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There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

What worries me slightly is this. A lot of us here would say there's no god. But with this free will thing, it's as if some of us are saying the equivalent of, 'look, if we define god this way, then he exists'.

It's more complex than that - I support free will over determinism, because to me determinism requires something closer to a concept of god than free will does. To me, free will is a non-deterministic process as it applies to intelligence and thought. It's much more similar to the process of evolution than it is to anything related to some cosmic zombie. Arguments for determinism, to me, always sound a lot more like intelligent design arguments.

What exactly do you mean by 'free will'? If I don't ask that, we could be at cross purposes.

Also, what sort of non-deterministic process do you have in mind? A combo of determinism and random? I've never been able to get from there to the sort of free will that many people and their folk psychology envisage. But maybe you're not talking about that sort of free will, or that combo.
 
So the question, what is that makes will qualify? Why is will free?
Since I've never argued that 'will' is free (it makes no sense without saying what it is free of/from). I'm guessing that what you really mean to ask is "how can 'will' be free?" (because I've only argued against your claim that 'will' cannot be described as free)?

I don't see that you have offered reasoned arguments. The frustrating thing being your way of wading in and announcing that this is a 'bad argument' while not appearing to understand the argument, sometimes this happens even after explanations have been given, ie, that words represent articles. objects, ideas, concepts, etc, and that as the word 'free' happens to represent something unrestricted, not restrained, non determined, it cannot apply to will because will is not the agency of decision making or motor action, the brain is. The brain decides and forms thoughts, feelings and actions, including will, which is attached to a given decision or action but does not generate these.

Logically you cannot describe something that is clearly not free, clearly not unrestricted, clearly not the agency of thought and response, as being 'free'

It doesn't work.

As I understand it (this not an attempt to misrepresent you - it's a genuine attempt to understand your position) you say that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation (and of course it's not free from this - so 'will' can never be described as free). I simply don't understand the reasoning which leads you to this conclusion. It seems to me that to say (for example) "my will is free from intoxicating influences", "my will is free from any [supernatural] divine influences", "my will is free from unwanted coercion from another person" etc. etc... are all logically valid (they don't lead to any logical contradictions). What am I missing?

I'll take the first point. Where have I said that ''that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation?''
 
We have will. Will is not free. Will cannot be free because it is shaped and formed in response to input and memory by means of neural architecture.

The term 'free will' is an oxymoron.

At this point, I think the only disagreement between you and I is semantic in nature. On the whole, I'm content to say that we're in agreement. The nuance you're drawing between 'will' and 'free will' is very much a disagreement of the specific contextual meaning of the term 'free' in this discussion. On the whole, I think we see it the same way.


Like all words, ''free'' has a certain essential meaning, something that is not bound, not determined, not obstructed or restricted, for example, so something that is bound or restricted cannot be called free as it doesn't meet the definition of the word. If your hands are bound, for instance, they cannot be described as being free. Your hands are not free. Your legs may not be bound, therefore you are able to walk, you are free to walk.

So, as will is not the agent of information processing or decision making or motor actions initiated, but plays a defined role as determined by the actual agency, an active brain....how is logically possible to define will as being free?
 
The problem with that being, it is the brain that forms will in response to stimuli.....so to say ''I am free to will' suggests that conscious experience is the 'I' that ''wills'' - which is not the case.

This is where I quibble. Yes, the brain forms will in response to stimuli... but you seem to imply that such stimuli are external. The brain can form will in response to internal stimuli. The brain can form will in response to memories, imagination, visualization techniques, mental rehearsing, and memorization. Sometimes it is a conscious experience that creates the will.


I did say that the brain responds to stimuli by means of architecture and memory function, the latter being a store of past experience with which to make sense of the world and self, which includes bodily conditions, illness, etc, that effect cognition, hence mood and disposition, etc.
 
It appears to me that you are quite arrogant, ignorant and rude. You complain about not being understood even while not understanding what your opponent is saying.

The best thing you could do is ignore everyone who disagrees with you, including me. It would do us all a favour.

Good example of your limited abilities. It's a straightforward non-sequitur. Bravo! Own goal!

Specifically, that I should decide to ignore you doesn't mean I would be ignoring you because we disagree.

I think I would ignore you just because you're a pain in the ass, quite unlike most people here.

Not so difficult to understand, that. And yet.

