What kind of entity is a fictional character?

[ficino]

Hello Kharakov, Perspicuo and DBT, hope to cycle around to your side of the thread later.

@Togo: This doesn't do more than add a few pebbles to our exchange above, but I note that Alyosius P. Martinich both denies that fictional objects "exist" and makes a distinction between existing objects and merely intentional objects. All objects of thought are intentional objects; some objects of thought also exist. The latter stand on their own in the world; intentional objects need only be thought about. So Mt. Washington, being thought about, is an intentional object, and it also is an existing object. A golden mountain can be thought about, we can say things about it, but it does not exist. so it's only an intentional object.

Martinich disagrees with the tendency of many philosophers to suppose that when we refer, we (can) only refer to things that exist, because, as they think, referring is the bridge between language and the world. Martinich insists we can refer to a lot of things that we only imagine. In many contexts, such as in fiction, there are conventions that authorize reference to things that we only imagine. Things said in a text or myth or story make up the depository of facts, with reference to which statements in fiction are true or false. the conventions of fiction authorize author and reader to suspend the usual maxim that, in making an assertion, one must satisfy all the requirements for that illocutionary act - i.e. being responsible for meeting real-world verification demands, etc.

So on this account, fictional objects do not exist but are yet the objects of intentional acts - imagining or whatever. M is against a metaphysics of fictional objects.

It seems as though Martinich's work has not received much attention. I understand that Richard Rorty has taken a similar line.

I haven't worked through whether I think there are holes in this account. When we outside the fiction talk about a character in a fiction, M's account has to cover our speech acts and the fictional character as the reference of them. The fictional character will be part of the world in that context, under a different set of relations than s/he is part of the world of the fiction. I think Martinich in general is ill-disposed toward thinking of the fiction as constituting a "world." Maybe his distinction between talk about fiction and talk in fiction is robust enough to avoid equivocating.

That's all I can write for now. Cheers, f

 

[Underseer]

Why are we still having this discussion? I thought I already settled it.

It is possible that the authors were accidentally correct, therefore you cannot conclusively prove that any given fictional character doesn't exist, therefore all fictional characters definitely exist. And don't give me any of that "shifting the burden of proof" crap. Anyone who understands logic understands that the burden of proof lies with the skeptic. [/christianormuslimapologist]

 

[ficino]

Why are we still having this discussion? I thought I already settled it.

It is possible that the authors were accidentally correct, therefore you cannot conclusively prove that any given fictional character doesn't exist, therefore all fictional characters definitely exist. And don't give me any of that "shifting the burden of proof" crap. Anyone who understands logic understands that the burden of proof lies with the skeptic. [/christianormuslimapologist]

And therefore, GOD IS!! I finally get it!!

 

[Kharakov]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

 

[Keith&Co.]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

If it was, would we be able to cause unconsciousness with chemicals?

 

[Kharakov]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

If it was, would we be able to cause unconsciousness with chemicals?

Why not? It certainly seems that human consciousness is subordinate to and affected by other aspects of reality (such as hammers).

 

[DBT]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

Depends on where you look.

 

[Kharakov]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

Depends on where you look.

Hey.... are you teasing me!@#!#@ because that would be funny.

 

[DBT]

Is there evidence of consciousness existing outside of the workings of a brain?

Is there evidence that consciousness isn't a fundamental part of reality?

Depends on where you look.

Hey.... are you teasing me!@#!#@ because that would be funny.

We may as well laugh. After all, it is the best option.

 

[Kharakov]

Sometimes it's just a kind smile.

 

[doubtingt]

Is a fictional character any different than an abstract category of actually existing objects? Individual chairs exist, but the "chairs" is an mental construct that exists only in the mind. Its mental elements are composed of real chairs that have been experienced. I can imagine a new kind of chair that has never previously existed and (unless someone actually builds it) it exists only as do abstract categories and fictional characters.

 

[ficino]

Hello doubtingt, yes, a fictional character is different from an abstract category. That's part of what makes the problem a good test case for theories about meaning and reference. We can formulate a "definite description" in Russell's sense about a fictional character: e.g. the prince of Denmark/on leave from studies at Wittenberg/recently lost father/believes father was murdered/ etc. "The" helps mark out the character as definite. The category "chair" on the other hand is a universal, not a particular, so it is not the subject of a definite description.

