My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[bilby]

Forget "sharing" a consciousness; I don't know where you got that from.

This argument is based on a flawed premise (two objects with arbitrarily similar properties are always and necessarily distinguishable from each other by their locations, if by nothing else); and even if it were not, the conclusion does not follow from your premises. Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

If there is no way to differentiate two objects, then they are both the same object, and you have one object - a contradiction. If two objects are not both the same object, then there is no reason to regard differences in consciousness between those objects as indicative that consciousness is non-physical.

This is a fallacy of composition. Something is not its surroundings.

I never used the word 'surroundings', so whatever flaws my argument may have, that can't be one of them.

I was referring to your "location" comment.

Then refer to it.

 

[ryan]

If two red balls are identical in every respect, down to the molecular level, and then the Government outlaws identical balls, and decides to paint one blue, does this demonstrate that colour is non-physical?

Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed.

 

[bilby]

If two red balls are identical in every respect, down to the molecular level, and then the Government outlaws identical balls, and decides to paint one blue, does this demonstrate that colour is non-physical?

Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed.

In what sense does a red ball stay red after it is destroyed?

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of a red ball, this might be the pigment molecules) that make it red, then the redness disappears.

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of my consciousness, this might be the structure of my brain) that makes me conscious, then my consciousness disappears.

 

[ryan]

Nice try with the T.V. analogy, but I stressed that this argument only works when people reading the thought experiment imagine themselves as part of it.

OK, How do you go about imagining yourself to be two identical twins at the same time?

If you are imagining yourself to be one of the twins, then there's the difference - one is 'me' and the other is 'him'. Nothing non-physical is needed to make that distinction.

This is exactly my point. "me" Is not the same as "him". The aftermath is quite different for you than for him if you are the unlucky one. But physically speaking, the exact thing happens either way.

Nothing is added to the situation in the Op by the fact of the twins being identical; or even related.

If I am one of two people, and one of them must die, then the important question is not how similar the other person is to me; it is whether or not they ARE me. And they are not; only I am me.

If we are sufficiently similar, we might both agree to the extent of both saying that "He should die and I should live" (or if we are both noble and self-sacrificing, that "I should die that he might live"). But while we would both say the same words, we are not calling for the same action.

Your argument does not in any way support the idea of a non-physical consciousness; In fact, it doesn't even address that idea. Two individuals are not the same individual no matter how similar they might be. The Pauli exclusion principle prevents them from occupying the same point in time and space.

 

[Keith&Co.]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things). Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

Now, if i have 300 identical robots, booted off of the same operating system, and i turn 150 of them off a random, it makes no difference to me. I have 150 identical operational robots and 150 identical inoperational robots. The serial numbers don't really matter to me.

But if you're going to put ME in the experiment, that's different. I can no longer be objective about a subjective experience. Either i'll wake up tomorrow or i won't. Whether or not my consciousness is part of my body or simply attached to it, i'm either still attached or i'm not. That's a big subjective difference. _I_ cannot claim that i can access an objective point of view where i can not see this big, inescapable difference in outcomes.

I'm guessing my family can't access that, either. There will be a difference. They go from having twins in the family to having one guy that pauses where he expected someone else to finish his sentence.... It's no longer a funny game if I can tell you what I am thinking, either.

These differences do not impact at all on where my consciousness is located.

This is more of an argument about who gives a rat's if we lose a redundant person.... I don't even see how that is tangential to physical or nonphysical consciouness....

 

[ryan]

Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed.

In what sense does a red ball stay red after it is destroyed?

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of a red ball, this might be the pigment molecules) that make it red, then the redness disappears.

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of my consciousness, this might be the structure of my brain) that makes me conscious, then my consciousness disappears.

I was talking about the human body being destroyed, not the ball.

 

[Keith&Co.]

This is exactly my point. "me" Is not the same as "him". The aftermath is quite different for you than for him if you are the unlucky one. But physically speaking, the exact thing happens either way.

Ah. Then you miscontructed your thought experiment. Two consciousnesses start the day, then either one ends or one simply stops being able to interact with friends and family.
The difference is that we cannot detect that fact that the one twin's consciousness persists.
You're assuming a non-physical consciousness, rather than proving one.

What if instead of twins, there's a Star Trek transporter accident that creates a perfect replica?
Perfect, except for the fact that only the original has a 'soul.' We can't detect the soul, we don't know that it's there, or that only one has it.

One of two officers gets shot by the bad guy of the episode.
There's nothing available to us to tell if it was the original or the replica that died, except that a soul we can't detect also persists.

The only problem is, that only difference is this non-physical consciousness, which you have to assume exists before starting your argument to prove that it exists.

 

[bilby]

In what sense does a red ball stay red after it is destroyed?

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of a red ball, this might be the pigment molecules) that make it red, then the redness disappears.

If you destroy the physical entity (in the case of my consciousness, this might be the structure of my brain) that makes me conscious, then my consciousness disappears.

I was talking about the human body being destroyed, not the ball.

And my reply addresses both, to show that they are completely analogous.

Was I wrong to think that you were agreeing that they are analogous when you said "Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed."?

When the ball is destroyed, it is no longer red. When the human body is destroyed, it is no longer conscious. Therefore a) I am indeed making a fair analogy, and b) Your assertion about what I would have to say is logically true, but you have expressed it in a very odd way: we DO NOT stay conscious, like the red ball DOES NOT stay red, after the body is destroyed.

 

[Underseer]

How many times do we have to go over the same ground? Substance dualism is pretty much incoherent.

 

[ryan]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things). Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

Now, if i have 300 identical robots, booted off of the same operating system, and i turn 150 of them off a random, it makes no difference to me. I have 150 identical operational robots and 150 identical inoperational robots. The serial numbers don't really matter to me.

