What is free will?

[Marvin Edwards]

Free of impediment of its course (or set of courses) towards fulfilment of requirement.

So, you're speaking of the ability to accomplish what we have decided to do, the ability to fulfill our intention. For example, I decide I will have pancakes this morning, but I'm out of pancake mix, so I cannot fulfill my intention. That's not how I'm defining free will. Free will is about the choosing of the will, and who or what is actually doing the choosing.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free of impediment of its course (or set of courses) towards fulfilment of requirement.

So, you're speaking of the ability to accomplish what we have decided to do, the ability to fulfill our intention. For example, I decide I will have pancakes this morning, but I'm out of pancake mix, so I cannot fulfill my intention. That's not how I'm defining free will. Free will is about the choosing of the will, and who or what is actually doing the choosing.

Nope. Sorry, it's not.

You can define free will the way you do, but it won't operate cleanly as a concept in any calculus of responsibility.

It all comes down to the interplay of "instructions", "system", "requirement" and "constraint". Constraint can operate on the requirement without requirement acting through the system to impact the instructions.

Any useful definition of these terms is going to have to fit the operations one wishes to perform, which here is the full derivation of responsibility in an event.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Free of impediment of its course (or set of courses) towards fulfilment of requirement.

So, you're speaking of the ability to accomplish what we have decided to do, the ability to fulfill our intention. For example, I decide I will have pancakes this morning, but I'm out of pancake mix, so I cannot fulfill my intention. That's not how I'm defining free will. Free will is about the choosing of the will, and who or what is actually doing the choosing.

Nope. Sorry, it's not.

You can define free will the way you do, but it won't operate cleanly as a concept in any calculus of responsibility.

It all comes down to the interplay of "instructions", "system", "requirement" and "constraint". Constraint can operate on the requirement without requirement acting through the system to impact the instructions.

Any useful definition of these terms is going to have to fit the operations one wishes to perform, which here is the full derivation of responsibility in an event.

I'm pretty sure the program has already been written, and we're living it now. So, it's just a matter of understanding what's currently going on, and why.

The operation is "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually of the form "I will X", where X is what we've decided to do. The chosen intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions as we carry out that will.

If the person performing the operation is subject to coercion or undue influence while choosing, then they are not free to choose for themselves what they will do. But if they are free of coercion and undue influence, then it is called a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free of impediment of its course (or set of courses) towards fulfilment of requirement.

So, you're speaking of the ability to accomplish what we have decided to do, the ability to fulfill our intention. For example, I decide I will have pancakes this morning, but I'm out of pancake mix, so I cannot fulfill my intention. That's not how I'm defining free will. Free will is about the choosing of the will, and who or what is actually doing the choosing.

Nope. Sorry, it's not.

You can define free will the way you do, but it won't operate cleanly as a concept in any calculus of responsibility.

It all comes down to the interplay of "instructions", "system", "requirement" and "constraint". Constraint can operate on the requirement without requirement acting through the system to impact the instructions.

Any useful definition of these terms is going to have to fit the operations one wishes to perform, which here is the full derivation of responsibility in an event.

I'm pretty sure the program has already been written, and we're living it now. So, it's just a matter of understanding what's currently going on, and why.

The operation is "choosing". Choosing inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually of the form "I will X", where X is what we've decided to do. The chosen intention then motivates and directs our subsequent actions as we carry out that will.

If the person performing the operation is subject to coercion or undue influence while choosing, then they are not free to choose for themselves what they will do. But if they are free of coercion and undue influence, then it is called a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Well, the operation you wish to perform logic around is responsibility for a will. Sometimes the will is to choose, sometimes the will is merely to do, but either way it comes down to fundamental operation of a will, which directs and defines a choice, but is not itself the choice it directs and decides through any more than an encrypted field means anything without the key.

You have to dig down into the more primitive concepts if you wish to axiomize this system of logic consistently.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Well, the operation you wish to perform logic around is responsibility for a will. Sometimes the will is to choose, sometimes the will is merely to do, but either way it comes down to fundamental operation of a will, which directs and defines a choice, but is not itself the choice it directs and decides through any more than an encrypted field means anything without the key.

You have to dig down into the more primitive concepts if you wish to axiomize this system of logic consistently.

Digging down to the more primitive concepts takes us from deliberate will to biological will. All living organisms exhibit "purposeful" or "goal-directed" behavior. The purpose/goal of a living organism is to survive, thrive, and reproduce.

Variations in species that lacked the behavior needed to survive and reproduce naturally became extinct, leaving only those species that behaved in a survivable way.

Digging below that, below biology, we would get a motivating force that I would call "chemical hunger", which is the tendency of atomic elements to join together into molecules with new properties that were not present in the elements themselves (emergence).

Digging below that, well, I don't know because I'm not a quantum physicist.

So, when you say "Hey, let's get primitive" that's about as far as I can go.

 

[DBT]

Sour grapes

Religiousity.

Nope. The opposite is true. It is compatibilism that makes a claim based on a definition that has no substance. ''The brain does it, therefore free will'' is an assertion, not an argument.

Simply a statement of fact.

It is a simple statement of fact that you are begging the question.

You have no argument, hence the silly assertions.

information processing, not will, not free will.

"Information processing" can be will.

Information is information. Asserting will does not make it so.

I have in this thread shown what is will. You even admit that it is willed in the other thread.

Which just shows that you don't understand the subject matter....you haven't from the beginning.

What we think and believe and hope for is not necessarily the way things are, or how they will go

And here even a recognition that it is both a will and free or not-free ("not necessarily the way things are or how they will go")

Hilarious.

neuroscience, not ideology.

And then you fall off again. You are making a foolish claim that does not support your declaration (that neurons cannot hold "the necessary form of regulatory control.

