In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[DBT]

No that's compulsion. Decision making is essentially the weighing of the cost to benefit for the individual (or their associates) that the option presents.

So you are telling me that the best option is always something enjoyable?

No. Decision making as a cost to benefit ratio...how much we are willing to sacrifice for the reward we hope to get. Unless someone happens to be a masochist or a willing martyr and suffering is a reward unto itself.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - It is obvious that a subject informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction of the action he is to decide on will be able to change his decision, thereby making the prediction false.

Why "always"?

All you need to fault a claim is one counterexample.

But it's not "one counterexample".

It would be if your proposition A had claimed that the Godel box always "correctly predicts decisions".

Sorry to be nitpicky but this is not the first time that the godel box TE (or something similar) has been has been presented to me as evidence against determinism - it's not. It's a silly argument so I'm not inclined to give sloppy argumentation a pass.

I thought A did mean that the Gödel Box always correctly predicted decisions, but fair enough, so the paradox should read instead:

Proposition A - The universe is deterministic therefore the Gödel Box always correctly predicts decisions.

Proposition B - Among the subjects informed in advance of the Gödel Box prediction, some will change their decision, thereby making the prediction false. This will be true in particular if subjects are sufficiently motivated to fault the Gödel Box, for example by rewarding them if they succeed and by punishing them if they fail, for example by adding a mechanism designed to kill them in case of failure.​

Though, if I understand you, you don't accept A in this new version. So, no paradox for you, just a true proposition (B) contradicting a false one (A). Yes?

I just need to convince you that some people will make the Gödel Box's prediction false by taking a decision different from the one predicted.

You don't need to.
I'm perfectly willing to concede that the godel-box (like any embedded subsystem within the universe) cannot be relied upon to correctly predict all things. However this is not evidence of indeterminacy and therefore does not count as evidence against determinism.

And I agree with that.

However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

I agree with that but then this is clearly a metaphysical claim, which you and other materialists should dismiss out of hand as unfalsifiable.

No. The claim that the universe is deterministic/indeterministic is a metaphysical claim. However the claim of external observer predictability is not (it logically follows from determinism).

Ok.

Although I lean toward the possibility that the universe is fundamentally deterministic, I am strictly speaking agnostic. I have no idea why you think materialists should dismiss out of hand all metaphysical (unfalsifiable) claims.

I was not saying that they should not believe them true. I was saying it cannot be a scientific claim.

Ok, we're done.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I was not saying that they should not believe them true. I was saying it cannot be a scientific claim.

I don't understand how a philosophical claim can be other than metaphysical. In addition how can one know that because someone claims something metaphysical one necessarily is precluded from scientific investigation of the problem?

 

[Speakpigeon]

I was not saying that they should not believe them true. I was saying it cannot be a scientific claim.

I don't understand how a philosophical claim can be other than metaphysical.

Obviously the term "philosophical" is not synonymous with "metaphysical". The term "metaphysical", as I used it here, has a rather narrow sense of being about the existence of something independently of our observation of reality. But there's no similar expression in use with "philosophy", not that I know of. So I'm not sure what a philosophical claim is supposed to be. If you could provide a definition, I could try to answer your question.


As I see it, philosophy is a bit like literature, there's no appropriate definition of it as a field of intellectual inquiry. Everything goes, it seems to me, as long as it is a genuine act. Some of my own claims are not scientific and yet they are also not metaphysical. However, it's also the case that I'm unwilling to describe them as philosophical either and you'll remember than I say I don't do philosophy.

Further, I think at least some claims made by philosophers qualify as pre-scientific claims rather than as metaphysical ones. The idea is that when people discuss God as a Being they don't normally have at the back of their mind the perspective that one day science could prove their claim true. But at least some of the claims made by philosophers are made with precisely this perspective in mind. That doesn't make them scientific but it would be misleading to call them metaphysical.

In other words, the characteristic of being metaphysical or not depends on how the thing in question is conceived of, not on what method is used to investigate it.

