Demystifying Determinism

[Marvin Edwards]

There are no choosing events because there are no realizable alternatives to choose from.

There is the restaurant menu listing the many realizable alternatives. Choosing must necessarily happen if we wish to have dinner tonight.

All events are fixed through a process of natural necessity/law;

It is obviously fixed through natural necessity that we will be making a choice from the menu tonight. Yet you continue to deny this reality.

Choosing is a logical operation performed by the brain. Like other logical operations (such as adding or subtracting), choosing actually happens in physical reality.

What the brain does, it does necessarily. The inputs are necessarily delivered as outputs.

The inputs are go through logical operations that produce the outputs. A column of numbers is added to produce a sum. A menu of alternatives is compared and evaluated to produce a choice. These are actual operations performed by our own brains. Neither the adding event nor the choosing event can be denied.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

And that definition is just as true of choosing as it is of adding. Choosing is a bit more complex that adding, because it has more factors involved, such as the criteria we use for evaluating our options, which will vary from person to person. But, given the same person, in the same circumstances, with the same options, we will get the same choice.

What you call 'choosing' is entailment.

I call choosing 'choosing', I call adding 'adding', and I call entailment 'entailment'.

All actions are always equally entailed. So, when speaking of different entailed actions we use different names, to distinguish one action from the other. Every verb in the dictionary identifies a different kind of action, all of which are deterministically entailed.

Your attempt to hide these distinctions between different entailed events destroys useful information. For example:
"What is the person doing?"
"He is doing an entailed action."
"Yeah, but all actions are equally entailed, so which specific action was the person doing? Was he walking, talking, adding, golfing, eating, choosing, sneezing ... or what?"

Entailment because - according to the given terms and definitions - there are no alternate actions.

There are always alternate actions, however, given determinism, only one action will happen. You continue to falsely suggest that if something will not happen then it cannot happen.

But "can" and "will" are two distinct notions. Something that "can" happen is different from something that "will" happen. Not everything that "can" happen "will" happen. For example, everything on the restaurant menu "can" be ordered by each person even though only one dinner "will" be ordered by each person.

If we have certain knowledge that something "will" happen, we simply say that it "will" happen. The notion of what "can" happen never comes up when we already know what "will" happen.

It is only when we are uncertain as to what "will" happen that we switch our context to the things that "can" happen. Something that "can" happen is known as a "possibility" or as an "alternative". The restaurant menu is a list of multiple "alternatives", any one of which "can" be ordered for dinner.

We have lots of words that invoke the context of possibility, words like "can", "potential", "ability", "might", "may", "alternative", "option", "list", "menu", and so on. A "real" possibility is something that could under specific circumstances actually happen. For example, in the restaurant, every item on the menu can be ordered by us and delivered to us, IF we choose to order it (the circumstance).

The only way to account for your confusing what "can" happen with what "will" happen is figurative thinking. There's a good article on the difference between Literal and Figurative Language in Wikipedia. Here's their summary:

• Literal language uses words exactly according to their conventionally accepted meanings or denotation.
• Figurative (or non-literal) language uses words in a way that deviates from their conventionally accepted definitions in order to convey a more complicated meaning or heightened effect.[1] Figurative language is often created by presenting words in such a way that they are equated, compared, or associated with normally unrelated meanings.

The word "as" (as in "AS IF") flags a simile, where one thing is said to be like another thing. IF only one thing will happen then it is AS IF only one thing can happen. But, as always, every figurative statement is literally false. So, if we take a figurative statement literally we get in trouble.

The trouble we get into when we conflate "can" with "will" is that we create a paradox. For example:

Waiter: What will you have for dinner?
Diner: I don't know. What are my possibilities?
Waiter: There is only one thing that you can order and it is the same thing as what you will order. So, if you tell me what you will order then I can tell you what you can order.
Diner: How can I tell you what I will order if I don't know what I can order?!
Waiter: Hmm. We have a paradox. Attention everyone! Is there a Compatibilist in the house?
Compatibilist: "Can" and "will" are two distinct notions that must not be conflated. There are many things that can be ordered even though only one of them will be ordered. Waiter, please hand the Diner a menu of the things she can order.
Waiter: Thanks! I knew you could help.

... we just experience the events and our thoughts and actions that were produced by the information processing activity of the brain as it acquires and processes information and presents it in conscious form milliseconds after the event.

In other words, our brain processes the restaurant menu, selects what we will order according to our own goals and reasons, and tells the Waiter, "I will have the Greek Salad, please".

The fact that what brain activity includes both conscious and unconscious processing does not alter the fact that we chose to order the Greek Salad and we will be expected to pay the Cashier before leaving the restaurant.

The fact that we were neither coerced nor unduly influenced while choosing the Greek Salad means that it was a choice of our own free will. Free will does not require freedom from our brain or freedom from normal cause and effect. It only requires freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence.

 

[bilby]

... misses the point that will itself is fixed by s determininsistic interaction of external events and underlying processes....none of which are freely willed ...

He's not missing that point; He just understands that it's completely irrelevant to anything.

Free will arises from precursors that are not freely willed. X arising from precursors that are not X is such a commonplace phenomenon that it's perfectly reasonable to take it for granted.

You might as well try to argue that life cannot have arisen from non-life - which is another popular misconception.

My car is built from hundreds of parts, not a single one of which is a car. Therefore, by your "logic", it cannot be a car.

 

[DBT]

You said - ''When we hold the will to change ourselves, and that will is free, change is a matter of free will'' - which misses the point that will itself is fixed by s determininsistic interaction of external events and underlying processes....none of which are freely willed, yet you assert that it is an example of free will

Yet again you claim "the machine must build itself to build other things."

But, this machine DOES build itself in many ways, regardless.