Coming from someone who doesn't understand the subject matter.

You cannot defend your clam with neuroscience. You have to actually defend your claim with math and fundamental systems theory because it is a claim about fundamental systems theory.

This is because systems theorists have shown, PROVEN that neurons can implement any Algorighm within their degree of network complexity.

As neurons can implement any Algorithm, it is your job to prove that no algorithm has "the right kind of regulatory control".

Of course the problem with THAT is that then I get to whip up some simple algorithms that clearly DO have the right kind of regulatory control: the dwarf holds a will, a plan, and that plan is measurable in it's vector either towards or away from it's goal through causality.

Hilarious. The right kind of regulatory control entails the ability to do otherwise, determinism, by definition eliminates the possibility to do otherwise in the same circumstances. Algorithms that select options based on sets of criteria are deterministic. The brain selects options based on sets of criteria, the option taken is determined by the state of the system, the options and criteria.

Determinism allows no deviations. As you yourself acknowledged. There goes the right kind of regulatory contol.

Compatibilism is not science

True, technically it's a logic of causal responsibility.

Crock, compatibilism is a carefully crafted definition designed to give the impression that freedom of will is compatible with determinism.

 

[DBT]

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

No need to remind me of this. That is the definition which I work with. We agree on the nature of determinism. The single point of dispute is the compatibilist definition of free will.

Just to remind you, there are two definitions of "free will" in most general dictionaries, including your favorite Merriam-Webster. I presume you've seen these, because you repeatedly posted the definition of "freedom" while ignoring their definitions of "free will".

It's not my 'favourite' definition - it just expresses what is taken to be the requirements of freedom.

Free will is a different matter.

In the definitions of "free will", each dictionary clearly separates freedom from causal necessity into a separate definition, because it is not the usual meaning of free will, as most people understand it.

Free Will Definition #1:
Merriam-Webster: 1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

That expresses the compatibilist definition of free will. Including the common perception of free will; the ability to consciously choose from a range of options.

But if definitions and common perceptions are enough to resolve the free will debate, it would have been settled long ago.

'The brain does it, therefore free will' is not a valid argument because it doesn't take critical information into account: the nature of brain agency and determinism.

The common perception of freely consciously choosing from sets of options is an illusion because because decisions are determined before being represented consciously, and determinism does not allow alternate decisions or actions.

So both the compatibilist definition of free will and the common perception of free will are not sufficient to prove the proposition: that will is indeed free.

The available evidence supports the opposite; that will is not free, that decisions and actions are determined prior to awareness or will.

Yes. And incompatibilists define 'free will' in a way that prevents it from co-existing with determinism. This causes an interminable debate. So, compatibilism offers a reasonable end to the endless silly debate.

There is no incompatibilist free will. Incompatibilists question the compatibilist definition of free will.

Free will is not "freedom from causal necessity". Free will is a deterministic event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while "free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". Nothing more. Nothing less.

That is where it goes wrong. 'The brain does it, therefore free will' is not sufficient. It doesn't take the nature and means of decision making and action into account. It just asserts, 'the brain does it, I am the the brain, therefore free will'' - Ignoring that what goes on within the brain cannot be controlled or regulated through the agency of will.

Will has no agency. Will cannot change outcomes. Will plays no part in decision making or motor action - which is information processing - yet it is asserted that 'will is free' - that we possess 'free will.'

 

[Jarhyn]

that has no substance

Systems of axioms can neither prove their primitive concepts nor axioms. It is merely that when the system has useful axioms, the system does not prove all sentences.

Your failure to understand why comes down to your religion.

You are inventing a nonsense, and then shoving that nonsense in so you can trivialize the system of axioms and absolve yourself from the responsibilities that math heaps upon you.

It's religion, and a religious absolution you seem to be seeking.

compatibilism is a carefully crafted definition designed to give the impression that freedom of will is compatible with determinism

And the axioms of math are carefully crafted to give the impression that sets of apples are "equal" despite things being "clearly different apples"...

You can play this game of obtuseness but we all see right through it.

"There can be no responsibility!!!"
"Why can't I hold all these limes!!!"

All systems of axioms are "carefully constructed" so as to avoid paradoxes. When an axiom leads to a paradox it just means a careful reconstruction and examination of the axioms becomes necessary.

When mathematicians ran into Russel's paradox they didn't say "well I guess math is useless", they reconstructed their definitions, carefully, so as as to avoid that paradox.

You on the other hand see a system whose calculus yields conclusions you dislike (that people are causally responsible for certain events) and you attempt to inject a trivializing paradox using a bad definitions.

The right kind of regulatory control entails the ability to do otherwise

No, it does not. I showed "the right kind of regulatory control" in my examples particularly breaking down the foolishness of your arguments in my example of the two robots: it is one robot managing the will of another robot. They do not have to be separate installations; they can be the same one.

The important part here is, you can draw a line around any event (ok, a surface, but "line" is easier to conceptualize), and circle an event and specify a time and ask a student "derive the causal responsibility for this event in this place for this time in past" and there is a fixed answer to the question.

your declaration "the universe is deterministic" in fact demands this math be valid!

"Free" here is not about deviations, it is about success of requirements.

The deviation happens against the will, not against reality.

The regulatory control system is generally of the form of an interrupt action. An interrupt activity happens, the old will gets cached, new potential wills are generated as sets, the freedom to requirements on the old will is evaluated, and then the will either gets replaced (it was assessed as unfree), and then it physically becomes unfree as it is deposed and replaced. A process inside the individual then selects a new will.

Through the entire course of this, there is a network of neurons evaluating, judging, and assessing this process to see that it happens smoothly: oh, I don't want to go there today (remove option); oh, I had salad yesterday (remove option).