Also, my view is that most of Western philosophy is based on the observation of the world because what is being investigated is conceived of as part of the world. Sure, you'll find many metaphysical claims in Western philosophy, but also interpretations of facts as could ultimately be made scientific.

In addition how can one know that because someone claims something metaphysical one necessarily is precluded from scientific investigation of the problem?

I need only repeat what I already said above:

The term "metaphysical", as I used it here, has a rather narrow sense of being about the existence of something independently of our observation of reality.​

Isn't that enough?

Maybe you have a different definition?
EB

 

[fromderinside]

I don't understand how a philosophical claim can be other than metaphysical.

Obviously the term "philosophical" is not synonymous with "metaphysical". The term "metaphysical", as I used it here, has a rather narrow sense of being about the existence of something independently of our observation of reality. But there's no similar expression in use with "philosophy", not that I know of. So I'm not sure what a philosophical claim is supposed to be. If you could provide a definition, I could try to answer your question.


As I see it, philosophy is a bit like literature, there's no appropriate definition of it as a field of intellectual inquiry. Everything goes, it seems to me, as long as it is a genuine act. Some of my own claims are not scientific and yet they are also not metaphysical. However, it's also the case that I'm unwilling to describe them as philosophical either and you'll remember than I say I don't do philosophy.

Further, I think at least some claims made by philosophers qualify as pre-scientific claims rather than as metaphysical ones. The idea is that when people discuss God as a Being they don't normally have at the back of their mind the perspective that one day science could prove their claim true. But at least some of the claims made by philosophers are made with precisely this perspective in mind. That doesn't make them scientific but it would be misleading to call them metaphysical.

In other words, the characteristic of being metaphysical or not depends on how the thing in question is conceived of, not on what method is used to investigate it.

Also, my view is that most of Western philosophy is based on the observation of the world because what is being investigated is conceived of as part of the world. Sure, you'll find many metaphysical claims in Western philosophy, but also interpretations of facts as could ultimately be made scientific.

In addition how can one know that because someone claims something metaphysical one necessarily is precluded from scientific investigation of the problem?

I need only repeat what I already said above:

The term "metaphysical", as I used it here, has a rather narrow sense of being about the existence of something independently of our observation of reality.​

Isn't that enough?

Maybe you have a different definition?
EB

Your text reassures me you see yourself as a philosopher. In may view a claim made by one who sees oneself as a philosopher on a philosophical thread as a philosophical claim. That should take care of those who I see making such claims on this thread. Any claim made by one who makes philosophical claims could be, IMHO, could be called by me a metaphysical claim. I'm going to cut you some slack. Any claim made by one who sees himself as a philosopher and who also behaves as if one believes one is a philosopher on one of these philosophical threads (you are participating in all categories) without offering support, preferably manipulated material support (support of experiment from a peer reviewed journal or other wise agreed by participants in which the material), presented as material evidence is presenting a metaphysical claim.

Yes I often present metaphysical claims

As to your funny little end bit I have just a bit of comment. Many things we attempt to manipulate can't be materially manipulated. We make observations about these. for instance we can't manipulate what we call black matter or energy. Yet we made this observation and I presume that since we made it we are being real and making a claim in reality. There are other things, gods come to mind, which we can't manipulate yet we call then gods and they appear as guiding material for our lives.

I'm going out on a limb and presuming both are considered by you to be metaphysical philosophical questions.

As for The AntiChris question it comes back to my thought that we can't measure or manipulate dark matter nor energy. Yet, in due time, I am confident we shall be able to do so since out current theories of the laws of nature are beginning to include them with presumptive attributes and effects and the theories continue to make verifiable predictions. Are we not manipulating material things and creating evidence compatible with existing theory even though that theory includes stuff we cannot yet manipulate or measure and is this not science.

I just think we think up a lot of stuff that we use to explain reality some of it is bullshit and yet it is motivatingly compelling. Other stuff is not verifiable but after a while we find ways to make sense of it in material ways. seems to be a pretty ridiculous pin on which to place oneself to claim that metaphysical questions cannot be reality.

