My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things). Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

Looking at this objectively, probably nobody is going to say that there is a difference. That is why you have to be a twin in the thought experiment.

 

[DBT]

The consciousness of one twin cannot be precisely the same as other because experience alters a brain in specific ways, dendrites and connections are formed that are not identical to the other twin. Brain plasticity, in other words.

 

[ryan]

The consciousness of one twin cannot be precisely the same as other because experience alters a brain in specific ways, dendrites and connections are formed that are not identical to the other twin. Brain plasticity, in other words.

I addressed that in the OP.

 

[DBT]

The consciousness of one twin cannot be precisely the same as other because experience alters a brain in specific ways, dendrites and connections are formed that are not identical to the other twin. Brain plasticity, in other words.

I addressed that in the OP.

It's not possible for twins to experience the exact same things, unless you meant something along the line of Thoraco-omphalopagus or Craniopagus twins?

Even then, in spite of conjoined bodies, each separate brain has a slightly different perspective of the world, left or right hand view, etc, which alters neural architecture to some degree, plasticity, so consciousness is not identical; consciousness being an expression of the information content of a brain...given time and events, no two brains being identical, not even the same brain from moment to moment.

 

[ryan]

I addressed that in the OP.

It's not possible for twins to experience the exact same things, unless you meant something along the line of Thoraco-omphalopagus or Craniopagus twins?

Even then, in spite of conjoined bodies, each separate brain has a slightly different perspective of the world, left or right hand view, etc, which alters neural architecture to some degree, plasticity, so consciousness is not identical; consciousness being an expression of the information content of a brain...given time and events, no two brains being identical, not even the same brain from moment to moment.

First of all, this is a thought experiment. I just want people to imagine perfectly identical twins. Secondly, it might actually be possible given the right conditions. If it makes it easier, just think of you and a clone of you engineered in identical labs. It is possible for each lab to have identical conditions even though it is practically infinitesimally low.

 

[DBT]

The single factor of two separate brains means that there are two separate conscious activities being shaped, formed and generated, one in each brain. So if one identical consciousness is extinguished, there remains one 'copy' rather than two.

Looking at it another way, you print a copy of a document, your printer being a quantum computer that replicates the original right down to subatomic scale. You have two identical documents. Destroying one document one leaves you with a single document, the other no longer exists.

So if a 'horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law' and one identical twin is killed, the consciousness of other no longer exists, regardless that it was perfectly identical to the other.

 

[ryan]

The single factor of two separate brains means that there are two separate conscious activities being shaped, formed and generated, one in each brain. So if one identical consciousness is extinguished, there remains one 'copy' rather than two.

Looking at it another way, you print a copy of a document, your printer being a quantum computer that replicates the original right down to subatomic scale. You have two identical documents. Destroying one document one leaves you with a single document, the other no longer exists.

So if a 'horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law' and one identical twin is killed, the consciousness of other no longer exists, regardless that it was perfectly identical to the other.

I am not sure what this has to do with my OP. The point that I am trying to make is that there seems to be a nonphysical difference between the two brains only if you are one of them. This difference only exists for the consciousness that gets "turned off". An objective point of view from an observer does not, and probably cannot, know this difference.

 

[Mageth]

Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

You just said the difference. There are two consciouses, or lives; one yours, one your twin's. There's obviously a difference between killing yourself and killing someone else.

But wtf does this latest nonsense have to do with the notion of a nonphysical conscience?

 

[bilby]

Nothing is added to the situation in the Op by the fact of the twins being identical; or even related.

If I am one of two people, and one of them must die, then the important question is not how similar the other person is to me; it is whether or not they ARE me. And they are not; only I am me.

If we are sufficiently similar, we might both agree to the extent of both saying that "He should die and I should live" (or if we are both noble and self-sacrificing, that "I should die that he might live"). But while we would both say the same words, we are not calling for the same action.

No matter how similar two people are, we are necessarily in different locations; our brains are in different locations; and we would not share a consciousness, but have one each.

Your argument does not in any way support the idea of a non-physical consciousness; In fact, it doesn't even address that idea. Two individuals are not the same individual no matter how similar they might be. The Pauli exclusion principle prevents them from occupying the same point in time and space.

 

[ryan]

Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

You just said the difference. There are two consciouses, or lives; one yours, one your twin's. There's obviously a difference between killing yourself and killing someone else.

But from a physicalist's point of view, there shouldn't be a difference between ending your life and ending your twin's life. But something different for you happens if your life ends. This isn't apparent physically or by outside observers.

 

[ryan]

Nothing is added to the situation in the Op by the fact of the twins being identical; or even related.

If I am one of two people, and one of them must die, then the important question is not how similar the other person is to me; it is whether or not they ARE me. And they are not; only I am me.

