According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

Assuming your conclusion, eh?

Meanwhile, I just saw you choose to respond to my post. Go figure, huh?

Incorrect. You have observed that I responded to your post, and interpreted that response as the result of a "choice" instead of, or in addition to, simply being the natural outcome of the events that proceeded it and my own neurological makeup.

And, as I have already said that we are our own neurological makeup, and that events preceding our choices are necessary for us to make any choices at all, your concern is?

But, of course, if you are serious, once more, you have to specify what kind of ”free choice” you have in mind. Libertarian? Compatibilist? Neo-Humean? Something else?

I need do no such thing

Then you don’t know anything about the subject. Compatibilism and libertarianism are completely at odds, for example, though both claim to support free will.

. If someone wished to make an argument for any of those positions they are free to do so. I was merely responding to your silly analogy about skipping breakfast.

No, you weren’t, and you aren’t. If you think it’s silly, provide an argument as to why, instead of just asserting it to be silly. What’s silly about counterfactual reasoning? We do it all the time. You just did it in the first sentence of the above-quoted post.

I thought this was meant as an argument for compatibilism but you are welcome to correct me if it was not.

Yes, it’s an argument for compatibilism, and how compatibilism uses counterfactual reasoning. And?

 

[pood]

…but it doesn't need to break causality in order to do so.

And, of course, I never said that we break causality. I said we USE causality. Maybe you should read a little more closely.

 

[bilby]

Do we really have to have this whole discussion again??






It's a rhetorical question. Please, for the love of God, do not try to answer it!

 

[pood]

Do we really have to have this whole discussion again??






It's a rhetorical question. Please, for the love of God, do not try to answer it!

I would rephrase the emphasis: Do we really have to have this discussion again??

No, we don’t, but we will, and that’s the point.

 

[bilby]

No, we don’t, but we will, and that’s the point.

I explicitly asked you not to do that.

 

[Don2 (Don1 Revised)]

Do we really have to have this whole discussion again??






It's a rhetorical question. Please, for the love of God, do not try to answer it!

We can't help it. We don't have free will.

 

[Don2 (Don1 Revised)]

…but it doesn't need to break causality in order to do so.

And, of course, I never said that we break causality. I said we USE causality. Maybe you should read a little more closely.

That wasn't me. But I admitted that I didn't understand what was being alluded to by Politesse.

 

[pood]

…but it doesn't need to break causality in order to do so.

And, of course, I never said that we break causality. I said we USE causality. Maybe you should read a little more closely.

That wasn't me. But I admitted that I didn't understand what was being alluded to by Politesse.

Sorry, these quote tags don’t always align if you delete stuff and aren’t careful. I know Politesse said it, not you.

 

[Politesse]

No, you weren’t, and you aren’t. If you think it’s silly, provide an argument as to why, instead of just asserting it to be silly. What’s silly about counterfactual reasoning? We do it all the time. You just did it in the first sentence of the above-quoted post.

I did, and you responded by asserting that boulders do not make choices and people do. When pressed for detail, you insisted that we observe choices (without offereing any evidence that we do) then, in a very transparent diversionary tactic, tried to change the subject to my knowledge or lack of knowledge about the various schools of thought on free will.

 

[Politesse]

Do we really have to have this whole discussion again??






It's a rhetorical question. Please, for the love of God, do not try to answer it!

What else have we got to do? It's not as though there's anything new to discuss in the philosophy forum, and if there were people wouldn't be interested. In the end, we prefer to sit in very familiar camps, making the same silly rhetorical arguments over and over.

Because human cognition is extremely predictable.

 

[pood]

No, you weren’t, and you aren’t. If you think it’s silly, provide an argument as to why, instead of just asserting it to be silly. What’s silly about counterfactual reasoning? We do it all the time. You just did it in the first sentence of the above-quoted post.

I did, and you responded by asserting that boulders do not make choices and people do. When pressed for detail, you insisted that we observe choices (without offereing any evidence that we do) then, in a very transparent diversionary tactic, tried to change the subject to my knowledge or lack of knowledge about the various schools of thought on free will.

It’s apparent you will be very unpleasant to talk to, because you poison the well by making unsupported charges, viz., that I engaged in a “transparent diversionary tactic.” I did no such thing, but if you think I did, you might consider that I had no intention of doing so. However, that would require that you deploy what in philosophy is known as the principle of charity. It seems that this is beyond you, but, charitably, I will give you more chances to prove otherwise.

