There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Emily Lake]

Depends on what I am responding to. If you check the tone of your own posts you may understand. But then, a good number of posters are blind to their own excesses, they only see fault in others.

Nothing that I have posted comes anywhere near the level of condescension engendered in "Sour Grapes, Sweety". Not even close.

That is a matter of perspective.

If your perspective is that "Sour Grapes, Sweety" is a mild and polite response that is less condescending than anything I've posted... well.. your perspective is just plain wrong.

 

[Emily Lake]

You missed a relevant part of what I said. I did not say, claim or imply that epilepsy is only caused by structural abnormalities....what I said was;''Their condition is associated with the abnormality that is evidently present in their brain, some structural, some chemical'' - which includes chemical abnormalities, neurotransmitters, etc, etc.

Your argument throughout this thread has been that it is ALL brain architecture - every bit of it is brain architecture, there is nothing more than brain architecture. You've repeatedly dismissed even the most basic of additions to that perspective. Aren't chemicals a result of brain architecture too?

And if not, how do you square that with the arguments you've used throughout this thread?

Why take what was a brief remark and assume that this is all that was meant?

Well, that would be because that "brief" remark constituted about 90% of the content of your post, and the portion you're on about now (some chemical) constituted only about 5% of the content of your post.

 

[Emily Lake]

The cause of most cases of epilepsy is unknown.

While the reasons for epilepsy on a case to case basis may not be known, the source of epilepsy is known; brain structure and function, state and condition, even if the exact cause be it chemical or structural is not known in many cases.

This really reads as if you're saying that the reason for epilepsy isn't known... but the reason is known. I really don't know what you're trying to convey.

- - - Updated - - -

Yet subjective experience is only related to brain activity, without that necessary condition there is no experience.....all experience being subjective.

Again... necessary but not sufficient. NOBODY has claimed that a brain isn't necessary, so I don't know what your argument is.

 

[untermensche]

So your mind must have decided you should believe that you mind decides which ideas you believe not your brain.

Who cares?
EB

I was actually living through every decision my mind has ever made.

What chose the ideas you believe?

Your anus?

Where else besides a mind do you imagine an idea can exist?

 

[Speakpigeon]

The cause of most cases of epilepsy is unknown.

While the reasons for epilepsy on a case to case basis may not be known, the source of epilepsy is known; brain structure and function, state and condition, even if the exact cause be it chemical or structural is not known in many cases. Plus, speaking generally, there is not one single cause of epilepsy but many, it may be structural, electrical, chemical or any combination.

I already accepted that,in the post you're replying to here:

Epilepsy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epilepsy
The cause of most cases of epilepsy is unknown. Some cases occur as the result of brain injury, stroke, brain tumors, infections of the brain and birth defects, through a process known as epileptogenesis. Known genetic mutations are directly linked to a small proportion of cases.

I even accepted that we actually know what epileptic seizures are:

Epilepsy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epilepsy
Epileptic seizures are the result of excessive and abnormal neuronal activity in the cortex of the brain.

I also said that this was not my point:

Still, my point was that admitting to the role of the brain in the existence of the mind is well motivated even from our subjective point of view.

My point was there:

Still, my point was that admitting to the role of the brain in the existence of the mind is well motivated even from our subjective point of view.

If you think it's enough to do away with the subjective point of view then the knock on the head test is good enough. Or indeed anything with the same effect such sleep, coma, or indeed the death of the subject. Or wait, just put the subject in a hermetic box. You should be able to observe that physical means stop any observable, objective elements that there is any mental activity.

For now at least, the only way anybody knows there's subjective experience is when the subject is having subjective experience. And when the subject doesn't have any, then nobody knows. Outside observers may not pick up any sign of mental activity even though the subject would be having some level of subjective experience, however minimal. Even a report of the subject of having been unconscious may be erroneous since we can forget that we've been conscious.

I have no idea what could explain subjective experience and I can't even conceive how the brain would.
EB

Yet subjective experience is only related to brain activity, without that necessary condition there is no experience.....all experience being subjective.

That "subjective experience is only related to brain activity" is something we don't actually know. It seems to me you still haven't really understood subjective experience. All the evidence we have about subjective experience is either subjective when it's our own, or it's inferred when it's that of somebody else, and it's inferred from objective signs of what we take to be mental activity, either by observing the behaviour of the subject or, often less conclusively, through things like EEGs, MRIs, CT scans and such. This should be enough to understand that signs of mental activity is not the same as subjective experience, and that there should be one may not necessarily mean there should be the other. If you don't understand that, you don't understand subjective experience.

All we can accept as sufficiently certain is whatever we take to be signs of brain activity. And then, of course, you need a brain for that. Big deal.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

This really reads as if you're saying that the reason for epilepsy isn't known... but the reason is known. I really don't know what you're trying to convey.