You still miss the point. Which is; whatever happens within a deterministic system must happen precisely as determined, s not chosen, no picking or choosing - 'oh, maybe I'll do this instead' is an illusion. It cannot happen. There is no instead.

The fixture of these events by deterministic process changes nothing of the fact that it was my will, caused by my deterministic process which... Changed my deterministic process, via deterministic process.

Your will is just as subject to the implacable development of the system as the actions that must necessarily follow.

You don't get to choose what you will. This is determinism, not let's pretend land.

“It might be true that you would have done otherwise if you had wanted, though it is determined that you did not, in fact, want otherwise.” - Robert Kane

In other words, what you want is formed fully set by antecedents, as is the action that necessarily follows.

Which is to say, my will to change myself was free. The machine does not need to build itself to build other things. Nonetheless, the machine does modify itself.

Uhm, no, you persistently overlook all of the elements that form your will before you even experience the desire to change. Even then, changing an addiction may be impossible without intervention.

''It is unimportant whether one's resolutions and preferences occur because an ''ingenious physiologist' has tampered with one's brain, whether they result from narcotics addiction, from 'hereditary factor, or indeed from nothing at all.' Ultimately the agent has no control over his cognitive states.

So even if the agent has strength, skill, endurance, opportunity, implements, and knowledge enough to engage in a variety of enterprises, still he lacks mastery over his basic attitudes and the decisions they produce. After all, we do not have occasion to choose our dominant proclivities.'' - Prof. Richard Taylor - Metaphysics.

 

[DBT]

... misses the point that will itself is fixed by s determininsistic interaction of external events and underlying processes....none of which are freely willed ...

He's not missing that point; He just understands that it's completely irrelevant to anything.

Of course it's relevant. If underlying processes form our thoughts, feelings and actions prior to consciously experiencing these things, they are not even being willed, yet alone freely willed. Cognition is not a free will activity, it is the role of neural networks processing information prior to conscious report and experience of agency.

”If the neurobiology level is causally sufficient to determine your behavior, then the fact that you had the experience of freedom at the higher level is really irrelevant.” - John Searle.

Free will arises from precursors that are not freely willed. X arising from precursors that are not X is such a commonplace phenomenon that it's perfectly reasonable to take it for granted.

The term 'free will' is being tacked onto a place where it doesn't exist.

If nothing is being willed, where each and every step in the development of the system necessarily follows the last, there is no point where free will can emerge.

You might as well try to argue that life cannot have arisen from non-life - which is another popular misconception.

Nobody has suggested that. If life arises from non life within a deterministic system, life necessarily arises as determined by the conditions within the system.

As nothing is being freely willed, there is no reason to invoke free will as a part of the process.

My car is built from hundreds of parts, not a single one of which is a car. Therefore, by your "logic", it cannot be a car.

Well, no, that is not the argument.

 

[DBT]

There are no choosing events because there are no realizable alternatives to choose from.

There is the restaurant menu listing the many realizable alternatives. Choosing must necessarily happen if we wish to have dinner tonight.

The list is there to cater for different tastes. There are things on a typical menu I would never order. What I order comes to mind when I read the menu in relation to my set of proclivities.

That is the same for everyone. And what you order in the moment, you necessarily order...which means that in that instance there is no alternative.

We have been through all this.

What I said above is entailed in your own definition of determinism;

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation).'' - Marvin Edwards.

If you claim that you could have ordered something else, you'd contradict the terms of your definition - 'fixed' and 'without deviation.'

All events are fixed through a process of natural necessity/law;

It is obviously fixed through natural necessity that we will be making a choice from the menu tonight. Yet you continue to deny this reality.

The reality being the observed actions of ordering and doing whatever must happen.

Given the terms of your definition, each and every action is fixed and and each and every action proceeds without deviation.

That is how it works according to how you define determinism.

Given these terms, nothing is freely chosen. Choice requires the possibility of alternate actions.

Yet according to your definition, there are none.

Choosing is a logical operation performed by the brain. Like other logical operations (such as adding or subtracting), choosing actually happens in physical reality.

What the brain does, it does necessarily. The inputs are necessarily delivered as outputs.

The inputs are go through logical operations that produce the outputs. A column of numbers is added to produce a sum. A menu of alternatives is compared and evaluated to produce a choice. These are actual operations performed by our own brains. Neither the adding event nor the choosing event can be denied.

There can only be one action in any given moment in time. This and nothing else. The action is fixed to happen precisely as it must before it happens.

Entailment and necessity is not a process of choosing. What is done necessarily is not freely chosen. It happens, not because it was chosen, but because it must.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

And that definition is just as true of choosing as it is of adding. Choosing is a bit more complex that adding, because it has more factors involved, such as the criteria we use for evaluating our options, which will vary from person to person. But, given the same person, in the same circumstances, with the same options, we will get the same choice.

That the initial state of a system produces the same result is not a matter of choice. It can be rewound and repeated a million times and the resulting action will be precisely the same each and every time.

That is determinism. A system where no instance of free will can be found.

 

[Jarhyn]

Of course it's relevant. If underlying processes form our thoughts, feelings and actions prior to consciously experiencing these things, they are not even being willed, yet alone freely willed

No, they are still willed, and still freely so. I don't have to be conscious of me willing it to be me willing it.

Either way it was me, and either way I was holding the will. Being conscious of it allows me to self-regulate, but it does not displace responsibility regardless. The failure of consciousness merely would mean that corrections would necessarily have to be imposed from outside rather than inside.

If you would like to continue to quote Searle, please kindly invite them to the discussion so we may berate them properly!

The term 'free will' is being tacked onto a place where it doesn't exist

This is your assertion, made without evidence. It is discounted without evidence.

