There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Treedbear]

...
If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition or this or that reasoning, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

To me it seems more like the Monty Python dead parrot sketch.

At any rate I think the confusion arises because the word freedom is properly always used within some context. In fact freedom is only realized when certain restrictions are recognized. Religions like to distort the proper use of the word by removing all context, as if there is an immaterial and somehow indeterministic realm akin to Plato's Forms. Under that interpretation it loses any useful meaning, except in order to justify an omniscient and absolutely free creator God.

So I can see the reason people argue for free will because they are using a particular context, and in philosophy this context usually comes down to how one defines the self, or I, or me, or a person. Take your pick, but each of these convey a slightly different context. If by "I" you mean the brain, or even the entire neurologic organism (as I think DBT tends to favor), then you have a purely deterministic result (allowing for quantum and stochastic effects). Many of us regard the mind as somehow removed from this context, or in terms of some program that runs the brain. In my own view the self is a model created by the brain. Not as an illusion but as a way of modeling one part of its environment. In that context I can accept both free and determined will with regard to future actions. But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

 

[untermensche]

Even if we say that "free" must mean "without constraint of any kind" I still await an answer to my question.

When I change my perception of a Necker cube at will, what exactly constrains me?

Not some irrational rambling about how the brain creates consciousness therefore the consciousness cannot possibly effect the brain.

An answer with evidence to support it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Excellent post!

Not least given it's concise shortness.

Against those very long 108 pages of very tedious and ultimately pointless arguing!

Bravo!

You're showing the way how to reduce the amount of energy the world is consuming.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

Without foundation, without justification, likely without any possible empirical verification, but not meaningless.

We definitely all understand what the possibility to have done otherwise means.

That being said, I agree with the rest of your post.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

In my own view the self is a model created by the brain. Not as an illusion but as a way of modeling one part of its environment.

It isn't illusory in the sense that the sensation exists, but it may be illusory in the sense that the self does not do what it feeels like it's doing (exerting personal control as the homunculus controller).

That's my take.

In that context I can accept both free and determined will with regard to future actions.

Depends what you mean by free. Personally, I consider compatibilism to be essentially a fudge. This makes me unpopular with compatibilists, usually.

But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

I wouldn't say it is meaningless. But maybe it depends on what you mean by meaningless.

In any case, there is also 'the ability to have freely willed to choose to do otherwise' which I sometimes think is a higher bar, but the one that should be used, because randomness (if it exists and plays a part) could, under some interpretations, allow us to merely 'do otherwise'. But it depends when we 'stop the clock'. At the instant of action, randomness would, I think, just become another cause which would mean that we could not even have merely 'done otherwise' than what we did.

 

[Speakpigeon]

It isn't illusory in the sense that the sensation exists, but it may be illusory in the sense that the self does not do what it feeels like it's doing. That's my take.

Personally, I don't believe there's anything that does what it feels like it's doing, except of course our mental impressions if taken as such (pain is definitely painful). I can look myself in a mirror and I sure don't look in there like I do what it feels like I'm doing. If I did, I guess I would feel what other people feel just by looking at them. I think I don't.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

It isn't illusory in the sense that the sensation exists, but it may be illusory in the sense that the self does not do what it feeels like it's doing. That's my take.

Personally, I don't believe there's anything that does what it feels like it's doing, except of course our mental impressions if taken as such (pain is definitely painful). I can look myself in a mirror and I sure don't look in there like I do what it feels like I'm doing. If I did, I guess I would feel what other people feel just by looking at them. I think I don't.
EB

I honestly do not want to get into a pointless or stupid argument with you about this. But at the same time, I think I disagree with you.

Maybe we should just leave it at that. You seem, by and large (odd expression that, I wonder where it comes from) to be a likeable and decent chap and there's no need for loggerheads.


ETA: No wait. Maybe I misread. Maybe I do agree with you.

 

[Emily Lake]

Pretty much agreed on that viewpoint.

Never mind. This is probably more appropriate than a facepalm:









Well, perhaps I should elaborate on that.

Here goes...