And, in effect, the way you reply, there's really no substantial difference with you ignoring who you're responding to.
EB


Get off your high horse and stop acting The Man. The Internet hero full of bravado, ready to abuse and insult all those who you deem to be wrong, according to your own opinion.

If you intend to ignore someone, do it, just ignore whoever you want to ignore without regularly trumpeting on about it like a child.

We would all be better off. Good riddance.
 
Logically you cannot describe something that is clearly not free, clearly not unrestricted, clearly not the agency of thought and response, as being 'free'
This is question begging. You're assuming as correct the very thing that's in dispute.

You can rescue this by explicitly declaring what it is the 'something' is/is not free of/from.

As I understand it (this not an attempt to misrepresent you - it's a genuine attempt to understand your position) you say that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation (and of course it's not free from this - so 'will' can never be described as free). I simply don't understand the reasoning which leads you to this conclusion. It seems to me that to say (for example) "my will is free from intoxicating influences", "my will is free from any [supernatural] divine influences", "my will is free from unwanted coercion from another person" etc. etc... are all logically valid (they don't lead to any logical contradictions). What am I missing?

I'll take the first point. Where have I said that ''that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation?''
You haven'y explicitly said this - it's implied when you declare that "will cannot be free" because it is subject to deterministic causality. This excludes the possibility that 'will' could be free if it were free from some other influencing factor.
 
This is question begging. You're assuming as correct the very thing that's in dispute.

No, it is not question begging. I have given accepted definitions of the word free and pointed out that is something is to be defined as being free, that something must necessarily comply with the given definition of the word.

This is not controversial. A prisoner tied to a chair cannot be said to be free because his condition does not relate to definition of freedom. It's basic logic.

If will is not the agent of decision making, but is being constantly shaped and formed by the actual agent, the brain, as a part of the means of response....how can will possibly comply with the definition of ''free?''

You can rescue this by explicitly declaring what it is the 'something' is/is not free of/from.

It doesn't need rescuing. It is quite basic and to the point...if something is to be described as 'free' it must meet or comply with the very definition of freedom.

You haven'y explicitly said this - it's implied when you declare that "will cannot be free" because it is subject to deterministic causality. This excludes the possibility that 'will' could be free if it were free from some other influencing factor.


As you first expressed it, ''that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation'' it's not even implied.

And what do you mean by 'free from some other influencing factor?'' What factor?
 
Like all words, ''free'' has a certain essential meaning, something that is not bound, not determined, not obstructed or restricted, for example, so something that is bound or restricted cannot be called free as it doesn't meet the definition of the word. If your hands are bound, for instance, they cannot be described as being free. Your hands are not free. Your legs may not be bound, therefore you are able to walk, you are free to walk.

There's a slight problem here. Strictly speaking, it seems we should never say anyone is free to walk, by the standard that you are setting for 'free'.
 
Like all words, ''free'' has a certain essential meaning, something that is not bound, not determined, not obstructed or restricted, for example, so something that is bound or restricted cannot be called free as it doesn't meet the definition of the word. If your hands are bound, for instance, they cannot be described as being free. Your hands are not free. Your legs may not be bound, therefore you are able to walk, you are free to walk.

There's a slight problem here. Strictly speaking, it seems we should never say anyone is free to walk, by the standard that you are setting for 'free'.

Able to walk, your legs are functional, unimpeded, not restrained, there is nothing to prevent you from walking. Perhaps a very provisional form of freedom, narrow and specific. or perhaps not. Offhand, It's hard to say.
 
Perhaps a very provisional form of freedom....

And that, I think, is essentially the way many compatibilists use the word free in free will.

Except that will has no autonomy of decision making or action, will does whatever the brain is doing....just as it is not the legs that act of their own accord but are moved by impulses sent by the brain, the provisional, narrow usage of the word does not prove the proposition. Provisional 'freedom' only refers to an aspect, a condition, a given ability....the dog is free from its chain but is constrained by the fenced enclosure, the dog is not free to roam being references to states within the system, not nature of the system as a whole.

The principle on which compatibilism rests does not actually make it compatible with determinism because determinism does not allow one to do otherwise, within a deterministic system, freedom is an illusion.
 
For example;

''Free will might be an illusion created by our brains, scientists might have proved.

