Demystifying Determinism

[pood]

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

Let’s delve into this a bit more closely.

You are a libertarian. You claim compatibilism cannot be a sufficient account of free will because it is deterministic. So if I order eggs for breakfast, you will say (under the compatibilist metaphysics) “That was inevitable! You had no choice but to order eggs!” But of course you’d say the same thing if I ordered pancakes. According to you, I think, an inevitable future precludes free will.

What does “inevitable” mean? It means an outcome that cannot be avoided — one that cannot be changed.

And yet, as I have pointed out (I do hope you read all of my posts), free will has nothing to do with changing the past, present, or future. So inevitability is a red herring.

Free will means I have the ability, in some small way, to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and future be what it will be. None of this involves changing or avoiding anything.

I happen to think that the Minkowski block spacetime is probably correct, and that the future exists along with the past and present. If this is so, then verily, the future is inevitable. But because changing or avoiding the future is not a precondition for compatibilist free will, there is no problem here for the compatibilist. To change the past, present or future would be to both do, and not do, something at the same time, which is a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

 

[Jarhyn]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

Having the universe corrupted halfway through by the predictor system puts the predictor in the same system and violates isolation.

The actual shape of the system was one in which you DID order the thing, but then it isn't a prediction, it's really a reading of a past relative to the current moment, even if the past looked a lot like the region immediately "future" to it.

Or in other words, if we want me telling Urist "the future", it can only be telling Urist "the future" because it is already in my, and in the greater reality also their, past.

 

[The AntiChris]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

Right. The rationale for predicting the future in the first place is usually to give us the ability to change it if we want. So, we'll assume that I am never informed of the prediction.

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

 

[pood]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

 

[Jarhyn]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

Or in other words, can god lie?

I can absolutely lie to dwarves.

 

[pood]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

Or in other words, can god lie?

I can absolutely lie to dwarves.

In this case I wasn’t thinking of God, but of a human perfect predictor, who (like God) could not exist anyway.

In the case of God, as I argued upthread, if we assume God cannot tell a lie (is that supposed to be one of his essential properties, or am I thinking of Superman?) then god simply would not disclose a prediction that he knew in advance would be contradicted by the person he disclosed it to. More, he could not do so, on the theory that even an all-powerful God cannot bring about a logical contradiction. If he were to disclose the prediction and the person to whom he disclosed it contradicted it, then God would prove to be a fallible predictor and this is supposed to be logically impossible.

 

[Jarhyn]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

Or in other words, can god lie?

I can absolutely lie to dwarves.

In this case I wasn’t thinking of God, but of a human perfect predictor, who (like God) could not exist anyway.

In the case of God, as I argued upthread, if we assume God cannot tell a lie (is that supposed to be one of his essential properties, or am I thinking of Superman?) then god simply would not disclose a prediction that he knew in advance would be contradicted by the person he disclosed it to. More, he could not do so, on the theory that even an all-powerful God cannot bring about a logical contradiction. If he were to disclose the prediction and the person to whom he disclosed it contradicted it, then God would prove to be a fallible predictor and this is supposed to be logically impossible.

That's the thing though. If we're being realistic here, I'm literally that universe's god. In fact the people who designed all of it's math and operation are all human. And all of them can lie.

As it is, I explained, god isn't any more capable of predicting the next frame of the universe than the universe is: all "perfect predictions" are in fact just "dictions" of the system, and actually past tense in the highest available "systemic time". By existing in the simulation, God itself implies a superspace and supertime.

The language of "perfect predictions" is just discussing a "diction" of the system that previously happened.

A god who would not lie (let's dispense with can't. Gods can lie. Period.) might say "in the situation wherein I told you nothing, you ordered chicken".

"Well, what about the situation we are in answer the question, which will I order?"