The reason why fictional entities come up in philosophy of language is that most theorists have held that to be true, definite descriptions have to refer to something that exists. Fictional characters by definition do not exist. So descriptions of them seem to have no referents. By this logic, those descriptions, or propositions that contain them, are either false or are not assertions.

I don't think the above problem arises in the case of universals, since they are secondary entities. I think your imaginary chair in some ways is a better analog of a fictional character than is the abstract category "chairs," because one is not imagining chair-ness but a particular chair with definite properties. Still, though, your imaginary chair, as a sort of blueprint of a chair that could be manufactured, is not completely analogous to a fictional character because the conventional suspension of disbelief entailed in producing and consuming fiction isn't made in the case of a chair that you are only imagining.

 

[fast]

Just putting in my two cents. Wouldn't be too quick to dismiss it though.

Fictional characters don't exist, but characters of fiction do. To say of a fictional character that it exists is to say a character of fiction exists in the real world outside works of fiction, and of course, they do not, but to say of a character of fiction that it exists is to say the invented character has been written about in a work of fiction, and of course, they have and therefore do.

 

[rizdek]

But it is fascinating for me, anyways, to discuss some fiction stories with folks who really get caught up in analyzing, defending and judging the actions of fictional characters. They often go way beyond what the author wrote to justify/condemn a given person for their actions. They imagine agendas, motivations, reasoning and beliefs of these fictional characters that the author never talks about. To them, apparently, the fictional character achieves almost real life status...somehow...in their brain. And their responses can be quite heated and stated with ardent conviction.

 

[DBT]

Fictional characters are normally endowed with traits that we relate to on a daily basis. So depending on how we feel about the flaws or strengths of a fictional character, an actual love or hate relationship may develop on the basis of the traits that are being represented.

 

[Juma]

Just putting in my two cents. Wouldn't be too quick to dismiss it though.

Fictional characters don't exist, but characters of fiction do. To say of a fictional character that it exists is to say a character of fiction exists in the real world outside works of fiction, and of course, they do not, but to say of a character of fiction that it exists is to say the invented character has been written about in a work of fiction, and of course, they have and therefore do.

Fictional characters exist: as a fictional character.

 

[ficino]

So if we talk about Hamlet, or if other characters in the play talk about Hamlet, or if Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guildenstern talk about Hamlet, Hamlet is a or the referent of their utterances. A problem for which fictional discourse provides test cases is the problem, whether a genuine assertion must refer to something that exists. Martinich and Strull call The Axiom of Existence the assumption that when we refer, we refer to a referent that exists. A consequence of this axiom, for Searle and many others, is that characters' utterances in fiction are not assertions because the referents do not exist. They are pretend assertions. Utterances in fiction that refer to things that exist in the real world might count as assertions if we say that the author makes them, but then we run into the problem that the author is not a constituent of the world of the fiction. Searle doesn't unravel this problem, to the best of my knowledge. He does allow that critics can make assertions in real life about characters in fiction because they make assertions about the fiction, which is a real life artefact.

In conjunction with the Axiom of Existence (Martinich and Strull's nomenclature), Searle also says that utterances in fiction don't count as illocutionary acts because the requirements of illocution are not satisfied - e.g. that the maker of an assertion commit him/herself to the truth of the expressed proposition.

M&S argue against the Axiom of Existence, invoking instead the notion of truth in fiction as resting on institutional facts, along an analogy with legal fictions. They say that instead of making "pretend assertions," the author makes assertions in which Grice's Maxim of Quality is suspended: "do not say what is false" - i.e. an utterance can still be an assertion, on this theory, even if its truth is not grounded in a real-life fact.

I am trying to wrap my mind around whether there's a philosophically interesting difference betw these approaches, or whether M&S just "change the name," as Aristotle said Plato did with Pythagorean paradigm-instance terminology.

 

[fast]

Just putting in my two cents. Wouldn't be too quick to dismiss it though.

Fictional characters don't exist, but characters of fiction do. To say of a fictional character that it exists is to say a character of fiction exists in the real world outside works of fiction, and of course, they do not, but to say of a character of fiction that it exists is to say the invented character has been written about in a work of fiction, and of course, they have and therefore do.