Nobody has suggested that. If life arises from non life within a deterministic system, life necessarily arises as determined by the conditions within the system.

And the metaphor sails right over your head.

You suggested that something has to will itself to have free will. It does not. It merely has to BE itself holding a will that is free so as to, in that moment, hold a will that is free and produced by its own geometry, to have "free will".

My car is built from hundreds of parts, not a single one of which is a car. Therefore, by your "logic", it cannot be a car.

Well, no, that is not the argument.

You claim something must have it's shape be freely willed of itself to freely will something else.

You claim something must have it's shape be _______ of itself to ________ something else.

You claim something must have it's shape be built of itself to build something else.

As we can see that this model devolves when a specific contextualization is applied, we can see your idea fails through counterexample.

 

[Jarhyn]

The fact is that some people really don't want to look at the idea that choices happen, events where subsets are rendered from sets, and that when this happens the function of the rendering can be identified as "being responsible for the choice rendered".

This does not conflict in any way with determinism.

Yet again, you cannot say 5 marbles were not placed in the tube.

You cannot say one marble did not exit the tube.

Thus you cannot say a subset was not rendered from a set.

Thus choice happens.

Assuming I have a system which holds a script with an IF/ELSE statement in it...

You cannot say things do not hold wills.

You cannot say those wills, when executed, shall have parts constrained and parts free; this is what the IF/ELSE statement does.

Thus you cannot say that free wills And constrained wills do not exist: in if/else, part of the will shall be constrained and parts of the will shall be free.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The list is there to cater for different tastes. There are things on a typical menu I would never order. What I order comes to mind when I read the menu in relation to my set of proclivities.

In other words, you inevitably choose what you will order according to your own tastes and your own dietary goals, your own thoughts and your own feelings.

And, if no one forces you to choose something that you don't want, you are FREE to make this choice for yourself. Specifically, you are free from coercion and undue influence, which is all that free will requires.

That is the same for everyone. And what you order in the moment, you necessarily order ...

Exactly. Both causal necessity and free will are satisfied when people decide for themselves what they will order for dinner.

...which means that in that instance there is no alternative.

There is still no justification for that conclusion. Every item on the menu that you did not order was an alternative to what you did order. Every item on the menu was something that you could have ordered IF things had been different. But, given how things were at this time, you would not order anything else for dinner tonight.

We have been through all this.

Indeed we have. But you keep conflating what "can" happen with what "will" happen, as if they were the same. They are NOT the same.

What we "can" do is not limited by what we "will" do. For example, if we had the money, then we "could" order every item on the menu. But, even if we have the money, it is not something that we "would" choose to do.

What we "could have done" is not limited to what we "would have done". This is not a matter of metaphysics, but simply a matter of the literal meaning of the words "can do" versus the words "will do".

Rather than using the literal meanings of "can" and "will", the incompatibilists attempt to smush them together into a single notion, using figurative language (if only one thing 'will' happen then it is AS IF only one thing 'can' happen). But if we take that figurative sense literally, we end up in a paradox:

Waiter: "What will you have for dinner tonight?"
Diner: "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "Given determinism, there is only one thing that you 'can' order and it is the same thing as what you 'will' order. So, if you tell me what you 'will' order then I can tell you what you 'can' order."
Diner: "How can I tell you what I 'will' order if I don't first know what I 'can' order?!"
Waiter: "Hmm. We have a paradox. Attention everyone! Is there a Compatibilist in the house?"
Compatibilist: " 'Can' and 'will' are two distinct notions that must not be conflated. There are many things that 'can' be ordered even though only one of them 'will' be ordered. Waiter, please hand the Diner a menu of the things she 'can' order."
Waiter: "Thanks! I knew you could help."
Compatibilist: "Yes, you knew that I 'could' help, but you didn't know whether I 'would' help until you asked."

The notions of 'can' and 'could' are clearly very different from the notions of will' and 'would'. When we attempt to limit what 'can' happen to what 'will' happen we create a paradox. So, let's stop doing that.

Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). This means that events 'will' actually proceed in one way.

Although events 'could have' proceeded differently, under different circumstances, they 'would not have' proceeded any other way, under the actual circumstances.

There can only be one action in any given moment in time.

Determinism only means that there 'will' only be one action in any given moment of time, even though there 'can' be many other actions. If we limit what 'can' happen to what 'will' happen we create a paradox.

While figurative speech is quite common in human communications, it has one consistent problem: Every figurative statement is literally false. So, we cannot take figurative statements literally if we care about the truth.

That the initial state of a system produces the same result is not a matter of choice. It can be rewound and repeated a million times and the resulting action will be precisely the same each and every time.

Yes. In that thought experiment, where we roll back time and replay it, we will always choose the Salad rather than the Steak, because we will always have had the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch. And, given those circumstances again, we 'would' always order the Salad for dinner, even though we 'could' have ordered the Steak.

And it shouldn't bother anyone that they 'would' always make the same choice under those same circumstances. It is only when the incompatibilist makes the figurative claim that we 'could not have done otherwise' that everyone normally experiences cognitive dissonance. You see, at the beginning of the choosing process, it was true that we 'could' order anything from the menu. So, how can it also be true that we 'could not have' ordered anything else? It seems like a false claim because it literally is a false claim.

On the other hand, the claim that we 'would not' have ordered the Steak under the same circumstances makes perfect sense.

 

[DBT]

Of course it's relevant. If underlying processes form our thoughts, feelings and actions prior to consciously experiencing these things, they are not even being willed, yet alone freely willed

No, they are still willed, and still freely so. I don't have to be conscious of me willing it to be me willing it.

You are asserting free will despite the terms of your own definition of determinism.

Which means, surprise, surprise, whatever you happen to will, wish, want, desire or do, you must necessarily will, wish, want, desire and do.