You assert that I’ve given no evidence that we choose. You really can’t tell the difference between a boulder rolling down a hill and a person walking down a hill? When a boulder rolls down a hill, its does so in conformance with Newton’s first law of motion. Until such time as I see a boulder volitionally alter its course, as opposed to its course being altered by contact with some external object or force (again, in conformance with Newton), I will provisonally assume that the boulder is incapable of volition or choice.

When I see a human walking down a hill, I see a person who meanders all over the place, or at least is capable of doing so if he or she chooses, based on the repeated performances of other humans. It strikes me as odd that you can’t discern the difference between a boulder and a human, but then again, maybe it’s not so odd, as I suspect you are here just to argue.

And yes, your evident lack of knowledge of the topic is germane. I never said, as you implied in a previous post directed at another individual, that my notion of free will “breaks causality.” LIbertarianism subscribes to causality breakage, while the compatiblism I support does not. If you don’t know that, it seems unlikely you will prove a worthy interlocutor.

 

[Politesse]

I will provisonally assume that the boulder is incapable of volition or choice.

Entirely reasonable.

When I see a human walking down a hill, I see a person who meanders all over the place, or at least is capable of doing so if he or she chooses, based on the repeated performances of other humans.

This is not as reasonable, How did you "see a person who ... is capable of meandering all over the place"? You can only observe what the person did, not what you believe they might have done instead. If we're going to instead compare different humans to determine whether there are consistent patterns of behavior that might act as accurate predictors of their "choices", that would be quite reasonable. If, deep down, you believe that human behavior is consistent enough for the principles of uniformitarianism and inference to apply to us. I do. Ergo I reject the notion of "free" will. We are very much like boulders, except that it upsets us to have it pointed out that we are confined by natural laws, whereas boulders lack an amygdala and cannot feel anything of the sort.

 

[DBT]

Determinism is not coercive, yet the evolution of events within the system eliminate alternate actions in any given instance of decision making. Consequently, decisions are neither a matter of choice (no alternate action possible) or free will, but necessitation.

We went over this in the other thread.

We did. Yet, apparently those arguing for compatibilism failed to understand what was pointed out.

You’re claiming that all true statements about the world are necessarily true.

That's not it. Not at all. The terms and conditions of determinism is used as given by Compatibilism. A standard definition. Not disputed.

It's the definition of free will as given by Compatibilsts that is problematic for the given reasons, up to and including the means and mechanisms by which decisions and and actions are generated.

There lies the problem, where the means of thought, decision making and action is more of a restriction than coercion, which is the point that many neuroscientists have pointed out.

This morning, John has a choice between putting on a blue shirt and a red shirt. He puts on a blue shirt. So the statement, “John puts on a blue shirt” is true.

This morning, John thinks he has a choice between drawing a triangle with three sides and drawing a triangle with four sides. In fact, he has no choice. If he draws a triangle, it must have three sides.

“John puts on a blue shirt” is a contingent truth about the world — true at some possible worlds, false at others. It could have been otherwise. “Triangles have three sides” is a necessary truth about the world — true at all possible worlds. It could not and cannot be otherwise.

Hence, this morning, John had a choice about what shirt to put on, but not about how to construct a triangle.

Let D stand for “puts on a blue shirt.” It may indeed be true that given deterministic antecedents A, B, and C, D will always follow — John will always put on a blue shirt given the determined antecedents. The key word here is “will” — he will put on a blue shirt, not must.

Moreover, if John does D, he requires it to be the case that D is preceded by A, B, and C. If it were not, John would have no basis for his decision; and moreover, no way to know if what he decides will in fact take place. A world at the macro level without determinism would be one in which free will is impossible. Free will requires determinism at the macro level to be true, or approximately true.

Sapolsky goes on and on about how we are “biologically determined” and hence have no free will. He says we are products not just of our conscious mind but of our subconscious, our neurons firing, our upbringing, our genes, etc. All that’s true. So what? If his aim is directed against libertarian free will, his aim is true. But what he needs to happen is for the gestalt switch to go off and realize that all these things — our conscious and subconscious, our bodies, our neurons, our upbringing, our genes — ARE us! All those things, collectively, are making choices in a deterministic macro world, in which all of us are part of the deterministic stream. He seems to want, for there to be free will, a switch in the head that would countermand what we (conscious, subconscious, bodies, neurons, upbringing, genes) — decide. If we had such a switch, THAT would be a lack of free will — the switch would override our choices!