And then god says "I cannot possibly answer that question honestly; when I tell you you WILL order chicken, you have the power to make a lie of that, and you do. When I tell you that you did this and order the steak, you then spited the knowledge of the prediction and order steak. Eventually this contrarian situation continued so long you ordered nothing. Ultimately, I can't tell you honestly what you will order except to distract you so long that the answer is "you order nothing". Doing that is stupid and immature, though. Order what you want, open the envelope, and inside will be the answer of what you would always have ordered assuming you don't open the envelope. But the fact is, the first time, without me manipulating At all, you did order the chicken. Because that's what you actually wanted." At which point you roll your eyes and sigh and take the answer because I scummed through dialogues until I found one that would shut you up and get you to accept the form of answer without me having to be cheeky. Assuming that you ever let me not be a cheeky fuck.

Note the tenses there. Because perfect prediction itself is a lie: It's just a past diction of the system no matter which way you slice it.

 

[The AntiChris]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

I think this is effectively what I've been saying (at least it's what I intended to convey).

The problem (if there is one) is that Kylie insists that absolute predictability must be possible under determinism and that any admission that this is not possible is taken as proof that 'true' determinism cannot exist.

 

[pood]

You can assume that but Kylie raised precisely this paradox with me earlier in this thread here.

I see no problem here. Suppose someone were able to predict with 100 percent accuracy what you would do. This could never happen, but we can suppose it as a thought experiment. Then the person tells you — tells you that you will order chicken for dinner, for example. You decide to be contrapredictive. You decide to order beef instead of chicken. Can you do that, under the circumstances? Of course you can. So you order beef. What’s the upshot? The perfect predictor was imperfect, a contradiction? No. It would mean that the perfect predictor would have known ahead of time that you would order beef, but only if the predictor told you that you’d order chicken. The point is that the perfect predictor would always know what you would do, but could never accurately convey that information to you, since you doing what you do, depends on the predictor giving you a false prediction.

I think this is effectively what I've been saying (at least it's what I intended to convey).

The problem (if there is one) is that Kylie insists that absolute predictability must be possible under determinism and that any admission that this is not possible is taken as proof that 'true' determinism cannot exist.

It’s a bit hard for me to tell, but if that is her position, she’s wrong.

I take it more that she is trying to show that if what you do is predictable, then you must do that thing, and thus have no free will. I have demonstrated that she is wrong about this, as well.

 

[The AntiChris]

The problem (if there is one) is that Kylie insists that absolute predictability must be possible under determinism and that any admission that this is not possible is taken as proof that 'true' determinism cannot exist.

It’s a bit hard for me to tell, but if that is her position, she’s wrong.

Of course.

I take it more that she is trying to show that if what you do is predictable, then you must do that thing, and thus have no free will. I have demonstrated that she is wrong about this, as well.

She's certainly saying that, but you need to remember that as a libertarian she has a keen interest in debunking determinism. I think it's clearly implied in post #299.

 

[Kylie]

yet you find nothing paradoxical in claiming that an outcome with a 0% probability is still possible.

I make no such claim.

Probabilities are relevant to unknowns.

In the absence of paradoxical gods, the outcome is unknown before the choosing has occurred, so I am claiming that an outcome with a non-zero probability is still possible - because it is.

You are assuming your conclusion as a premise in your argument.

It is not unknown from the point of view of the universe.

You are AGAIN making the mistake of thinking that if we don't know about it, it must be unknowable.

The universe doesn't know things, nor does it have a point of view. You are making a category error, by attempting to take a pantheist approach to resolving the paradoxical nature of gods.

You miss my point.

I am not thinking that it must be unknowable; It's unknowable because of the nature of causality - effects do not precede causes, and so what you will order for dinner cannot be known - even to you - until after you choose what to order for dinner.

But you still say that there is one particular outcome that is inevitable.

Well, no, I don't; But I am certain that it wouldn't matter one iota if there were, so (as I have repeatedly told you) I accept it for the sake of this discussion.

How do you think the existence of an unknown inevitable outcome changes the fact that the outcome only becomes known as a result of the choosing operation; While the existence of an unknown and variable outcome would not change that fact?

Choosing is done by people. People have incomplete knowledge. Gods don't choose, not least because they don't exist.