*Giggle* Yeah, I know. I seem kind of inconsistent don't I? It's part and parcel of not having the appropriate words.

I don't think the world is actually deterministic... but for all intents and purposes it's close enough for most things to treat it as such. But I also think that free will (in the sense that DBT uses the terms will and agency) is perfectly compatible with it. Having definitive causes for all things doesn't mean that only one outcome is possible, nor does it mean that will is an illusion. Having will and agency doesn't imply a lack of causality. I can envision the dynamics of it... but I don't have the right words. And in all honesty I lack both the philosophical background and the neurological expertise to hold my ground. So I wander along trying very hard to make myself make sense to anyone other than me.

- - - Updated - - -

As for invention requires free will --- Monkeys have Will. Monkeys are poor inventors......it is not will, free or otherwise that enables invention but brain complexity, the necessary wiring. Will is merely the byproduct. Monkeys swing in trees, humans invent.

Okay. How does brain complexity enable invention? Describe the process, if you would.

- - - Updated - - -

DBT, as much as I agree with your argument against calling human agency capacities free will, I agree with AntiChris's main point, that we cannot say it is not possible, using some definition, one which does not mean completely free (or free ultimately at all, arguably), to call it free will. And that, as far as I can see, is now AntiChris's only point. And on that point he is correct. You and I may agree that it is not a very good term, for a variety of reasons, but that's all.

There is no point in repeating over and over why you reason that it should not be called free will, because all he is objecting to is you saying that it is not even possible to call it that, when it clearly is.

If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition or this or that reasoning, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

DBT, as much as I agree with your argument against calling human agency capacities free will, I agree with AntiChris's main point, that we cannot say it is not possible, using some definition, one which does not mean completely free (or free ultimately at all, arguably), to call it free will. And that, as far as I can see, is now AntiChris's only point. And on that point he is correct. You and I may agree that it is not a very good term, for a variety of reasons, but that's all.

There is no point in repeating over and over why you reason that it should not be called free will, because all he is objecting to is you saying that it is not even possible to call it that, when it clearly is.

If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

Lol. Very funny.

Lol. Very funny.

I am confused by this series of posts.

 

[Emily Lake]

DBT, as much as I agree with your argument against calling human agency capacities free will, I agree with AntiChris's main point, that we cannot say it is not possible, using some definition, one which does not mean completely free (or free ultimately at all, arguably), to call it free will. And that, as far as I can see, is now AntiChris's only point. And on that point he is correct. You and I may agree that it is not a very good term, for a variety of reasons, but that's all.

There is no point in repeating over and over why you reason that it should not be called free will, because all he is objecting to is you saying that it is not even possible to call it that, when it clearly is.

If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition or this or that reasoning, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

DBT, as much as I agree with your argument against calling human agency capacities free will, I agree with AntiChris's main point, that we cannot say it is not possible, using some definition, one which does not mean completely free (or free ultimately at all, arguably), to call it free will. And that, as far as I can see, is now AntiChris's only point. And on that point he is correct. You and I may agree that it is not a very good term, for a variety of reasons, but that's all.

There is no point in repeating over and over why you reason that it should not be called free will, because all he is objecting to is you saying that it is not even possible to call it that, when it clearly is.

If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

Lol. Very funny.

...
If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition or this or that reasoning, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

To me it seems more like the Monty Python dead parrot sketch.

At any rate I think the confusion arises because the word freedom is properly always used within some context. In fact freedom is only realized when certain restrictions are recognized. Religions like to distort the proper use of the word by removing all context, as if there is an immaterial and somehow indeterministic realm akin to Plato's Forms. Under that interpretation it loses any useful meaning, except in order to justify an omniscient and absolutely free creator God.

So I can see the reason people argue for free will because they are using a particular context, and in philosophy this context usually comes down to how one defines the self, or I, or me, or a person. Take your pick, but each of these convey a slightly different context. If by "I" you mean the brain, or even the entire neurologic organism (as I think DBT tends to favor), then you have a purely deterministic result (allowing for quantum and stochastic effects). Many of us regard the mind as somehow removed from this context, or in terms of some program that runs the brain. In my own view the self is a model created by the brain. Not as an illusion but as a way of modeling one part of its environment. In that context I can accept both free and determined will with regard to future actions. But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

I always thought it was a pretty straightforward case of brain:hardware::mind:software.

