My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[Duke Leto]

Being in Perth and not Sydney is absolutely not an intrinsic property. I don't know how you can argue that.

I get that. After so many posts I get that you are a lost case. Buy.

One wonders what exactly the fuck he thinks he's talking about...

 

[ryan]

The location of an equilateral triangle does not change its intrinsic properties of equal sides.

Of course not. Bye.

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/ ),

"x has F in an intrinsic fashion iff every duplicate of x has F".

DBT = x, and relative location = F.

 

[Juma]

Of course not. Bye.

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/ ),

"x has F in an intrinsic fashion iff every duplicate of x has F".

DBT = x, and relative location = F.

Ok. I give one more chance just you actually made a statement that say something consistent:

See it like this instead:

x=DBT and F="separation from other DBT"

Separation from DBT is a function of its relative location.


But i have a firm belief that you continoue to ask the wrong questions so I have really lost intrest in this discussion.

 

[ryan]

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/ ),

"x has F in an intrinsic fashion iff every duplicate of x has F".

DBT = x, and relative location = F.

Ok. I give one more chance just you actually made a statement that say something consistent:

See it like this instead:

x=DBT and F="separation from other DBT"

Separation from DBT is a function of its relative location.

If we define DBT and the clone by how long they have existed, the clone won't be a true duplicate.

 

[ryan]

But i have a firm belief that you continoue to ask the wrong questions so I have really lost intrest in this discussion.

Okay, then I remember you saying that experiencing experience is a problem. I believe we are both talking about the same thing, only I call it "being".

Objectively the universe is always the same. But subjectively, it is different but still physically the same.

 

[fromderinside]

Can you be in Perth and Sydney at the same time? Of course not. That constraint constitutes a vote for intrinsic property. /sheesh

To determine an intrinsic property is quite simple. Does an entity's location affect what it is? The answer is obviously no.

Sydney is not Perth and Perth is not Sydney. They are unique cities with unique populations located in unique ecology. What things come down to is definition. If your definition fails to account for uniqueness it fails to limit intrinsic attributes.

 

[fromderinside]

S-E-P-A-R-A-T-E. Separate. The two bodies are separare.

Separate.

Got it?

The environment does not give the body its feature of originality. If anything it would be time.

Current theory suggest a time-space continuum. Time and space are joined. What is at location A at time A is not the same as what is at location A' at time A'. Look. Even the notations are different.

 

[ryan]

To determine an intrinsic property is quite simple. Does an entity's location affect what it is? The answer is obviously no.

Sydney is not Perth and Perth is not Sydney. They are unique cities with unique populations located in unique ecology. What things come down to is definition. If your definition fails to account for uniqueness it fails to limit intrinsic attributes.

Take the Eiffel Tower for example. If we plop it in New York, it is still the Eiffel Tower. Its intrinsic properties are the same even though its extrinsic properties have changed.

 

[ryan]

The environment does not give the body its feature of originality. If anything it would be time.

Current theory suggest a time-space continuum. Time and space are joined. What is at location A at time A is not the same as what is at location A' at time A'. Look. Even the notations are different.

Yes, I agree. They are just indistinguishable without observing their respective environments. If they were somehow a singular object in different locations, then my argument is dead.

 

[Keith&Co.]

To determine an intrinsic property is quite simple. Does an entity's location affect what it is? The answer is obviously no.

Sydney is not Perth and Perth is not Sydney. They are unique cities with unique populations located in unique ecology.

With unique gravity vectors, different speeds on the rotating Earth. Each will have a detectable, if very slight, difference in weight and velocity. Location does affect the entity.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I addressed that in the OP.

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

Ok, so, for the sake of the argument (the OP, actually), suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Is there a difference between a fox and the animal?

Yes. The fox is necessarily an animal but an animal is not necessarily a fox.

Also, the fox is not necessarily a fox.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

If I have an animal, it is not true that I must have a fox. If I have a fox, then it is true that I must have an animal.

I will assume that the brain process is analogous to animal, and fox is the mind where the mind is a type of brain process. Is this accurate?

Yeah!

There are a lot of processes in the mind and together they create what you experience as your mind.

Spooky!
EB

 

[Keith&Co.]

Ok, so, for the sake of the argument (the OP, actually), suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

then Ryan has established that our nonphysical consciousness cannot access experiences that happen to other people's physical bodies, even if they're exactitudely similar.

 

[Speakpigeon]

S-E-P-A-R-A-T-E. Separate. The two bodies are separare.

Separate.

Got it?

If you separate separate then it's no longer separate.
Gotcha!
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

Being in Perth and not Sydney is absolutely not an intrinsic property. I don't know how you can argue that.

I get that. After so many posts I get that you are a lost case. Buy.

I knew it.

I knew there would be a commercial deal in the end.
EB

 

[Keith&Co.]

If you separate separate then it's no longer separate.
Gotcha!
EB

But they could be disparate....

 

[Juma]

No you didn't.

In order for two physical consciousness to be exactly the same and have exactly the same experiences. That would mean they have to occupy the same physical position continuously. If one twin is so much as standing next to the other in the same room, their fields of vision will be different and they will have slightly different conscious experiences.

Even if you cheated and used a matter replicator to make a perfect identical copy, that copy would have to be occupying a different position in the physical universe after the replication. So from the insistent that the replicator makes the new twin, they stop being experiential twins.

Just another rigged thought experiment predicated on a definitional impossibility in the premises, although to be fair, I don't think you're smart enough to have realized that the argument was fallacious, so it was not offered in bad faith.

Ok, so, for the sake of the argument (the OP, actually), suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

If you have them at the same spot they will die immidiately...

 

[fromderinside]

Sydney is not Perth and Perth is not Sydney. They are unique cities with unique populations located in unique ecology.

With unique gravity vectors, different speeds on the rotating Earth. Each will have a detectable, if very slight, difference in weight and velocity. Location does affect the entity.

Eyup.

thanks.

 

[fromderinside]

Ok, so, for the sake of the argument (the OP, actually), suppose we can create two clones, the exact copy of some original, and have them at the exact same spot. Everything looks the same to both but they can't interact with each other. Now, one of them is sentenced to death.

Then what?
EB

If you have them at the same spot they will die immidiately...

... or, a new spot will we be created making them physically possible...... defeating the idea that they are identical.... again.