 

[rousseau]

Without addressing the original post directly (I think fromderinside did a pretty good job at the beginning of the thread), this is where I've personally landed on the topic of free will:

- we are human beings
- all that we can do/say/know is constrained by the fact that we're human beings
- as people we've evolved in way that makes our lives comfortable, enjoyable, and fun, given that our needs are met
- regardless of how you conceptualize that experience, the most accurate description of our experience is: "we are experiencing being human"
- therefore diving into the black hole of free will is irrelevant, our lives are what they are no matter how you size them up
- therefore pour yourself a tall glass of whisky

 

[DBT]

Well put, rousseau.

 

[fromderinside]

Well put, rousseau.

I'd sat ditto except for the existence of religion based same folk reasoning.

 

[Togo]

If you want to tighten up Togo's TE I suppose you could stipulate that the subject will always and without exception do the opposite of what's predicted, in which case you've asked the godel-box to perform an unsolvable calculation (it entails an infinite feedback loop). This is why embedded subsystems within the universe are problematic for absolute predictability. However determinism only implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe.

Which is why it's called a Godel-box. After Godel's mathematical discovery that a system may not be predictable even in theory, to those within the system.

The difficulty comes when you realise that, for something to be determined according to fixed laws and causality, you can't have external information. For any form of determinism relying on causality and natural laws, all information is internal to the system. So what happens to events that are supposedly determined by natural law and causality, but can not, even in principle, be so determined?

It would be if your proposition A had claimed that the Godel box always "correctly predicts decisions".

Sorry to be nitpicky but this is not the first time that the godel box TE (or something similar) has been has been presented to me as evidence against determinism - it's not. It's a silly argument so I'm not inclined to give sloppy argumentation a pass.

The original argument was that the Godel-box was infallible.

I made up the Gödel-Box back 2012, in conjunction with a mathematician and physicist of my acquaintance, due to my frustration at not having an argument that combined mathematical reasoning with philosophical. I'd be interested in any similar arguments that are floating around out there, since I couldn't find them at the time.

I'm perfectly willing to concede that the Gödel-Box (like any embedded subsystem within the universe) cannot be relied upon to correctly predict all things. However this is not evidence of indeterminacy and therefore does not count as evidence against determinism.

No, it's evidence that determinism is implausible within a closed system. You need external information.

It's an argument against a very particular form of determinism - that formed entirely by physical laws, which by definition use physical data - information within the system. I have no problem with determinism as a metaphysical position.

Although I lean toward the possibility that the universe is fundamentally deterministic, I am strictly speaking agnostic. I have no idea why you think materialists should dismiss out of hand all metaphysical (unfalsifiable) claims.

Fair enough. We get a lot people through here who argue just that, though, so it's a point worth making.

 

[The AntiChris]

For any form of determinism relying on causality and natural laws, all information is internal to the system. So what happens to events that are supposedly determined by natural law and causality, but can not, even in principle, be so determined?

I'm afraid I can't make sense of this.

I made up the Gödel-Box back 2012, in conjunction with a mathematician and physicist of my acquaintance, due to my frustration at not having an argument that combined mathematical reasoning with philosophical. I'd be interested in any similar arguments that are floating around out there, since I couldn't find them at the time.

You may find this interesting: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

I'm perfectly willing to concede that the Gödel-Box (like any embedded subsystem within the universe) cannot be relied upon to correctly predict all things. However this is not evidence of indeterminacy and therefore does not count as evidence against determinism.

No, it's evidence that determinism is implausible within a closed system. You need external information.

No. It's only evidence that infallible predictability is impossible within a closed system

It's an argument against a very particular form of determinism

No. It only demonstrates that predictability is not always possible within a closed system.

 

[ryan]

Without addressing the original post directly (I think fromderinside did a pretty good job at the beginning of the thread), this is where I've personally landed on the topic of free will:

- we are human beings
- all that we can do/say/know is constrained by the fact that we're human beings
- as people we've evolved in way that makes our lives comfortable, enjoyable, and fun, given that our needs are met
- regardless of how you conceptualize that experience, the most accurate description of our experience is: "we are experiencing being human"
- therefore diving into the black hole of free will is irrelevant, our lives are what they are no matter how you size them up
- therefore pour yourself a tall glass of whisky

Personally, I think this is very irresponsible and can lead to a less fulfilling life.