Through this, you have options. The machinery that reduces a set to a singleton here and placed the instructions into the behavioral engine, is "responsible" for having made that choice upon "will".

The set will always be reduced to a singleton in a given event; determinism demands this. It does not change the fact that it was a set before it reduced, within the context of available knowledge.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

No need to remind me of this. That is the definition which I work with. We agree on the nature of determinism. The single point of dispute is the compatibilist definition of free will.

Ironically, I dealt specifically with our definitions of free will in the other thread this morning. See:

Do you possibly agree, that ...

But I think we may still disagree about the logical implications of determinism. If you don't mind, I'd like to go into that a bit here:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) article, “Causal Determinism”, describes determinism in several different ways. Some of these are good. Some are not.

“The roots of the notion of determinism surely lie in a very common philosophical idea: the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained, or that everything that is, has a sufficient reason for being and being as it is, and not otherwise.” [2] (SEP)

Determinism is based in the belief that the physical objects and forces that make up our universe behave in a rational and reliable fashion. By “rational” we mean that there is always an answer to the question, “Why did this happen?”, even if we never discover that answer.

This belief gives us hope that we may uncover the causes of significant events that affect our lives, and, by understanding their causes, gain some control over them. Medical discoveries lead to the prevention and treatment of disease, agricultural advancements improve our world’s food supply, new modes of transportation expand our travel, even to the moon and back, and so forth for all the rest of our science and innovation. Everything rests upon a foundation of reliable causation.

“Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.” [3] (SEP)

A logical corollary of reliable causation is causal necessity. Each cause may be viewed as an event, or prior state, that is brought about by its own causes. Each of these causes will in turn have their own causes, and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, reliable causation implies the logical fact that everything that happens is “causally necessary”. Everything that has happened, or will happen, will only turn out one way. A key issue in determinism is what to make of this logical fact.

Determinism itself is neither an object nor a force. It cannot do anything. It does not control anything. It is not in any way an actor in the real world. It is only a comment, an assertion that the behavior of objects and forces will, by their naturally occurring interactions, bring about all future events in a reliable fashion.

So, the next step is to understand the behavior of the actual objects and forces.

“Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions…” [4] (SEP)

We observe that material objects behave differently according to their level of organization as follows:

(1) Inanimate objects behave passively, responding to physical forces so reliably that it is as if they were following “unbreakable laws of Nature”. These natural laws are described by the physical sciences, like Physics and Chemistry. A ball on a slope will always roll downhill. Its behavior is governed by the force of gravity.

(2) Living organisms are animated by a biological drive to survive, thrive, and reproduce. They behave purposefully according to natural laws described by the life sciences: Biology, Genetics, Physiology, and so on. A squirrel on a slope will either go uphill or downhill depending upon where he expects to find the next acorn. While still affected by gravity, the squirrel is no longer governed by it. It is governed instead by its own biological drives.

(3) Intelligent species have evolved a neurology capable of imagination, evaluation, and choosing. They can behave deliberately, by calculation and by choice, according to natural laws described by the social sciences, like Psychology and Sociology, as well as the social laws that they create for themselves. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, an intelligent species is no longer governed by them, but is instead governed by its own choices.

So, we have three unique causal mechanisms, that each operate in a different way, by their own set of rules. We may even speculate that quantum events, with their own unique organization of matter into a variety of quarks, operates by its own unique set of rules.

A naïve Physics professor may suggest that, “Everything can be explained by the laws of physics”. But it can’t. A science discovers its natural laws by observation, and Physics does not observe living organisms, much less intelligent species.

Physics, for example, cannot explain why a car stops at a red traffic light. This is because the laws governing that event are created by society. While the red light is physical, and the foot pressing the brake pedal is physical, between these two physical events we find the biological need for survival and the calculation that the best way to survive is to stop at the light.

It is impossible to explain this event without addressing the purpose and the reasoning of the living object that is driving the car. This requires nothing that is supernatural. Both purpose and intelligence are processes running on the physical platform of the body’s neurology. But it is the process, not the platform, that causally determines what happens next.

We must conclude then, that any version of determinism that excludes purpose or reason as causes, would be invalid. There is no way to explain the behavior of intelligent species without taking purpose and reason into account.

And that is the point I'd like to make here, that all human behavior, including choosing what we will do, is an essential part of causal necessity.

Causal necessity never replaces us as the meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, or anything else. Causal necessity is about us, and about all the other actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe. And it simply says that all events will unfold in a single way, a way that is caused by all of the individual objects and forces just doing what they naturally do.

But back to free will...

In the definitions of "free will", each dictionary clearly separates freedom from causal necessity into a separate definition, because it is not the usual meaning of free will, as most people understand it.

Free Will Definition #1:
Merriam-Webster: 1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'

''Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism.'' - wiki.

That expresses the compatibilist definition of free will. Including the common perception of free will; the ability to consciously choose from a range of options.

Yes. The compatibilist definition of free will, the practical and operational meaning, has been around for a long time. It is simply a voluntary, unforced choice, one free of coercion and undue influence. And it is the definition used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

But if definitions and common perceptions are enough to resolve the free will debate, it would have been settled long ago.

I'm sure that if the paradox had not trapped so many otherwise intelligent minds, the debate would have ended a lot sooner. But I suspect that it got caught up in the religious debates, and that gave it a head of steam.

'The brain does it, therefore free will' is not a valid argument because it doesn't take critical information into account: the nature of brain agency and determinism.

We wouldn't even bring up the brain if the incompatibilists didn't throw neuroscience into the mix, with its own unique version of causal necessity. But, causal necessity, in whatever form it takes, has no impact upon operational free will. Operational free will makes no claims to being an uncaused event.

The common perception of freely consciously choosing from sets of options is an illusion because because decisions are determined before being represented consciously, and determinism does not allow alternate decisions or actions.

