That sounds reasonable.
It is almost a shame that it isn't, in fact, reasonable.
Of course, the characters in a book cannot influence the ending; they may be described as having free will in the text, but they cannot actually choose an ending other than the one the author wrote - they have no freedom at all. Sure, the author can change the ending during the drafting process; but in that case, he has no foreknowledge of any kind and is as much in the dark as anyone as to how things will end (I'm looking at you, G.R.R.Martin). Once the author knows how the book will end, the ending is inevitable, and free will is gone.
your argument is only as good as the analogy of a book, which is written with fixed text, and our experiences with reading books gives us this impression that you are saying that if time is like a book then it must be fixed, therefore no free will.
This is really arguing the wrong thing... as you are arguing against the weakness of the analogy, not the argument.
Sure; but I never said I was doing anything else. If the analogy is inapt, then I don't even know what the argument is - all I have to go on is the analogy. If I grant the presumption that the analogy is apt, then my argument against the analogy also must be an argument against the argument. If I don't grant that presumption, then my argument against the argument is that it has yet to be coherently stated at all.
the simple point is that this version of the god character that exists such that all of time is visible to him at "the same time" (<- lack of a temporally detached preposition - a 'failure' of English), does not violate the idea of free will (if you believe in free will - I do not, but that is another argument).
You can change your mind all you want, or never make up your mind... at some point in the future, your mind will be in one place or another with respect to a decision.. and this god thing has visibility into that. So what is the problem? It sounds like those that argue this free will problem are saying that to be aware of a decision is to eliminate the ability to make the decision.
That's exactly what I am arguing. Once it is known - for certain and by ANY entity - what the result of a decision will be, there is no longer any possibility to decide otherwise, and so foreknowledge MUST imply that the decision was constrained to be what the foreknower knew it would be.
Let's say that you come into work today wearing a red tie. I see you in that red tie. I say to you, "nice tie". At that point, it seems you are saying that your choice to wear that tie retroactively became predetermined by me.
At that point, you know what tie I chose; and I cannot change that decision. You never see me in a red tie that I decided not to wear.
Let's say I am god, and I didn't say anything about it... but I KNEW that your tie would be red. and it was. How does that change anything at all?
If you KNEW my tie would be red, how could I have chosen anything else? If I can't choose anything else, then my freedom to choose is a fantasy - I can tell myself I had a choice, but YOU, as a God, know that I did not.
Let's take it further and say that 2 days ago, I said to you that I knew that you were going to wear a red tie the next day. How that changes your decision to wear a red tie is a personal one... maybe you are spiteful, maybe not... since I am not god, I don't know how you will react. If I was this god guy, with these magic attributes, then I would KNOW how that information I passed on to you would affect your choice. So until the claim is made that free will is only in jeopardy if god TELLS YOU what he knows, I still reject the idea that the knowing of something makes the something not freely chosen.
Nope. I don't need to know what you know to be constrained by it.
If I put my tie on in the dark, and have no idea what colour it is; and you see that it is red, but don't tell me, it is not possible for me to have chosen a different tie today.
As soon as anyone KNOWS what colour my tie (is/was/will be) today, that information cannot be changed; the decision is fixed and immutable. I have no choice to wear a blue tie tomorrow if God has foreseen that tomorrow's tie will be red, any more than I can choose to have work a blue tie yesterday if someone saw me in a red tie yesterday - I can't change the past, because the past can only be as we observed that it was; and nor could I change the future, if it has been observed to be a certain way.
If time is a single line, stretching into the past and the future, then the present is the only point where it can be 'steered', and even that is only possible if the future has not yet been observed by any entity. If, rather than a single line, time is a set of lines that bifurcates at each decision point (the Many Worlds hypothesis), then God cannot have foreknowledge - if He knows which timeline will be the 'real' timeline, then we are back with the 'single line' idea; and if He doesn't know which timeline will be the 'real' one, then he loses foreknowledge - he can see what is possible, but not what will be, and is in no better position to know which tie I will wear tomorrow than anyone who looks at my tie collection and says 'it will be one of these, but I don't know which'.
Knowledge can exist; or choice can exist - but not both at the same time. If anyone or anything knows what happened, then there is no choice. And note the past tense - once something KNOWS what happened, that happening is in the past, for that entity.