We may have very limited or constrained choices - but choices nonetheless. What if our brains are functions of quantum mechanical behavior? What if every once and a while choices come down to what a particle in a superposition does (remember, we are these particles)? We don't know enough about this yet to rule it out. Better yet, what if our identity as human beings are specially arranged quantum entangled systems that can make "free will" decisions based on instantaneously sampling multiple sources of information through space and time? I don't see how this isn't possible.

Anyways, if we have choices, then we are responsible for getting what we want out of life. If we don't have choices, then acting as if we have a choice was predetermined, which we were going to do anyway. In other words, if I don't have choices, then I don't have a choice to act as if I have choices - I am forced to look like a fool. But if I do have choices, which is what I believe, then I am going to take advantage of them when I can.

I don't think we have choices all of the time because it definitely seems like I am mostly on autopilot making unconscious choices. But it definitely at least seems like we have conscious choices sometimes, and I think we have to take advantage of them when they arise.

 

[bilby]

Terry Pratchett summarised this well in Small Gods:

"His philosophy was a mixture of three famous schools -- the Cynics, the Stoics and the Epicureans -- and summed up all three of them in his famous phrase, 'You can't trust any bugger further than you can throw him, and there's nothing you can do about it, so let's have a drink.'"

 

[DBT]

Without addressing the original post directly (I think fromderinside did a pretty good job at the beginning of the thread), this is where I've personally landed on the topic of free will:

- we are human beings
- all that we can do/say/know is constrained by the fact that we're human beings
- as people we've evolved in way that makes our lives comfortable, enjoyable, and fun, given that our needs are met
- regardless of how you conceptualize that experience, the most accurate description of our experience is: "we are experiencing being human"
- therefore diving into the black hole of free will is irrelevant, our lives are what they are no matter how you size them up
- therefore pour yourself a tall glass of whisky

Personally, I think this is very irresponsible and can lead to a less fulfilling life.

We may have very limited or constrained choices - but choices nonetheless. What if our brains are functions of quantum mechanical behavior? What if every once and a while choices come down to what a particle in a superposition does (remember, we are these particles)? We don't know enough about this yet to rule it out. Better yet, what if our identity as human beings are specially arranged quantum entangled systems that can make "free will" decisions based on instantaneously sampling multiple sources of information through space and time? I don't see how this isn't possible.

Anyways, if we have choices, then we are responsible for getting what we want out of life. If we don't have choices, then acting as if we have a choice was predetermined, which we were going to do anyway. In other words, if I don't have choices, then I don't have a choice to act as if I have choices - I am forced to look like a fool. But if I do have choices, which is what I believe, then I am going to take advantage of them when I can.

I don't think we have choices all of the time because it definitely seems like I am mostly on autopilot making unconscious choices. But it definitely at least seems like we have conscious choices sometimes, and I think we have to take advantage of them when they arise.

The ability to make decisions has nothing to do with free will. We (the brain) have the ability to make decisions, but all the decisions we (the brain) make are shaped and formed by:

1 - The unchosen neural architecture of the brain.
2 - The unchosen inputs and information processing activity of neural structures and networks.
3 - The unchosen memory content of neural structures and networks, life experience in the form of 'software' - without which decision making, including consciousness itself (as we experience conscious phenomena), is not possible.

So the brain is 'responsible' for the decisions it makes, but the decisions it makes are determined by the factors outlined above.

The law holds people with a healthy functional brain responsible for their actions, quite rightly, because a functional brain is able weigh the cost to benefit ratio of any given set of options that arebeing presented. This is not 'free will' but information processing by neural networks, the human brain being an intelligent system of neural structures and connections with its own self programming software memory content, again, without memory function, thought and decision making is not possible.

Which makes the term 'free will' irrelevant.

 

[ryan]

Personally, I think this is very irresponsible and can lead to a less fulfilling life.

