I have free will.

The ability to think, plan and act has nothing to do with will, yet alone free will.

Free will is being asserted, not established as an element of the system. A flawed definition doesn't make it so.

Here’s how it would be without free will: I think, plan, and … as I am about to act on my choice, someone holds a gun to my head and orders me to do the opposite of what I want. We see that sometimes.

Determinism permits no choice. Whatever happens must necessarily happen precisely as determined by a singular progression of events.
Your ability to think, feel, plan and act is determined by the work and activity of neural architecture.

A failure of a single element of the system, memory function, and it's all over, you can no longer recognize what were familiarthings , think coherently, plan or act rationally.

The ability to think, plan and act has nothing to do with free will.

OR … here is what we never see. I think, plan and … as I am about to act on my choice, Mr. Causal Determinism steps in, says, “Nuh-huh!” and stays my hand to prevent me actuating my choice.

What you overlook are all the unconscious elements that form your thoughts and initiate your action milliseconds before they are experienced consciously. Which of course - you guessed it - progress without deviation.

That is not ''Mr Causal Determinism'' dictating the terms, just how the world works if it is a deterministic system, as defined by compatibilists.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation).'' - Marvin Edwards.

You didn’t answer the question, again. It’s a simple question:

Did Roark design and build the building? Yes? No?

If your answer is No, then please tell us who or what did design the building.

 

[pood]

Both hard determinists and libertarians agree that “true” free will consists of “could have done otherwise” free will — Jerry Coyne, a biologist who is also a hard determinist, has reduced this to “CHDO free will.” We don’t have that, he says, so we don’t have free will. Libertarians agree that CHDO is needed for “true” free will, whatever that is, and that we DO have it.

I think this claim is vacuous, and has no bearing on free will at all.

What do you mean when we say, CHDO? Under the exact same circumstances? Under the exact same mental state?

This claim is unempirical and hence unscientific. We can’t “back up” history and replay it, to see what would happen.

But imagine an American football game. A running back breaks a few tackles, and streaks into the open. He zigs, he zags, he dances around a few downfield defenders, and makes it all the way to the end zone.

There is an instant replay of the touchdown — several, in fact, from multiple angles. When the replays are shown, what would we expect to see?

Would we expect to see the runner fail to score? Or to score in a different way? Obviously not.

Why, then, would we expect that if we could replay history, with the identical antecedent circumstances and the identical mental state of the runner, in this case, a different outcome? Of course the outcome would be the same. So what?

What possible bearing does this have on free will? Answer: None.

 

[bilby]

Because action production by a deterministic process is a problem for compatibilism, acting without external force, coercion or undue influence is not sufficient to establish the reality of Libertarian free will.

FTFY. Again.

Compatiblist free will need not establish the reality of the Libertarian free will that compatibilists reject. You are imposing a nonsensical requirement.

If you persist in equivocating between "Libertarian free will" and "Compatibilist free will", which are completely different things, then it is no surprise that you're horribly confused.

Perhaps you should stop using the phrase "free will" without explicitly stating which of these two different things you are talking about. That would have the unfortunate side effect of destroying your arguments, but the significant benefit of destroying your arguments.

Inner necessity is the self. That the self acts deterministically is a big problem for Libertarian free will. It's no problem whatsoever for Compatibilist free will, because all that's required by Compatibilism is that the responsibility for what is done lies within the individual who does it.

The waiter brings you the bill, because your inner necessity - that is, YOU - placed the order.

I'm not referring to Libertarian free will.

Nobody is referring to Libertarian free will.

The compatibilist definition of free will is basically to act without external force, coercion or undue influence, ie, to act according to one's will or wish.

It is this very definition that fails because it ignores inner necessity. Inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

Again;
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

INNER NECESSITY IS US!!

Freedom from inner necessity is absolutely not required for Compatiblist free will.

Inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of Libertarian free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

It's not an issue at all for Compatiblism. The individual does as he does, without external interference. Whether his actions are deterministic or not is utterly irrelevant.

You say "Nobody is referring to Libertarian free will", but then you start saying stuff that's nonsensical, unless your "free will" is Libertarian. Inner necessity is a problem ONLY for Libertarian definitions of "free will".

If you need to invoke "inner necessity" in your argument, then you are talking about Libertarian free will, whether or not you understand that that's what you are doing.

 

[bilby]

Free will is being asserted, not established as an element of the system. A flawed definition doesn't make it so.

Again, you are describing the definition as "flawed", because it's not Libertarian. That's what invoking "inner necessity" implies.

Ultimately this entire waste of time of a thread boils down to compatibilists having a definition of free will that you refuse to accept. But defining words is not subject to authority, nor to any personal vetos.

