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My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

It's obvious you think that it's a valid argument, but your thinking is very sloppy.

Case in point: You are trying to prove that X is not always true. So you assume a specific situation where X is not true, and then argue that X is not always true because it is false in the specific situation. Then you say that your conclusion is more general than your premise and your argument is not circular. Think about that for a minute...

It's deductive reasoning. Example, if I am in Alberta, and if Alberta is in Canada, then I am in Canada. It was meant to be obvious.

Now I will imagine that the argument will shift to the first premise.

Circular arguments certainly are examples of deductive reasoning. They just aren't useful examples and should be avoided when trying to make a convincing argument...
 
There is an unspeakably small quantum probability that the two universes will actually be the exact same right down to the particle.

And if you just won't accept the possibility, then physicalism is meaningless. Physicalism uses an identical universe in its definition.

Can you explain how 'physicalism' uses an 'identical universe' in its definition? Including a description of 'identical' to...what?

I thought I saw somewhere that had it as a requirement.
 
Well this comment should positively put you to sleep. If there are two things combined and the properties of the combination are specified you'll find there are no emergent properties since they are all derived from the properties extant in the two things . So much for emergence.
 
Well this comment should positively put you to sleep. If there are two things combined and the properties of the combination are specified you'll find there are no emergent properties since they are all derived from the properties extant in the two things . So much for emergence.

My faith in reductionism is fading. The problem is that even the elementary particles can't be reduced and not separable from their intrinsic properties. For example, the electron must be an emergent property of spin, mass, duality etc. We know this because these properties do not exist on their own.

Maybe most of the universe is reducible, but maybe some isn't.
 
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Can you explain how 'physicalism' uses an 'identical universe' in its definition? Including a description of 'identical' to...what?

I thought I saw somewhere that had it as a requirement.

Not that I know of. But this still doesn't alter the fact of two distinctly separate objects, regardless of whether they are identical or not. An objective observer would see two separate people, and if they happen to be identical clones, take them to be twins. Each with his own unique conscious experience of the world.
 
I thought I saw somewhere that had it as a requirement.

Not that I know of. But this still doesn't alter the fact of two distinctly separate objects, regardless of whether they are identical or not. An objective observer would see two separate people, and if they happen to be identical clones, take them to be twins. Each with his own unique conscious experience of the world.

I am not sure where you are regarding the mind. Do you believe that the mind is a process, or do you believe that the mind is a property of a process?
 
Not that I know of. But this still doesn't alter the fact of two distinctly separate objects, regardless of whether they are identical or not. An objective observer would see two separate people, and if they happen to be identical clones, take them to be twins. Each with his own unique conscious experience of the world.

I am not sure where you are regarding the mind. Do you believe that the mind is a process, or do you believe that the mind is a property of a process?

What difference would either proposition make to your position?
 
I am not sure where you are regarding the mind. Do you believe that the mind is a process, or do you believe that the mind is a property of a process?

What difference would either proposition make to your position?

The mind is needed for subjectivity. Subjectivity is needed for my argument to work.
 
What difference would either proposition make to your position?

The mind is needed for subjectivity. Subjectivity is needed for my argument to work.

'Subjective' refers to the experience generated by a brain that cannot be experienced by another brain, a separate brain with it's own neuronal activity of conscious experience. This doesn't mean the physical activity of conscious experience itself is subjective, but that brains cannot directly access the experience of other brains, or even the scaffolding and production of its own experience.
 
The mind is needed for subjectivity. Subjectivity is needed for my argument to work.

'Subjective' refers to the experience generated by a brain that cannot be experienced by another brain, a separate brain with it's own neuronal activity of conscious experience. This doesn't mean the physical activity of conscious experience itself is subjective, but that brains cannot directly access the experience of other brains, or even the scaffolding and production of its own experience.

There is no physical trace of subjectivity. So there can be twins where one is a zombie without subjectivity and the other has it.
 
There is no physical trace of subjectivity.
Yeah. Nobody ever did anything physical for art, love, or beauty. Everything in the universe is moved by entirely objective beings.
 
The mind is needed for subjectivity. Subjectivity is needed for my argument to work.

Another stone cannot fall the same fall as another stone falls.

That is all there is to "subkectivity"

That's only part of it. The other part is that the rock's subjectivity does not emit information; whereas the rock falling does emit information.
 
I should have used "account" not "trace".

What do you mean by account, in this case? "There is no physical account of subjectivity."

It should be obvious. A physical account is a physical description/report of what is there. "Account" is often used in ontological philosophy. For example, the physical account of an electron is its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Or a physical account of only the electron are its intrinsic properties.

Actually, others don't seem to respond to me properly when I use "account" either.
 
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What do you mean by account, in this case? "There is no physical account of subjectivity."

It should be obvious. A physical account is a physical description/report of what is there. "Account" is often used in ontological philosophy. For example, the physical account of an electron are its intrinsic or extrinsic properties. Or a physical account of only the electron are its intrinsic properties.

Actually, others don't seem to respond to me properly when I use "account" either.
Ehh, just trying to make sure you weren't talking about something other than what I thought you said. I understand the standard usage of the term account....

There is a (more or less accurate) physical account of subjectivity in your mind, although I'm not dividing your mental state from the rest of physical reality in this case.
 
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