My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

I am dying to know an honest answer as to why everyone is so sure that they are right yet willing to put in so much time.

It's not that anyone is sure that they are right. We're just all sure that you are wrong.

If

Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain;

and if

Physicalism: A perfect copy of Universe A must be exactly like it in every way;

then

Physicalism is false.

Good luck, but I don't think you can change my mind on something so clear to me.

If there are any questions on how to read this, then sorry, I don't have anymore time.

 

[Kharakov]

There is a meat shop on the corner.

I bought an umbrella at WalMart one day.

Therefore the statement 7+5=9 is true.

If there are any questions on how to interpret this response, I've plenty of time to respond. To quote untermensche: "It is a logical argument."

 

[bilby]

It's not that anyone is sure that they are right. We're just all sure that you are wrong.

If

Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain;

and if

Physicalism: A perfect copy of Universe A must be exactly like it in every way;

then

Physicalism is false.

Good luck, but I don't think you can change my mind on something so clear to me.

If there are any questions on how to read this, then sorry, I don't have anymore time.

The two parts of your opening premise are self contradictory.

If person A fully describes the universe as U+X, and person B fully describes the universe as U, then either X is zero, or you have a contradiction.

The cause of this contradiction appears to be your belief that person A's experience (in this case of pain) cannot in principle be observed or detected by person B.

As this belief is also, apparently, what you are seeking to demonstrate, you have a circular argument.

As a physicalist, I assert that there is an in-principle way to recognise pain from a sufficiently detailed examination and understanding of the particles and interactions that are person A. Of course, given the vast complexity of person A, such an examination is hugely impractical, and may never be possible to actually achieve.

But there is a vital difference between the impossible and the merely hugely difficult.

There is no experiment we could currently devise to separate our hypotheses; so we are left in the hands of William of Ockham, who might gently point out that despite a huge number of non-physical real entities having been hypothesised, to date every single such hypothesis tested has been shown to be false.

Your 'God of the gaps' (or rather, 'Soul of the gaps') argument is unconvincing.

 

[ryan]

If

Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain;

and if

Physicalism: A perfect copy of Universe A must be exactly like it in every way;

then

Physicalism is false.

Good luck, but I don't think you can change my mind on something so clear to me.

If there are any questions on how to read this, then sorry, I don't have anymore time.

The two parts of your opening premise are self contradictory.

If person A fully describes the universe as U+X, and person B fully describes the universe as U, then either X is zero, or you have a contradiction.

The cause of this contradiction appears to be your belief that person A's experience (in this case of pain) cannot in principle be observed or detected by person B.

As this belief is also, apparently, what you are seeking to demonstrate, you have a circular argument.

It may be false, but it is not a circular argument. I assumed something specific and ended with a generalization; I used deductive reasoning. Example, if I have a banana, then I have a fruit.

As a physicalist, I assert that there is an in-principle way to recognise pain from a sufficiently detailed examination and understanding of the particles and interactions that are person A. Of course, given the vast complexity of person A, such an examination is hugely impractical, and may never be possible to actually achieve.

I don't doubt you can recognize someone's pain; you just can't experience it. If you could experience it, then it would be your pain and the other person's pain. But we know that's not possible since physicalism says that every "lower level" property, the body, must have a "higher level" property, the mind.

 

[beero1000]

Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain

Your premise assumes that the sensation of pain is separate from the universe. You use this premise to conclude that ... the sensation of pain is separate from the universe.

If that isn't circular, I don't know what is...

 

[Kharakov]

P1: Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain;

P2: Physicalism: A perfect copy of Universe A must be exactly like it in every way;

Cw: Physicalism is false.

There is no connection between the premises and the conclusion. If universe A is not the same as universe B, it isn't a perfect copy.

 

[ryan]

Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain

Your premise assumes that the sensation of pain is separate from the universe. You use this premise to conclude that ... the sensation of pain is separate from the universe.

If that isn't circular, I don't know what is...

It's not circular because the premise is not equivalent to the conclusion; I end with something more general.

I was simply clearing things up. It may be obvious, but that's what I intended to do.

 

[ryan]

P1: Person A fully describes the universe with a sensation of pain, but Person B fully describes the universe without a sensation of pain;

P2: Physicalism: A perfect copy of Universe A must be exactly like it in every way;

Cw: Physicalism is false.

There is no connection between the premises and the conclusion. If universe A is not the same as universe B, it isn't a perfect copy.

Ooookay - so tired, so very tired - if all lower level properties are identical in both universes, then all higher level properties must be identical too.

 

[beero1000]

Your premise assumes that the sensation of pain is separate from the universe. You use this premise to conclude that ... the sensation of pain is separate from the universe.

If that isn't circular, I don't know what is...

It's not circular because the premise is not equivalent to the conclusion; I end with something more general.

I was simply clearing things up. It may be obvious, but that's what I intended to do.

It's obvious you think that it's a valid argument, but your thinking is very sloppy.

Case in point: You are trying to prove that X is not always true. So you assume a specific situation where X is not true, and then argue that X is not always true because it is false in the specific situation. Then you say that your conclusion is more general than your premise and your argument is not circular. Think about that for a minute...

 

[DBT]

There is no connection between the premises and the conclusion. If universe A is not the same as universe B, it isn't a perfect copy.