No alternatives. No wanting desiring or doing other than precisely what must happen before it even comes to being played out.

That is how determinism works.

That is why your assertion of free will is unfounded.

Either way it was me, and either way I was holding the will. Being conscious of it allows me to self-regulate, but it does not displace responsibility regardless. The failure of consciousness merely would mean that corrections would necessarily have to be imposed from outside rather than inside.

If you would like to continue to quote Searle, please kindly invite them to the discussion so we may berate them properly!

All you need to do is understand what he is saying, and why it is so. That has been amply explained, but to no avail.

To no avail because faith in free will is too strong to overcome reason, just as determined by your proclivities.

The term 'free will' is being tacked onto a place where it doesn't exist

This is your assertion, made without evidence. It is discounted without evidence.

No, it has been explained; no alternatives, all thoughts, feeling and actions fixed by prior states of the system, no willing, wishing, thinking, feeling or doing anything other than what must necessarily happen.

Do you really think this paints a picture of free will?

It's not even in the ballpark.

Nobody has suggested that. If life arises from non life within a deterministic system, life necessarily arises as determined by the conditions within the system.

And the metaphor sails right over your head.

It was irrelevant. You do that a lot.

You suggested that something has to will itself to have free will. It does not. It merely has to BE itself holding a will that is free so as to, in that moment, hold a will that is free and produced by its own geometry, to have "free will".

That's not what I am suggesting.

Now please pay attention: the argument is that the notion of free will, that will has freedom, that will makes a difference, is not compatible with determinism as determinism is defined by you.

No free will possible within a deterministic system.

Please stop making things up and introducing irrelevant examples or metaphors.

My car is built from hundreds of parts, not a single one of which is a car. Therefore, by your "logic", it cannot be a car.

Well, no, that is not the argument.

You claim something must have it's shape be freely willed of itself to freely will something else.

You claim something must have it's shape be _______ of itself to ________ something else.

You claim something must have it's shape be built of itself to build something else.

As we can see that this model devolves when a specific contextualization is applied, we can see your idea fails through counterexample.

 

[DBT]

The list is there to cater for different tastes. There are things on a typical menu I would never order. What I order comes to mind when I read the menu in relation to my set of proclivities.

In other words, you inevitably choose what you will order according to your own tastes and your own dietary goals, your own thoughts and your own feelings.

You don't ''inevitably choose.'' The inevitable just happens. The inevitable happens because, well, it is inevitable. Being inevitable, there are no alternatives and consequently no choice in the matter.

That is the no choice principle of determinism in practice.

And, if no one forces you to choose something that you don't want, you are FREE to make this choice for yourself. Specifically, you are free from coercion and undue influence, which is all that free will requires.

Nope, forced by other people is not the only element at work, As described above, natural necessity eliminates choice and freedom of will just as effectively as coercion by others.

Just the means and expression happen to be different.

There lies the distinction.

In one instance you feel coerced or forced by others, and the other you may feel free but your thoughts and actions are nonetheless restricted to what must necessarily happen, with no ability to alter the course of a fixed progression of events.

Nor being aware of the inner processes that make it happen.

That's determinism.

That is the same for everyone. And what you order in the moment, you necessarily order ...

Exactly. Both causal necessity and free will are satisfied when people decide for themselves what they will order for dinner.

It's not sufficient to qualify for free will status. The reasons are given above.

...which means that in that instance there is no alternative.

There is still no justification for that conclusion. Every item on the menu that you did not order was an alternative to what you did order. Every item on the menu was something that you could have ordered IF things had been different. But, given how things were at this time, you would not order anything else for dinner tonight.

Of course there is sufficient reason for that conclusion.

You outlined the justification yourself: all events fixed by natural law (including brain activity), everything that happens must proceed without deviation.

Which obviously eliminates alternate actions.

Choice, by definition, requires the possibility of taking a different option.

But without alternate actions there is, as defined, no choice.

 

[Jarhyn]

No wanting desiring or doing other than precisely what must happen before it even comes to being played out

Um, yes, there is plenty of desiring other than precisely what will happen before it even comes to being played out.

Unless you assume JFK wanted to die?

Unless you assume I  wanted to be raped?

We can clearly desire futures that will not which cannot, come to pass.

Sometimes the future we want will not be quite when we want it, too, or it takes a couple of tries and we aren't picky about when it happens.

The point is there are things we want and they don't always happen.

When we want something and it happens? That's a free will.

When we want something and it doesn't happen? That's a constrained will.

Oftentimes when I want something and it does happen, I have both a free will and many constrained wills. Some of the wills are constrained by the rules of physics, some of them are constrained by the accident of a particular arrangement of stuff, sometimes the particular arrangement of stuff is "Its not that I don't want it but I want this other thing more."

The fact of us wanting it and working towards what we want makes it happen. Anything different is "eye lasers".

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You don't ''inevitably choose.'' The inevitable just happens. The inevitable happens because, well, it is inevitable. Being inevitable, there are no alternatives and consequently no choice in the matter. That is the no choice principle of determinism in practice.

You've been to the restaurant. You've seen the people choosing from a literal menu of possibilities what they will order for dinner. For you or Peter Van Inwagen or any other "philosopher" to claim that choosing is not happening is literally delusional.

One need only acknowledge the empirical facts to escape the delusion.

Once someone escapes the delusion, they can still acknowledge the logical theory of causal necessity, but it will cease to be a monster that robs them of their control and their freedom.

Deterministic causal necessity does not actually change anything in any meaningful or relevant way.

As described above, natural necessity eliminates choice and freedom of will just as effectively as coercion by others.

Only within the delusion. Cause and effect is not in itself coercive, and it is certainly not undue! Only specific causes, such as coercion, insanity, and other forms of undue influence can rob us of the ability to decide for ourselves what we will do.