Humans are convinced that they make conscious choices as they live their lives. But instead it may be that the brain just convinces itself that it made a free choice from the available options after the decision is made.

The idea was tested out by tricking subjects into believing that they had made a choice before the consequences of that choice could actually be seen. In the test, people were made to believe that they had taken a decision using free will – even though that was impossible.

The idea that human beings trick themselves into believing in free will was laid out in a paper by psychologists Dan Wegner and Thalia Wheatley nearly 20 years ago. They proposed the feeling of wanting to do something was real, but there may be no connection between the feeling and actually doing it.

In one of the studies undertaken by Adam Bear and Paul Bloom, of Yale University, the test subjects were shown five white circles on a computer monitor. They were told to choose one of the circles before one of them lit up red.

The participants were then asked to describe whether they’d picked the correct circle, another one, or if they hadn’t had time to actually pick one.

Statistically, people should have picked the right circle about one out of every five times. But they reported getting it right much more than 20 per cent of the time, going over 30 per cent if the circle turned red very quickly.

The scientists suggest that the findings show that the test subjects’ minds were swapping around the order of events, so that it appeared that they had chosen the right circle – even if they hadn’t actually had time to do so.''
 
Perhaps a very provisional form of freedom....

And that, I think, is essentially the way many compatibilists use the word free in free will.

Except that will has no autonomy of decision making or action, will does whatever the brain is doing....just as it is not the legs that act of their own accord but are moved by impulses sent by the brain, the provisional, narrow usage of the word does not prove the proposition. Provisional 'freedom' only refers to an aspect, a condition, a given ability....the dog is free from its chain but is constrained by the fenced enclosure, the dog is not free to roam being references to states within the system, not nature of the system as a whole.

The principle on which compatibilism rests does not actually make it compatible with determinism because determinism does not allow one to do otherwise, within a deterministic system, freedom is an illusion.

Yes, but a leg isn't 'really' free to move either, so all I'm saying is that the word 'free' in free will can be validly used, in a provisional, limited or colloquial way, imo.

I can still say, if I want to, which I sometimes do, that at the end of the day it's the wrong word (for reasons given) and you can say that it cannot (reasonably) be used. Your saying that isn't arbitrary or irrational, nor is it a fallacy, but it is just your reasoned view, and strictly-speaking wrong in the absolute (non-subjective) sense, since the word free can (reasonably) be used, via different reasoning. Your view (and perhaps mine) might be special pleading in an informal sort of way. Or at least let me say I get that general objection. I think we should call them our reasoned opinions regarding labelling, not an absolute decree.

Moving on (hopefully), I pretty much agree with almost everything you say.

There is, looming on the horizon, for everyone, the prospect that everything we think or do is determined and/or randomly caused and that beyond that we cannot think or do anything otherwise than what we did think or do in any given instant. The 'algorithms' in our brains would, it seems, have to churn out exactly the same output if the system were re-run (allowing for the possibility of randomness).

At least it seems very difficult indeed to make a case for there being a convincing alternative to this hypothetical.

This would mean that if a certain person commits a crime, that person literally could not have done otherwise and we would have done the same had we literally been in that person's shoes, so to speak. Of course, we would be them in that case, obviously.

In that scenario, compatibilist free will would be 'fully trapped anyway' and we might ask, in what way is it reasonable to hold that person morally responsible for what they did? I don't mean to suggest there isn't an answer to that. I have read several. But this is what I mean about tricky questions which follow on after the labelling issue has been set aside.
 
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And I do mean 'fully trapped' because to my eyes, no amount of stochastic jiggery-pokery (or elbow room as it has been called), no amount of complex agency or choice-making capacity, gets us out of saying that we apparently must do what we do (and think), because in the final analysis, we (our human systems) are as subject to what we call the laws of physics as everything else is.

At least that is the way it seems. It's an 'if', based on current knowledge, reasoning and understanding. But I have never heard a convincing counter-hypothetical, yet.

Daniel Dennett (wisely, imo) acknowledges it, and says it doesn't matter. That is one way to go. I'm not entirely convinced by him on that.

He also (again wisely imo) doesn't get much into citing randomness facilitating free will, because it's hard to see how it does or even could, when you dig down into that idea.
 
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Logically you cannot describe something that is clearly not free, clearly not unrestricted, clearly not the agency of thought and response, as being 'free'
This is question begging. You're assuming as correct the very thing that's in dispute.


