My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[bilby]

And my reply addresses both, to show that they are completely analogous.

Was I wrong to think that you were agreeing that they are analogous when you said "Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed."?

When the ball is destroyed, it is no longer red.

But you didn't say that the ball would be destroyed in your original analogy. And I am trying to tell you that I didn't either. I meant the human body, not the ball.

You may have an argument to present; but if so, there is no way for me to tell what it is from what you have posted.

Perhaps you could try to present a coherent statement of what it is you are trying to convey here? What did you mean about the human body and not the ball; and how are the two non-analogous?

As far as I can see, we have a human body, with a property - consciousness. That property ceases to exist if the human body is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of consciousness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

By direct analogy, we can take a simpler system - a ball, with a property - redness. That property also ceases to exist if the physical entity responsible for its existence is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of redness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

Your argument is not valid, sound nor coherent. If you have something, now would be the time to present it, because so far, you've got nothing.

 

[Unbeatable]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things).

Identical parallel universes would be more plausible.

Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

I think the particles that produce my consciousness occupy a different position in spacetime than the particles that produce their consciousness.

 

[ryan]

''Non material consciousness'' implies something that is not dependent on physical processes, therefore can exist in a disembodied state.

I think that you are referring to minimal physicalism. This physicalism actually allows an immaterial mind but claims that each physical process has a unique mental "value". This is also a type of supervenience physicalism. See, #1, #2, #3 and the first part of #4 in the contents of http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#SupPhyInt . I am arguing against the more narrow versions of physicalism.

And from what I have read, it sounds like materialism might be dead.

 

[ryan]

But you didn't say that the ball would be destroyed in your original analogy. And I am trying to tell you that I didn't either. I meant the human body, not the ball.

You may have an argument to present; but if so, there is no way for me to tell what it is from what you have posted.

Perhaps you could try to present a coherent statement of what it is you are trying to convey here? What did you mean about the human body and not the ball; and how are the two non-analogous?

As far as I can see, we have a human body, with a property - consciousness. That property ceases to exist if the human body is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of consciousness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

By direct analogy, we can take a simpler system - a ball, with a property - redness. That property also ceases to exist if the physical entity responsible for its existence is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of redness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

Your argument is not valid, sound nor coherent. If you have something, now would be the time to present it, because so far, you've got nothing.

The point is that there seems to be only a physical difference for the observers observing the death of one of the twins, but there is more than just a physical difference for the person who dies. To everyone else, the difference is A, but to the dead twin, the difference is A and B.

 

[bilby]

You may have an argument to present; but if so, there is no way for me to tell what it is from what you have posted.

Perhaps you could try to present a coherent statement of what it is you are trying to convey here? What did you mean about the human body and not the ball; and how are the two non-analogous?

As far as I can see, we have a human body, with a property - consciousness. That property ceases to exist if the human body is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of consciousness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

By direct analogy, we can take a simpler system - a ball, with a property - redness. That property also ceases to exist if the physical entity responsible for its existence is destroyed. To conclude that "therefore the property of redness is non-physical" from this would be perverse.

Your argument is not valid, sound nor coherent. If you have something, now would be the time to present it, because so far, you've got nothing.

The point is that there seems to be only a physical difference for the observers observing the death of one of the twins, but there is more than just a physical difference for the person who dies. To everyone else, the difference is A, but to the dead twin, the difference is A and B.

I think Ricky Gervais may be able to help here:

When you are dead, you do not know you are dead. It is only painful for others.

The same applies when you are stupid.

 

[ryan]

The point is that there seems to be only a physical difference for the observers observing the death of one of the twins, but there is more than just a physical difference for the person who dies. To everyone else, the difference is A, but to the dead twin, the difference is A and B.

I think Ricky Gervais may be able to help here:

When you are dead, you do not know you are dead. It is only painful for others.

The same applies when you are stupid.

Except that I used "for". See the bold print.

 

[bilby]

I think Ricky Gervais may be able to help here:

When you are dead, you do not know you are dead. It is only painful for others.

The same applies when you are stupid.

Except that I used "for". See the bold print.

It is clear from your response that you think your choice of preposition is of critical importance to your argument; But I don't see how it makes any difference whatsoever.

 

[ryan]

I think Ricky Gervais may be able to help here:

When you are dead, you do not know you are dead. It is only painful for others.

The same applies when you are stupid.

Except that I used "for". See the bold print.

It is clear from your response that you think your choice of preposition is of critical importance to your argument; But I don't see how it makes any difference whatsoever.

"for" Is used so that others can be part of the observation and not just the twin who dies. Ricky's point is strictly about a first-person account of death.

 

[DBT]

''Non material consciousness'' implies something that is not dependent on physical processes, therefore can exist in a disembodied state.

I think that you are referring to minimal physicalism. This physicalism actually allows an immaterial mind but claims that each physical process has a unique mental "value". This is also a type of supervenience physicalism. See, #1, #2, #3 and the first part of #4 in the contents of http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#SupPhyInt . I am arguing against the more narrow versions of physicalism.
And from what I have read, it sounds like materialism might be dead.

Not really, conscious activity is a physical process involving electrochemical activity, physical structures, neurons, dendrites, axons, glial support cells, etc....the mechanisms which generate the conscious experience, sight, sound, smell, touch, etc, including the associated emotions, feelings and thoughts.

There is no indication of a non material element, nor an explanation of what ''non material'' is or how it, this non stuff, could form consciousness. The idea of non material mind, whether fully or in part, is a dead end.

