• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

It's odd that quite a lot of people need to improve their reading skills, perhaps when one has the same complaint about many around them, it's worth thinking about why that might be.

I supported each of my claims about your reading skills. You should look into that first if you want to be taken seriously.

So, how does your understanding of BT and externalism affect your position on freewill? Because It's hard to see how you can hold the position you held if you accept both of them, <snip>

I don't accept externalism and never said I did. You really need to improve your reading skills.

I also just explained that Banach Tarski has no import for the physical world. Combine that with the fact that my view of free will is compatible with the conventional view on the physical world and you should be able to infer that I take Banach Tarski to have no import on my view of free will.

I think it's safe to say you're wasting my time here.
EB
 
Excuse me!?
I was genuinely asking for feedback, not being prickly :)

I'm re-reading you post and I don't see how it could be interpreted differently from you saying that Free Will is wrong because we can't just decide to disobey gravity.

I suppose it wasn't as clear as I thought it was. In both cases, I'm talking about "perfect" determinism and "perfect" free will. But I did neglect to include that term. I assumed it was implied, but obviously it wasn't.

I've had many additional posts since that one was made. I hope that my perspective has become clearer in that interim... but if it hasn't, let me know. I don't mind going through it again, but I also don't want to clog up the thread being repetitive :)
 
It's odd that quite a lot of people need to improve their reading skills, perhaps when one has the same complaint about many around them, it's worth thinking about why that might be.

I supported each of my claims about your reading skills. You should look into that first if you want to be taken seriously.

So, how does your understanding of BT and externalism affect your position on freewill? Because It's hard to see how you can hold the position you held if you accept both of them, <snip>

I don't accept externalism and never said I did. You really need to improve your reading skills.

I also just explained that Banach Tarski has no import for the physical world. Combine that with the fact that my view of free will is compatible with the conventional view on the physical world and you should be able to infer that I take Banach Tarski to have no import on my view of free will.

I think it's safe to say you're wasting my time here.
EB


Frankly I take your comments about my reading skills as the ad hominem that they are and chuckle to myself.

You certainly don't have to accept externalism, or indeed understand it, but at least have a go at understanding it before rejecting it on the basis of wikipedia as there's a fair body of evidence that co processing goes on all the time. I could explain but hey...

As for Banach Tarski, perhaps you might want to get your head around what irreducible emergence before pronouncing. I'm sure there's a wiki page about it to help you out.
 
If you want to know, I'm pretty sure I broadly understand the principle of the Banach Tarski paradox. I did two years of maths at university and I liked topology best so I'm intuitive enough about that sort of things. That's also why I understand it has no import for the physical world as we understand it so far.

I'm not intending to be difficult, just making an observation. I did three years of physics at university, and I liked modern physics best. I don't make any claims to be intuitive enough about dark matter or about the details of quantum mechanics to argue with someone who actually knows the topic.

Hell, I have degrees in maths, and I've spent 20 years applying math in my job, and the least 3 of those have been managing a team that includes data scientists and statisticians. The amount of math that I don't understand is quite large. I don't make any claim to understand the Banach Tarski paradox (especially since I was unfamiliar with it until this thread), let alone intuitively.
 
Also I note Emily Lake has done a lovely job on stochasticism in machine learning...
:o Thank you Sub!

Also, I am Pandora at SC ;)

- - - Updated - - -

It's odd that quite a lot of people need to improve their reading skills, perhaps when one has the same complaint about many around them, it's worth thinking about why that might be.

I supported each of my claims about your reading skills. You should look into that first if you want to be taken seriously.

So, how does your understanding of BT and externalism affect your position on freewill? Because It's hard to see how you can hold the position you held if you accept both of them, <snip>

I don't accept externalism and never said I did. You really need to improve your reading skills.

I also just explained that Banach Tarski has no import for the physical world. Combine that with the fact that my view of free will is compatible with the conventional view on the physical world and you should be able to infer that I take Banach Tarski to have no import on my view of free will.

EB

I genuinely can't tell what your argument is, Speakpigeon. Can you please try explaining it again?
 
You certainly don't have to accept externalism, or indeed understand it, but at least have a go at understanding it before rejecting it on the basis of wikipedia as there's a fair body of evidence that co processing goes on all the time. I could explain but hey...

As for Banach Tarski, perhaps you might want to get your head around what irreducible emergence before pronouncing.

All other players aside, I don't really get externalism at all, and I'm failing to connect the dots on how Banach Tarski or irreducible emergence relate to free will. Frankly, I can't wrap my head around any of them well enough to even begin seeing the connection. Any chance you feel like providing the high-school cliff-notes version of them for me?