Fictional characters exist: as a fictional character.

read my post again

 

[fast]

So if we talk about Hamlet, or if other characters in the play talk about Hamlet, or if Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guildenstern talk about Hamlet, Hamlet is a or the referent of their utterances. A problem for which fictional discourse provides test cases is the problem, whether a genuine assertion must refer to something that exists. Martinich and Strull call The Axiom of Existence the assumption that when we refer, we refer to a referent that exists. A consequence of this axiom, for Searle and many others, is that characters' utterances in fiction are not assertions because the referents do not exist. They are pretend assertions. Utterances in fiction that refer to things that exist in the real world might count as assertions if we say that the author makes them, but then we run into the problem that the author is not a constituent of the world of the fiction. Searle doesn't unravel this problem, to the best of my knowledge. He does allow that critics can make assertions in real life about characters in fiction because they make assertions about the fiction, which is a real life artefact.

In conjunction with the Axiom of Existence (Martinich and Strull's nomenclature), Searle also says that utterances in fiction don't count as illocutionary acts because the requirements of illocution are not satisfied - e.g. that the maker of an assertion commit him/herself to the truth of the expressed proposition.

M&S argue against the Axiom of Existence, invoking instead the notion of truth in fiction as resting on institutional facts, along an analogy with legal fictions. They say that instead of making "pretend assertions," the author makes assertions in which Grice's Maxim of Quality is suspended: "do not say what is false" - i.e. an utterance can still be an assertion, on this theory, even if its truth is not grounded in a real-life fact.

I am trying to wrap my mind around whether there's a philosophically interesting difference betw these approaches, or whether M&S just "change the name," as Aristotle said Plato did with Pythagorean paradigm-instance terminology.

Concepts, for instance, reside in the only one place they can, in the mind, or at least our language functions as such to ascribe them as being in such a place, as if the mind itself is actually, lol, somewhere, but what concepts are concepts of, for example, a horse, do not reside in such a, haha, place; they are out and about among us; hence, the concept of a horse is not within our tangible grasp, but what the concept is a concept of, namely a horse, is.

Funny, if a real life unicorn were before me, no one would say that which is before me is a concept, yet I wonder why they seem to confuse them with concepts, for instance. Either there is or isn't a referent, yet when there isn 't people ascribe them to being where our concepts of them are. Would horses actually be in my mind as concepts if they should all disappear? Of course not. The concepts are there, and they are a product of the brain said to be housed in the mind, but surely the horses are much to big to fit.

Characters of fiction do exist, and they exist in works of fiction, and should one miraculously appear before me, then the character of fiction would continue to exist in the work, but something would change, the proposition that fictional characters don't exist would no longer be true, well, sorta, don't want to bring too much confusion to bare at once. We mustn't confuse that which is among us and that which is a product of our imagination. If fictional characters existed, they would be among us, and they are not, so they don't, but characters of fiction that belong in the place they were created to be are there and in the form we ascribe to them.

Watch how people scramble to relocate them once we take away the temporary presumption of real world existence.

 

[Togo]

@Togo: This doesn't do more than add a few pebbles to our exchange above, but I note that Alyosius P. Martinich both denies that fictional objects "exist" and makes a distinction between existing objects and merely intentional objects. All objects of thought are intentional objects; some objects of thought also exist. The latter stand on their own in the world; intentional objects need only be thought about. So Mt. Washington, being thought about, is an intentional object, and it also is an existing object. A golden mountain can be thought about, we can say things about it, but it does not exist. so it's only an intentional object.

I'm broadly fine with confining the term 'exist' to describe an absolute relationship with reality, if that's what we want to do. However, I'd point out that we do, in practice, intelligibly use the term to distinguish between actual and notional objects within a fiction, so some kind of special explanation is required there if we want to make the more limited term stick.

Martinich disagrees with the tendency of many philosophers to suppose that when we refer, we (can) only refer to things that exist, because, as they think, referring is the bridge between language and the world. Martinich insists we can refer to a lot of things that we only imagine. In many contexts, such as in fiction, there are conventions that authorize reference to things that we only imagine. Things said in a text or myth or story make up the depository of facts, with reference to which statements in fiction are true or false. the conventions of fiction authorize author and reader to suspend the usual maxim that, in making an assertion, one must satisfy all the requirements for that illocutionary act - i.e. being responsible for meeting real-world verification demands, etc.

So on this account, fictional objects do not exist but are yet the objects of intentional acts - imagining or whatever. M is against a metaphysics of fictional objects.

I'm certainly against some kind of special metaphysical system that applies only to fictional objects. I'd be more happy to do it the other way around. In other words, to acknowledge that metaphysical speculation is most typically around fictional, notional or abstract ideas, and that physical objects are exceptional, and may need special handling.