No, it is not question begging. I have given accepted definitions of the word free and pointed out that is something is to be defined as being free, that something must necessarily comply with the given definition of the word.

It most certainly is begging the question.

You don't get away with it simply because you believe you've proven your case elsewhere. That's not how internet discussions work.

This is not controversial.
You mean your claim that you have indisputably resolved the free will debate based on (your interpretation of) dictionary definitions? You're kidding!


You haven'y explicitly said this - it's implied when you declare that "will cannot be free" because it is subject to deterministic causality. This excludes the possibility that 'will' could be free if it were free from some other influencing factor.

And what do you mean by 'free from some other influencing factor?'' What factor?
I provided three examples in post #767. Here they are again:

As I understand it (this not an attempt to misrepresent you - it's a genuine attempt to understand your position) you say that the only thing 'will' can logically be free from is deterministic causation (and of course it's not free from this - so 'will' can never be described as free). I simply don't understand the reasoning which leads you to this conclusion. It seems to me that to say (for example) "my will is free from intoxicating influences", "my will is free from any [supernatural] divine influences", "my will is free from unwanted coercion from another person" etc. etc... are all logically valid (they don't lead to any logical contradictions). What am I missing?

In any event, it really shouldn't matter. Either you stick by your claim that free will cannot be defined as free or you change your claim to "I cannot imagine any circumstances under which I would describe 'will' as free".
 
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Except that will has no autonomy of decision making or action, will does whatever the brain is doing....just as it is not the legs that act of their own accord but are moved by impulses sent by the brain, the provisional, narrow usage of the word does not prove the proposition. Provisional 'freedom' only refers to an aspect, a condition, a given ability....the dog is free from its chain but is constrained by the fenced enclosure, the dog is not free to roam being references to states within the system, not nature of the system as a whole.

The principle on which compatibilism rests does not actually make it compatible with determinism because determinism does not allow one to do otherwise, within a deterministic system, freedom is an illusion.

Yes, but a leg isn't 'really' free to move either, so all I'm saying is that the word 'free' in free will can be validly used, in a provisional, limited or colloquial way, imo.

It's just a reference to an ability that does not appear to be constricted or blocked. Saying 'you can move your leg freely' says nothing about the nature of motor action....just as calling decision making ''free will'' says nothing about the nature of decision making....which may be entirely determined, therefore not 'free' at all.
 
Sort of, maybe. You might say that (by certain definitions of 'freedom').



It's not dissimilar in some ways to asking what way is any other imaginary conception relevant to being human. It is arguably part of being human.

If we throw away that baggage and move the problem to 'being human as physical process', then in what ways would we define our existence? How is the concept of freedom relevant to what we are, if at all?

Imo, we'd still have all the capacities we already have, which I like to call 'human agency'. We might start to think of ourselves as 'not so spechul' in some ways. Thinking of ourselves as spechul is arguably endemic to the species. Some don't like the term 'meat robot' for example.

It's like people who contemplate free will have this feeling that they are an 'I' that is trapped in a body, rather than the body itself and what it means to be that body. To me that's just an odd position.

You don't have a robust sense of self?

So we agree on our points.

I'm still interested in hearing some in this thread address some of the questions I've brought up in my last several posts, but that hasn't happened of their.. own free-will, so I'll just leave it :D
 
Except that will has no autonomy of decision making or action, will does whatever the brain is doing....just as it is not the legs that act of their own accord but are moved by impulses sent by the brain, the provisional, narrow usage of the word does not prove the proposition. Provisional 'freedom' only refers to an aspect, a condition, a given ability....the dog is free from its chain but is constrained by the fenced enclosure, the dog is not free to roam being references to states within the system, not nature of the system as a whole.

The principle on which compatibilism rests does not actually make it compatible with determinism because determinism does not allow one to do otherwise, within a deterministic system, freedom is an illusion.

Yes, but a leg isn't 'really' free to move either, so all I'm saying is that the word 'free' in free will can be validly used, in a provisional, limited or colloquial way, imo.

It's just a reference to an ability that does not appear to be constricted or blocked. Saying 'you can move your leg freely' says nothing about the nature of motor action....just as calling decision making ''free will'' says nothing about the nature of decision making....which may be entirely determined, therefore not 'free' at all.

Yes. Neither free to walk or free to will are really/totally free.
 
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