ETA: When I try to read a wikipedia article, and I have to go look up every third word in it... and about 30% of the time I have to look up a word from the definition of the word I was looking up... I tend to throw in the towel. That happened with externalism, and with BT. I get emergence as a concept... but I ran out of stamina before I managed to get to the irreducible part of it.
 
If you want to know, I'm pretty sure I broadly understand the principle of the Banach Tarski paradox. I did two years of maths at university and I liked topology best so I'm intuitive enough about that sort of things. That's also why I understand it has no import for the physical world as we understand it so far.

I'm not intending to be difficult, just making an observation. I did three years of physics at university, and I liked modern physics best. I don't make any claims to be intuitive enough about dark matter or about the details of quantum mechanics to argue with someone who actually knows the topic.

Hell, I have degrees in maths, and I've spent 20 years applying math in my job, and the least 3 of those have been managing a team that includes data scientists and statisticians. The amount of math that I don't understand is quite large. I don't make any claim to understand the Banach Tarski paradox (especially since I was unfamiliar with it until this thread), let alone intuitively.

Frankly, I'm just using BT as it's a fairly compelling application of the axiom of choice that clearly demonstrates irreducible emergence. Where IE gets teeth is in the hands of people like Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim, but it's not half as compelling as BT to those without a solid philosophical training.

So, Here's a really simple thought experiment application - I'm being chased by a bunch of crazed determinists being guided by Laplace's Demon. Obviously, as a monist, I know that everything supervenes on the physical, but that doesn't mean everything can be reduced to the physical so during a particularly determined car chase I ask my passenger to run through the process of proving BT. Still entirely determined, I am determined to decide to turn left if the result is two and right if the result is one. At the crucial moment, my passenger calls out the result and I make the turn. Left. Of course, the demon will predict right and I will escape.

And that's just the tip of the iceberg:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/

For example.
 
But the observer has no control over quantum states. The observer cannott consciously access quantum states or effect changes as desired through an act of will.

How do you know this? How do you even know what the observer is?

Are we not talking about our own experience as conscious people?

Do you as a conscious person have access to the underlying mechanisms of your conscious experience, including your very existence?

Do you as a conscious person have access to quantum activity, manipulating it to your advantage and will?

If your consciousness is matter/QM, then you are the manipulator. You are your own physical laws. How you appear to observers is not as accurate as what you choose.

A scientific test for this is if you can constantly choose to go against the mathematical probability theory of QM. We may not be able to set up this test for a while though.
 
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We have been through this so many times before... it is complete baloney.
Indeterminism doesnt give you free will, only indeterminism. You cant steer it.
your hogwash about an observer has been thouroughly delt with by bilby.
Last: even if ”decisions” would performed in quantum processes those decisions are so tiny parts of the brainfunctions that there will be no resemblancesto the high level decisions we perceive us make.

Look at the research done by Wang et al using quantum probability theory to BETTER explain decision making (whether QM is actually behind it or not).
.
As you say yourself: that doesnt say anything about your argument. So why bring it up?

Juma, I was just pointing out that the new QM math model differs from classical probability models used for QM decision-making. You said there wouldn't be much of a difference; clearly there might be.
 
Again... how is this a more parsimonious explanation than that choice actually exists?

How can it not be? "What we observe" is necessarily more parsimonious than "what we observe + choice". We don't (usually) assume 'choice' when it comes to the behaviour of cyclones, so why would we introduce this needless new entity when discussing the behaviour of brains?

Because the explanations required to explain the "illusion" of choice are significantly less parsimonious than choice actually existing.

Not really; We know for certain that people are easily fooled by all manner of illusions. That's all the explanation needed. If football fall under gravity, and tennis balls fall under gravity, then it's not necessary to invent any new force to explain why cannon balls fall.

Humans are known to have an understanding that is frequently and demonstrably at odds with reality. That they imagine themselves to have 'choice' requires no further explanation - unless and until you can demonstrate 'choice' as a real thing, needing an explanation.
 
Because the explanations required to explain the "illusion" of choice are significantly less parsimonious than choice actually existing.

Not really; We know for certain that people are easily fooled by all manner of illusions. That's all the explanation needed. If football fall under gravity, and tennis balls fall under gravity, then it's not necessary to invent any new force to explain why cannon balls fall.

Humans are known to have an understanding that is frequently and demonstrably at odds with reality. That they imagine themselves to have 'choice' requires no further explanation - unless and until you can demonstrate 'choice' as a real thing, needing an explanation.

Now we are full circle from fast's query to which I provide an answer.