In one instance you feel coerced or forced by others, and the other you may feel free but your thoughts and actions are nonetheless restricted to what must necessarily happen, with no ability to alter the course of a fixed progression of events.

Everyone expects a fixed progression of events. That's what cause and effect is about. But people do not expect to be coerced, manipulated, or otherwise unduly influenced to do something they would rather not do. That's why drugging someone in order to have sex with them is considered criminal rape, but consensual sex between conscious adults is not.

The distinction between acts of free will versus acts due to undue influence is a key factor in determining legal responsibility. It is morally irresponsible to attempt to remove these distinctions.

Nor being aware of the inner processes that make it happen. That's determinism.

Choosing is what we call the inner process that makes a deliberate act happen. Determinism, when correctly understood, acknowledges that choosing to rob a bank is very different from being forced to rob a bank because your family is being held hostage by people who will kill them if you don't rob the bank. In one case, the robber is held responsible, in the other, the kidnappers are held responsible.

The continued insistence that there are no distinctions between any such cases, due to the fact that all events are equally inevitable, and thus should be treated the same, is morally corrupting.

It's not sufficient to qualify for free will status.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more and nothing less.

That is all that is required for free will, and that has always been sufficient. This fact is not altered in any way by deterministic causal necessity. No one expects free will to be free of cause and effect. It is only when cause and effect are falsely described as a monster that robs us of our freedom and control that people see it as something that they must be "free of" in order to have any freedom at all.

But that is of course a delusion, created by a series of false but believable suggestions.

 

[pood]

I admire the persistence of the compatibilists posting here, but it seems you are hitting your heads against a brick wall.

I’ll just sum up my own position, and then probably break off from further posting in this thread.

As I have shown, DBT, the hard determinist, is unable, under his metaphysics, to answer a simple question: How did the architect Howard Roark, lacking the ability to choose according to DBT, make the thousands of correct choices needed to design and build a great building? And, if Roark did not build the building, because he had no ability to make the actual choices required to do so, who or what designed and built the building?

DBT has no answer, as we have all seen. Oh, he made a response, but it was nonsensical. (He may have responded further since then, but I have mostly lost interest in this thread and I’m only skimming it over now. If he made a sensible response, I welcome him to point me to it.)

Because, if all of Roark’s choices were illusory, as DBT would have it, there is no reason to think that he would have made all the right choices needed to make a great building, unless one were to absurdly argue that the Big Bang was sentient and that it designed the buildings eons ago, or else to absurdly argue that causal determinism is itself a reified, sentient agent and foresees and plans.

But only brains, human and otherwise, can foresee, and plan, and, yes, make choices. The Big Bang could not. Causal determinism cannot. Because, as I and others have pointed out, causal determinism is descriptive and and not prescriptive. Causal determinism shows how the world goes; it does not make the world go, as it does.

But if the Big Bang did not choose all the countless correct steps to make a great building, and if causal determinism did not do that either; and if Roark didn’t do it either, who or what did? DBT’s answer: blank out.

Now it is true, as I explained earlier, that some things in nature, principally living things, look as if they were designed but really weren’t. But we can account for this appearance of design where none actually exists: natural selection. No comparable account exists to explain how a great building can arise with neither cognitive choice-making nor some natural process similar to how selection works in evolution.

But the answer is staring us right in the face: Roark made genuine, authentic choices, to build that building. Otherwise no building would have gotten built. That’s the end of hard determinism.

Roark made his choices based on antecedent circumstances. When he chose to do x, he could easily have chosen y instead. It was certainly within his power to choose y. But he chose x. Why? Because x seemed the best choice available, under the actual circumstances. Had circumstances been different, Roark might have chosen y. For example, suppose he had to decide between erecting a high-rise or a low-rise building. To make the choice, he has to determine if the ground in that particular location will support a high rise. Let x stand for “will support a high-rise” and y stand for “will not support a high-rise.”

Roark builds a high-rise. Why? Because he found that x was true and y was false. Had y been true, he would have built a low-rise instead.

What does the Big Bang care for whether the ground will support a high-rise or not? It has no capacity to care. The human brain, however, does, and the brain itself, being part of the deterministic process, determines that a high-rise will be built, if antecedent circumstances justify the choice.

To ask whether Roark would have made the same choice had history been backed up, so to say, and replayed, to ask whether he would have made the same choice under identical circumstances, is unempirical and hence vacuous. We cannot run this test. But of course we can say that he would make the same choice, because why wouldn’t he? The hard determinist tacks on to this scenario an unsupported claim: that Roark must make the choice that he does; which means that he has no choice in what he does. But as we have seen, this is absurd. For then we would be back to the Big Bang, even though it had no mind, being the actual architect that built the great building.

When the compatiblilst says that someone could have done other than what he or she did, he means that that person would have done otherwise had circumstances been different. This sort of counterfactual reasoning is an everyday occurrence. I gave an example earlier. Bob wanted to take a job in Boston, but the job in New York offered more, so Bob took the New York job, even though he might have preferred living in Boston. And he would have taken the Boston job, too, if the pay had been better — i.e., had antecedent circumstances been different. This is all very basic stuff.

With respect to Marvin, with whom I am substantively in total agreement and who has done an awesome job in this thread, I will reiterate that I reject any notion of “causal necessity.” The word “necessity” belongs entirely to logic and refers to true propositions that are true at all possible worlds. When Roark chooses how to build a structure, or Marvin chooses what to have for dinner, their choices were, are, and always will be, causally contingent. To suppose otherwise, is to concede that all of our choices are true at all possible worlds; i.e., logically necessary. Such a supposition begs the question in favor of hard determinism, but in any case it’s a logically false proposition. The simple test for the modal status of the truth of any proposition is: can I conceive a situation in which the converse of the proposition brings about a logical contradiction? If I can conceive such a situation, then the modal status of the proposition is (logically) necessary; if I cannot do so, its modal status is (logically) contingent. Since I can conceive Roark building a low-rise instead of a high-rise without logical contradiction, and since I can conceive Marvin ordering steak instead of salad without logical contradiction, then their choices ipso facto are contingent and could have been otherwise.