When compatiblists say "free will" they mean what they say they mean - action without external interference - and not what you might want to insist that they ought to mean.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Both hard determinists and libertarians agree that “true” free will consists of “could have done otherwise” free will — Jerry Coyne, a biologist who is also a hard determinist, has reduced this to “CHDO free will.” We don’t have that, he says, so we don’t have free will. Libertarians agree that CHDO is needed for “true” free will, whatever that is, and that we DO have it.

I think this claim is vacuous, and has no bearing on free will at all.

What do you mean when we say, CHDO? Under the exact same circumstances? Under the exact same mental state?

This claim is unempirical and hence unscientific. We can’t “back up” history and replay it, to see what would happen.

But imagine an American football game. A running back breaks a few tackles, and streaks into the open. He zigs, he zags, he dances around a few downfield defenders, and makes it all the way to the end zone.

There is an instant replay of the touchdown — several, in fact, from multiple angles. When the replays are shown, what would we expect to see?

Would we expect to see the runner fail to score? Or to score in a different way? Obviously not.

Why, then, would we expect that if we could replay history, with the identical antecedent circumstances and the identical mental state of the runner, in this case, a different outcome? Of course the outcome would be the same. So what?

What possible bearing does this have on free will? Answer: None.

The argument for "could have done otherwise" is fairly simple. Suppose, for example, we are given the choice between chocolate and vanilla:

1. If "I can choose chocolate" is true now, then "I could have chosen chocolate" will be true later.
2. If "I can choose vanilla" is true now, then "I could have chosen vanilla" will be true later.

No matter which choice we make, "I could have chosen otherwise" will always be true. It is only "I would have chosen otherwise" that will always be false.

When we say "I could have done X", we are implying that (a) we definitely did not do X, which is true, and (b) that we only would have done X under different circumstances, which is also true. So, "I could have done otherwise" will always be true when we start with two different things that we "can" do. One of the things we "can" do will become the thing we "will" do. The other will become the thing we "could have" done.

This logic is embedded in the literal meanings of the words "can" and "will".

 

[Jarhyn]

The compatibilist definition of free will is basically to act without external force, coercion or undue influence, ie, to act according to one's will or wish.

It is this very definition that fails because it ignores inner necessity. Inner necessity is just as much a problem for the idea of free will as external force, coercion or undue influence.

"Inner necessity" is also known as "personal responsibility"

"Inner necessity" is not a problem for compatibilist free will because when it is "inner necessity" rather than "external force" causing a decision to resolve as it does, that is exactly when the will is going to be considered by all as "free".

The very invocation of "inner" and "outer" necessity is saying that there are things that something "inside" the boundary may be observed as "responsible for necessitating".

The thing inside in this discussion is US, so saying "inner necessity" is admitting "we are responsible". Responsible, here, for the choices we have observable agency in.

 

[DBT]

\

You have shown nothing.

Perhaps one thing; the knack of misrepresenting incompatibilism, which includes whatever I happen to say, quote or cite, even while brushing aside or rationalizing inner necessity as the ultimate restriction on choice and the notion of free will.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The patience is mine.

I see you still can’t tell us who or what made that building.

No surprise. Because your hard determinism has no answer for this simple question.

I have addressed your example several times. You disappear for a while, then come back and pretend it didn't happen. Now you should go back and read what I said and instead of pretending that nothing happened, just respond to what I said. That would be the reasonable thing to do.

Even now you ignored what I quoted, addressing nothing, just more sniping.

But you didn’t address it. If you did, point me to it. Or just say it here:

Who, or what, designed and built the building, and how did that happen, if Roark was unable to make choices?

Simple question.

I addressed it several times, Nor am I searching through numerous posts in several threads to indulge you. You ignored my reply several times. Just as you ignore anything that I quote and cite.

The explanation is not difficult. It's right there in the quotes I posted a couple of days ago, which instead of reading and considering the implications of what was said in relation to your example, you simply ignored it.

As I noted, you responded, but you did not answer. Again: Roark builds a great building, requiring that he make thousands of correct choices — none of which, according to you, are actual choices. They are illusory choices, I-choices. So clearly, according to you, Roark did not build the building.

Who or what did?

Just answer the question!

At no point has the ability to think, plan and act been denied. So stop spruiking your strawman argument.

Did you not read what I said? That ''the ability to think, plan and act has nothing to do with will, yet alone free will.''

Where have you seen me deny the ability to think, plan and act? Well, I'll tell you, nowhere. You are making unfounded assumptions.

That you are still pushing your Roark strawman shows that you either not reading what I say, or provide, or you don't understand what is being said and provided..

Once again, read the terms and consider the implications.

Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

Do you see this; that''in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action,'' does not mean that we can't fucking think. or fucking plan or fucking act, it means means that whatever we think, plan or do is done necessarily.

That it is impossible for any alternate thought, plan or action to take place within a deterministic system.

So yes, your Roark does indeed think, plan and act, he designs and constructs his building, but that '''it is impossible that he could have made any other decision or performed any other action'' whist doing it.

Is that clear?

Or are you going to pretend that nothing was explained?