This might seem like it's coming out of left field, but in hopes there might be a smidgen of relevancy, is there compatibility between the notions of contingent truths and necessary events?

From The Metaphysicist we have the following: Necessity and Contingency http://metaphysicist.com/problems/necessity/

Contingency is the idea that many things or events are neither necessary nor impossible. Possibility is normally understood to include necessity. If something is necessary, it is a fortioripossible. Contingency must be defined as the subset of possibility that excludes necessity.Information philosophy claims that there is no physical necessity. The world is contingent. Necessity is a logical concept, an idea that is an important part of a formal logical or mathematical system that is a human invention.
Like certainty, analyticity, and the a priori, necessity and necessary truths are useful concepts for logicians and mathematicians, but not for a metaphysicist exploring the fundamental nature of reality, which includes irreducible contingency.

This is only one point in the the general discussion so you need to search and find what suits your intent.
 
Because the explanations required to explain the "illusion" of choice are significantly less parsimonious than choice actually existing.

Not really; We know for certain that people are easily fooled by all manner of illusions. That's all the explanation needed. If football fall under gravity, and tennis balls fall under gravity, then it's not necessary to invent any new force to explain why cannon balls fall.

Humans are known to have an understanding that is frequently and demonstrably at odds with reality. That they imagine themselves to have 'choice' requires no further explanation - unless and until you can demonstrate 'choice' as a real thing, needing an explanation.

It's a pretty prevalent and pervasive shared delusion, I suppose. And one that doesn't suffer from the myriad of interpretations that we get with things like religion, where the codified version of "truth" is reinvented by consensus on a regular basis, reinterpreted by each adherent, and applied in wildly differing ways by every actor.

With the "illusion" of choice, however, there's a persistent perception that extends through every aspect of our existence. It pervades our language, our social structures, our view of justice, fairness, and responsibility. It is implicit in our every interaction with each other. It underlies the very discussion we're having at the moment. Even those who truly believe that it's fully deterministic and that choice is a mass delusion shared by quadrillions of people throughout the entirety of human history cannot help but interact and discuss the topic in a way that implicitly acknowledges the existence of choice.

Simply saying "Well, humans are frequently wrong about things" isn't really as compelling an argument as you might think... not when weighed against the entire body of human history, knowledge, and behavior.
 
Because the explanations required to explain the "illusion" of choice are significantly less parsimonious than choice actually existing.

Not really; We know for certain that people are easily fooled by all manner of illusions. That's all the explanation needed. If football fall under gravity, and tennis balls fall under gravity, then it's not necessary to invent any new force to explain why cannon balls fall.

Humans are known to have an understanding that is frequently and demonstrably at odds with reality. That they imagine themselves to have 'choice' requires no further explanation - unless and until you can demonstrate 'choice' as a real thing, needing an explanation.

It's a pretty prevalent and pervasive shared delusion, I suppose. And one that doesn't suffer from the myriad of interpretations that we get with things like religion, where the codified version of "truth" is reinvented by consensus on a regular basis, reinterpreted by each adherent, and applied in wildly differing ways by every actor.

With the "illusion" of choice, however, there's a persistent perception that extends through every aspect of our existence. It pervades our language, our social structures, our view of justice, fairness, and responsibility. It is implicit in our every interaction with each other. It underlies the very discussion we're having at the moment. Even those who truly believe that it's fully deterministic and that choice is a mass delusion shared by quadrillions of people throughout the entirety of human history cannot help but interact and discuss the topic in a way that implicitly acknowledges the existence of choice.

Simply saying "Well, humans are frequently wrong about things" isn't really as compelling an argument as you might think... not when weighed against the entire body of human history, knowledge, and behavior.

Meh. People are consistently of the opinion that velocities can be added by simple arithmetic; that heavy objects fall faster than light ones; and that substance dualism is obviously true. But they are consistently and uniformly wrong about those things.

That they imagine themselves to have 'choice' requires no further explanation - unless and until you can demonstrate 'choice' as a real thing, needing an explanation. Identifying other errors wherein people are less consistent, falls a VERY long way short of demonstrating choice as a real thing.
 
I see what you're saying, but I disagree that it relates to my post. Saying that two animals can both perceive an experience is not at all comparable to hypothesizing about the impact and interpretation of that experience. We know that dogs smell things. We know that dogs can be taught behavior - they learn. I haven't opined on their feelings in any fashion. A robot can perceive and learn... that observation requires neither empathy nor in-depth knowledge of its programming to note.
Saying that two animals can perceive an "experience" is tantamount to saying that their perceptions are the same, which I think is wrong. Experience is an interpretation of perceptions. Both can perceive the same phenomenon, but their experiences will represent different interpretations of the same phenomenon. As for robots, there is experimental evidence to support the conclusion that people impute human characteristics to, and empathize with, program interfaces that they know are not human. I am referring to the work of Byron Reeves and Cliff Nass (See  The Media Equation).