The myth that determinism makes every empirical event an illusion is another false implication of determinism. Determinism guarantees that a specific choice will be made, from a specific set of options, according to specific motives and evaluations of those options, and that the choosing will not be an illusion, but an actual event that takes place in empirical reality. That's what determinism actually implies.

So both the compatibilist definition of free will and the common perception of free will are not sufficient to prove the proposition: that will is indeed free.

There is no proposition on the table "that will is indeed free". That's your strawman definition of free will. The compatibilist definition of free will is that it is an event in which someone decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

The available evidence supports the opposite; that will is not free, that decisions and actions are determined prior to awareness or will.

The will is always causally determined. The mechanism of causally determining a person's deliberate will is the person's choosing operation. Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some appropriate criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice.

Now, whether this operation is perform entirely unconsciously and then conveyed to conscious awareness along with the reasons for the choice, OR, if conscious awareness is on board from the beginning as a participating function, does not matter. The person who ordered the salad will be still be held responsible for the bill, after all, he is the one who chose to place the order.

There is no incompatibilist free will. Incompatibilists question the compatibilist definition of free will.

Good. If there is no incompatibilist free will then the only free will left is the one the compatibilists describe.


Free will is not "freedom from causal necessity". Free will is a deterministic event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while "free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". Nothing more. Nothing less.

That is where it goes wrong. 'The brain does it, therefore free will' is not sufficient.

No. That's your free will, not mine. The brain must make the choice while free of coercion and undue influence, that's my free will.

It doesn't take the nature and means of decision making and action into account.

The nature of deliberate choosing is that it is a deterministic operation.
The means of deliberate choosing is that it involves multiple functional areas of the brain, including functions that occur beneath conscious awareness.

It just asserts, 'the brain does it, I am the the brain, therefore free will'' - Ignoring that what goes on within the brain cannot be controlled or regulated through the agency of will.

What is asserted is simple and clear. Free will is an event in which a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence.

There is no requirement that what goes on within the brain be consciously controlled or deliberately willed. That's another strawman.

Will has no agency.

Will is agency. Will is the motive force behind the action. Will may be conscious or unconscious and still perform its function. Will is a function of the neural architecture.

 

[DBT]

that has no substance

Systems of axioms can neither prove their primitive concepts nor axioms. It is merely that when the system has useful axioms, the system does not prove all sentences.

Your failure to understand why comes down to your religion.

You are inventing a nonsense, and then shoving that nonsense in so you can trivialize the system of axioms and absolve yourself from the responsibilities that math heaps upon you.

It's religion, and a religious absolution you seem to be seeking.

compatibilism is a carefully crafted definition designed to give the impression that freedom of will is compatible with determinism

And the axioms of math are carefully crafted to give the impression that sets of apples are "equal" despite things being "clearly different apples"...

You can play this game of obtuseness but we all see right through it.

"There can be no responsibility!!!"
"Why can't I hold all these limes!!!"

All systems of axioms are "carefully constructed" so as to avoid paradoxes. When an axiom leads to a paradox it just means a careful reconstruction and examination of the axioms becomes necessary.

When mathematicians ran into Russel's paradox they didn't say "well I guess math is useless", they reconstructed their definitions, carefully, so as as to avoid that paradox.

You on the other hand see a system whose calculus yields conclusions you dislike (that people are causally responsible for certain events) and you attempt to inject a trivializing paradox using a bad definitions.

The right kind of regulatory control entails the ability to do otherwise

No, it does not. I showed "the right kind of regulatory control" in my examples particularly breaking down the foolishness of your arguments in my example of the two robots: it is one robot managing the will of another robot. They do not have to be separate installations; they can be the same one.

The important part here is, you can draw a line around any event (ok, a surface, but "line" is easier to conceptualize), and circle an event and specify a time and ask a student "derive the causal responsibility for this event in this place for this time in past" and there is a fixed answer to the question.

your declaration "the universe is deterministic" in fact demands this math be valid!

"Free" here is not about deviations, it is about success of requirements.

The deviation happens against the will, not against reality.

The regulatory control system is generally of the form of an interrupt action. An interrupt activity happens, the old will gets cached, new potential wills are generated as sets, the freedom to requirements on the old will is evaluated, and then the will either gets replaced (it was assessed as unfree), and then it physically becomes unfree as it is deposed and replaced. A process inside the individual then selects a new will.

Through the entire course of this, there is a network of neurons evaluating, judging, and assessing this process to see that it happens smoothly: oh, I don't want to go there today (remove option); oh, I had salad yesterday (remove option).

Through this, you have options. The machinery that reduces a set to a singleton here and placed the instructions into the behavioral engine, is "responsible" for having made that choice upon "will".

The set will always be reduced to a singleton in a given event; determinism demands this. It does not change the fact that it was a set before it reduced, within the context of available knowledge.

Interrupt action, therefore free will? Really?

Invoking things like 'interrupt actions'' is designed to give the impression of an explanation, when in fact it explains nothing in terms of free will.

Decision making is not 'free will' at work. Brain function is determined by multiple elements, none of which are controlled or regulated by will, yet alone free will.

Decision making in the brain is not organized or run by will, yet free will is asserted regardless.

It's too silly for words.

 

[DBT]

Let's be clear on "causal necessity". Causal necessity is a universal constant. There are no uncaused events. Every event that ever happens is the reliable result of prior events. From my perspective, these are indisputable logical facts. There are no such things as "uncaused" events, but only events for which the causes may as yet remain unknown.

No need to remind me of this. That is the definition which I work with. We agree on the nature of determinism. The single point of dispute is the compatibilist definition of free will.

Ironically, I dealt specifically with our definitions of free will in the other thread this morning. See:

Do you possibly agree, that ...

