There is a lot of rich phenomena that reduces to 4 fundamental forces, or the particles that carry them (assuming the graviton). Some examples of what emerges in this universe are largely due to these 4 forces are: all structures, accelerating bodies, decay, tension, etc. Everything else is reduced to these and other properties of the particles of the SM the same way.
I disagree.
Could you give an example of something in science that isn't fully explained by its parts?
To spell it out: no, not only do the physical properties of “very fundamental properties” not have to be conserved in order for us to make successful predictions, we don’t even have to be aware of these “very fundamental particles” or their properties.
Without conservation everything would be constantly changing. Gold might just turn into a turkey and then into water. Energy/EM could increase in value to more energetic photons or just turn into 3 electrons instead of an electron and positron, why not?
Properties are not always conserved, especially extrinsic properties. Like an elastic is stretchy in only certain conditions. But strangeness in the weak interacting particles is not conserved.
The issue here is perhaps one of semantics.
Actually, this is very important for this topic of discussion. It must be understood what properties are required for a substance in a given space and what properties are not. The extrinsic properties are the properties that many people will claim emerge (just to refresh, your weight is an extrinsic property because it depends on how massive the object you are on is, something not intrinsic to you.).
But these emerging properties are not ontologically real; they do not logically exist in addition to the ontological properties (fundamental properties) that are actually there. This becomes clear when we try to see if they both exist at the same time. The apple exists
or the particles that make up the apple, but both are not actually there. It's called a category error. Wiki does a good enough job explaining here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake . An easy way to prove this is if I have an apple that weighs 1.5 kg's, we could not say that I have an apple that weighs 1.5 kg's and particles that collectively weigh 1.5 kg's because then I would have a total of 3 kg's!
So if the particles that constitute a piece of gold, for example, were to keep changing their properties, we would likely get different results when testing the properties of it, and it wouldn't compare well with other samples of gold.
Right, so if the “properties” (intrinsic properties?) of particles changed, then brains would not work the way they do. Is that what you are getting at? This was never in doubt. The problem I have is with suggesting that because a brain is "conscious" then each particle that makes up a brain has part of that "consciousness".
Building off of my last paragraph where the apple
or its constituting particles exist, we have to make a tough decision now. We have to ask ourselves if the consciousness is a substance or just a property (substance dualism or property dualism).
Let's use the more commonly accepted choice and call the consciousness a property.
Here's my attempt to put this all together.
Let's assume for a moment that the consciousness is an extrinsic property. But, we can quickly see that your consciousness does not depend on its environment or how other observers are viewing you; you are always going to have a consciousness as long as your brain is working properly. So we ruled out an extrinsic property.
Nooooow here is the conclusion.
We are left with the consciousness being an intrinsic property (by a reasonable assumption using elimination). (Again, just to clarify, a square is not an intrinsic property of a chain of molecules forming it because it depends to the observer, curvature of space, definition, etc.) But how can that be since the brain itself has its own intrinsic properties from the particles that constitute it?
We are left with 2 options that I think are quite easy to choose from. One, the consciousness is itself a fundamental particle that is attracted to only brains but somehow leaves no physical "footprint"; or more commonly the brain is a receiver for a field of consciousness. Two, and quite fitting with the rest of science, the consciousness is an intrinsic property of one, some or all kinds of particles WITH the necessary unification from entanglement. The second option is good and is the simplest choice (Occam's razor) because it does not need one-way or two-way physical interactions like the first option does.
I know entanglement in the brain is still in its early stages, but there is some evidence and more and more scientists are finding working models that allow entanglement in decision making processes and other brain processes correlating to the consciousness.
Like math, philosophy is practically inseparable from science. Explaining how something is science is not actually performing science.
Yes and no. Math is certainly separable from science, though it is a very useful tool in science. Philosophy is quite separable from science, being a very different discipline. The practice of science certainly does not involve the study of philosophy at all. In any event the quoted text about X and Y does not seem to be relevant to the practice of science.
I, for one, have never read a published scientific paper without at least some math as part of its reasoning and without some critical thinking that attempts to raise a justified true belief in the conclusion, the latter being in the set of philosophy.
What I said there depends on whether or not you are buying my argument.
lol!
OK, that pretty much sums it up. I will leave the last word to you.
Peez
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