First the short answer - QM is essentially the source of randomness in all things. It's a well established field that has repeatedly demonstrated the fundamentally non-deterministic nature of, well, everything. That's why it ends up coming up in discussions of free will vs. determinism. Because it is fairly well established that reality is NOT perfectly deterministic - it is stochastic.
Short response: It is not at all well established that randomness has anything at all to do with free will. Even gamblers make a conscious choice to gamble, but that doesn't mean they randomly choose to do so. Moreover, it is only established that QM events are in a sense unpredictable, not random. Don't confuse unpredictability with randomness. It is a philosophical position that the unpredictability is the result of randomness.

Now for the longer bit. The process I outlined doesn't rely on QM for the experience part of it. I thought it was relatively clear... but then I also know exactly what I meant :p. The "experience" is the set of perceptions received by the entity in question. That is all pretty macro level, and there's unlikely to be any meaningful impact.
Perceptions are interpretations. They differ from sensations. Since neither can exist without neurons firing, they would necessarily also be subject to QM "randomness". You may well think you know what you are talking about, but I don't see a logical connection here with the process of making a decision.

QM comes in at the neural synapse level - it's the randomness effect.
I'm still waiting for you to explain how this relates to the process of making a choice. A lot of things also happen at the "synapse level". What does "randomness" have to do with it?

What I'm talking about is essentially an evolving cluster algorithm... only instead of the cluster algorithm comparing the new data element set being compared to ALL of the existing cluster centroids, there would be a boundary condition. The new set would be compared to a subset of centroids (depending on whether we're talking about parallel or series processing) UNTIL such time as a sufficient fit to centroid has been achieved. In the case of a thinking algorithm, the data set would be the set of perceptions associated with an event. The brain would then effectively sample past experience clusters, and compare the set of experiences this time against the centroid of the cluster. It would keep sampling until it finds a centroid that is "close enough" to the current experience. It wouldn't look exhaustively to find the "best fit" centroid - it wouldn't be identifying the true nearest neighbor. It would only look until it finds a neighbor that is within a reasonable radius (although it's a tad more complex to talk about radii in a n-dimensional space where n itself is a variable :D).
I am familiar with programs that use statistics to identify clusters, but there are much simpler ways to describe the decision making process that don't use buzzwords like "centroid", appeal to n-dimensional space, or low level neural processing. I grant you that we may some day be able to give a soup-to-nuts explanation of how neurons relate to choices, but, as I've already explained (and I think you acknoweldge), we can simulate the same decision-making process at a higher level in machines that are not animal brains. You have not even begun to explain what you mean by "experience" or "perception" when you talk about cluster centroids. All you've done is add a layer of jargon. You seem to be trying to explain the properties of an emergent systemic behavior in terms of the properties of components that make up the system. I think that Subsymbolic has been trying to get at why that is not necessarily a good idea (although he does seem to get a little hard-on every time someone talks about neurons and stochastic processes. :))

If we were running this as a machine learning model, we'd have a pseudo-random starting seed that dictates which centroid is the first compared, and each subsequently compared centroid would be chosen at random as well. That would mean that different runs of the model would produce different outcomes, and because it's an evolving algorithm, it means that with each repeated run, the centroids themselves would change. For an entity with a very small range of perceptive sets (for example, a snail simply has fewer receptor cells than a dog does), there would necessarily be very few possible clusters, and they're likely to converge - so that over a large number of observed entities, the clusters of perception-response pairs would be small and very similar to each other. For an entity with a larger range of perceptive sets (the dog), they would be more likely to develop a larger number of clusters or perception-response pairs (they'd exhibit more complex behaviors, which are less predictable). For a large enough observed sample of that entity, there would be some convergence in clustering (they'd start to form general patterns of behavior across individuals), but there would still be a fair bit of residual variation from one entity to another of the same type.
You really don't need to explain unsupervised learning techniques for bootstrapping machine learning. It's a great idea, but there is a problem in scaling up those "proof of concept" toy programs. Nevertheless, machine learning specialists recognize the problem with hand-crafting training sets, so they understand the need for self-programming machines. They have found practical uses for these programs, but it is a mistake to confuse simulation with reality. Hence, object recognition is still a huge problem for AI researchers. We can do it up to a point, but scale-up still isn't there.

