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WL Craig on God's foreknowledge

Brian63

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Just looked at a Q&A from William Lane Craig on his website from a few months ago:

How Does God Foreknow Free Choices?

The question is asked by the feedback-writer, in essence, as:
How does God foreknow what I would freely choose? I can see how he could foresee my choices if I was determined to make a specific choice, based on my genetics/upbringing/situation. But then the will isn't free - is it?

Near the beginning of Craig's response, he states:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

So I went on to read what else Craig says about the subject, and this bit caught my eye, when he says very shortly after that:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.


The 2 key parts I will quote again here, with added emphasis:

...He does not have literal foreknowledge.

God...does literally foreknow the future.

Ummm...are those contradictory statements? I looked through the rest of his argument and was trying to find some way to make sense of those 2 sentiments, but did not find it. I am open to the idea of being wrong on this, and that in some way those are not contradictory assertions. Can anyone make any sense of it? Am I just misinterpreting those statements, or reading them out of context but that they are coherent when in context?

Thanks,

Brian
 
I don't think it matters that it's contradictory. What matters is that the question of omniscience and free will has been answered. If any atheists bring it up as some kind of logical contradiction inherent in the existence of God, one can now just reference the fact that Craig has answered it, so the atheists are stupid and God wins.
 
Just looked at a Q&A from William Lane Craig on his website from a few months ago:

How Does God Foreknow Free Choices?

The question is asked by the feedback-writer, in essence, as:


Near the beginning of Craig's response, he states:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

So I went on to read what else Craig says about the subject, and this bit caught my eye, when he says very shortly after that:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.


The 2 key parts I will quote again here, with added emphasis:

...He does not have literal foreknowledge.

God...does literally foreknow the future.

Ummm...are those contradictory statements? I looked through the rest of his argument and was trying to find some way to make sense of those 2 sentiments, but did not find it. I am open to the idea of being wrong on this, and that in some way those are not contradictory assertions. Can anyone make any sense of it? Am I just misinterpreting those statements, or reading them out of context but that they are coherent when in context?

Thanks,

Brian
He is considering two different options - if God exists in time, and if God exists timelessly.
Craig believes that God literally foreknows the future, but also considers the position of theists who believe in God's timelessness.
That is not contradictory.
 
My understanding is that Craig believes that god originally existed outside of time. Now that he has created time, he exists within it. If he ever ends time, then he will again exist outside of it.


Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

So I went on to read what else Craig says about the subject, and this bit caught my eye, when he says very shortly after that:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.


The 2 key parts I will quote again here, with added emphasis:

...He does not have literal foreknowledge.

God...does literally foreknow the future.

Ummm...are those contradictory statements?

No.

Suppose I say, "If you turn right, you'll come to the bank. But, if you turn left, you won't come to the bank." That's not a contradiction, it's an alternative.

Craig says that if god is in time, then his knowledge is foreknowledge; but if not, then not. There's nothing contradictory about that.
 
My understanding is that Craig believes that god originally existed outside of time. Now that he has created time, he exists within it. If he ever ends time, then he will again exist outside of it.


So I went on to read what else Craig says about the subject, and this bit caught my eye, when he says very shortly after that:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.


The 2 key parts I will quote again here, with added emphasis:

...He does not have literal foreknowledge.

God...does literally foreknow the future.

Ummm...are those contradictory statements?

No.

Suppose I say, "If you turn right, you'll come to the bank. But, if you turn left, you won't come to the bank." That's not a contradiction, it's an alternative.

Craig says that if god is in time, then his knowledge is foreknowledge; but if not, then not. There's nothing contradictory about that.

That's just human intellectual gymnastics. It's like saying "I am wearing invisible handcuffs," and my actions are limited until I take off the invisible handcuffs. The human brain sees time as a sequence of events and every event is a consequence of previous events. Whether we have free will, or the perfect illusion of free will, is irrelevant to our daily life.

If there is an all knowing, all powerful God, independent of space and time, this being could create the universe we perceive, with all it's philosophical quandaries. If there were no such being, this place would look pretty much the same and the rent would still be due on the first of the month.
 
Craig says that if god is in time, then his knowledge is foreknowledge; but if not, then not. There's nothing contradictory about that.
(emphasis added)

Except Craig is not just saying "if" God is in time or not. He is saying both that God actually does exist in and out of time.

In the parts I quoted earlier, he says as a response to the letter writer:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

Admittedly, I am reading into that statement that Craig is asserting that God exists timelessly. His whole point in making that statement does not make sense unless he were saying so. He asserts that the letter writer presupposes a certain point (which people usually do when they are about to dispute that presupposition), and he also starts his next sentence with a "But" and then goes on to defend that conflicting claim that disputes the letter-writer.