Also, as Bilby and others, myself included, have noted, what we call free will is an emergent property of underlying component systems, some of which are deterministic and some of which are indeterministic (quantum). As Bilby explained, no single component part of a car is itself a car.

Hard determinism is a quasi-religious faith that, upon scrutiny, cannot even explain how or why a building comes into existence. As such it can safely be discarded as not just wrong, but vacuous.

I expect DBT will now accuse me of another “long-winded, hit-and-run” post, as he baselessly did earlier, but what he’s really asking us to do, when he writes stuff like that, is not look behind the Oz-like curtain of his own impotent metaphysics. Personal aspersions are quite often red herrings. Witness how many times he has insultingly averred that his interlocutors are incapable of understanding anything. I suggest he employ a mirror.

 

[DBT]

No wanting desiring or doing other than precisely what must happen before it even comes to being played out

Um, yes, there is plenty of desiring other than precisely what will happen before it even comes to being played out.

Wow, you don't seem to grasp that experiences like will or desire are denied as being steps in the process of the evolution of events.

It's not hard: conscious will, desires, prompts and urges are also fixed by the events, external and internal, that bring you to the point of experiencing these things.

You don't choose your urges and prompts, desire and will....these things are formed prior to conscious report.

Thoughts and feelings, urges and prompts are generated in response to events in the external world, emerging as fully formed thoughts and urges, they do not control the process, they have no agency in terms of making a difference to outcomes.

They are a part of the inevitable outcome.

I won't bother with the rest. It's the same fallacy over and over again.

 

[DBT]

I admire the persistence of the compatibilists posting here, but it seems you are hitting your heads against a brick wall.

I’ll just sum up my own position, and then probably break off from further posting in this thread.

As I have shown, DBT, the hard determinist, is unable, under his metaphysics, to answer a simple question: How did the architect Howard Roark, lacking the ability to choose according to DBT, make the thousands of correct choices needed to design and build a great building? And, if Roark did not build the building, because he had no ability to make the actual choices required to do so, who or what designed and built the building?

DBT has no answer, as we have all seen. Oh, he made a response, but it was nonsensical. (He may have responded further since then, but I have mostly lost interest in this thread and I’m only skimming it over now. If he made a sensible response, I welcome him to point me to it.)

Because, if all of Roark’s choices were illusory, as DBT would have it, there is no reason to think that he would have made all the right choices needed to make a great building, unless one were to absurdly argue that the Big Bang was sentient and that it designed the buildings eons ago, or else to absurdly argue that causal determinism is itself a reified, sentient agent and foresees and plans.

But only brains, human and otherwise, can foresee, and plan, and, yes, make choices. The Big Bang could not. Causal determinism cannot. Because, as I and others have pointed out, causal determinism is descriptive and and not prescriptive. Causal determinism shows how the world goes; it does not make the world go, as it does.

But if the Big Bang did not choose all the countless correct steps to make a great building, and if causal determinism did not do that either; and if Roark didn’t do it either, who or what did? DBT’s answer: blank out.

Now it is true, as I explained earlier, that some things in nature, principally living things, look as if they were designed but really weren’t. But we can account for this appearance of design where none actually exists: natural selection. No comparable account exists to explain how a great building can arise with neither cognitive choice-making nor some natural process similar to how selection works in evolution.

But the answer is staring us right in the face: Roark made genuine, authentic choices, to build that building. Otherwise no building would have gotten built. That’s the end of hard determinism.

Roark made his choices based on antecedent circumstances. When he chose to do x, he could easily have chosen y instead. It was certainly within his power to choose y. But he chose x. Why? Because x seemed the best choice available, under the actual circumstances. Had circumstances been different, Roark might have chosen y. For example, suppose he had to decide between erecting a high-rise or a low-rise building. To make the choice, he has to determine if the ground in that particular location will support a high rise. Let x stand for “will support a high-rise” and y stand for “will not support a high-rise.”

Roark builds a high-rise. Why? Because he found that x was true and y was false. Had y been true, he would have built a low-rise instead.

What does the Big Bang care for whether the ground will support a high-rise or not? It has no capacity to care. The human brain, however, does, and the brain itself, being part of the deterministic process, determines that a high-rise will be built, if antecedent circumstances justify the choice.

To ask whether Roark would have made the same choice had history been backed up, so to say, and replayed, to ask whether he would have made the same choice under identical circumstances, is unempirical and hence vacuous. We cannot run this test. But of course we can say that he would make the same choice, because why wouldn’t he? The hard determinist tacks on to this scenario an unsupported claim: that Roark must make the choice that he does; which means that he has no choice in what he does. But as we have seen, this is absurd. For then we would be back to the Big Bang, even though it had no mind, being the actual architect that built the great building.

When the compatiblilst says that someone could have done other than what he or she did, he means that that person would have done otherwise had circumstances been different. This sort of counterfactual reasoning is an everyday occurrence. I gave an example earlier. Bob wanted to take a job in Boston, but the job in New York offered more, so Bob took the New York job, even though he might have preferred living in Boston. And he would have taken the Boston job, too, if the pay had been better — i.e., had antecedent circumstances been different. This is all very basic stuff.