- - - Updated - - -

'the ability to have freely willed to choose to do otherwise'

How does 'freely willed' differ from 'choose' in your statement? To me, they're the same thing.

 

[Treedbear]

Even if we say that "free" must mean "without constraint of any kind" I still await an answer to my question.

When I change my perception of a Necker cube at will, what exactly constrains me?

Not some irrational rambling about how the brain creates consciousness therefore the consciousness cannot possibly effect the brain.

An answer with evidence to support it.

I don't know what consciousness is other than the state of being conscious. As such it usually refers to the subjective experience. You seem to insist that consciousness is also the source of control for one's thoughts and actions. I can't agree simply because I don't know how this subjective experience is produced. It's the hard problem. The easy problem seems to be the neural mechanisms responcible for our perceptions as well as (to my understanding) our motivations. I see no clear line in my experiences separating an independent central motivator from the various urges and inclinations generated by the unconscious brain. You apparently claim to have the evidence. My view is that of course conscious awareness effects the brain's processes. It's part of the brain and so must have some influence. But is it the motivator or just the model which provides an input to the various functional areas? A kind of database by which the brain predicts future interactions. I just don't know. I can say that I have thoughts and that I control them or I can say that I don't actually know where they come from. It's clear to me that at times I have thoughts, and even inspirations, ideas, and intuitions that I really can't attribute to my conscious awareness. They just come through fully formed.

- - - Updated - - -

But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

Without foundation, without justification, likely without any possible empirical verification, but not meaningless.

We definitely all understand what the possibility to have done otherwise means.

That being said, I agree with the rest of your post.
EB

Thanks for that. Meaningless as in having no basis in fact, reason, or purpose. Meaning is derived from what has come before. Purpose is derived from meaning. Why would I want to have done otherwise given the same information? It would no longer be me.

- - - Updated - - -

It isn't illusory in the sense that the sensation exists, but it may be illusory in the sense that the self does not do what it feeels like it's doing (exerting personal control as the homunculus controller).

That's my take.

Agreed. The illusion is not intended but due to a lack of information.

Depends what you mean by free. Personally, I consider compatibilism to be essentially a fudge. This makes me unpopular with compatibilists, usually.

Agreed. Compatibilism seems to get the idea of context but in the limited sense of internal vs external influence.

But "the ability to have done otherwise" is meaningless.

I wouldn't say it is meaningless. But maybe it depends on what you mean by meaningless.

In any case, there is also 'the ability to have freely willed to choose to do otherwise' which I sometimes think is a higher bar, but the one that should be used, because randomness (if it exists and plays a part) could, under some interpretations, allow us to merely 'do otherwise'. But it depends when we 'stop the clock'. At the instant of action, randomness would, I think, just become another cause which would mean that we could not even have merely 'done otherwise' than what we did.

Randomness in itself is not an excersize of the will outside of making a choice to chose randomly. That is, there might be pseudo-random or even quantum based random generators within the brain. So it might be an option, just like literally throwing the dice, which is nevertheless bound by determinism. Actually I see pseudo random or stochastic events as important inputs for the creative process (a la evolution).

 

[untermensche]

I don't know what consciousness is other than the state of being conscious. As such it usually refers to the subjective experience. You seem to insist that consciousness is also the source of control for one's thoughts and actions. I can't agree simply because I don't know how this subjective experience is produced. It's the hard problem. The easy problem seems to be the neural mechanisms responcible for our perceptions as well as (to my understanding) our motivations. I see no clear line in my experiences separating an independent central motivator from the various urges and inclinations generated by the unconscious brain. You apparently claim to have the evidence. My view is that of course conscious awareness effects the brain's processes. It's part of the brain and so must have some influence. But is it the motivator or just the model which provides an input to the various functional areas? A kind of database by which the brain predicts future interactions. I just don't know. I can say that I have thoughts and that I control them or I can say that I don't actually know where they come from. It's clear to me that at times I have thoughts, and even inspirations, ideas, and intuitions that I really can't attribute to my conscious awareness. They just come through fully formed...