But if you're going to put ME in the experiment, that's different. I can no longer be objective about a subjective experience.

That's my point; don't you see that it is somehow different if you are in the experiment rather than not being in the experiment?

Either i'll wake up tomorrow or i won't. Whether or not my consciousness is part of my body or simply attached to it, i'm either still attached or i'm not. That's a big subjective difference. _I_ cannot claim that i can access an objective point of view where i can not see this big, inescapable difference in outcomes.

Well, then I can tweak the argument a bit and ask what the difference is between John and his identical clone. Will it be different for the original John if he dies? Will there be a physical difference whether one is killed or the other is killed the exact same way from your point of view?

 

[Keith&Co.]

That's my point; don't you see that it is somehow different if you are in the experiment rather than not being in the experiment?

I can't see that this proves our consciousness will persist after death, no. It's not connected at all

Well, then I can tweak the argument a bit and ask what the difference is between John and his identical clone. Will it be different for the original John if he dies? Will there be a physical difference whether one is killed or the other is killed the exact same way from your point of view?

Again, what the fuck does this difference have o do with whether or not consciousness is non-physical? You have to either assume or reject non-physical consciousness to decide how it comes out, which makes it exactly NOT an argument for one side or the other.

 

[ryan]

This is exactly my point. "me" Is not the same as "him". The aftermath is quite different for you than for him if you are the unlucky one. But physically speaking, the exact thing happens either way.

Ah. Then you miscontructed your thought experiment. Two consciousnesses start the day, then either one ends or one simply stops being able to interact with friends and family.
The difference is that we cannot detect that fact that the one twin's consciousness persists.
You're assuming a non-physical consciousness, rather than proving one.

You're right; I am assuming a nonphysical consciousness. We have to assume that x = 3 if we want to know if the statement 2x = 6 is true or not. If I am right, then hopefully it will make sense soon.

Also, this might be a rare time where the nonphysical makes contact with the physical.

What if instead of twins, there's a Star Trek transporter accident that creates a perfect replica?
Perfect, except for the fact that only the original has a 'soul.' We can't detect the soul, we don't know that it's there, or that only one has it.

One of two officers gets shot by the bad guy of the episode.
There's nothing available to us to tell if it was the original or the replica that died, except that a soul we can't detect also persists.

The only problem is, that only difference is this non-physical consciousness, which you have to assume exists before starting your argument to prove that it exists.

This is just another kind of philosophical zombie argument.

 

[ryan]

I was talking about the human body being destroyed, not the ball.

And my reply addresses both, to show that they are completely analogous.

Was I wrong to think that you were agreeing that they are analogous when you said "Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed."?

When the ball is destroyed, it is no longer red.

But you didn't say that the ball would be destroyed in your original analogy. And I am trying to tell you that I didn't either. I meant the human body, not the ball.

 

[Kharakov]

I am not sure what this has to do with my OP. The point that I am trying to make is that there seems to be a nonphysical difference between the two brains only if you are one of them. This difference only exists for the consciousness that gets "turned off". An objective point of view from an observer does not, and probably cannot, know this difference.

I don't know ryan, killing your twin wasn't very satisfying, I feel like you didn't even notice.

Next set of perfect twins I kill, I'll have both of them facing one another and slowly desynchronize and resynchronize their experience of losing body parts. I'll have to use many sets of twins to experiment on synchronization.... you know what, maybe instead of pain I'll experiment with pleasure. Maybe a little bit of pain.

 

[DBT]

I am not sure what this has to do with my OP. The point that I am trying to make is that there seems to be a nonphysical difference between the two brains only if you are one of them. This difference only exists for the consciousness that gets "turned off". An objective point of view from an observer does not, and probably cannot, know this difference.

It makes no difference for your proposition, it is the electrochemical activity of a brain that is generating consciousness based on its information state, inputs, memory and neural architecture. It doesn't matter how many identical brains are generating identical conscious states because conscious activity of a brain is a physical process in each and every brain.

 

[DBT]

If two red balls are identical in every respect, down to the molecular level, and then the Government outlaws identical balls, and decides to paint one blue, does this demonstrate that colour is non-physical?

Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed.

'We' are not separate from what ' our' brain is doing. 'We' - conscious awareness - are what the brain is doing in relation to information processing and conscious representation of a portion of that processing; the part that is needed in order to interact with the world.

 

[ryan]

How many times do we have to go over the same ground? Substance dualism is pretty much incoherent.

At 9:40, he actually uses a nonphysical concept to argue against duality. There is no physical difference that I can find between being something and not being something.

 

[ryan]

I can't see that this proves our consciousness will persist after death, no. It's not connected at all.

That is a very odd and possibly telling reply. Why are you bringing up consciousness persisting after death? I haven't said anything about that. This does not mean god or afterlife. God is probably not going to let us see proof of the soul; it wouldn't be fair to the others.

 

[ryan]

I am not sure what this has to do with my OP. The point that I am trying to make is that there seems to be a nonphysical difference between the two brains only if you are one of them. This difference only exists for the consciousness that gets "turned off". An objective point of view from an observer does not, and probably cannot, know this difference.

It makes no difference for your proposition, it is the electrochemical activity of a brain that is generating consciousness based on its information state, inputs, memory and neural architecture. It doesn't matter how many identical brains are generating identical conscious states because conscious activity of a brain is a physical process in each and brain.

For practical purposes, everything you said sufficiently explains what we need to know.

 

[DBT]

''Non material consciousness'' implies something that is not dependent on physical processes, therefore can exist in a disembodied state.