With respect to Marvin, with whom I am substantively in total agreement and who has done an awesome job in this thread, I will reiterate that I reject any notion of “causal necessity.” The word “necessity” belongs entirely to logic and refers to true propositions that are true at all possible worlds. When Roark chooses how to build a structure, or Marvin chooses what to have for dinner, their choices were, are, and always will be, causally contingent. To suppose otherwise, is to concede that all of our choices are true at all possible worlds; i.e., logically necessary. Such a supposition begs the question in favor of hard determinism, but in any case it’s a logically false proposition. The simple test for the modal status of the truth of any proposition is: can I conceive a situation in which the converse of the proposition brings about a logical contradiction? If I can conceive such a situation, then the modal status of the proposition is (logically) necessary; if I cannot do so, its modal status is (logically) contingent. Since I can conceive Roark building a low-rise instead of a high-rise without logical contradiction, and since I can conceive Marvin ordering steak instead of salad without logical contradiction, then their choices ipso facto are contingent and could have been otherwise.

Also, as Bilby and others, myself included, have noted, what we call free will is an emergent property of underlying component systems, some of which are deterministic and some of which are indeterministic (quantum). As Bilby explained, no single component part of a car is itself a car.

Hard determinism is a quasi-religious faith that, upon scrutiny, cannot even explain how or why a building comes into existence. As such it can safely be discarded as not just wrong, but vacuous.

I expect DBT will now accuse me of another “long-winded, hit-and-run” post, as he baselessly did earlier, but what he’s really asking us to do, when he writes stuff like that, is not look behind the Oz-like curtain of his own impotent metaphysics. Personal aspersions are quite often red herrings. Witness how many times he has insultingly averred that his interlocutors are incapable of understanding anything. I suggest he employ a mirror.

You have shown nothing.

Perhaps one thing; the knack of misrepresenting incompatibilism, which includes whatever I happen to say, quote or cite, even while brushing aside or rationalizing inner necessity as the ultimate restriction on choice and the notion of free will.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The patience is mine.

 

[DBT]

You don't ''inevitably choose.'' The inevitable just happens. The inevitable happens because, well, it is inevitable. Being inevitable, there are no alternatives and consequently no choice in the matter. That is the no choice principle of determinism in practice.

You've been to the restaurant. You've seen the people choosing from a literal menu of possibilities what they will order for dinner. For you or Peter Van Inwagen or any other "philosopher" to claim that choosing is not happening is literally delusional.

This still misses the point.

Which is, according to your own definition, there are no alternate actions at any point in the progression of events within a deterministic system.

Consequently, what we see are customers placing their one and only possible order in any given instance, not as a matter of free choice, but natural necessity.

If perfect knowledge of the system was available to you, you could precisely predict what each and every customer is going to order.

Given determinism, what we see with our limited perception or understanding of the system is the appearance of choice.

And appearance, of course, is not necessarily representative of the world as it is.

One need only acknowledge the empirical facts to escape the delusion.

You are misrepresenting what I said.

Once someone escapes the delusion, they can still acknowledge the logical theory of causal necessity, but it will cease to be a monster that robs them of their control and their freedom.

The error lies in asserting choice, which is in contradiction to the terms and references of the definition of determinism.

As choice is defined, a fixed progression of events does not represent choice.

Deterministic causal necessity does not actually change anything in any meaningful or relevant way.

Of course it doesn't. Causal necessity sets a progression of events that have no alternatives into motion. No alternatives, no choice.

Which means that decisions are entailed through necessity, fixed, not chosen.

Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. Nothing more and nothing less.

Nothing acts in isolation. Countless elements act upon the brain and determine response according to countless elements in its makeup that are neither chosen or subject to regulation through will or wish.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

That is all that is required for free will, and that has always been sufficient.

That is being asserted, not demonstrated. The demonstration of incompatibility is based on the given terms and references.

This fact is not altered in any way by deterministic causal necessity. No one expects free will to be free of cause and effect. It is only when cause and effect are falsely described as a monster that robs us of our freedom and control that people see it as something that they must be "free of" in order to have any freedom at all.

But that is of course a delusion, created by a series of false but believable suggestions.

Determinism, by definition, permits only one possible outcome.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

 

[Jarhyn]

Wow, you don't seem to grasp that experiences like will or desire are denied as being steps in the process of the evolution of events.

You have to want to do something before you do it. It is the seed that grows into the tree of doing it.

You do not even need to be conscious of it. But it is clear that without the automation script (the will) or the state indicator (the desire), the machine will not do the dance.

Eye lasers indeed.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

You've been to the restaurant. You've seen the people choosing from a literal menu of possibilities what they will order for dinner. For you or Peter Van Inwagen or any other "philosopher" to claim that choosing is not happening is literally delusional.

... according to your own definition, there are no alternate actions at any point in the progression of events within a deterministic system.

That remains correct. There is no alternative to opening the restaurant menu. There is no alternative to considering the alternatives listed on the menu as real possibilities. There is no alternative to choosing for ourselves what we will order. There is no alternative to telling the Waiter what we "will" have for dinner. There is no alternative to having our dinner and paying the cashier on the way out.

Note that "no alternative to the deterministic sequence of events" does not remove any alternatives from the restaurant menu. They are there as a matter of deterministic necessity, and our considering them to be real alternatives is a matter of both logical and causal necessity.

Consequently, what we see are customers placing their one and only possible order in any given instance, not as a matter of free choice, but natural necessity.

You continue to confuse possibilities with actualities, conflating things that can happen with things that will happen. Every item on the menu is a possibility, something that any customer in the restaurant can order at any time. But the fact that this can happen never implies that it will happen. What we "can" do and what we "will" do are two entirely different concepts.

If perfect knowledge of the system was available to you, you could precisely predict what each and every customer is going to order.