We may have very limited or constrained choices - but choices nonetheless. What if our brains are functions of quantum mechanical behavior? What if every once and a while choices come down to what a particle in a superposition does (remember, we are these particles)? We don't know enough about this yet to rule it out. Better yet, what if our identity as human beings are specially arranged quantum entangled systems that can make "free will" decisions based on instantaneously sampling multiple sources of information through space and time? I don't see how this isn't possible.

Anyways, if we have choices, then we are responsible for getting what we want out of life. If we don't have choices, then acting as if we have a choice was predetermined, which we were going to do anyway. In other words, if I don't have choices, then I don't have a choice to act as if I have choices - I am forced to look like a fool. But if I do have choices, which is what I believe, then I am going to take advantage of them when I can.

I don't think we have choices all of the time because it definitely seems like I am mostly on autopilot making unconscious choices. But it definitely at least seems like we have conscious choices sometimes, and I think we have to take advantage of them when they arise.

The ability to make decisions has nothing to do with free will. We (the brain) have the ability to make decisions, but all the decisions we (the brain) make are shaped and formed by:

1 - The unchosen neural architecture of the brain.
2 - The unchosen inputs and information processing activity of neural structures and networks.
3 - The unchosen memory content of neural structures and networks, life experience in the form of 'software' - without which decision making, including consciousness itself (as we experience conscious phenomena), is not possible.

So the brain is 'responsible' for the decisions it makes, but the decisions it makes are determined by the factors outlined above.

The law holds people with a healthy functional brain responsible for their actions, quite rightly, because a functional brain is able weigh the cost to benefit ratio of any given set of options that arebeing presented. This is not 'free will' but information processing by neural networks, the human brain being an intelligent system of neural structures and connections with its own self programming software memory content, again, without memory function, thought and decision making is not possible.

Which makes the term 'free will' irrelevant.

I equated quantum mechanics as the mechanism responsible for what I claim is free will. In order to see how much of an effect quantum mechanics has on our bodies and the choices we make, I would like you to read my thought experiment.

Imagine that the universe divides into two exact copies right now. In both cases, your body is subject to the exact same physical phenomena that we have already, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. But the rest of your environment in both universes is completely ran by classical mechanics (please suspend any major differences that this would cause between a universe with quantum mechanics and a universe without it). Now, how much do you think that the two DBT's would deviate from each other? Remember, there will probably be a lot of differences even without our brains being functions of quantum mechanics.

Please note. They don't know the exact mechanism for choosing to direct attention to one conversation over another. At least the last I heard there wasn't any good explanations for this yet. Anyways, I would be surprised if the attention that I choose is entirely explained with classical mechanics.

The whole point in response to rousseau's post is that we don't know everything about humans or the nature of what we are made of, so there is no reason not to believe in free will. If you believe in free will and there is free will, then you at least can have some control over your life. But if there is no free will and you believe in free will, then you can't be a fool because you didn't have a choice anyway.

 

[bilby]

The ability to make decisions has nothing to do with free will. We (the brain) have the ability to make decisions, but all the decisions we (the brain) make are shaped and formed by:

1 - The unchosen neural architecture of the brain.
2 - The unchosen inputs and information processing activity of neural structures and networks.
3 - The unchosen memory content of neural structures and networks, life experience in the form of 'software' - without which decision making, including consciousness itself (as we experience conscious phenomena), is not possible.

So the brain is 'responsible' for the decisions it makes, but the decisions it makes are determined by the factors outlined above.

The law holds people with a healthy functional brain responsible for their actions, quite rightly, because a functional brain is able weigh the cost to benefit ratio of any given set of options that arebeing presented. This is not 'free will' but information processing by neural networks, the human brain being an intelligent system of neural structures and connections with its own self programming software memory content, again, without memory function, thought and decision making is not possible.

Which makes the term 'free will' irrelevant.

I equated quantum mechanics as the mechanism responsible for what I claim is free will. In order to see how much of an effect quantum mechanics has on our bodies and the choices we make, I would like you to read my thought experiment.