If we are sufficiently similar, we might both agree to the extent of both saying that "He should die and I should live" (or if we are both noble and self-sacrificing, that "I should die that he might live"). But while we would both say the same words, we are not calling for the same action.

No matter how similar two people are, we are necessarily in different locations; our brains are in different locations; and we would not share a consciousness, but have one each.

Your argument does not in any way support the idea of a non-physical consciousness; In fact, it doesn't even address that idea. Two individuals are not the same individual no matter how similar they might be. The Pauli exclusion principle prevents them from occupying the same point in time and space.

Noooo, that is not at all the point. The point of this is that you both have your own consciousness; I argue that the consciousness is something in addition to the physical. A physicalist cannot agree with this, but my OP argues for it.

 

[bilby]

You just said the difference. There are two consciouses, or lives; one yours, one your twin's. There's obviously a difference between killing yourself and killing someone else.

But from a physicalist's point of view, there shouldn't be a difference between ending your life and ending your twin's life. But something different for you happens if your life ends. This isn't apparent physically or from outside observers.

Of course it is. The guy on the left is dead, and the guy on the right is alive. It's an easy difference to spot, no matter how similar the two guys are in appearance. The difference with an outside observer is not that he can't tell the two 'twins' apart; only that he doesn't much care which lives, and which dies.

 

[bilby]

Nothing is added to the situation in the Op by the fact of the twins being identical; or even related.

If I am one of two people, and one of them must die, then the important question is not how similar the other person is to me; it is whether or not they ARE me. And they are not; only I am me.

If we are sufficiently similar, we might both agree to the extent of both saying that "He should die and I should live" (or if we are both noble and self-sacrificing, that "I should die that he might live"). But while we would both say the same words, we are not calling for the same action.

No matter how similar two people are, we are necessarily in different locations; our brains are in different locations; and we would not share a consciousness, but have one each.

Your argument does not in any way support the idea of a non-physical consciousness; In fact, it doesn't even address that idea. Two individuals are not the same individual no matter how similar they might be. The Pauli exclusion principle prevents them from occupying the same point in time and space.

Noooo, that is not at all the point. The point of this is that you both have your own consciousness; I argue that the consciousness is something in addition to the physical. A physicalist cannot agree with this, but my OP argues for it.

No, it doesn't.

Your argument is that two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are not distinguishable from each other; and that therefore if those objects are conscious, and do not share a single consciousness, their separate consciousnesses must be non-physical in nature.

This argument is based on a flawed premise (two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are always and necessarily distinguishable from each other by their locations, if by nothing else); and even if it were not, the conclusion does not follow from your premises. Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

If there is no way to differentiate two objects, then they are both the same object, and you have one object - a contradiction. If two objects are not both the same object, then there is no reason to regard differences in consciousness between those objects as indicative that consciousness is non-physical.

Your argument has more holes than a colander.

 

[ryan]

But from a physicalist's point of view, there shouldn't be a difference between ending your life and ending your twin's life. But something different for you happens if your life ends. This isn't apparent physically or from outside observers.

Of course it is. The guy on the left is dead, and the guy on the right is alive. It's an easy difference to spot, no matter how similar the two guys are in appearance. The difference with an outside observer is not that he can't tell the two 'twins' apart; only that he doesn't much care which lives, and which dies.

That's an external difference, not a compositional difference. In other words, the one system is identical to the other system but only by an observer.

 

[ryan]

Noooo, that is not at all the point. The point of this is that you both have your own consciousness; I argue that the consciousness is something in addition to the physical. A physicalist cannot agree with this, but my OP argues for it.

No, it doesn't.

Your argument is that two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are not distinguishable from each other; and that therefore if those objects are conscious, and do not share a single consciousness, their separate consciousnesses must be non-physical in nature.

Forget "sharing" a consciousness; I don't know where you got that from.

This argument is based on a flawed premise (two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are always and necessarily distinguishable from each other by their locations, if by nothing else); and even if it were not, the conclusion does not follow from your premises. Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

If there is no way to differentiate two objects, then they are both the same object, and you have one object - a contradiction. If two objects are not both the same object, then there is no reason to regard differences in consciousness between those objects as indicative that consciousness is non-physical.

This is a fallacy of composition. Something is not its surroundings.

 

[bilby]

Of course it is. The guy on the left is dead, and the guy on the right is alive. It's an easy difference to spot, no matter how similar the two guys are in appearance. The difference with an outside observer is not that he can't tell the two 'twins' apart; only that he doesn't much care which lives, and which dies.

That's an external difference, not a compositional difference. In other words, the one system is identical to the other system but only by an observer.

So you have shown that the concept of 'self' is an internal artefact of sentient systems. That doesn't make the consciousness that gives rise to that concept non-physical.