But I think we may still disagree about the logical implications of determinism. If you don't mind, I'd like to go into that a bit here:

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) article, “Causal Determinism”, describes determinism in several different ways. Some of these are good. Some are not.

“The roots of the notion of determinism surely lie in a very common philosophical idea: the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained, or that everything that is, has a sufficient reason for being and being as it is, and not otherwise.” [2] (SEP)

Determinism is based in the belief that the physical objects and forces that make up our universe behave in a rational and reliable fashion. By “rational” we mean that there is always an answer to the question, “Why did this happen?”, even if we never discover that answer.

This belief gives us hope that we may uncover the causes of significant events that affect our lives, and, by understanding their causes, gain some control over them. Medical discoveries lead to the prevention and treatment of disease, agricultural advancements improve our world’s food supply, new modes of transportation expand our travel, even to the moon and back, and so forth for all the rest of our science and innovation. Everything rests upon a foundation of reliable causation.

“Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.” [3] (SEP)

A logical corollary of reliable causation is causal necessity. Each cause may be viewed as an event, or prior state, that is brought about by its own causes. Each of these causes will in turn have their own causes, and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, reliable causation implies the logical fact that everything that happens is “causally necessary”. Everything that has happened, or will happen, will only turn out one way. A key issue in determinism is what to make of this logical fact.

Determinism itself is neither an object nor a force. It cannot do anything. It does not control anything. It is not in any way an actor in the real world. It is only a comment, an assertion that the behavior of objects and forces will, by their naturally occurring interactions, bring about all future events in a reliable fashion.

So, the next step is to understand the behavior of the actual objects and forces.

“Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions…” [4] (SEP)

We observe that material objects behave differently according to their level of organization as follows:

(1) Inanimate objects behave passively, responding to physical forces so reliably that it is as if they were following “unbreakable laws of Nature”. These natural laws are described by the physical sciences, like Physics and Chemistry. A ball on a slope will always roll downhill. Its behavior is governed by the force of gravity.

(2) Living organisms are animated by a biological drive to survive, thrive, and reproduce. They behave purposefully according to natural laws described by the life sciences: Biology, Genetics, Physiology, and so on. A squirrel on a slope will either go uphill or downhill depending upon where he expects to find the next acorn. While still affected by gravity, the squirrel is no longer governed by it. It is governed instead by its own biological drives.

(3) Intelligent species have evolved a neurology capable of imagination, evaluation, and choosing. They can behave deliberately, by calculation and by choice, according to natural laws described by the social sciences, like Psychology and Sociology, as well as the social laws that they create for themselves. While still affected by gravity and biological drives, an intelligent species is no longer governed by them, but is instead governed by its own choices.

So, we have three unique causal mechanisms, that each operate in a different way, by their own set of rules. We may even speculate that quantum events, with their own unique organization of matter into a variety of quarks, operates by its own unique set of rules.

A naïve Physics professor may suggest that, “Everything can be explained by the laws of physics”. But it can’t. A science discovers its natural laws by observation, and Physics does not observe living organisms, much less intelligent species.

Physics, for example, cannot explain why a car stops at a red traffic light. This is because the laws governing that event are created by society. While the red light is physical, and the foot pressing the brake pedal is physical, between these two physical events we find the biological need for survival and the calculation that the best way to survive is to stop at the light.

It is impossible to explain this event without addressing the purpose and the reasoning of the living object that is driving the car. This requires nothing that is supernatural. Both purpose and intelligence are processes running on the physical platform of the body’s neurology. But it is the process, not the platform, that causally determines what happens next.

We must conclude then, that any version of determinism that excludes purpose or reason as causes, would be invalid. There is no way to explain the behavior of intelligent species without taking purpose and reason into account.

And that is the point I'd like to make here, that all human behavior, including choosing what we will do, is an essential part of causal necessity.

Causal necessity never replaces us as the meaningful and relevant cause of our actions, or anything else. Causal necessity is about us, and about all the other actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe. And it simply says that all events will unfold in a single way, a way that is caused by all of the individual objects and forces just doing what they naturally do.

But back to free will...

Padding, volume, sophistry and semantics aside, the issue boils down to:

Neural architecture is not willed or subject to will.

Neural functionality is not willed or subject to will

Intelligence is not willed or subject to will .

Decision making (determined) is not willed or subject to will.

Response is neither willed or subject to will, but determined by the immediate state and condition of the system, which is not chosen or subject to regulation.

Given the above, it is false to claim brain agency in terms of free will . Function, determined by the state of the system (not chosen or regulated by will) does not equate to free will.

''Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.''

For the reasons outlined above;

''Intelligence, therefore free will'' is false.

''It is our brain doing it, therefore free will'' is false.

'Acting according to our will (inevitable, unless forced), therefore free will'' is false.

 

[Jarhyn]

Interrupt action, therefore free will? Really?

DBT, you seem to be doing a great deal of effort to validate the belief that there exists a reading comprehension issue in addition to a causal heirarchy comprehension issue at play in your worldview.

No, interrupt action therefore freely held will.

Your inability to look on the inside of the box at concepts without crushing them or running roughshod over the statements is telling to say the least.

Decision making is not 'free will' at work.

Except that it really is. You use the term "decision making", yes, making a decision, actually making it and something else not making a different decision instead, is free will.

It is in fact how it has been axiomized in the system of logic that allows calculation of causal responsibility.

I get that you don't WANT decision making to be considered free will, and my guess is because you dislike being held as responsible for your actions but it is! Deal with it. Accept responsibility for the decisions you make. Accept that others have responsibility for the decisions they make, particularly from the point on where they have made those decisions!