I don't insist on anything.

I point out a clear experience.

Try it.

Cause your left arm to move over your head.

What did you use?

 

[DBT]

DBT, as much as I agree with your argument against calling human agency capacities free will, I agree with AntiChris's main point, that we cannot say it is not possible, using some definition, one which does not mean completely free (or free ultimately at all, arguably), to call it free will. And that, as far as I can see, is now AntiChris's only point. And on that point he is correct. You and I may agree that it is not a very good term, for a variety of reasons, but that's all.

There is no point in repeating over and over why you reason that it should not be called free will, because all he is objecting to is you saying that it is not even possible to call it that, when it clearly is.

If the two of you ever got over that hump, you could move on to discussing the merits and demerits of using or not using the term. But at the moment reading your exchanges feels like watching the movie Groundhog Day over and over.

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition or this or that reasoning, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

Sure, it is possible to apply semantics, like lube, to concepts in order make whatever you wish appear logical and reasonable.

For example;

1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

The common definition of free will is equally meaningless:

1)Free will is the ability to make conscious decisions.
2)Conscious decision making can be experienced.
3)Conscious decision making exists.
4) Free will exists.

There is no given reason to define or conflate Love with God. Love is love, nothing more and nothing less.

Just as there is no given reason to define conscious decision making as ''free will'' - conscious decision making requires nothing additional, it is a function of neural activity, nothing more and nothing less.


So a definition alone or an ontological argument without relationship to evidence proves nothing.

Which is why the issue of free will is an issue of how the brain functions, the actual role of will, how it is formed, etc, and not merely applying words that have little or no relationship to how things actually work.....that is the stuff of Thomas Equines...''the universe would be incomplete without Angels" - except that we are talking about 'free will''

 

[DBT]

Here's my question again:
In order to help us understand your argument can you cite any other source (literature/serious philosopher) for your 'disproof of free will by dictionary definition'? I've never seen this argument made by anyone other than you.I'd genuinely like to know if anyone else you know of argues that it is logically problematic to call will 'free'. Possibly someone else's formulation of the argument might make more sense to me?

What do you think the debate on free will is about?.............

So that's a "no".


It should give you pause for thought that you can find no one else who claims that 'will' "cannot logically" be described as free.

No, it's not a no. You should realize that I am not arguing from semantics, where it is possible to make miracles appear to be real, God, gods, magic, special creation, but the use terms that must have a foundation, brain role and function, etc.

When I said 'logically' I didn't mean semantics.

I could say the ability to make conscious decisions is free will, we are able to make conscious decisions, therefore we have free will, hey presto, the term free will may be applied to decision making and the brain.

The issue is not that simple.

Logic should be based on evidence, not semantics, which allows logical arguments that 'prove' the existence of gods and angels, demons and devils.

Now if 'free will'' requires regulative control, which it should given the nature of freedom, there is no regulative control within either a determined world or a world of random causality.

Now there are plenty of people who have given arguments against free will on that basis, not logic alone, as in ontology, but in reference to defined states and conditions, both in relation to the brain and the world at large.

''If the argument is valid but the premises are not true, then again the conclusion may or may not be true, but the argument can't help us decide this.''


So in reference to the state of the world at large;

''Either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other event. But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom.

On the other hand, if indeterminism is true, then, though things could have happened otherwise, it is not the case that we could have chosen otherwise, since a merely random event is no kind of free choice. That some events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices.