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

If the outcome is completely unknowable BEFORE, how can it be inevitable?

Like I said, it's the sharpshooter fallacy. You wait to see what happens and then claim that was always going to happen, despite the fact that it could be completely random and you could STILL say the exact same thing.

 

[Kylie]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

Can in what context? Can if circumstances are different?

To test the logic of this, well, you can just spin up any deterministic mathematical system (like Dwarf Fortress) and ask that question, and then change circumstances in some particular way (essentially, inventing a new initial condition ala Last Thursday) and seeing if the engine of the system parses and continues parsing indefinitely, and the outcome you seek happens.

If the outcome you seek happens, you have in your hands an immediate state in which "can".

It doesn't matter what that state is.

CAN asks "of I load up a blank universe in some way, with some condition, will this result ever happen?"

Usually the question of "can I?" Assumes the condition being examined is going to be very similar to the condition present in the actual universe.

For many decisions we make, that condition examined contains the actual universe, as we process macrostates in general ways rather than microstates, and the macrostates describe a range of microstates.

When it does we call such wills, the situation where "Can I?" Is not "you may" but "you shall", "free".

You miss my point.

You are saying that if the starting point is different then the end result will be different.

I am saying that if the starting point is the same, then the end result can still be different because there are small random things which can have an effect.

That's lovely, but it has EXACTLY zero to do with whether or not a free choice is being made. Randomness cannot create freedom.

But it can eliminate inevitable outcomes. And inevitable outcomes destroy freedom.

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Then how can you claim that the universe must be deterministic?

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Indeed, if anyone is commiting a sharpshooter’s fallacy, it is Kylie. If you choose eggs she would gloat, “ah ha, see? It had to be eggs!” But if you choose pancakes she would gloat, “ah hah, see? It had to be pancakes!” But of course it didn’t have to be one or the other, it just had to be that a choice was made.

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

Excuse me, I have “bothered to understand” your position. You’re a libertarian. I acknowledged that upthread, which you‘d know if you bothered to read my posts.

What I’m saying here is that you are imputing to the compatibilist positions he/she does not hold.

All I can do is work with what you give me. If the position you claim is one that I find to be contradictory then I have to go with that. It's like the circle/square example I posted a while back.

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

Tell ya what.

You guys figure out what your position is. When you find something you can all agree on, let me know and then we'll go from there, okay?

 

[Kylie]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

I have very clearly described the paradox.

If God knows in advance that you will do A, then you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do Not-A.

To claim that you can do both A and Not-A is contradictory.

Tell ya what, here's another yes/no question.

God comes to me today and says, "Kylie, you're going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow. This is absolutely guaranteed to happen because I am God, I am all-knowing, and I can't possibly be wrong." I decide to smash all my eggs and the following morning I sit down to a nice stack of pancakes.

Is there anything that will stop me from doing that?

Yes or no.

 

[Jarhyn]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

I have very clearly described the paradox.

If God knows in advance that you will do A, then you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do Not-A.

To claim that you can do both A and Not-A is contradictory.

I have already explained the mechanics.

You aren't free to do not-X. You CAN do not-X. In fact the whole point of "can" in this context is that the only thing stopping you, the ONLY thing, is you. Can when not  shall is defined in fact by your choice, and when it is, you have what we call "free will"

 

[Kylie]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

Kylie is mooting a Laplacean conception of deterministic prediction. But becaue of quantum mechanics, the world is not Lapleacean.

Even if the world were non-quantum, no computer would be sufficiently powerful to generate flawless prediction. But because QM introduces indeterminism into the scene, then no such flawless predictions could be made even in principle.

So now you are agreeing with me that the universe is not completely deterministic?

 

[Kylie]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

So, you are saying that under those circumstances, a being that can't possibly be wrong would actually be wrong...?

 

[Kylie]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

Right. The rationale for predicting the future in the first place is usually to give us the ability to change it if we want. So, we'll assume that I am never informed of the prediction.

Just sweeping it under the rug to avoid a question you can't answer?