My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[Keith&Co.]

Nor would they say fire is a property of systems that include friction between dry pieces of wood and straw with added oxygen.

Depends on their understanding of the system.
I mean, when i saw someone welding in the vicinity of an oxygen tank, i did assume that 'explosion' was a property of the activity.

 

[ryan]

I think that anything known to exist is an emergent property of something else. I can't think of anything that isn't an emergent property of something else.

So, for you, emergent property = consequence?

Yeah, I can't think of a counter example.

 

[Keith&Co.]

So, for you, emergent property = consequence?

Yeah, I can't think of a counter example.

So the term is meaningless.

 

[DBT]

To state the obvious, architecture is critical to the emergence of properties that are not present in any of the constituent parts, computers/information processing, engines/ internal combustion/energy/work, natural eco friendly systems/life/evolution....neural architecture/ electrochemical activity/information processing/perception/thought...

 

[Juma]

So, for you, emergent property = consequence?

Yeah, I can't think of a counter example.

Ponder the difference between "enable" and "cause".

 

[ryan]

Yeah, I can't think of a counter example.

Ponder the difference between "enable" and "cause".

Are you going to answer my question in post #136?

 

[Duke Leto]

The consciousness of one twin cannot be precisely the same as other because experience alters a brain in specific ways, dendrites and connections are formed that are not identical to the other twin. Brain plasticity, in other words.

I addressed that in the OP.

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

 

[PyramidHead]

I addressed that in the OP.

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

You could just substitute the twins with two brains being fed identical sensory simulations by a computer. I'm not convinced by the thought experiment either, but it's not because of any definitional impossibility. Just imagine a future where virtual reality is detailed enough.

 

[ryan]

I addressed that in the OP.

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

You are late to the party. I conceded, but not for the reasons you have here.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

Do you feel like I won't care about your post if you don't throw in a trolling comment? Why else would you put such a thing?

 

[Duke Leto]

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

You could just substitute the twins with two brains being fed identical sensory simulations by a computer. I'm not convinced by the thought experiment either, but it's not because of any definitional impossibility. Just imagine a future where virtual reality is detailed enough.

So these are spontaneously generated brains that pop into existence without ever having been part of a body? And the machinery never malfunctions in giving these two brains exactly the same experiences?

Because if either of these are not true, then there is some difference between their history of experience.

The thought experiment demands perfectly identical brains with perfectly identical experiences, or else it's rubbish.

- - - Updated - - -

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

Do you feel like I won't care about your post if you don't throw in a trolling comment? Why else would you put such a thing?

I include what you refer to as "trolling comments" because I feel the need to express my disgust at your ongoing trolling of the entire forum.

You ask the same questions over and over again and get the same responses and you never learn a fucking thing.

 

[PyramidHead]

You could just substitute the twins with two brains being fed identical sensory simulations by a computer. I'm not convinced by the thought experiment either, but it's not because of any definitional impossibility. Just imagine a future where virtual reality is detailed enough.

So these are spontaneously generated brains that pop into existence without ever having been part of a body? And the machinery never malfunctions in giving these two brains exactly the same experiences?

Because if either of these are not true, then there is some difference between their history of experience.

The thought experiment demands perfectly identical brains with perfectly identical experiences, or else it's rubbish.

Yeah, it's pretty outlandish. But thought experiments often are. Another way to frame it might be modally, with a many-worlds kind of thing. Two identical parallel universes and all. The point is not to figure out something about the situation being described per se, but something that is true even outside the constraints of the thought experiment. It's pretty standard fare for most thought experiments (like the Mary case for qualia) to be very, very far removed from anything that would actually happen, while still being possible to imagine.

My favorite is still the teletransporter problem.

 

[ryan]

Yeah, it's pretty outlandish. But thought experiments often are. Another way to frame it might be modally, with a many-worlds kind of thing. Two identical parallel universes and all. The point is not to figure out something about the situation being described per se, but something that is true even outside the constraints of the thought experiment. It's pretty standard fare for most thought experiments (like the Mary case for qualia) to be very, very far removed from anything that would actually happen, while still being possible to imagine.

My favorite is still the teletransporter problem.

Actually, if there is a multiverse - and this is a mainstream idea that many physicists now theorize about - then all thought experiments that are at least theoretically possible have happened, will happen and are happening.

 

[Duke Leto]

Yeah, it's pretty outlandish. But thought experiments often are. Another way to frame it might be modally, with a many-worlds kind of thing. Two identical parallel universes and all. The point is not to figure out something about the situation being described per se, but something that is true even outside the constraints of the thought experiment. It's pretty standard fare for most thought experiments (like the Mary case for qualia) to be very, very far removed from anything that would actually happen, while still being possible to imagine.

The Mary the color scientist thought experiment is exactly the same kind of equivocational horseshit. It depends on you accepting the preposterous notion that someone with a "complete scientific knowledge" of color who has nonetheless never seen anything but black, white and shades of gray wouldn't immediately recognize a blue banana passed off as yellow as the cheap trick that it is. (Hint, different colors make different shades of gray.)

It depends on a kind of intellectual sleight of hand, where you are invited to imagine a bizarre scenario without being prompted to think through the implications of that scenario, and are than invited to make a plausible sounding intuition about how it would play out, an intuition that involves conveniently ignoring implications of the scenario.

 

[Juma]

Ponder the difference between "enable" and "cause".

Are you going to answer my question in post #136?

Is there a difference between a fox and the animal?

 

[ryan]

Are you going to answer my question in post #136?

Is there a difference between a fox and the animal?

If I have an animal, it is not true that I must have a fox. If I have a fox, then it is true that I must have an animal.

I will assume that the brain process is analogous to animal, and fox is the mind where the mind is a type of brain process. Is this accurate?

 

[Juma]

Is there a difference between a fox and the animal?

If I have an animal, it is not true that I must have a fox. If I have a fox, then it is true that I must have an animal.

I will assume that the brain process is analogous to animal, and fox is the mind where the mind is a type of brain process. Is this accurate?

There are a lot of processes in the mind and together they create what you experience as your mind.

 

[ryan]

If I have an animal, it is not true that I must have a fox. If I have a fox, then it is true that I must have an animal.

I will assume that the brain process is analogous to animal, and fox is the mind where the mind is a type of brain process. Is this accurate?

There are a lot of processes in the mind and together they create what you experience as your mind.

In your opinion, does the brain have processes + mind, or is it just process?

 

[Juma]

There are a lot of processes in the mind and together they create what you experience as your mind.

In your opinion, does the brain have processes + mind, or is it just process?

How many years have we discussed this? Have I ever said anything but that mind is processes? That there is no more than interacting particles?

 

[ryan]

In your opinion, does the brain have processes + mind, or is it just process?

How many years have we discussed this? Have I ever said anything but that mind is processes? That there is no more than interacting particles?

Don't you think it's at least incredibly unintuitive to see a brain process and equate that to the sensation of smelling roses? I don't know how I could ever accept that they are exactly the same thing.

 

[Juma]

How many years have we discussed this? Have I ever said anything but that mind is processes? That there is no more than interacting particles?

Don't you think it's at least incredibly unintuitive to see a brain process and equate that to the sensation of smelling roses? I don't know how I could ever accept that they are exactly the same thing.

1) Being unintuitive isnt an argument for anything. Of course it is veru unintuitive. But just saying that and think that would make a difference makes you a big douchebag.

2) why would "seeing a brain process" be the same as "smelling roses"? they are two very different activities.
But why wouldnt you be able to observe a brain process that is currently performing the activity of smelling roses?