Yet subjective experience is only related to brain activity, without that necessary condition there is no experience.....all experience being subjective.

Again... necessary but not sufficient. NOBODY has claimed that a brain isn't necessary, so I don't know what your argument is.

He's trying to sound like a U-Bot.

Close enough. Not bad.
EB

 

[Kharakov]

The brain generates thoughts.

Sure. In exactly the same way that a server generates processes

"Who pitched first?" said the pine tree marketer.

 

[Speakpigeon]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

The problem is that people here conflate the mind with subjective experience. Subjective experience is one aspect of the mind. The concept of the mind includes many functions, such as abstract reasoning and decision making. DBT's arguments address these latter concerns very well as far as I can see. His argument is weaker as to how the brain produces subjective experience. If that's what you and Emily Lake and untermensche are basing your arguments on then you should limit it to that single aspect rather than trying to equate it with all these other issues. That is unless you want to obscure the fact that brains can handle the other functions quite well without the need for having a subjective experience of red.

 

[DBT]

That is a matter of perspective.

If your perspective is that "Sour Grapes, Sweety" is a mild and polite response that is less condescending than anything I've posted... well.. your perspective is just plain wrong.

An expression of opinion....good for you, Emily Lake.

 

[DBT]

You missed a relevant part of what I said. I did not say, claim or imply that epilepsy is only caused by structural abnormalities....what I said was;''Their condition is associated with the abnormality that is evidently present in their brain, some structural, some chemical'' - which includes chemical abnormalities, neurotransmitters, etc, etc.

Your argument throughout this thread has been that it is ALL brain architecture - every bit of it is brain architecture, there is nothing more than brain architecture. You've repeatedly dismissed even the most basic of additions to that perspective. Aren't chemicals a result of brain architecture too?

I have never claimed, said or implied that electrochemical activity in the brain is in any way shape or form separate from the brain.

Just roughly, architecture determines function, capacity for information processing, abilities and behavioral output...electrochemical activity makes it happen, forming the 'software'- the mental representation of the world and self....in some cases only the immediate environment (rudimentary animal brains, Moths, flies, ants, etc, etc)

- - - Updated - - -

This really reads as if you're saying that the reason for epilepsy isn't known... but the reason is known. I really don't know what you're trying to convey.

Yet subjective experience is only related to brain activity, without that necessary condition there is no experience.....all experience being subjective.

Again... necessary but not sufficient. NOBODY has claimed that a brain isn't necessary, so I don't know what your argument is.

He's trying to sound like a U-Bot.

Close enough. Not bad.
EB

Sour grapes, Noddy, including your typical display of arrogance and conceit. Always playing The Man. The Judge and Jury.

 

[DBT]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

The problem is that people here conflate the mind with subjective experience. Subjective experience is one aspect of the mind. The concept of the mind includes many functions, such as abstract reasoning and decision making. DBT's arguments address these latter concerns very well as far as I can see. His argument is weaker as to how the brain produces subjective experience. If that's what you and Emily Lake and untermensche are basing your arguments on then you should limit it to that single aspect rather than trying to equate it with all these other issues. That is unless you want to obscure the fact that brains can handle the other functions quite well without the need for having a subjective experience of red.

Sure, I fully understand that we do not know how a brain forms subjective experience, and have said it many times. However, the evidence that we have fully supports the proposition that it does, that subjective experience is the function and work of a brain.

 

[DBT]

That "subjective experience is only related to brain activity" is something we don't actually know.

Why don't we know this? Is there a single example of subjective experience that is not related to brain activity?

It seems to me you still haven't really understood subjective experience.

It seems to me that I understand it well enough, I am experiencing it right now. Just as I understand that it is related to brain activity even if I do not know how the brain does it.

All the evidence we have about subjective experience is either subjective when it's our own, or it's inferred when it's that of somebody else, and it's inferred from objective signs of what we take to be mental activity, either by observing the behaviour of the subject or, often less conclusively, through things like EEGs, MRIs, CT scans and such. This should be enough to understand that signs of mental activity is not the same as subjective experience, and that there should be one may not necessarily mean there should be the other. If you don't understand that, you don't understand subjective experience.

Because it is inferred does not mean that the evidence for a relationship between brain activity and subjective experience is not present or is insufficient to support the proposition.

The relationship between brain and mind/consciousness is quite clear. There is no evidence for mind/consciousness/subjective experience without the presence of a functional brain.