Concepts are patterns of energy flow in a brain. They are no less physical than pictures on a TV screen. That I can't reach out and give King Joffrey a smack does not mean that his image on my TV is non-physical. The TV can show me a picture of anything - and yet it has the same fundamental physical make up regardless of whether I watch Game of Thrones or World's Most Superlative TV Show Titles. If two TVs are identical in every respect down to the molecular level, with the same show playing on both, and I turn one of them off, then that I can do so does not indicate that TV shows are metaphysical. They are physical arrangements of energy, in the form of photon and electron flows. As are brains.

 

[bilby]

No, it doesn't.

Your argument is that two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are not distinguishable from each other; and that therefore if those objects are conscious, and do not share a single consciousness, their separate consciousnesses must be non-physical in nature.

Forget "sharing" a consciousness; I don't know where you got that from.

This argument is based on a flawed premise (two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are always and necessarily distinguishable from each other by their locations, if by nothing else); and even if it were not, the conclusion does not follow from your premises. Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

If there is no way to differentiate two objects, then they are both the same object, and you have one object - a contradiction. If two objects are not both the same object, then there is no reason to regard differences in consciousness between those objects as indicative that consciousness is non-physical.

This is a fallacy of composition. Something is not its surroundings.

I never used the word 'surroundings', so whatever flaws my argument may have, that can't be one of them.

If consciousness is a property of physical brains, then two identical but separate brains will have identical but separate consciousnesses. That is not evidence that consciousness is non-physical.

If two red balls are identical in every respect, down to the molecular level, and then the Government outlaws identical balls, and decides to paint one blue, does this demonstrate that colour is non-physical?

I don't see how it even addresses the issue.

 

[ryan]

That's an external difference, not a compositional difference. In other words, the one system is identical to the other system but only by an observer.

So you have shown that the concept of 'self' is an internal artefact of sentient systems. That doesn't make the consciousness that gives rise to that concept non-physical.

Concepts are patterns of energy flow in a brain. They are no less physical than pictures on a TV screen. That I can't reach out and give King Joffrey a smack does not mean that his image on my TV is non-physical. The TV can show me a picture of anything - and yet it has the same fundamental physical make up regardless of whether I watch Game of Thrones or World's Most Superlative TV Show Titles. If two TVs are identical in every respect down to the molecular level, with the same show playing on both, and I turn one of them off, then that I can do so does not indicate that TV shows are metaphysical. They are physical arrangements of energy, in the form of photon and electron flows. As are brains.

Nice try with the T.V. analogy, but I stressed that this argument only works when people reading the thought experiment imagine themselves as part of it.

 

[ryan]

Forget "sharing" a consciousness; I don't know where you got that from.

This argument is based on a flawed premise (two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are always and necessarily distinguishable from each other by their locations, if by nothing else); and even if it were not, the conclusion does not follow from your premises. Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

If there is no way to differentiate two objects, then they are both the same object, and you have one object - a contradiction. If two objects are not both the same object, then there is no reason to regard differences in consciousness between those objects as indicative that consciousness is non-physical.

This is a fallacy of composition. Something is not its surroundings.

I never used the word 'surroundings', so whatever flaws my argument may have, that can't be one of them.

I was referring to your "location" comment.

 

[bilby]

So you have shown that the concept of 'self' is an internal artefact of sentient systems. That doesn't make the consciousness that gives rise to that concept non-physical.

Concepts are patterns of energy flow in a brain. They are no less physical than pictures on a TV screen. That I can't reach out and give King Joffrey a smack does not mean that his image on my TV is non-physical. The TV can show me a picture of anything - and yet it has the same fundamental physical make up regardless of whether I watch Game of Thrones or World's Most Superlative TV Show Titles. If two TVs are identical in every respect down to the molecular level, with the same show playing on both, and I turn one of them off, then that I can do so does not indicate that TV shows are metaphysical. They are physical arrangements of energy, in the form of photon and electron flows. As are brains.

Nice try with the T.V. analogy, but I stressed that this argument only works when people reading the thought experiment imagine themselves as part of it.

OK, How do you go about imagining yourself to be two identical twins at the same time?

If you are imagining yourself to be one of the twins, then there's the difference - one is 'me' and the other is 'him'. Nothing non-physical is needed to make that distinction.

Nothing is added to the situation in the Op by the fact of the twins being identical; or even related.

If I am one of two people, and one of them must die, then the important question is not how similar the other person is to me; it is whether or not they ARE me. And they are not; only I am me.

If we are sufficiently similar, we might both agree to the extent of both saying that "He should die and I should live" (or if we are both noble and self-sacrificing, that "I should die that he might live"). But while we would both say the same words, we are not calling for the same action.

Your argument does not in any way support the idea of a non-physical consciousness; In fact, it doesn't even address that idea. Two individuals are not the same individual no matter how similar they might be. The Pauli exclusion principle prevents them from occupying the same point in time and space.