My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

Don't you think it's at least incredibly unintuitive to see a brain process and equate that to the sensation of smelling roses? I don't know how I could ever accept that they are exactly the same thing.

1) Being unintuitive isnt an argument for anything. Of course it is veru unintuitive. But just saying that and think that would make a difference makes you a big douchebag.

It carries some weight, and sometimes it's all we have. But I am not going to use it in this argument.

2) why would "seeing a brain process" be the same as "smelling roses"? they are two very different activities.
But why wouldnt you be able to observe a brain process that is currently performing the activity of smelling roses?

There is a brain that senses the smell of roses. Then there is being the brain that sense the smell of roses. It seems like there must be something more to being the brain rather than the brain just existing.

 

[Juma]

1) Being unintuitive isnt an argument for anything. Of course it is veru unintuitive. But just saying that and think that would make a difference makes you a big douchebag.

It carries some weight, and sometimes it's all we have. But I am not going to use it in this argument.

2) why would "seeing a brain process" be the same as "smelling roses"? they are two very different activities.
But why wouldnt you be able to observe a brain process that is currently performing the activity of smelling roses?

There is a brain that senses the smell of roses. Then there is being the brain that sense the smell of roses. It seems like there must be something more to being the brain rather than the brain just existing.

Yes, there is something more than just "being". There is the organization and behaviour: it is not any bunch of particles: it is a very specific organization of particles interacting in an specific way in an immensly complex system.

 

[ryan]

It carries some weight, and sometimes it's all we have. But I am not going to use it in this argument.

2) why would "seeing a brain process" be the same as "smelling roses"? they are two very different activities.
But why wouldnt you be able to observe a brain process that is currently performing the activity of smelling roses?

There is a brain that senses the smell of roses. Then there is being the brain that sense the smell of roses. It seems like there must be something more to being the brain rather than the brain just existing.

Yes, there is something more than just "being". There is the organization and behaviour: it is not any bunch of particles: it is a very specific organization of particles interacting in an specific way in an immensly complex system.

There seems to be some miscommunication. I am trying to say that there is something called "being" that is in addition to the brain processes. There is a brain that has the sensation of the smell of roses, then there is being the brain that has the sensation of smelling roses. The difference is clearly non-physical; it is what we call "I".

 

[Juma]

It carries some weight, and sometimes it's all we have. But I am not going to use it in this argument.

2) why would "seeing a brain process" be the same as "smelling roses"? they are two very different activities.
But why wouldnt you be able to observe a brain process that is currently performing the activity of smelling roses?

There is a brain that senses the smell of roses. Then there is being the brain that sense the smell of roses. It seems like there must be something more to being the brain rather than the brain just existing.

Yes, there is something more than just "being". There is the organization and behaviour: it is not any bunch of particles: it is a very specific organization of particles interacting in an specific way in an immensly complex system.

There seems to be some miscommunication. I am trying to say that there is something called "being" that is in addition to the brain processes. There is a brain that has the sensation of the smell of roses, then there is being the brain that has the sensation of smelling roses. The difference is clearly non-physical; it is what we call "I".

And here is where you go wrong. You just assume that it has to be "non-physical" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Which is nothing else than a variant of " god of the gaps".

 

[ryan]

And here is where you go wrong. You just assume that it has to be "non-physical" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Which is nothing else than a variant of " god of the gaps".

But the thought experiment assumes everything to be physically identical.

 

[Juma]

And here is where you go wrong. You just assume that it has to be "non-physical" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Which is nothing else than a variant of " god of the gaps".

But the thought experiment assumes everything to be physically identical.

S-E-P-A-R-A-T-E. Separate. The two bodies are separare.

Separate.

Got it?

 

[ryan]

But the thought experiment assumes everything to be physically identical.

S-E-P-A-R-A-T-E. Separate. The two bodies are separare.

Separate.

Got it?

The environment does not give the body its feature of originality. If anything it would be time.

 

[Juma]

S-E-P-A-R-A-T-E. Separate. The two bodies are separare.

Separate.

Got it?

The environment does not give the body its feature of originality. If anything it would be time.