Later on he states his other point explicitly instead:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.

He is not just saying "if" he believes that, but is saying bluntly that that is what he believes.



So admittedly I am inferring a certain position of Craig, but I think it is a reasonable inference in this case, as there really is no point in him making those statements if he was not defending them. Also, the way he phrased it, made it sound like he was describing his position that he actually holds, not just describing an alternative (that he happens to not hold anyway).

Brian
 
Just for the sake of reference, here is the key part of Craig's response, altogether:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge. For what is future for us is not future for Him. So He knows what is future for us, but He does not foreknow it. Defenders of divine timelessness, then, have no difficulty with your question, since it presupposes a temporal deity.

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future. As you rightly point out, foreknowledge of free choices cannot be based upon inference from present causes, for that would imply determinism and annihilate free choice. So God must know future free choices in some other way.

I am just unclear what position he is actually taking, versus when he is just describing hypotheticals that he does not actually subscribe to himself, and why he is defending those if he does not think they are true anyway. It reads as a lot of word salad to me, without much substance.

Brian
 
Just for the sake of reference, here is the key part of Craig's response, altogether:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge. For what is future for us is not future for Him. So He knows what is future for us, but He does not foreknow it. Defenders of divine timelessness, then, have no difficulty with your question, since it presupposes a temporal deity.

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future. As you rightly point out, foreknowledge of free choices cannot be based upon inference from present causes, for that would imply determinism and annihilate free choice. So God must know future free choices in some other way.

I am just unclear what position he is actually taking, versus when he is just describing hypotheticals that he does not actually subscribe to himself, and why he is defending those if he does not think they are true anyway. It reads as a lot of word salad to me, without much substance.

Brian
I already answered that one, but still, he believes God exists in time (timelessness without creation, but temporal with creation), and that God does have foreknowledge. He also says that theists who hold that God is timeless do not have a difficulty with the question; they would just deny foreknowledge.
 
Except Craig is not just saying "if" God is in time or not. He is saying both that God actually does exist in and out of time.

That's not how I read it. I don't see any way to put that interpretation on what he said.



WLC said:
Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

Admittedly, I am reading into that statement that Craig is asserting that God exists timelessly.

He says that his own belief is that god exists in time.



His whole point in making that statement does not make sense unless he were saying so.

I can't see why you think that.



Just for the sake of reference, here is the key part of Craig's response, altogether:

I'll paraphrase it for you.



Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do.

<paraphrasing>
You may think that god exists timely (exists in time). That's what I think too.



But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

<paraphrasing>
But what if we were wrong about that? What if god was timeless? In that case --- if god happened to be timeless --- then god couldn't, by definition, have foreknowledge any more than he can have pastknowlege (memories of the past). Because, see, in the absense of time, he would be neither before or after any event.



For what is future for us is not future for Him.

<paraphrasing>
Events in our future wouldn't be in his future, because he would be timeless.



So He knows what is future for us, but He does not foreknow it.

<paraphrasing>
So his knowledge of (what is for us) the future would not be (for him) foreknowledge.



Defenders of divine timelessness, then, have no difficulty with your question, since it presupposes a temporal deity.

<paraphrasing>
So, people who believe god is timeless, they don't have any problem squaring god's knowledge with free will.



But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.

<paraphrasing>
But what about you? And what about me? We don't think god is timeless. We think god's knowledge is foreknowledge. Do we have a problem squaring foreknowledge with free will?



As you rightly point out, foreknowledge of free choices cannot be based upon inference from present causes, for that would imply determinism and annihilate free choice.

<paraphrasing>
We would have a problem if god's foreknowledge were based on determinism. If the present determined the future, then free will could not exist. If god's foreknowledge were based on such determinism, then there couldn't be free will.



So God must know future free choices in some other way.

<paraphrasing>
But god's knowledge, or so I believe, is not based on logically figuring out the future based on a deterministic present. Instead, it is based on magic. The future is not set, but god knows what will happen anyway. It's just magic, see?

Or else god remembers the future from when he was timeless, from before he created time.
</paraphrasing>


I am just unclear what position he is actually taking,
[/QUOTE]

His position is this: Free will is compatible with omniscience.

If god is timeless, free will is compatible with omniscience.
If god is timely, free will is still compatible with omniscience.