Imagine that the universe divides into two exact copies right now. In both cases, your body is subject to the exact same physical phenomena that we have already, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. But the rest of your environment in both universes is completely ran by classical mechanics (please suspend any major differences that this would cause between a universe with quantum mechanics and a universe without it). Now, how much do you think that the two DBT's would deviate from each other? Remember, there will probably be a lot of differences even without our brains being functions of quantum mechanics.

Please note. They don't know the exact mechanism for choosing to direct attention to one conversation over another. At least the last I heard there wasn't any good explanations for this yet. Anyways, I would be surprised if the attention that I choose is entirely explained with classical mechanics.

But the whole point of this is that we don't know everything about humans or the nature of what we are made of, so there is no reason not to believe in free will. If you believe in free will and there is free will, then you at least can have some control over your life. But if there is no free will and you believe in free will, then you can't be a fool because you didn't have a choice anyway.

Pascal's wager doesn't fly for religion; and it doesn't fly here either.

If there is no free will, then the concept "there is no reason not to believe in free will" is meaningless - reason doesn't make a jot of difference.

 

[ryan]

Pascal's wager doesn't fly for religion; and it doesn't fly here either.

If there is no free will, then the concept "there is no reason not to believe in free will" is meaningless - reason doesn't make a jot of difference.

I agree if your circular argument is correct. But you are going to have to prove that there is no free will instead of assuming it.

 

[bilby]

Pascal's wager doesn't fly for religion; and it doesn't fly here either.

If there is no free will, then the concept "there is no reason not to believe in free will" is meaningless - reason doesn't make a jot of difference.

I agree if your circular argument is correct. But you are going to have to prove that there is no free will instead of assuming it.

It's not MY circular argument; it is a modified part of YOUR original argument, and I am demonstrating that it is circular.

You said "But the whole point of this is that we don't know everything about humans or the nature of what we are made of, so there is no reason not to believe in free will. If you believe in free will and there is free will, then you at least can have some control over your life. But if there is no free will and you believe in free will, then you can't be a fool because you didn't have a choice anyway."

The bolded part is flawed, as I just pointed out - it contains an implied circular argument.

 

[DBT]

I equated quantum mechanics as the mechanism responsible for what I claim is free will. In order to see how much of an effect quantum mechanics has on our bodies and the choices we make, I would like you to read my thought experiment.

It makes no difference how quantum mechanics effects the brain (being the agent of information processing) because the effects are not chosen. Quantum probability, or randomness, being no more chosen than the events of causal determinism. Forces beyond the control of the brain, being the sole information processor, effect changes in neural mechanisms that in turn altering behaviour that is experienced in conscious form....rendering the term 'free will' irrelevant, yet it still holds an appeal for some as an ideology.

 

[ryan]

I agree if your circular argument is correct. But you are going to have to prove that there is no free will instead of assuming it.

It's not MY circular argument; it is a modified part of YOUR original argument, and I am demonstrating that it is circular.

You said "But the whole point of this is that we don't know everything about humans or the nature of what we are made of, so there is no reason not to believe in free will. If you believe in free will and there is free will, then you at least can have some control over your life. But if there is no free will and you believe in free will, then you can't be a fool because you didn't have a choice anyway."

The bolded part is flawed, as I just pointed out - it contains an implied circular argument.

No, read it again. My argument includes free will and no free will. You had it right the first time; it is like Pascal's wager.

 

[ryan]

I equated quantum mechanics as the mechanism responsible for what I claim is free will. In order to see how much of an effect quantum mechanics has on our bodies and the choices we make, I would like you to read my thought experiment.

It makes no difference how quantum mechanics effects the brain (being the agent of information processing) because the effects are not chosen. Quantum probability, or randomness, being no more chosen than the events of causal determinism. Forces beyond the control of the brain, being the sole information processor, effect changes in neural mechanisms that in turn altering behaviour that is experienced in conscious form....rendering the term 'free will' irrelevant, yet it still holds an appeal for some as an ideology.

If quantum mechanics is part of making choices or anything else that has to do with the consciousness, then "I" am quantum mechanical down to the most fundamental level of what I am. My nature is quantum mechanical because my physical nature is quantum mechanical.