Thus one horn of the dilemma represents choices as predetermined happenings in a predictable causal sequence, while the other construes them as inexplicable lurches to which the universe is randomly prone. Neither alternative supplies what the notion of free will requires, and no other alternative suggests itself. Therefore freedom is not possible in any kind of possible world. The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.'' - Colin McGinn

And the brain in particular;


How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction. Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord. When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires. There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control. Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex. For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs. Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear. Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain. Is it necessary that there be anything else? This can be a complete description of the process of movement selection, and even if there is something more -- like free will -- it would have to operate through such neuronal mechanisms.
The view that there is no such thing as free will as an inner causal agent has been advocated by a number of philosophers, scientists, and neurologists including Ryle, Adrian, Skinner and Fisher.(Fisher 1993)''

 

[DBT]

Okay. How does brain complexity enable invention? Describe the process, if you would.

Did you not read what I said about brain complexity, capacity and pattern recognition? The ability to recognize relationships between objects and events to the degree where it becomes possible to reconfigure and design objects that have functions not seen in nature.

As I said, both Monkeys and humans have will, the capacity to act according to will, but monkeys have little capacity for invention while humans do...yet both have 'will'

It is not will or free will that enables inventiveness, but the necessary neural wiring, brain architecture. Not will, not free will.

You cannot will yourself to be an Einstein or a Master Mathematician if capacity is not there.

 

[DBT]

So, imo, all you say to AntiChris is, yes, it is possible, using this or that definition, to call it free will, but that you think it's not a good term.

It is possible using Fluff Bunny logic, but that is not what I meant.

His objection surprised me because I have always referred to evidence from neuroscience, brain function, etc, and not just pure logic as practiced by philosophers who don't bother with science.

The origins of proof
''If the argument is valid but the premises are not true, then again the conclusion may or may not be true, but the argument can't help us decide this.''

I just took it for granted that this is what I meant.

 

[The AntiChris]

Here's my question again:
In order to help us understand your argument can you cite any other source (literature/serious philosopher) for your 'disproof of free will by dictionary definition'? I've never seen this argument made by anyone other than you.I'd genuinely like to know if anyone else you know of argues that it is logically problematic to call will 'free'. Possibly someone else's formulation of the argument might make more sense to me?

What do you think the debate on free will is about?.............

So that's a "no".

No, it's not a no.

You mean you can cite other sources but choose not to? Or did you misunderstand the question?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Without foundation, without justification, likely without any possible empirical verification, but not meaningless.

We definitely all understand what the possibility to have done otherwise means.

That being said, I agree with the rest of your post.
EB

Thanks for that. Meaningless as in having no basis in fact, reason, or purpose. Meaning is derived from what has come before. Purpose is derived from meaning. Why would I want to have done otherwise given the same information? It would no longer be me.

Yes. I agree that to have actually done otherwise would have required us to have been different from what we actually were at the time.

Yet, you can be different and still be yourself. We do it all the time, every moment in time we're different from what we were the moment before and yet we're still ourselves. So, I think we can conceive of ourselves being somewhat different from what we actually were at a particular point in time and, as a result of being somewhat different, we would have done something different from what we actually did.

This is just what I take to be what we mean by exercising our free will. It is what we are at one point in time that decides what we do at that point. If we'd have been different, we would have done differently. That's all there is to it, I think. It's not much and it only becomes a hot metaphysical potato when ideologues start to chip in.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

How does 'freely willed' differ from 'choose' in your statement? To me, they're the same thing.

The way I see it, choices can be coerced. If I put a gun to your head and said that if you didn't eat the banana I gave you, I would shoot you dead, that would be one type (or degree) of coerced choice. You could in theory choose to be shot, of course (if, say, you knew or believed that the banana contained a lethal poison which would cause you to die horribly painfully and slowly).

The 'actual state of affairs' in your life seems to be that all your thoughts and actions are even more coerced than that, the 'degree of coercion' is, it would seem, 100%, because of the (let's say trillions) of prior causes (including ones that were indetermined beforehand or at the time of action or thought) that are 'in play' at any moment of your life. You are arguably just 'following the instructions of the universe' no matter how complicated your 'machine processing' is.

Perhaps we might not, at a pinch, even call that 'choosing' at all, under a certain, perhaps very strict definition. But we could use the word, if we meant something akin to a driverless car 'choosing' to turn right at a certain junction. Simplistic analogy I know, but ultimately, I think, correct, though it feels otherwise to us in relation to our own circumstances. Perhaps it would be better to simply say that our very complicated and sophisticated systems automatically make decisions according to priorities (desires let's say, or 'drives') which are themselves automatically generated by or developed in the system. Whatever. At no moment do you have much (or perhaps any) of what we might call a choice, it seems, let alone a free one, or a freely-willed one.