Ooookay - so tired, so very tired - if all lower level properties are identical in both universes, then all higher level properties must be identical too.

But nothing is identical, the specific emergent properties of any structure of interacting components are specific to that structure of interacting components, and that structure alone...even if the phenomena is common to all structures of that kind, no two are identical. Similar, indistinguishable to the naked eye even, but not identical.

 

[ryan]

It's not circular because the premise is not equivalent to the conclusion; I end with something more general.

I was simply clearing things up. It may be obvious, but that's what I intended to do.

It's obvious you think that it's a valid argument, but your thinking is very sloppy.

Case in point: You are trying to prove that X is not always true. So you assume a specific situation where X is not true, and then argue that X is not always true because it is false in the specific situation. Then you say that your conclusion is more general than your premise and your argument is not circular. Think about that for a minute...

It's deductive reasoning. Example, if I am in Alberta, and if Alberta is in Canada, then I am in Canada. It was meant to be obvious.

Now I will imagine that the argument will shift to the first premise.

 

[ryan]

Ooookay - so tired, so very tired - if all lower level properties are identical in both universes, then all higher level properties must be identical too.

But nothing is identical, the specific emergent properties of any structure of interacting components are specific to that structure of interacting components, and that structure alone...even if the phenomena is common to all structures of that kind, no two are identical. Similar, indistinguishable to the naked eye even, but not identical.

I don't understand what you are saying. Why can't the two universes be identical if I am assuming they are identical?

 

[Kharakov]

Why can't the two universes be identical if I am assuming they are identical?

That is a beautiful question. Thank you. I might respond to it later, but for now, I'm just going to sit here and feel very happy to have read that.

 

[ryan]

Why can't the two universes be identical if I am assuming they are identical?

That is a beautiful question. Thank you. I might respond to it later, but for now, I'm just going to sit here and feel very happy to have read that.

You're welcome. Take all the time you need.

 

[Juma]

Ooookay - so tired, so very tired - if all lower level properties are identical in both universes, then all higher level properties must be identical too.

But nothing is identical, the specific emergent properties of any structure of interacting components are specific to that structure of interacting components, and that structure alone...even if the phenomena is common to all structures of that kind, no two are identical. Similar, indistinguishable to the naked eye even, but not identical.

I'm not sure I understand you but:
If all participant particles and fields move is placed and moves identically then everything in those two universes are identical.

 

[DBT]

But nothing is identical, the specific emergent properties of any structure of interacting components are specific to that structure of interacting components, and that structure alone...even if the phenomena is common to all structures of that kind, no two are identical. Similar, indistinguishable to the naked eye even, but not identical.

I'm not sure I understand you but:
If all participant particles and fields move is placed and moves identically then everything in those two universes are identical.

I was commenting on the impossibility of two absolutely identical universes (or brains) working under the known rules and principles of physics, QM, relativity, chaotic, albeit deterministic weather patterns, etc, being absolutely identical.

Maybe two Laplacian Universes, but these are imaginary constructs. We could imagine two absolutely identical universes or brains or whatever, but they would still occupy their own space and consequently would be separate and distinct objects regardless of their [theoreticaly] absolutely identical makeup.

 

[ryan]

Why can't the two universes be identical if I am assuming they are identical?

That is a beautiful question. Thank you. I might respond to it later, but for now, I'm just going to sit here and feel very happy to have read that.

Just to be clear, you were being sarcastic, right? The rep points threw me.

 

[ryan]

I'm not sure I understand you but:
If all participant particles and fields move is placed and moves identically then everything in those two universes are identical.

I was commenting on the impossibility of two absolutely identical universes (or brains) working under the known rules and principles of physics, QM, relativity, chaotic, albeit deterministic weather patterns, etc, being absolutely identical.

Maybe two Laplacian Universes, but these are imaginary constructs. We could imagine two absolutely identical universes or brains or whatever, but they would still occupy their own space and consequently would be separate and distinct objects regardless of their [theoreticaly] absolutely identical makeup.

There is an unspeakably small quantum probability that the two universes will actually be the exact same right down to the particle.

And if you just won't accept the possibility, then physicalism is meaningless. Physicalism uses an identical universe in its definition.

 

[DBT]

I was commenting on the impossibility of two absolutely identical universes (or brains) working under the known rules and principles of physics, QM, relativity, chaotic, albeit deterministic weather patterns, etc, being absolutely identical.

Maybe two Laplacian Universes, but these are imaginary constructs. We could imagine two absolutely identical universes or brains or whatever, but they would still occupy their own space and consequently would be separate and distinct objects regardless of their [theoreticaly] absolutely identical makeup.

There is an unspeakably small quantum probability that the two universes will actually be the exact same right down to the particle.

And if you just won't accept the possibility, then physicalism is meaningless. Physicalism uses an identical universe in its definition.

Can you explain how 'physicalism' uses an 'identical universe' in its definition? Including a description of 'identical' to...what?

 

[Kharakov]

That is a beautiful question. Thank you. I might respond to it later, but for now, I'm just going to sit here and feel very happy to have read that.

Just to be clear, you were being sarcastic, right? The rep points threw me.

The question cracks me up. Why can't X exist if I assume X exists?