Craig believes that god is (currently) timely, but he doesn't stake the compatibility (of free will and omniscience) on our agreeing with him. He thinks free will and omniscience are compatible regardless of whether god is timely.



versus when he is just describing hypotheticals that he does not actually subscribe to himself,

Let's consider a topic that I hope will prove to be related. One gets tired of reading (or writing) past perfect. So, when your narrative requires a flashback, you signal it with a soupçon of past perfect, and then you plunge into the earlier time. Thus:

Sara shivered in the cold. {past tense, the "now" of the story} She remembered the recent summer. {hinting the shift to come} She had worn shorts and a t-shirt and still been warm. {past perfect, we're leaving the present of the story to visit an earlier time} Jake whistled at her lewdly, so she spit in his tapioca. {no longer past perfect, we've completed the transition to the "now" of the flashback} Then she went swimming. At the swimming hole, she had broken a fingernail. {past perfect again; we're either snapping back to the "present," or we're referencing a time even earlier than the "now" of the flashback} She shivered again, and looked at the fingernail, almost completely healed. {Ah, we're back in the "present," the point that we flashed back from}



Michael Cunningham says a single "had" resets the story's clock. Damon knight says you can use one or two.

Now, let's go look at Craig's subjunctives, see if they work similarly.

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge. For what is future for us is not future for Him. So He knows what is future for us, but He does not foreknow it. Defenders of divine timelessness, then, have no difficulty with your question, since it presupposes a temporal deity.

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future. As you rightly point out, foreknowledge of free choices cannot be based upon inference from present causes, for that would imply determinism and annihilate free choice. So God must know future free choices in some other way.

I've bolded the signposts.

presupposes: This suggests that WLC is discussing a proposition he isn't wedded to, a hypothetical, or a contrafactual, or just something he isn't committing himself to the truth of at this time.

if: An even stronger hedge: What follows is definitely hypothetical.

For:
Short for "therefore." In other words, what follows results from the "if" that preceded. We're still discussing a hypothetical.

So He knows: Now we're using regular language, as we did when we plunged back to the past of the flashback. We've done plenty of signaling our intent, so we can afford to simplify our language.

presupposes:
This is like when Sara shivered the second time. She was leaving the flashback. WLC is leaving his hypothetical

Now we have a blankline, a new paragraph, a change of subject. We'll need to watch for new signals to see whether we're entering a new hypothetical or what.

But suppose: This means a new hypothetical. The "but" means we aren't continuing the old one.

as I do: This is WLC's own position. It may be hypothetical for the sake of this argument, but it is not so hypothetical that WLC doesn't believe it to be actually true.

would: This flags the subjunctive mood. We're dealing in counterfactuals: Even if, as Craig believes, god is timely, god's knowledge of the future does not result from his knowledge of a determinative present. Even in this hypothetical, that source of knowedge is not the case.

God must know: We're still in the hypothetical. If we stipulate to the givens of this hypothetical, then it follows that god must know. We're in an if/then/must structure. If god is timely, then god must know.

and why he is defending those if he does not think they are true anyway.

For the same reason that I don't commit myself to a definition of "objective" when discussing the moral argument. I win that argument regardless of how it is defined. So long as you are committed to logic, you must yield to my logic, regardless of what you mean by "objective."

Why should I throw away that victory-in-all-circumstances position for one that wins only if you happen to share my definition of "objective"?

And why should WLC throw away his victory-regardless-of-whether-god-is-timely position for one that wins only if you happen to agree that god is timely?



It reads as a lot of word salad to me, without much substance.

It's all misdirection and lies, but not for the reason you suggest.
 
Well, I am not a fan of the large line-by-line and quote-by-quote style of response to quite that extent, but will respond with a brief comment for now---

On reviewing Craig's article, I do think that I had initially misread his key early paragraph as him describing his own view, when really he was describing a view of others on the subject but that he does not hold himself, so I admit misinterpretation on my part there. When I get some more free time available, I want to re-read the rest of the article to try and make sense of his views on the issue and some of the responses here in this thread with it as well, but that will be in a few days' time (work stuff keeping me busy at present). In the meantime, friends, everyone?

Thanks,

Brian
 
Certainly! Wouldn't waste all that work on an enemy.
 
Just looked at a Q&A from William Lane Craig on his website from a few months ago:

How Does God Foreknow Free Choices?

The question is asked by the feedback-writer, in essence, as:


Near the beginning of Craig's response, he states:

Your question presupposes that God exists in time, as we do. But if God exists timelessly, He does not have literal foreknowledge.

So I went on to read what else Craig says about the subject, and this bit caught my eye, when he says very shortly after that:

But suppose we think, as I do, that God does exist at every time that there is and so does literally foreknow the future.


The 2 key parts I will quote again here, with added emphasis:

...He does not have literal foreknowledge.

God...does literally foreknow the future.

Ummm...are those contradictory statements? I looked through the rest of his argument and was trying to find some way to make sense of those 2 sentiments, but did not find it. I am open to the idea of being wrong on this, and that in some way those are not contradictory assertions. Can anyone make any sense of it? Am I just misinterpreting those statements, or reading them out of context but that they are coherent when in context?