 

[Keith&Co.]

You're right; I am assuming a nonphysical consciousness. We have to assume that x = 3 if we want to know if the statement 2x = 6 is true or not. If I am right, then hopefully it will make sense soon.

Then why call it an argument FOR nonphysical consciousness? You're making an assumption and calling it an argument for the assumption. That's a waste of time.

 

[Keith&Co.]

I can't see that this proves our consciousness will persist after death, no. It's not connected at all.

That is a very odd and possibly telling reply. Why are you bringing up consciousness persisting after death? I haven't said anything about that.

Well, you did say: "Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed."
That's a little telling, you're hoping that after your body dies, then you're still here.
And that's your biggest motivation, your absolute terror at the thought of oblivion. The only reason you even hope for a nonphysical consciousness is that it's your best hope of persisting a

This does not mean god or afterlife.

Well, it wouldn't necessarily mean gods.

God is probably not going to let us see proof of the soul; it wouldn't be fair to the others.

That makes absolutely no sense.

 

[fromderinside]

... If I am right, then hopefully it will make sense soon.

....That's a waste of time.

Well put.

 

[PyramidHead]

Type/token distinction.

 

[Juma]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things). Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

Looking at this objectively, probably nobody is going to say that there is a difference. That is why you have to be a twin in the thought experiment.

? Why should there be no difference? It is two separate physical processes.

There must be some weird metaphysical assumption behind this

 

[ryan]

I think that you are referring to minimal physicalism. This physicalism actually allows an immaterial mind but claims that each physical process has a unique mental "value". This is also a type of supervenience physicalism. See, #1, #2, #3 and the first part of #4 in the contents of http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#SupPhyInt . I am arguing against the more narrow versions of physicalism.
And from what I have read, it sounds like materialism might be dead.

Not really, conscious activity is a physical process involving electrochemical activity, physical structures, neurons, dendrites, axons, glial support cells, etc....the mechanisms which generate the conscious experience, sight, sound, smell, touch, etc, including the associated emotions, feelings and thoughts.

There is no indication of a non material element, nor an explanation of what ''non material'' is or how it, this non stuff, could form consciousness. The idea of non material mind, whether fully or in part, is a dead end.

Of course a nonphysical substance is probably never going to be detected. If it ever can be detected, it would just appear to be random "bugs" in the instruments.

 

[ryan]

You're right; I am assuming a nonphysical consciousness. We have to assume that x = 3 if we want to know if the statement 2x = 6 is true or not. If I am right, then hopefully it will make sense soon.

Then why call it an argument FOR nonphysical consciousness? You're making an assumption and calling it an argument for the assumption. That's a waste of time.

It's an argument supporting a nonphysical consciousness.

That is a very odd and possibly telling reply. Why are you bringing up consciousness persisting after death? I haven't said anything about that.

Well, you did say: "Okay, then if you are making a fair analogy, you would have to say that we stay conscious, like the red ball stays red, after the body is destroyed."
That's a little telling, you're hoping that after your body dies, then you're still here.
And that's your biggest motivation, your absolute terror at the thought of oblivion. The only reason you even hope for a nonphysical consciousness is that it's your best hope of persisting a

This does not mean god or afterlife.

Well, it wouldn't necessarily mean gods.

God is probably not going to let us see proof of the soul; it wouldn't be fair to the others.

That makes absolutely no sense.

Don't make assumptions because they are wrong. I am not scared of oblivion; I am scared at what might come next. Oblivion would be great if it were true; at least there is not a possibility of reincarnation and an endless amount of horrible things happening.

 

[ryan]

You have a perfect twin right down to the molecule (you both have always experienced the exact same things). Some horrible new world order passes a "no twin" law, so one of you must die. The government will randomly choose. Is there a difference between ending your consciousness or ending your twin's consciousness? If you think that there is a difference, then what is it?

Looking at this objectively, probably nobody is going to say that there is a difference. That is why you have to be a twin in the thought experiment.

? Why should there be no difference? It is two separate physical processes.

There must be some weird metaphysical assumption behind this

When person A dies and person B lives, the universe no longer exists for person A, assuming no afterlife. Yet person B knows absolutely nothing about this nonphysical loss that person A goes through. Person B cannot detect this loss even though there is no loss of a physical entity. The symmetry breaks for person A in a strange nonphysical way.

 

[Juma]

When person A dies and person B lives, the universe no longer exists for person A, assuming no afterlife.

Why should it matter to B that "the universe exists for A"?

Yet person B knows absolutely nothing about this nonphysical loss that person A goes through.

"Nonphysical loss"? Whatever.

Person B cannot detect this loss even though there is no loss of a physical entity.

This doesnt make sense. Did you forgot a negation, or are there too many?

 

[PyramidHead]

? Why should there be no difference? It is two separate physical processes.

There must be some weird metaphysical assumption behind this

When person A dies and person B lives, the universe no longer exists for person A, assuming no afterlife. Yet person B knows absolutely nothing about this nonphysical loss that person A goes through. Person B cannot detect this loss even though there is no loss of a physical entity. The symmetry breaks for person A in a strange nonphysical way.

Type/token distinction.

 

[ryan]

Why should it matter to B that "the universe exists for A"?

That's the whole point. Something different happens for person A's reality that didn't happen for person B's reality.

Person B cannot detect this loss even though there is no loss of a physical entity.

This doesnt make sense. Did you forgot a negation, or are there too many?

No, person A's loss of qualia, for example, is not detectable by person B; only the loss of A's conscious function ceases to exist to person B.