We lock up child molesters (make them unfree, in general) because their will ("to molest children!") regardless of source must be constrained, otherwise they will molest children. It doesn't matter whether the will is inserted consciously or subconsciously, whether they woke up in the morning believing they wanted to be a chomo or whether they were raped so badly as a child they can't understand any other thing. The issue is they hold the will, and the will be free, "to molest children".

It is a fact that locking them up for holding this will prevents this will from being "free".

The interrupt is merely the mechanism that allows review-in-flight and thus a will, not necessarily freely held but itself free, which is held and operated by the "will fulfillment and evaluation engine", the agency, of the form "reevaluate"

This is the regulatory control you seem to think does not exist. In some ways the will which drives the interrupt is external to the process, making the following statement in this framework "true":
The final resultant will was freely selected but the will to evaluate the will was not itself freely willed in this instance.

I will say that sometimes I do freely will to reevaluate my will as the will to reevaluate is something I have freely willed that I may do more of and more skillfully.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Padding, volume, sophistry and semantics aside,

Sorry, I understand you don't have time to read everything. I'll try to keep it short.

Neuroscience tells us that we have brains, that our brains make decisions, and that those decisions govern our actions.

Neural architecture is not willed or subject to will.
Neural functionality is not willed or subject to will.
Intelligence is not willed or subject to will.

According to neuroscience, we have brains, our brains make decisions, and those decisions govern our actions.

Decision making (determined) is not willed or subject to will.

Except, of course, when decision making is actually willed. We willingly enter the restaurant. We willingly pick up the menu. We willingly decide what we will order. We willingly tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

So, your generalization has a big hole in it. You cannot leave out the system's function of "forming an intention and carrying it out", because neuroscience tells us that our brains make decisions, and those decisions govern our actions.

Response is neither willed or subject to will, but determined by the immediate state and condition of the system, which is not chosen or subject to regulation.

The "will" is the system's intention to accomplish a specific goal. The biological need for energy (food) causes a recall of memories associated with that need and the actions required to satisfy it. There are multiple ways of obtaining food, for example, going home or going out for dinner. We decide that tonight, we will go out for dinner.

That deliberately chosen will, "to go out for dinner", leads the system to its next decision, "Where shall we go to have dinner?" which sets our intent upon a specific restaurant. That second deliberately chosen will causes us to drive to the restaurant, walk in, and face our next decision. We pickup the menu, weigh our options, and choose what we will have for dinner. That third deliberately chosen will causes us to call the waiter over and say to him, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

According to neuroscience, we have brains, our brains make decisions, and those decisions govern our actions. Our decisions set our intentions upon specific goals that we reach through our specific actions.

Given the above, it is false to claim brain agency in terms of free will.

According to neuroscience, the brain has the agency of deciding what we will do.

Whether this decision was, or was not, "free of coercion and undue influence" is where the issue of free will enters the picture. The deliberate will may either be freely chosen by the brain itself, or the choice may be imposed upon it by some other brain pointing a gun at it.

Function, determined by the state of the system (not chosen or regulated by will) does not equate to free will.

Except when it does.

''Dr. Robert Sapolsky: The basic theme is that we are biological creatures, which shouldn't be earth-shattering. And thus all of our behavior is a product of our biology, which also shouldn't be earth-shattering—even though it's news to some people.

If we want to make sense of our behavior—all the best, worst, and everything in between—we're not going to get anywhere if we think it can all be explained with one thing, whether it's one part of the brain, one childhood experience, one hormone, one gene, or anything. Instead, a behavior is the outcome of everything from neurobiology one second before the action, to evolutionary pressure dating back millions of years.''

Sapolsky is referring to your notion of free will, not mine. My notion of free will has no problem with our behavior being a complex product of our biology, our brain, our experiences, our hormones, our genes, and our evolution over millions of years.

All of those antecedent causes result in us being us. And it is actually "that which is us" that is deciding for itself whether to have the steak or the salad for dinner.

For the reasons outlined above;

As you can see, the reasons you've outlined above do not hold water.

 

[DBT]

Interrupt action, therefore free will? Really?

DBT, you seem to be doing a great deal of effort to validate the belief that there exists a reading comprehension issue in addition to a causal heirarchy comprehension issue at play in your worldview.

Saying that just demonstrates that you have not understood what I have gone to a great deal of trouble to explain. Not a word.

What part of ''it is the compatibilist who is making a positive claim and supporting it with a definition designed to make it appear that 'free will' is compatible with determinism,'' and it is the incompatibilist who questions this claim and definition, is hard to grasp?

Not to mention that incompabilism is not something that I made up.

You haven't understood what I said. You clearly do not understand incompatibilism, the implications of determinism, the nature and role of will, the cognitive process, decision making or motor action.

Nada, Zip, Zilch, nothing.

 

[DBT]

Padding, volume, sophistry and semantics aside,

Sorry, I understand you don't have time to read everything. I'll try to keep it short.

Neuroscience tells us that we have brains, that our brains make decisions, and that those decisions govern our actions.

Of course. No disagreement there. The issue lies in applying the label of free will when will does not and cannot alter outcomes.

What the brain does is not a matter of will or free will. Each brain produces response according the state and makeup. Each animal according to their neural makeup, evolutionary role, etc, etc.

Everything with a brain inevitably acts according to the response determined by the makeup of their brain. Form and Function has nothing to do with free will.

Neural architecture is not willed or subject to will.
Neural functionality is not willed or subject to will.
Intelligence is not willed or subject to will.

According to neuroscience, we have brains, our brains make decisions, and those decisions govern our actions.

Yes indeed. Which is a matter of form and function, not free will.

Decision making (determined) is not willed or subject to will.

Except, of course, when decision making is actually willed. We willingly enter the restaurant. We willingly pick up the menu. We willingly decide what we will order. We willingly tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

This misrepresents the order of events within the cognition process.