Determinism, biological or otherwise, does not threaten free will, it makes free will possible in the first place. What would a world look like, in which determinism thwarted free will? Like this: John moves to put on a blue shirt this morning, but Determinism stays his hand, guiding it to the red shirt instead, even as John protests that he would prefer blue. Anyone ever see that, or anything like it, ever happen?

No.

Sapolski, for reasons that have been gone into at length in several threads on free will, is absolutely correct.

Again;


''To a determinist, all choice is illusory. The literal meaning of choice is that there are multiple options, and the person selects one of them. Thus, choice requires multiple possible outcomes, which is a no-no to determinism. To the determinist, the march of causality will make one outcome inevitable, and so it is wrong to believe that anything else was possible. The chooser does not yet know which option he or she is going to choose, hence the subjective experience of choice. Thus, the subjective choosing is simply a matter of one's own ignorance - ignorance that those other outcomes are not really possibilities at all.

To illustrate: When you sit in the restaurant looking at the menu, it may seem that there are many things that you might order: the fish, the chicken, the steak, the onion soup. Eventually you will make a selection and eat it. To a determinist, causal processes dictated that what you ordered was inevitable. When you entered the restaurant you may not have known, yet, that you would end up ordering the chicken, but that simply reflects your ignorance of what was happening in your unconscious mind. To a determinist, there was never any chance at all that you could have ordered the fish. Maybe you saw it on the menu and were tempted to get it, and maybe you even started to order it and then changed your mind. No matter. It was never remotely possible. The causal processes that ended up making you order the chicken were in motion. Your belief that you could have ordered the chicken was mistaken.''


Compatibilists are of course determinists who define free will in their own special way.

You know, it’s funny. You do this again and again. You cherry pick a quote to support your position (almost always I support my position with my own words.). Then you give a link whence the quote comes. I click on the link and discover, lo and behold, that the article from which you quoted goes on to rebut the bit you quoted. How could you not notice that?

iow, the article goes on to show why the quote above is wrong.

You have it wrong, Plus you miss the point,

The article describes the implications of determinism just as it is defined. It does not show that the definition or what the implications are false, instead the author denies the reality of determinism.

He is saying the world is not deterministic. Which is irrelevant to the issue of compatibilism.

Please read carefully, the author says - ''it could be true, I suppose. But it requires a huge leap of faith, as well as a tortuous effort to deny that what we constantly observe and experience is real. Instead, I think psychological science is better suited to a belief in indeterminacy'' - does not negate the terms and conditions of determinism as it is defined...not only by 'determinists' but compatibilists.

Compatibilism is not related to indeterminacy, but determinism, precisely as described in the first part of the article, implications and all.


Nor does indeterminacy help establish free will.

 

[DBT]

Determinism is not coercive, yet the evolution of events within the system eliminate alternate actions in any given instance of decision making. Consequently, decisions are neither a matter of choice (no alternate action possible) or free will, but necessitation.

We went over this in the other thread.

We did. Yet, apparently those arguing for compatibilism failed to understand what was pointed out.

You‘d be more intresting to talk to if you would accept the possibiity that people DO understand what you say, and simply disagree with it, and also give reasons for their disagreement.

Yet you talk anyway. You say you understand, yet your remarks show that you haven't grasped the implications of determinism on choice, or the reasons of the failure of compatibilist definition of free will.

That's not it. Not at all.

That’s exactly it. You use the word ”necessitated.” If something is necessary, it cannot be otherwise, on pain of logical contradiction — like a four-sided triangle. Even though at a restaurant I may order fish, ordering chicken was a live possibility because doing so would bring about no logical contradiction. You are illicitly importing the modal concept of necessity into a realm where it does not and cannot apply.

Necessitated is just another word for determinism, where all events are fixed by antecedents, inevitable. no alternate options or actions possible, where decisions in any given instance have no alternate actions, so are not choices. That is determinism. And a reminder, compatibilism is related not to indeterminacy, but determinism.

But you know that.

The terms and conditions of determinism is used as given by Compatibilism. A standard definition. Not disputed.

It's the definition of free will as given by Compatibilsts that is problematic for the given reasons, up to and including the means and mechanisms by which decisions and and actions are generated.