Now, you may gain some comfort from saying that unlike the driverless car, you can, before you get to the junction, select from a greater range of options, but you would, it seems, still make the turn that you would make. It's a bit of a mind-melter, I know.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Personally, I don't believe there's anything that does what it feels like it's doing, except of course our mental impressions if taken as such (pain is definitely painful). I can look myself in a mirror and I sure don't look in there like I do what it feels like I'm doing. If I did, I guess I would feel what other people feel just by looking at them. I think I don't.
EB

I honestly do not want to get into a pointless or stupid argument with you about this.

Nobody in their right mind would want to, not even me.

But at the same time, I think I disagree with you.

How could you disagree if there was no substantive argument to be made?!

Maybe we should just leave it at that. You seem, by and large (odd expression that, I wonder where it comes from) to be a likeable and decent chap and there's no need for loggerheads.

First, by and large:

by and large: to (the wind) and off it, in one direction and another (said of the manner of handling a sailing vessel) : by, toward + large, with the wind abaft the beam.

So, we both learnt something here!

Then, no need for loggerheads.

I think we've done well you and me so far so I'm not too worried about loggerheads.

By and large, you know you can trust your shipmates once you've gone through rough weather together!

ETA: No wait. Maybe I misread.

Maybe you misread yourself?

Maybe I do agree with you.

I believe most people agree as to substance. Discussion may be just the way we have to go to make sure that we do.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

For the benefit of speakpigeon and anyone who isn't aware I rudely added to my post above, here is the extended version...

How does 'freely willed' differ from 'choose' in your statement? To me, they're the same thing.

The way I see it, choices can be coerced. If I put a gun to your head and said that if you didn't eat the banana I gave you, I would shoot you dead, that would be one type (or degree) of coerced choice. You could in theory choose to be shot, of course (if, say, you knew or believed that the banana contained a lethal poison which would cause you to die horribly painfully and slowly).

The 'actual state of affairs' in your life seems to be that all your thoughts and actions are even more coerced than that, the 'degree of coercion' is, it would seem, 100%, because of the (let's say trillions) of prior causes (including ones that were indetermined beforehand or at the time of action or thought) that are 'in play' at any moment of your life, inside your body or your skull and outside them. You are arguably just 'following the instructions of the universe' no matter how complicated your 'machine processing' is.

Perhaps we might not, at a pinch, even call that 'choosing' at all, under a certain, perhaps very strict definition. But we could use the word, if we meant something akin to a driverless car 'choosing' to turn right at a certain junction. Simplistic analogy I know, but ultimately, I think, correct, though it feels otherwise to us in relation to our own circumstances. Perhaps it would be better to simply say that our very complicated and sophisticated systems automatically make decisions according to priorities (desires let's say, or 'drives') which are themselves automatically generated by or developed in the system. Whatever. At no moment do you have much (or perhaps any) of what we might call a personal choice, it seems, let alone a free one, or a freely-willed one, and especially not a consciously-controlled freely-willed one.

Now, you may gain some comfort from saying that unlike the (at this time in their development less complex than you) driverless cars, you can, before you get to the junction, select from a greater range of options, but you would, it seems, still make the same turn that you would make, whichever one it turns out to have been. This is not (currently) available for checking empirically, but there seems to be no way of explaining it any other way, even in principle. It's a bit of a mind-melter, I know.

ETA: Daniel Dennett says that the future that is going to happen is going to happen anyway, and I agree with him. He just chooses to call the robot decision-making capacities that we have, 'free will' and I have reservations about that term (partly because even the sophisticated 'advance-modelling simulations' capacities we might have are still themselves running and happening automatically, and partly for other reasons).

Please don't cite randomness. That would not appear to get us around the core issue. It's really, it seems (or would be if it happened) just another type of cause.