First sensory inputs, then propagation of information, processing, memory integration enabling recognition (milliseconds), then conscious representation of information, a decision becomes conscious with the will to carry it out.

Information processing must necessarily precede will, and shape and form the will to act. Information processing is the driver. Will is the result.

I have supported this with numerous quotes, links and studies.

 

[Jarhyn]

Iko

''it is the compatibilist who is making a positive claim and supporting it with a definition designed to make it appear that 'free will' is compatible with determinism,''

I have proven quite visibly that the thing I call "free will" is compatible with determinism, and also that the thing Marvin calls "free will" and which I call "freely held will" also is compatible with determinism.

The positive claim is merely the rhetorical acknowledgement of the proof.

The reason that free will is compatible with our deterministic universe on the first part is because not every particle interacts in every moment with every other particle, and the mechanisms of their interaction are incapable of observing the geometries which are meaningful against the "requirements" of the locality.

In some ways even the physics itself is will. Nothing can constrain the free will of the deterministic system! It is deterministic! But lots of things can constrain the wills of incomplete stochastic actors within the system.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Neuroscience tells us that we have brains, that our brains make decisions, and that those decisions govern our actions.

Of course. No disagreement there. The issue lies in applying the label of free will when will does not and cannot alter outcomes.

Okay, set "free" aside for a moment. We're still having a disagreement over the nature of "will". Biological drives animate living organisms to acquire food and other biological necessities from the environment. This is the key distinction between living organisms and inanimate matter. So, to me, biological drives are the initial source of motivation for specific actions.

With evolved intelligence we get the rational brain that responds to these biological drives in creative ways. It explores the environment for sources of food, discovering what is edible and not edible, and passing this knowledge on to its children. It finds ingenious ways to "hunt and gather". Eventually it learns how to farm, and before you know it, it begins sending its kids to college, to learn skills they perform in trade for money to buy the food they need to meet their biological requirement for the energy to reproduce.

So, our will is a biological drive that is given specific direction by the brain's rational deliberation. The "free" part refers to whether the rational deliberation was, or was not, free of coercion and undue influence.

What the brain does is not a matter of will or free will.

The brain does not choose to be a brain, it simply IS a brain. The brain does not choose to be the receptacle of sensory input, it simply IS the receiver of sensory input. The brain does not choose to be a decision maker, it simply IS a decision maker.

Being a decision maker, the brain will, when it is presented with multiple options, choose which of those options the person will pursue. And choosing what the person will be doing also entails what the brain will be concentrating upon, until the task is complete. So, there is a bit of recursion going on in the process, such that the brain does, in this sense, get to choose what the brain will be doing.

"Ordinary", "operational", "compatibilist" free will does not require the brain to be anything other than what it is, just doing what it does, which includes, on occasion, choosing from multiple options what the person will do.

Each brain produces response according the state and makeup. Each animal according to their neural makeup, evolutionary role, etc, etc. Everything with a brain inevitably acts according to the response determined by the makeup of their brain.

Of course. But the state and makeup of the brain is such that, when it faces a decision, it will mediate that response according to the inner necessity of its thoughts and feelings. For example, in the restaurant the brain will experience thoughts and feelings about the steak and thoughts and feelings about the salad, and these will necessitate the choice.

Form and Function has nothing to do with free will.

Form and function enable the healthy brain to made decisions about what the person will do. An illness or injury to the brains form or function can impair the brain's ability to make rational decisions. That is how form and function relate to free will.

Decision making (determined) is not willed or subject to will.

Except, of course, when decision making is actually willed. We willingly enter the restaurant. We willingly pick up the menu. We willingly decide what we will order. We willingly tell the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

This misrepresents the order of events within the cognition process. First sensory inputs, then propagation of information, processing, memory integration enabling recognition (milliseconds), then conscious representation of information, a decision becomes conscious with the will to carry it out. Information processing must necessarily precede will, and shape and form the will to act. Information processing is the driver. Will is the result.

The starting point was sensory input, our biological urge to eat, which came to conscious awareness as our workday ended. We then decided we would have dinner at the restaurant. That deliberate intention motivated our subsequent actions, beginning with going to the restaurant and ending with our walking out with that biological urge satisfied. This included our reading the menu and deciding what we would eat. This second will motivated our telling the waiter, "I will have the Chef Salad, please".

The point is that one "will" (we will eat at the restaurant) can be the cause of a subsequent "will" (we will have the salad). The sensory input of the first will is the biological urge to eat. The sensory input of the second will was the menu. However, the second sensory input would not have occurred without the motivation of the first will.

"Will" itself may be the expression of the sensation of intention. We do seem to feel this need to complete an intent.

 

[DBT]

Neuroscience tells us that we have brains, that our brains make decisions, and that those decisions govern our actions.

Of course. No disagreement there. The issue lies in applying the label of free will when will does not and cannot alter outcomes.

Okay, set "free" aside for a moment. We're still having a disagreement over the nature of "will". Biological drives animate living organisms to acquire food and other biological necessities from the environment. This is the key distinction between living organisms and inanimate matter. So, to me, biological drives are the initial source of motivation for specific actions.

Biological drives are not willed. They are programmed into the system. Evolutionary biology, etc.

With evolved intelligence we get the rational brain that responds to these biological drives in creative ways. It explores the environment for sources of food, discovering what is edible and not edible, and passing this knowledge on to its children. It finds ingenious ways to "hunt and gather". Eventually it learns how to farm, and before you know it, it begins sending its kids to college, to learn skills they perform in trade for money to buy the food they need to meet their biological requirement for the energy to reproduce.

Freely willed? No. Free will plays no part in evolution or biology. That's an attempt at shoehorning an ideological concept into a place it exist.

Biology, therefore free will is quite a leap.

So, our will is a biological drive that is given specific direction by the brain's rational deliberation. The "free" part refers to whether the rational deliberation was, or was not, free of coercion and undue influence.

