Ok, now we are getting somewhere at least a bit interesting, if also tired and droll on its own way, because it's about The Modal Fallacy.
First off, I'm a determinist. I came to the conclusion that the universe is systematically most likely deterministic independently after observing physics and studying computer science to the point of understanding how neurons drive thought.
I think the biggest issue here is that when many naive people utter the word "can" with reference to a subject, they don't fully understand that the subject is a completely* different collection of things than when they utter that same word and point to the same thing and say "did".
The only exception to this complete difference is that the subject of "can" contains the subject of "did" as an infinitesimal subset.
In the same way as sentences in propositional logic cannot be self or circularly referential and remain valid, ever, can can't refer to the exact collection as did and have the language remain valid, ever.
This is known as a circular reference and no formal language can "compile" into a Turing complete construction with such a reference for the former, and likewise there is a difference between types and instances of the type in such languages. Can vs Did accesses type vs instance.
To demonstrate what I mean by this, when I ask "can I jump over that candlestick" I am not asking will "this instance of type 'I'...", I am asking about the properties of the type itself. I am asking you to observe "anywhere, anywhen in the universe where any instance of that structure 'I' exists consistent with an instance of this contextual element 'candlestick', do ANY jump over it?"
When we ask "could it have been otherwise", we are faced with an entire infinite universe where it was, in fact, otherwise everywhere but there.
That's not how I see it.
Then you are wrong.
There are no instances of "could have done otherwise" anywhere when discussing the laws that all sentient beings are part of.
I just pointed to the instances of "did otherwise". Every point in the universe is already doing otherwise of every other point in the universe. I discussed this early in the thread when I discussed local realism.
Determinism is, fundamentally, a belief in local realism.
You have a shape, and are made of stuff. In other contexts, that shape does otherwise. This is a property of the type according to the shape, rather than a property of the instance. It is like the mathematical concept of integration: it takes something, and looks at a more general case.
This is a well understood aspect of those laws all things in the universe are subject to, that things have properties, and properties allow integral thinking.
So while every point in space and time does otherwise in a very wide way, things with some more complicated property tend to be fewer and further away from each other.
We can observe the literal doing-otherwise by observable members of various classes though so we can observe the literal truth of doing otherwise.
Yes, I call determinism a law even though it is descriptive, not prescriptive.
No, determinism is the corrolary of laws but is not a law itself.
I can only offer what I know to be true.
Bullshit, you have offered plenty of shit that is not true. And you know it.
No one is saying that there isn't the potential to make a different choice based on different contingencies,
Ok...
but there is no way a person could have chosen otherwise given his genetics, predisposition, and the options that were available to him at any given moment in time.
Ok, so, you commit a modal fallacy right here. "
Person could", is a dofferent subject than "available to
him at a given moment in time"
The first word uses the type scope, accessing the idea of that person
specifically and especially at all moments in space and time where things are shaped as that person. This is
explicitly going to conflict with the predicate to-be of the first subject later declared.
This is a modal violation!