There lies the problem, where the means of thought, decision making and action is more of a restriction than coercion, which is the point that many neuroscientists have pointed out.

Determinism is not a restriction on our actions. It is the REASON for them. If I order chicken at the restaurant instead of fish, presumably I have a REASON for doing so. One reason might be that I am alllergic to fish. Yes, I had no choice over whether I have that allergy, but having the allergy gives me a reason to order chicken or something else instead of fish. If I had no reason for anything that I do, THEN I would lack free will.

For heaven's sake, saying ''determinism does not restrict our actions'' demonstrates that despite everything that has been explained, you still don't understand determinism.

A hint, actions that are determined are performed without hinderance or restriction, quite freely, it's just that nothing else could have happened, no alternate actions possible.

Sapolski, for reasons that have been gone into at length in several threads on free will, is absolutely correct.

As I pointed out, and you ingored, he is correct if his target is libertarianism. I gave my reasons why his analysis is no problem for compatibilists, but you failed to respond to a single thing I said in that regard, other than to effectively say “nyuh-huh!”

He is correct in that determined actions are not freely willed. That as it's the non-chosen state and condition of a brain that determines decision making (not a choice) thought and action, the term 'free will' does not represent the process.

Compatibilists are of course determinists who define free will in their own special way.

Correct. Compatibilists are also called soft detereminists.

Yet their definition of determinism is the same as it is for incompatibilists. The definition of free will is where they go wrong

 

[pood]

I will provisonally assume that the boulder is incapable of volition or choice.

Entirely reasonable.

When I see a human walking down a hill, I see a person who meanders all over the place, or at least is capable of doing so if he or she chooses, based on the repeated performances of other humans.

This is not as reasonable, How did you "see a person who ... is capable of meandering all over the place"? You can only observe what the person did, not what you believe they might have done instead. If we're going to instead compare different humans to determine whether there are consistent patterns of behavior that might act as accurate predictors of their "choices", that would be quite reasonable. If, deep down, you believe that human behavior is consistent enough for the principles of uniformitarianism and inference to apply to us. I do. Ergo I reject the notion of "free" will. We are very much like boulders, except that it upsets us to have it pointed out that we are confined by natural laws, whereas boulders lack an amygdala and cannot feel anything of the sort.

I wonder how “natural laws” “confine us.” Are these “laws” handed down by God, or a supreme cosmic legislature, or ….? There are no “natural laws.” There are, rather descriptions of how the world goes — Newton’s “laws” are really descriptions of reality. Some descriptions hold universally, others do not. So neither we nor a boulder are “confined” by “natural laws.” Rather, a boulder is observed to travel the path of least resistance (Newton) while humans are observed to meander all over the place. The difference is stark, because human behavior is volitional.

 

[pood]

.And a reminder, compatibilism is related not to indeterminacy, but determinism.

But you know that.

Thanks, I didn’t need the reminder. Never once have I bought up “indeterminacy” in this thread. I’ll get to the rest later.

 

[Politesse]

I wonder how “natural laws” “confine us.” Are these “laws” handed down by God, or a supreme cosmic legislature, or ….? There are no “natural laws.” There are, rather descriptions of how the world goes — Newton’s “laws” are really descriptions of reality

A point I myself have made many times. In this case it's a figure of speech. However, the same cause will always have the same effect, in our world. This, we can observe. It is not a prescriptive rule, but a descriptive pattern.

to travel the path of least resistance (Newton) while humans are observed to meander all over the place

This is simply not true. Human behavior is also predictable, and if there are unexpected results from an observation, an explanation can generally be arrived at eventually. We are not mystical exceptions to the general pattern of the universe. It does not matter (nor can one "observe") what a person might have done if conditions were different, whether it is a boulder or a human rolling down the hill; what matters is what they will do and can be observed doing, and that will fall into clear and predictable patterns.

 

[pood]

I never said we were “mystical exceptions” to the general pattern of the universe. And it’s true that human behavior is predictable to some extent. What if it were fully predictable? Would that preclude any form of free will?

 

[Politesse]

What if it were fully predictable? Would that preclude any form of free will?

Depends on what you consider free will to be, I suppose. But if human behavior is "fully predictable", then I don't see how the concept of free will would be in any way useful to an analyst of human behavior. What is it adding to the conversation, except for confusion?

 

[pood]

My point is that the predictability of human behavior is irrelevant to whether or not we have free will.