Originality? Who is talking about orginality? The question was how they could be two, not one. Originality has nothing to do with it. If you make two copies instead of one, how can the copies be two and not one mind? Because they are SEPARATE! Not because wether one of them are more original than the other.

 

[ryan]

The environment does not give the body its feature of originality. If anything it would be time.

Originality? Who is talking about orginality? The question was how they could be two, not one. Originality has nothing to do with it. If you make two copies instead of one, how can the copies be two and not one mind? Because they are SEPARATE! Not because wether one of them are more original than the other.

I have never said anything about one mind; I don't know where you and DBT are getting that from. There are two identical bodies and two identical minds. One body with its mind is the original. The original is a non-physical feature. DBT's body and mind is in Perth, and the copied body and its mind is in Sydney. There is a non-physical difference between the body/mind in Perth and the body/mind in Sydney.

 

[Juma]

There is a non-physical difference between the body/mind in Perth and the body/mind in Sydney.

Ok. Forget about "one mind" then.

Why do you keep saying that there is a non-physical difference?

Any difference is easy to account for: the very obvious PHYSICAL difference: location!

 

[ryan]

There is a non-physical difference between the body/mind in Perth and the body/mind in Sydney.

Ok. Forget about "one mind" then.

Why do you keep saying that there is a non-physical difference?

Any difference is easy to account for: the very obvious PHYSICAL difference: location!

Location is only how we can tell them apart. Location, in this instance, does not affect what they are composed of, which is what the argument is about.

 

[Juma]

Ok. Forget about "one mind" then.

Why do you keep saying that there is a non-physical difference?

Any difference is easy to account for: the very obvious PHYSICAL difference: location!

Location is only how we can tell them apart. Location, in this instance, does not affect what they are composed of, which is what the argument is about.

No. If they are separate they will behave as separate entities but if they are conjoined they will behave as single a connected system.

 

[ryan]

Location is only how we can tell them apart. Location, in this instance, does not affect what they are composed of, which is what the argument is about.

No. If they are separate they will behave as separate entities but if they are conjoined they will behave as single a connected system.

This only gets around my point semantically. If they converge, then it is one of the bodies that causes the singularity of bodies, not the location. The environment is a fixed variable that doesn't change in this scenario. And besides all of that, I am talking about the composition of the bodies.

 

[Juma]

No. If they are separate they will behave as separate entities but if they are conjoined they will behave as single a connected system.

This only gets around my point semantically. If they converge, then it is one of the bodies that causes the singularity of bodies, not the location. The environment is a fixed variable that doesn't change in this scenario. And besides all of that, I am talking about the composition of the bodies.

What the fuck! The relative position of the parts of a system IS a intrinsic property of the sysyem. End of discussion.

 

[ryan]

This only gets around my point semantically. If they converge, then it is one of the bodies that causes the singularity of bodies, not the location. The environment is a fixed variable that doesn't change in this scenario. And besides all of that, I am talking about the composition of the bodies.

What the fuck! The relative position of the parts of a system IS a intrinsic property of the sysyem. End of discussion.

Being in Perth and not Sydney is absolutely not an intrinsic property. I don't know how you can argue that.

 

[fromderinside]

Can you be in Perth and Sydney at the same time? Of course not. That constraint constitutes a vote for intrinsic property. /sheesh

 

[ryan]

Can you be in Perth and Sydney at the same time? Of course not. That constraint constitutes a vote for intrinsic property. /sheesh

To determine an intrinsic property is quite simple. Does an entity's location affect what it is? The answer is obviously no.

 

[Juma]

What the fuck! The relative position of the parts of a system IS a intrinsic property of the sysyem. End of discussion.

Being in Perth and not Sydney is absolutely not an intrinsic property. I don't know how you can argue that.

I get that. After so many posts I get that you are a lost case. Buy.

 

[ryan]

Being in Perth and not Sydney is absolutely not an intrinsic property. I don't know how you can argue that.

I get that. After so many posts I get that you are a lost case. Buy.

The location of an equilateral triangle does not change its intrinsic properties of equal sides.

 

[Juma]

I get that. After so many posts I get that you are a lost case. Buy.

The location of an equilateral triangle does not change its intrinsic properties of equal sides.

Of course not. Bye.