Thanks,

Brian

I think it is a little pedantic to harp on that distinction... the word foreknowledge does mean knowing beforehand. In the quote, he is attempting to explain his belief that this god experiences all time at the same time (nonsensical, sure).. so the WORD foreknowledge is not perfectly representing the kind of knowledge he is trying to describe. God does not experience a "before", therefore it is just knowledge, not foreknowledge.... but then he uses the word "foreknowledge" with respect to the human timeframe. To god there was no before, so it is just knowledge, but to the human that experiences linear time, there is a before so that knowledge that god has is SEEMS like foreknowledge to us.

His argument is simply that this god's knowledge of future events has no bearing on free will, because he is a time traveler. It is not predetermined, it is just already known back in the future.

This would be a great time to claim that the lack of any evidence for this god is explained by this paradox inducing side effect of a sentient, omniscient being existing at all times simultaneously... the temporal prime directive would be violated by its appearance.
 
I don't see the trouble. A deity seeing time like we see space. Honestly, isn't it that simple, and not require the literary gymnastics?
 
Here's how I picture what WLC is arguing. Think of time like a book. A book consists of, say, 300 pages, containing 50,000 words. Those of us in time read one page at a time. To 'read ahead' would mean to flip forward a few pages. We can imagine ourselves reading ahead a few pages, but we can't actually do it because the book has us locked in on the current page.

For God, however, reading a book is like condensing the entire 300-page book onto a single page. Or even a single character that stands for all the characters of the words in the book. Much like how π (or pi) is a single character that means a long string of numbers. So if God is looking at a single character which stands for an entire book, then the notion of 'reading ahead' becomes meaningless. Likewise, if God can 'see' (whatever that means) all of time in one unit, then he can 'see' what you're going to decide to eat for lunch on the fourth Thursday of next month without influencing or suppressing your decision.

That's how I understood it, and that's the notion I carried around in my head when I was a Christian and needed to reconcile the free will/foreknowledge conundrum.
 
Here's how I picture what WLC is arguing. Think of time like a book. A book consists of, say, 300 pages, containing 50,000 words. Those of us in time read one page at a time. To 'read ahead' would mean to flip forward a few pages. We can imagine ourselves reading ahead a few pages, but we can't actually do it because the book has us locked in on the current page.

For God, however, reading a book is like condensing the entire 300-page book onto a single page. Or even a single character that stands for all the characters of the words in the book. Much like how π (or pi) is a single character that means a long string of numbers. So if God is looking at a single character which stands for an entire book, then the notion of 'reading ahead' becomes meaningless. Likewise, if God can 'see' (whatever that means) all of time in one unit, then he can 'see' what you're going to decide to eat for lunch on the fourth Thursday of next month without influencing or suppressing your decision.

That's how I understood it, and that's the notion I carried around in my head when I was a Christian and needed to reconcile the free will/foreknowledge conundrum.

That sounds reasonable.

It is almost a shame that it isn't, in fact, reasonable.

Of course, the characters in a book cannot influence the ending; they may be described as having free will in the text, but they cannot actually choose an ending other than the one the author wrote - they have no freedom at all. Sure, the author can change the ending during the drafting process; but in that case, he has no foreknowledge of any kind and is as much in the dark as anyone as to how things will end (I'm looking at you, G.R.R.Martin). Once the author knows how the book will end, the ending is inevitable, and free will is gone.
 
Here's how I picture what WLC is arguing...For God, however, reading a book is like condensing the entire 300-page book onto a single page. Or even a single character that stands for all the characters of the words in the book. Much like how π (or pi) is a single character that means a long string of numbers. So if God is looking at a single character which stands for an entire book, then the notion of 'reading ahead' becomes meaningless...

WLC, meet Claude E. Shannon.
 
Forgive me for not parsing through all the comments made this far, but I would like to add my two cents on the matter.

Obviously, being an agnostic, I disagree with Craig. But I didn't see a contradiction when I read through the OP the first time. Don't get me wrong, I understand why some would see a contradiction. I just don't think he is being inconsistent in the manner alleged.

To literally fore know in the first paragraph is different from the literally foreknow in the second paragraph. Craig may be considered wrong about his metaphysics, but I don't think for one second that he is so stupid in the span two paragraphs. Maybe being inarticulate and wrong about the metaphysical are his true crimes here.
 
I fully agree that it is worthless to quibble about semantics, but; if God sees space/time as "a 3d object" from the outside, is he then still not the creator of said "object"? I don't see how he is now any more excused from accusations of being "the author of sin" than he was before.

:confused:
 
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