According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[pood]

@pood @Jarhyn

Is there any reading you'd recommend on Compatibilism, or related approaches?

I would recommend the writings of the philosopher Norman Swartz, who isn’t exactly a compatibilist, but more a neo-Humean. Regardless, he makes the case in detail why determinism can’t undermine free will, and he makes his case across three different forms of determinism: Logical determinism, epistemic determinism, and causal determinism.

 

[Elixir]

It occurs to me that if the question of the existence/nonexistence of free will was consequential, there would be some manifestation of free will that would be incompatible with determinism, or some manifestation of determinism that was incompatible with free will.
Since I see neither, I am left with the impression that it is a semantic, rhetorical or abstract question, the answer to which has no bearing on real life experience, decisions or outcomes. But I am probably missing something.
Anyhow, carry on - I don’t mean to stifle conversation …

 

[rousseau]

It occurs to me that if the question of the existence/nonexistence of free will was consequential, there would be some manifestation of free will that would be incompatible with determinism, or some manifestation of determinism that was incompatible with free will.
Since I see neither, I am left with the impression that it is a semantic, rhetorical or abstract question, the answer to which has no bearing on real life experience, decisions or outcomes. But I am probably missing something.
Anyhow, carry on - I don’t mean to stifle conversation …

This is pretty much my view. I've taken a stab at getting a little more intricate with the explanation, but this is it in a nutshell. I really need to take the topic off of the web and try to express it properly sometime.

 

[Politesse]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

 

[Elixir]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

I think your "what if" encapsulates my take on the whole question.
If it goes off to the left you're facing the wrong way! (I.e. you can have it either way, no matter WHAT happens, or not.)

 

[pood]

It occurs to me that if the question of the existence/nonexistence of free will was consequential, there would be some manifestation of free will that would be incompatible with determinism, or some manifestation of determinism that was incompatible with free will.
Since I see neither, I am left with the impression that it is a semantic, rhetorical or abstract question, the answer to which has no bearing on real life experience, decisions or outcomes. But I am probably missing something.
Anyhow, carry on - I don’t mean to stifle conversation …

Yes, that’s right. And I noted one. If we ever saw in real life someone reaching for, say, the salt shaker, but an invisible hand called Determinism guided this person’s hand to the pepper shaker instead (even though this person hates pepper) that would be a manifestation of free will/determinism incompatibility. We never witness this.

 

[pood]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

No, because a boulder does not make choices. People do. All the time.

 

[pood]

@pood @Jarhyn

Is there any reading you'd recommend on Compatibilism, or related approaches?

I mentioned Norman Swartz. You can find a bunch of his work online, including three entire books that can be read or downloaded for free. Google Norman Swartz, philsopher, to avoid confusion with similarly named people.

 

[Politesse]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

No, because a boulder does not make choices. People do. All the time.

Assuming the conclusion, eh?

 

[pood]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

No, because a boulder does not make choices. People do. All the time.

Assuming the conclusion, eh?

How so?

 

[pood]

If you mean I’m assuming the conclusion that people make choices, I am not. Read my posts. I explain why we make choices, not assume that to be so. In any case, if you think I am assuming that conclusion, the charge applies just as well to those who assume that we don’t make choices.

 

[pood]

Of course, given that we observe people making choices all the time, including ourselves, I‘d say assuming we do not make choices is the much bigger assumption.

 

[Politesse]

Of course, given that we observe people making choices all the time, including ourselves, I‘d say assuming we do not make choices is the much bigger assumption.

No, you interpret them as having made choices. The whole notion of free choice is a product of cultural invention, not empirical observation.

 

[pood]

Of course, given that we observe people making choices all the time, including ourselves, I‘d say assuming we do not make choices is the much bigger assumption.

No, you interpret them as having made choices. The whole notion of free choice is a product of cultural invention, not empirical observation.

Assuming your conclusion, eh?

Meanwhile, I just saw you choose to respond to my post. Go figure, huh?

But, of course, if you are serious, once more, you have to specify what kind of ”free choice” you have in mind. Libertarian? Compatibilist? Neo-Humean? Something else?

 

[Politesse]

Assuming your conclusion, eh?

Meanwhile, I just saw you choose to respond to my post. Go figure, huh?

Incorrect. You have observed that I responded to your post, and interpreted that response as the result of a "choice" instead of, or in addition to, simply being the natural outcome of the events that proceeded it and my own neurological makeup.

But, of course, if you are serious, once more, you have to specify what kind of ”free choice” you have in mind. Libertarian? Compatibilist? Neo-Humean? Something else?

I need do no such thing. If someone wished to make an argument for any of those positions they are free to do so. I was merely responding to your silly analogy about skipping breakfast. I thought this was meant as an argument for compatibilism but you are welcome to correct me if it was not.

 

[Don2 (Don1 Revised)]

Question....suppose that guy is right. There's no free will and it all results from chemicals and our animal brains and biological imperatives, etc etc etc.