All we can accept as sufficiently certain is whatever we take to be signs of brain activity. And then, of course, you need a brain for that. Big deal.
EB

We can be sufficiently certain that signs of brain activity are related to consciousness in some form. This includes the point where decisions can be predicted before they become conscious for the subject, based purely on certain patterns of brain activity prior to awareness, fMRI experiments, etc

 

[Speakpigeon]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

The problem is that people here conflate the mind with subjective experience. Subjective experience is one aspect of the mind. The concept of the mind includes many functions, such as abstract reasoning and decision making. DBT's arguments address these latter concerns very well as far as I can see. His argument is weaker as to how the brain produces subjective experience. If that's what you and Emily Lake and untermensche are basing your arguments on then you should limit it to that single aspect rather than trying to equate it with all these other issues. That is unless you want to obscure the fact that brains can handle the other functions quite well without the need for having a subjective experience of red.

I very broadly agree with that.

Still, I don't see subjective experience as an aspect of the mind. I assume that mind and subjective experience are, at least potentially, two different things. I don't see subjective experience as necessarily connected to mind and I fail to see why I should. And, crucially, it's easy enough to make that distinction. I would even make a further distinction, between our qualia, i.e. the qualitative aspect of our mind, and the quantitative aspect of what our mind does. Computers already do something very much like the quantitative aspect, if only on a very small footing. I'm not sure we could even imagine a computer also doing the qualia thing, somehow. Let alone how to check that it would truly do it.

So, yes, I agree that any argument about the mind doesn't carry any water as far as subjective experience is concerned.

And, yes, I also agree that DBT's arguments are essentially about the mind, sort of.

But then, it's not really about the mind itself. Rather, it's all about whatever it is our body does--essentially the activity of our brain and our behaviour--that we take both to be closely related to what we call a mind, and that we, as outside observers, think we experience as a mind, something much like what we experience subjectively as our own mind.

And there is no dispute as to what our body does, except perhaps that some scientists may come to think they've discovered something quite stupendous. But no, we already knew, without any CT scan and EEG, broadly what they may think we've discovered with them, which is that we need a body to get any sign or signal that there is a mind. In fact, observing behaviour, i.e. not the brain, still is the best way to understand a mind, and this is something that nearly all human beings do without even thinking about it.

Personally, I try to keep that distinction clear. The quantitative aspect of our mind is, at least very likely, an activity of our brain. Our subjective experience is subjective experience of our mind but may be not necessarily only of our mind. I'll keep an open mind about that. And there's the hard problem of subjective experience. And then there's also the hard problem of qualitative qualia, which we wouldn't know how to explain from an essentially quantitative understanding of our physical universe and of our brain.

So, there you are, it's a scoop, the first time anybody (body!), ever, suggested there were two hard problems, not just one.

I'm still not sure what it is Emily and UM think.
EB

 

[DBT]

Again... necessary but not sufficient. NOBODY has claimed that a brain isn't necessary, so I don't know what your argument is.

You need to explain your 'not sufficient' far more clearly than you have, especially in relation to what I assume is your argument for free will...if that is the point of your comment, this being the subject of the thread. I don't know what your point is, or how it may relate to free will.

 

[DBT]

The brain generates thoughts.

Sure. In exactly the same way that a server generates processes

Do you understand the distinction between hardware and software? Do you understand the distinction between architecture and process, as it relates to information systems - whether those systems are silicon based or organic?

Do you understand that a server is useless without hardware to run it? That software cannot function without hardware? That a functioning brain is composed of both hardware and software? That a brain generates its own 'software' according to its architecture and information input?

 

[Treedbear]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

The problem is that people here conflate the mind with subjective experience. Subjective experience is one aspect of the mind. The concept of the mind includes many functions, such as abstract reasoning and decision making. DBT's arguments address these latter concerns very well as far as I can see. His argument is weaker as to how the brain produces subjective experience. If that's what you and Emily Lake and untermensche are basing your arguments on then you should limit it to that single aspect rather than trying to equate it with all these other issues. That is unless you want to obscure the fact that brains can handle the other functions quite well without the need for having a subjective experience of red.

Sure, I fully understand that we do not know how a brain forms subjective experience, and have said it many times. However, the evidence that we have fully supports the proposition that it does, that subjective experience is the function and work of a brain.

I appreciate that. I didn't say the evidence was lacking completely. Just that it is not as complete, and should therefore be treated as a separate problem. The absence of, or inability to have subjective experiences should not equate to an absence of mind, simply because all the other aspects of mind may still be present.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Again... necessary but not sufficient. NOBODY has claimed that a brain isn't necessary, so I don't know what your argument is.

You need to explain your 'not sufficient' far more clearly than you have, especially in relation to what I assume is your argument for free will...if that is the point of your comment, this being the subject of the thread. I don't know what your point is, or how it may relate to free will.

Here it is:

sufficient
adj
2. (Logic) (of a condition) assuring the truth of a statement; requiring but not necessarily required by some other state of affairs.

