Agreed. When I asked Barbos about what he'd think would happen if Russia gets pushed back to pre-Feb 2022 areas, he advocated for nuclear war. Clearly the nuclear option has been coming up more and more as Russia keeps backsliding and losing allies. My hope is that China will see reason and could talk Russia off of nuclear suicide.I'd say nukes are a real concern if Russia is pushed back to the point where it is obvious they have to withdraw.
Putin is crazy, I mean literally. He left himself no out or off ramp. He has no where to go but down.
Putin and Trump are both unstable. Putin might publicly say to Russians the 'Nazis' are going to invade Russia. If that happens it can escalate all the way to a nuclear exchange. Which is probably why NATO did not make a direct response to the invasion.
Going back far on the forum when he first appeared I though he was either a Russian operative or had links to the Russian government.Agreed. When I asked Barbos about what he'd think would happen if Russia gets pushed back to pre-Feb 2022 areas, he advocated for nuclear war. Clearly the nuclear option has been coming up more and more as Russia keeps backsliding and losing allies. My hope is that China will see reason and could talk Russia off of nuclear suicide.I'd say nukes are a real concern if Russia is pushed back to the point where it is obvious they have to withdraw.
Putin is crazy, I mean literally. He left himself no out or off ramp. He has no where to go but down.
Putin and Trump are both unstable. Putin might publicly say to Russians the 'Nazis' are going to invade Russia. If that happens it can escalate all the way to a nuclear exchange. Which is probably why NATO did not make a direct response to the invasion.
However, I do agree with Jay that I expect a Russian counterattack as some point. Presently, Ukraine has taken back about 3,000 KM back from Russia. An amazing achievement. But Russia still occupies 125,000 KM of Ukranian land.
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Trump had private meetings with Putin with no Americans present.I can't help but wonder.
All those Top Secret US military documents Trump left available to Russians. How much of that treasure trove of information gave Putin the idea that he could win Ukraine in a few days. But when it was known to be missing, and the US military responded appropriately, it turned into a disaster for the Russians.
Maybe the reason the Russians are having such a bad invasion is because they trusted Trump more than most Americans do.
No truth claims here, just connecting dots.
Tom
I'm seeing some reports in Twitter that Russia is retreating in Kherson. Not confirmed yet, but if it is... called it.EDIT: I think Russia will have to respond somehow. Either by escalating with mobilization, nuclear "accident" in ZNPP, etc., or by scaling down their goals and setting up a defensible front line. It would be strategically sound to withdraw from Kherson city to left bank of Dnipro, but that would mean giving up on Odessa, which is politically difficult.
Drone footage of Russian.. um... redeployment efforts? Yea, lets go with that.
Nadezhdin: We're now at the point when we have to understand it's absolutely impossible to defeat Ukraine using those resources and colonial war methods with which Russia is trying to wage war, using contract soldiers, mercenaries, no mobilization. A strong army is opposing the Russian Army, fully supported by the most powerful countries, in the economic and technological sense, including European countries.
Host: Are you suggesting military mobilization?
Nadezhdin: I'm suggesting peace talks about stopping the war, and moving on to dealing with political issues.
I think the key that the Russians are contemplating is that NATO *can*, if they want to. Russia cannot.The problem is that the current Ukrainian offensive is rapidly depleteing their munitions and supplies.
By mid winter both sides will no longer to commit to sustained major offensive operations. Unless NATO
No clue, but Julia Davis on twitter regularly posts clips of Russian shows with translations.That was really interesting listening to them discuss from a Russian perspective - and even more so looking at how they look at each other. When Goatee Man was talking, Crew-Cut Man was looking at him like, “You are going to fall out of a window, comrade.”
I’d be intrested in watching more of this. Are they a weekly show?
I have a question. Considering the huge disparity between what Putin thought the Russian military was like in January and what it actually is, how meaningful is Russia's nuclear arsenal nowadays? Has it been traded for a bunch of IOUs and vodka? I suspect it has the capability to turn some of Ukraine into a parking lot, but that would severely deplete their nuclear stockpile.Agreed. When I asked Barbos about what he'd think would happen if Russia gets pushed back to pre-Feb 2022 areas, he advocated for nuclear war. Clearly the nuclear option has been coming up more and more as Russia keeps backsliding and losing allies. My hope is that China will see reason and could talk Russia off of nuclear suicide.
Russia possesses an estimated 5,977 nuclear warheads as of 2022, the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world; the second-largest stockpile is the United States' 5,428 warheads. Russia's deployed missiles (those actually ready to be launched) number about 1,588, second to the United States' 1,644.
Under the 2010 bilateral New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty—also known as New START—the United States and Russia have a similar number of deployed strategic (i.e., high-yield and long-range) nuclear weapons: 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each. But not all of Washington’s or Moscow’s nuclear weapons are covered by New START.
Indeed, Russia has nearly a 10:1 advantage over the United States and NATO in non-strategic (i.e., low-yield and short-range) nuclear weapons (NSNWs).
Assessments based on open sources estimate that Russia has about 2,000 NSNWs. It is similarly assessed that the United States and NATO have about 200 NSNWs in their arsenal. It is postulated that half of those U.S.-NATO weapons are located in the United States and half are based in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear forces.
>>> The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time
While capable of significant destruction, these tactical nuclear weapons are lower in yield—or explosive power—and are meant for use on the battlefield against military installations or troop and equipment concentrations as opposed for use against counterforce or countervalue targets such as ICBM missile fields, command and control nodes, and or population centers (e.g., cities).
It is believed that Russia can deploy these weapons on multiple tactical systems including dual-capable short-range or theater ballistic missiles, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. Indeed, it is expected that Russia’s new hypersonic weapons may be dual-capable (i.e., conventional or nuclear armed) as well.
Major nuclear weapons states, including Russia, have said that a nuclear war could never be won and therefore should never be fought. However, there are deep concerns among policy makers and security analysts outside Russia about whether Moscow fully embraces that idea or if it is just convenient diplomatic rhetoric.
Also of increasing concern is a Russian military doctrine associated with battlefield nuclear weapons known as “escalate to deescalate.” This topic is of particularly interest right now with the war in Ukraine ongoing since late February