In this sort of model, QM is the physical mechanism for randomization. It would be less random than a computer generated psuedo-random element would be... but it would still be present.

That means that the exact same entity, at the exact same time, with the exact same past experiences, and the exact same perception experience set... may have a different response than in the first run.
You've gotten so far down in the weeds that you seem to have forgotten the original question--how "randomness" (aka "unpredictability") relates to the decision-making process. What does it explain about "free will"? That is the question that I've been asking and that you seem unable to address. You disagree with my claim that decision-making is a fully-determined process. Fine. Explain what it is about decision-making that is random.

That's all only getting us to how randomness (the QM element) plays into the framework for learning. That's not agency, it's not choice. It's the mechanism for learned and adaptive behavior.
Right, although just being able to simulate learning does not mean that you've illuminated the processes that are at play in brain activity when humans learn. We all know that some kind of associative processing is going on, but it seems to exist at a much higher (emergent) level than individual synapses. You still have to explain why people do the things they do before you can hold them responsible for their actions. Random neural processes are not a good place to start.

To get from there to agency, the entity needs to be able to reference past experience sets (both as individual specific experiences and as representative centroid sets), and be able to extrapolate from those past experience to imagine a set of possible future experiences. They need to be able to learn and adapt from 1) extrapolated, imagined scenarios or 2) vicarious experiences.
Using the expression "experience set" does nothing more than just the word "experience" here. It begs the question of what defines the set. Or is your "set" just a random collection of elements?
 
Are we not talking about our own experience as conscious people?

Do you as a conscious person have access to the underlying mechanisms of your conscious experience, including your very existence?

Do you as a conscious person have access to quantum activity, manipulating it to your advantage and will?

If your consciousness is matter/QM, then you are the manipulator. You are your own physical laws. How you appear to observers is not as accurate as what you choose.

It doesn't follow...you still cannot manipulate conditions according to your will. Quantum states are expressed without consciousness or will (the observer effect is not will). Which means that your will is an expression of non chosen quantum states and conditions, not the Maestro.

Plus there are interpretations of QM that are not probabilistic or random, but deterministic - many worlds, Bohmian pilot waves, etc.

A scientific test for this is if you can constantly choose to go against the mathematical probability theory of QM. We may not be able to set up this test for a while though.


What you choose is not exempt from the underlying activity that is being expressed as ''choosing to go against the mathematical probability theory of QM'' (there are at least 10 different interpretations of QM, with at least 4 being deterministic). There are no exemptions.
 
Contingent truths ... yes
Necessary truths ... yes

Contingent events ... yes
Necessary events ... no
 
It doesn't follow...you still cannot manipulate conditions according to your will. Quantum states are expressed without consciousness or will (the observer effect is not will). Which means that your will is an expression of non chosen quantum states and conditions, not the Maestro.

My argument is that you might be the conditions/matter.

Plus there are interpretations of QM that are not probabilistic or random, but deterministic - many worlds, Bohmian pilot waves, etc.
But if you want to stick with science, QM ends at probabilistic physics because there is no evidence yet for hidden variables or many worlds.
A scientific test for this is if you can constantly choose to go against the mathematical probability theory of QM. We may not be able to set up this test for a while though.


What you choose is not exempt from the underlying activity that is being expressed as ''choosing to go against the mathematical probability theory of QM'' .

So without testing this, you are just going to deny it?

(there are at least 10 different interpretations of QM, with at least 4 being deterministic). There are no exemptions.

Maybe not for science, but there are exemptions in philosophy. And none of the "theories" say anything about agency, consciousness, free will, etc. I am simply forming my own logical argument.
 
As you say yourself: that doesnt say anything about your argument. So why bring it up?

Juma, I was just pointing out that the new QM math model differs from classical probability models used for QM decision-making. You said there wouldn't be much of a difference; clearly there might be.

That response is wrong on so many levels so there is really no way to answer it...
What I say is that the brain isa helluva complex thing and to model ut on a high level it just might be ok to use QM model but that diesnt mean that the brain actually acts using QM. Its is just a model.
At small scales though, atomic scales, we know that QM works, since it does everywhere.
But upon that scale there are numerous hierarchies in the brain that isnt QM at all. An it is these structures that makes your brain work as it does.
Thus, it may be that at the smallest scale the brain have QM parts, but each such part would handle so little informatio...

For us to be a QM pilot wave then all these tiny part be connected and there is absolutely no reason to belifve that they are.
And even if: how would this unified object be able to steer all these part (atoms!).

It is but a silly dream...
 
What would you call an imaginary choice that you then act upon?
 
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