If that can help you with your English and your logic.
Noddy

 

[Treedbear]

They disagree in what they disagree about.
EB

The problem is that people here conflate the mind with subjective experience. Subjective experience is one aspect of the mind. The concept of the mind includes many functions, such as abstract reasoning and decision making. DBT's arguments address these latter concerns very well as far as I can see. His argument is weaker as to how the brain produces subjective experience. If that's what you and Emily Lake and untermensche are basing your arguments on then you should limit it to that single aspect rather than trying to equate it with all these other issues. That is unless you want to obscure the fact that brains can handle the other functions quite well without the need for having a subjective experience of red.

I very broadly agree with that.

Still, I don't see subjective experience as an aspect of the mind. I assume that mind and subjective experience are, at least potentially, two different things. I don't see subjective experience as necessarily connected to mind and I fail to see why I should. And, crucially, it's easy enough to make that distinction. I would even make a further distinction, between our qualia, i.e. the qualitative aspect of our mind, and the quantitative aspect of what our mind does. Computers already do something very much like the quantitative aspect, if only on a very small footing. I'm not sure we could even imagine a computer also doing the qualia thing, somehow. Let alone how to check that it would truly do it.

I don't know what you mean by qualia if not simply how subjective experience is characterized.

... qualia are defined to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.

I define the mind broadly as everything that the brain does. It would seem subjective experience has to come from this, but (still baffled) I don't know for sure. So I have to accept your opinion even though I don't see it leading to any new understanding. I assume by "[un]connected to mind" you mean not a product of the mind, rather than not at least receiving input from the mind. Otherwise there is nothing to experience!

So, yes, I agree that any argument about the mind doesn't carry any water as far as subjective experience is concerned.

And, yes, I also agree that DBT's arguments are essentially about the mind, sort of.

But then, it's not really about the mind itself. Rather, it's all about whatever it is our body does--essentially the activity of our brain and our behaviour--that we take both to be closely related to what we call a mind, and that we, as outside observers, think we experience as a mind, something much like what we experience subjectively as our own mind.
...
Personally, I try to keep that distinction clear. The quantitative aspect of our mind is, at least very likely, an activity of our brain. Our subjective experience is subjective experience of our mind but may be not necessarily only of our mind.

That's as clear as you've ever been about it. Now I understand.

I'll keep an open mind about that. And there's the hard problem of subjective experience. And then there's also the hard problem of qualitative qualia, which we wouldn't know how to explain from an essentially quantitative understanding of our physical universe and of our brain.
...

You lose me on the distinction between subjective experience and qualia.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes. ... Chalmers ... argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".

 

[Speakpigeon]

I'll keep an open mind about that. And there's the hard problem of subjective experience. And then there's also the hard problem of qualitative qualia, which we wouldn't know how to explain from an essentially quantitative understanding of our physical universe and of our brain.
...

You lose me on the distinction between subjective experience and qualia.

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes. ... Chalmers ... argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".

I've come to accept at least the possibility that subjective experience may be distinct from qualia, both on principle and on the basis of my own experience. The qualia we experience are obviously different from each other in quality, and yet they also have something in common, namely that we experience them subjectively. This suggests to me the possibility that these two aspects come from two distinct things. In my experience, instances of subjective experience may include any number of qualia as well as apparently very nearly none. Including in particular, not the qualia of personhood, so to speak. That is, you may be experiencing without the sense of being you, or even of being a human being, or indeed even that of being, although these would be special cases, such as near coma, but also dreams, and some more ordinary but rather inconspicuous mental states where you're just not there (i.e. absentmindedness). In such cases, there's just nobody there to experience anything even though it seems there is experience. That's also why I now think it's problematic and misleading to call that subjective experience. I now think of the "subjective" impression as just another qualia. I think expressions such as "bare consciousness", or "bare experience", would be much less misleading. And bare consciousness does look very different. I would say that the qualia we do experience ordinarily, including that of self and that of being, somewhat conceal to us the bare quality of experience. Our notion of subjective experience breaks down when there's no qualia to be experienced and yet there's still some kind of experience.

I also came to believe that we are mislead to accept that we have a limited range of specific qualia, typically corresponding to our senses and then some, i.e. whatever we get to experience ordinarily. Well, there's really no good reason to believe there should only be such an arbitrarily limited arbitrary range of arbitrary qualia. There seems to be a much larger set of qualia, which we may experience in unusual situations, as I myself did. And, also, possibly, even a potentially infinite range of qualia.

But, again, I keep an open mind about these things.

Still, as long as we can't show that bare experience and qualia are just one thing, it means we have two hard problems to solve, not just one. And again, these two are qualitative problems and our quantitative understanding of the physical world won't do by itself. We'll have to think of something else, if we really want to crack that nut.
EB