Function is determined by architecture, not will. Function is not coerced or forced, but it is necessitated by the state of the system....which is not subject to will, wish or want.

What the brain does is not a matter of will or free will.

The brain does not choose to be a brain, it simply IS a brain. The brain does not choose to be the receptacle of sensory input, it simply IS the receiver of sensory input. The brain does not choose to be a decision maker, it simply IS a decision maker.

Exactly. That is what I have been saying all along.

Being a decision maker, the brain will, when it is presented with multiple options, choose which of those options the person will pursue. And choosing what the person will be doing also entails what the brain will be concentrating upon, until the task is complete. So, there is a bit of recursion going on in the process, such that the brain does, in this sense, get to choose what the brain will be doing.

"Ordinary", "operational", "compatibilist" free will does not require the brain to be anything other than what it is, just doing what it does, which includes, on occasion, choosing from multiple options what the person will do.

The person is the work of the brain. The person has no choice but to do whatever the brain is doing in terms of information processing/thought and action.

Thought and action is the result of an interaction of inputs and memory through the agency of neural information processing, not will.

Not trying to sound flippant but, ''Not will, therefore free will'' just doesn't work.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Biological drives are not willed. They are programmed into the system. Evolutionary biology, etc.

Correct. I'm simply pointing to biological drives as motivational forces that animate the behavior of living organisms. Self-animated behavior distinguishes an amoeba from a rock. The amoeba extends its pseudopod to move to where food might be. The rock just sits there.

With evolved intelligence we get the rational brain that responds to these biological drives in creative ways. It explores the environment for sources of food, discovering what is edible and not edible, and passing this knowledge on to its children. It finds ingenious ways to "hunt and gather". Eventually it learns how to farm, and before you know it, it begins sending its kids to college, to learn skills they perform in trade for money to buy the food they need to meet their biological requirement for the energy to reproduce.

Freely willed? No. Free will plays no part in evolution or biology. That's an attempt at shoehorning an ideological concept into a place it exist.
Biology, therefore free will is quite a leap.

No no. Biology, therefore "purposeful" instinctual behavior, but not "deliberate" behavior.

Free will doesn't show up until we evolved the intelligence to imagine, evaluate, and choose. With intelligence we get "deliberate" behavior, a "chosen" will, a specific reportable intention, as in "I will X", where X is what we have chosen to do. Deliberate behavior results from a choice causally necessitated by our thoughts and feelings.

So, our will is a biological drive that is given specific direction by the brain's rational deliberation. The "free" part refers to whether the rational deliberation was, or was not, free of coercion and undue influence.

Function is determined by architecture, not will. Function is not coerced or forced, but it is necessitated by the state of the system....which is not subject to will, wish or want.

Correct. And one of those functions is deciding what we will do. Once we have set our intent upon doing something, that intention drives the body's actions toward accomplishing that intent. And the brain itself may participate in that action, being driven by its own deliberate intent to accomplish that intent.

For example, if my brain decides to balance my checkbook, then my brain will be performing the comparisons while my hand is making the check marks in my checkbook. The series of actions, by my brain and by my hand, are motivated and directed by the deliberate choice to compare my checks to the bank statement to see what checks have cleared. The intention is driving the action.

What the brain does is not a matter of will or free will.

The brain does not choose to be a brain, it simply IS a brain. The brain does not choose to be the receptacle of sensory input, it simply IS the receiver of sensory input. The brain does not choose to be a decision maker, it simply IS a decision maker.

Exactly. That is what I have been saying all along.

Me too.

Being a decision maker, the brain will, when it is presented with multiple options, choose which of those options the person will pursue. And choosing what the person will be doing also entails what the brain will be concentrating upon, until the task is complete. So, there is a bit of recursion going on in the process, such that the brain does, in this sense, get to choose what the brain will be doing.

"Ordinary", "operational", "compatibilist" free will does not require the brain to be anything other than what it is, just doing what it does, which includes, on occasion, choosing from multiple options what the person will do.

The person is the work of the brain. The person has no choice but to do whatever the brain is doing in terms of information processing/thought and action.

Figuratively speaking, yes. But, to avoid "creeping dualism", keep in mind that the brain IS the person. Whatever the brain chooses to do, the person has chosen to do. The brain, the heart, the arms and legs, the nose and eyes, are all integral parts of that single physical object that we call a "person".

The brain is not forcing the person to act against the person's will. The brain contains the person's will, just as the person's skull contains the brain. There is no will except within the brain.

Thought and action is the result of an interaction of inputs and memory through the agency of neural information processing, not will.

Will is the deliberate agency of the neural information processing. When the neural information processing results in a will to take some action, that will encapsulates the agency of the neural information processing.

Not trying to sound flippant but, ''Not will, therefore free will'' just doesn't work.

The will is not hiding. It is right there in the neural information processing. And if the neural information processing decides to balance my checkbook, then the neural information processing will perform the comparisons while the hand makes checkmarks in the checkbook. Both the hand and the neural information processing are motivated and directed by the intention chosen by the neural information processing, while free of coercion and undue influence. So, I'm balancing my checkbook of my own freely chosen will ("of my own free will").

 

[Jarhyn]

Something strikes me in the development of cognition, Validation and Review are also elements of the process that encompasses "me".

Something in my mind is... Well, it produced an answer to something, recognized a property, and walked "me" through what it saw by me giving it some influence on my will as "I, everything in the meat", not "I, the process that is speaking", was doing.

I saw what it saw, "review", and then I gave it a gold star: "validation".

Of course these are all actually terms which discuss algorithmic process.

It strikes me that this whole requirements,plan(will),Review,validation,test process is reflected in a number of safety critical design processes across a number of different parts of society.