Then, what is it about those things that drives us to think there might be such a thing as free will and to develop a conscious mind where we presumably are just pretending to work out decisions as pros and cons and deliberations and take that whole patterning of deliberation as a part of our being and process we have? i.e. how does possessing that abstract notion (free will) fit into a paradigm that it's evolutionarily beneficial to perceive we have free will when we really don't? Wouldn't it just be a whole hell of a lot more biologically efficient to just know we don't have free will and then just do whatever our impulses say to do because that's what we're going to do anyway?

what is the animal brain model for me approaching this with skepticism and asking complex questions as a skeptic? and what is the animal brain model for your response rebutting my doubts with explanations?

 

[Elixir]

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.
...

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

So if a boulder is rolling down the hill, hits a log and diverts off toward the right, the boulder must have free will, since if it had not hit that log, it would have gone off to the left instead?

No, because a boulder does not make choices. People do. All the time.

I don’t think we can even state that with complete certainty. I don’t recall ever having been a boulder, but if I was a philosophical one, I probably would have thought the same thing about people.

 

[Politesse]

Then, what is it about those things that drives us to think there might be such a thing as free will and to develop a conscious mind where we presumably are just pretending to work out decisions as pros and cons and deliberations and take that whole patterning of deliberation as a part of our being and process we have? i.e. how does possessing that abstract notion (free will) fit into a paradigm that it's evolutionarily beneficial to perceive we have free will when we really don't? Wouldn't it just be a whole hell of a lot more biologically efficient to just know we don't have free will and then just do whatever our impulses say to do because that's what we're going to do anyway?

I'm not sure why you think that isn't a pattern that might just naturally develop. "We" don't actually agree on all of those points you raise (I'm human too actually) but no magic is needed to explain why conscious perception might arise. Our remarkable prefrontal cortex has given us a substantial evolutionary advantage, but it doesn't need to break causality in order to do so.

 

[Bronzeage]

It is no great intellectual feat to create a model of the universe in which every event is predicated on every event which occurred before, with an argument of "Why not?"

It is the ultimate untestable hypothesis and ultimately, it doesn't matter. Like a lot of philosophical discussions which question the nature of existence, we aren't going to change anything about the way we live, no matter how convincing the argument the argument that we can't change anything, even if we wanted to.

It’s true you can’t test these claims. They‘re unempircal. I suppose that’s why a lot of scientists get exasparated with philosophers.

Suppose, again, ”D” stands for ”John puts on a blue shirt.” We observe antecedents A,B,C, and note that we get D.

The hard determinist wants to say that given A,B,C, we MUST get D — that John MUST put on a blue shirt.

The compatibilist merely says, much more parsimoniously, that given A,B,C, we WILL get D — John WILL put on a blue shirt, but he does not HAVE TO do that.

How are we to decide who is right? We can’t. The notions are underdetermined by the available data.

However, the compatibilist has logic on his side — he notes that contingent behaviors (“puts on blue shirt”) can never be necessarily true (triangle has three sides).

Regardless, if we were somehow able to “back up” the universe, and replay it again and again, the compatibilist has no problem in saying that the result will always be the same — given A,B, and C, we will get D. He will simply continue to deny, appropriately so, that D is a necessary outcome of A,B,C.

We deal all the time in counterfactuals, so effortlessly that we hardly notice them. And yet I think counterfactuals are the key to understanding the compatibilist account.

I may say this morning, “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner.” So last night’s big dinner determines my choice this morning to skip breakfast.

But I might also put it this way: “I’m skipping breakfast, because last night I had a big dinner. If I had NOT had a big dinner last night, I’d eat breakfast this morning.”

So there is a possible world at which I eat breakfast, but at that world the antecedents are counterfactally different. This is called a possible nonactual world.

Antecedents A,B,and C don’t FORCE John to put on a blue shirt, they give him a REASON to do so, just like my having a big dinner last night gives me a REASON to skip breakfast this morning. Different antecedents, different reasons, and then different outcomes.

The universe of no free will crumbles as soon as the question, "What difference does it make?" is posed.

 

[Don2 (Don1 Revised)]

Then, what is it about those things that drives us to think there might be such a thing as free will and to develop a conscious mind where we presumably are just pretending to work out decisions as pros and cons and deliberations and take that whole patterning of deliberation as a part of our being and process we have? i.e. how does possessing that abstract notion (free will) fit into a paradigm that it's evolutionarily beneficial to perceive we have free will when we really don't? Wouldn't it just be a whole hell of a lot more biologically efficient to just know we don't have free will and then just do whatever our impulses say to do because that's what we're going to do anyway?

I'm not sure why you think that isn't a pattern that might just naturally develop.

That's the obvious implication if you go down this line of thought starting from a premise the author is correct. So then, what is the evolutionary benefit(s) that lead to a perception of free will?

"We" don't actually agree on all of those points you raise (I'm human too actually) but no magic is needed to explain why conscious perception might arise.

Not merely the conscious mind which could be implemented in many different ways but the specific kind of "conscious mind where we presumably are just pretending to work out decisions as pros and cons and deliberations and take that whole patterning of deliberation as a part of our being and process we have"

Our remarkable prefrontal cortex has given us a substantial evolutionary advantage, ...

Well, of course.

but it doesn't need to break causality in order to do so.

I am unsure what you are referring to here. I am sure based on previous discussion that it is something meaningful, I am just not sure what you mean. Please explain further.