Of course. Now, all you need to do is supply the restaurant with Waiters having perfect knowledge, and then we can eliminate the menus entirely. Perhaps you could place an advertisement for Waiters with the condition "only the omniscient need apply".

What?! No one answered the ad? Then I guess we'll have to go back to using the menu and allowing the customers to choose for themselves what they will have for dinner.

Given determinism, what we see with our limited perception or understanding of the system is the appearance of choice.

No, it really is choosing and a "choice" is what we call the output of a choosing operation. The real question here is how you and Van Inwagen manage to make this empirical operation invisible to yourself and others. That's quite an illusion you've created.

And appearance, of course, is not necessarily representative of the world as it is.

And yet no one questions the fact of walking, talking, solving math problems, or choosing, despite the fact that all we have to go on is appearances. The teacher gives out a math quiz and the students return it with the answers. The waiter gives out the menus and the customers return it with their dinner order.

It is an extraordinary claim to suggest that solving the math problems didn't happen or that choosing what we will have for dinner did not happen. Such a claim requires more evidence than a simile, such as "it is as if the Big Bang solved the math problems and not the students" or "it is as if causal determinism chose the dinner and not the customer".

Again, figurative language is commonly used in human speech, but it cannot be taken literally, because every figurative statement is always literally false.

One need only acknowledge the empirical facts to escape the delusion created by figurative thinking.

You are misrepresenting what I said.

Not at all. You're claiming that choosing isn't happening, even after you've witnessed it happening, right? I'm simply explaining how you and others most likely deluded yourselves by figurative thinking into such a conclusion.

Once someone escapes the delusion, they can still acknowledge the logical theory of causal necessity, but it will cease to be a monster that robs them of their control and their freedom.

The error lies in asserting choice, which is in contradiction to the terms and references of the definition of determinism.

There is no error in asserting that what we all saw happening actually did happen. The question them becomes, "how do we explain this event in terms of deterministic causal necessity?" And I've answered that question over and over again: Each event is reliably caused by prior events, the decision to have dinner at the restaurant causes our thoughts and actions as we get in the car, drive to the restaurant, walk in, sit down, and open the menu. Opening the menu reliably causes our thoughts to consider many things, such as what we had for breakfast and lunch, whether to have something familiar or to try something new, what are the special for tonight, how different meals might satisfy our tastes while being consistent with our dietary goals, etc. And these considerations reliably cause us to settle upon one specific dinner order. Having made our choice then causes us to convey our decision to the Waiter, which causes the Waiter to take our order to the kitchen, and eventually return with our dinner order and the bill.

As choice is defined, a fixed progression of events does not represent choice.

I have just laid out a fixed progression of events that happens to represent two choices: first, the choice to have dinner at a restaurant, and second, deciding what we will actually order from the menu.

So, there we have choosing within a fixed progression of events, demonstrating that choosing is consistent with a deterministic view of events.

Causal necessity sets a progression of events that have no alternatives into motion. No alternatives, no choice.

You will have no logical alternative but to consider the items on the menu to be real alternatives as you go about choosing what you will order.

The notion of multiple possibilities is built into logical operations such as choosing, planning, inventing, etc. It cannot be removed or dismissed without breaking these operations.

Nothing acts in isolation. Countless elements act upon the brain and determine response according to countless elements in its makeup that are neither chosen or subject to regulation through will or wish.

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

Despite that collection of false but believable suggestions, the waiter is tapping his pencil and staring at me, "Have you decided what you will have for dinner, or should I come back later?" Apparently it is up to me to make the choice. So, I make the choice. The waiter then brings me my dinner and the bill.

The waiter does not bring the bill to any "countless elements acting upon my brain" nor does he bring the bill to my "genes" even though they were "provided rather than decided". What I ordered was decided by me, and no one else. And the dinner and the bill are set on the table in front of me, and no one else. And I will responsibly pay the cashier on my way out.

Free will is not complicated. It is simply a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Determinism, by definition, permits only one possible outcome.

Sorry, but that claim remains false. Determinism, by definition, permits only one "actual" outcome. And, whenever choosing, or planning, or inventing are involved, determinism, by definition, will necessitate the consideration of multiple "possible" actions and outcomes.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''

That's a reasonable definition of a deterministic system. And that's actually how things always play out, from a determinist's viewpoint, which happens to be my viewpoint. Randomness is a problem of unreliable prediction, not a problem of unreliable causation. All variations in outcome are accountable by variations in inputs or variations in the process. These in turn can always be accounted for through physical, biological, or rational deterministic causal mechanisms. Determinism is rescued by the assumption that (a) these three mechanisms are themselves perfectly reliable within their own domain, such that (b) every event is reliably caused by some specific combination of these mechanisms.

Choosing would be classified as a rational causal mechanism, one that works through logic and calculation. Whether a rational causal mechanism produces a correct or incorrect result does not change its deterministic nature. Faulty logic will produce an erroneous conclusion, but the false conclusion will still be reliably caused. Given the same inputs, the same faulty logic will produce the same error.

Which brings us to the incompatibilists claim that choosing does not happen. The tendency to take certain figurative statements literally, such that possibilities are conflated with actualities, and what can happen is conflated with what will happen, explains this error.

 

[bilby]

You don't choose your urges and prompts, desire and will....these things are formed prior to conscious report.

By who, or what?

(Hint: My subconscious is still "me")

 

[pood]

\

You have shown nothing.

Perhaps one thing; the knack of misrepresenting incompatibilism, which includes whatever I happen to say, quote or cite, even while brushing aside or rationalizing inner necessity as the ultimate restriction on choice and the notion of free will.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents.''

''The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

The patience is mine.

I see you still can’t tell us who or what made that building.

No surprise. Because your hard determinism has no answer for this simple question.