Demystifying Determinism

[Kylie]

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

Let’s delve into this a bit more closely.

You are a libertarian. You claim compatibilism cannot be a sufficient account of free will because it is deterministic. So if I order eggs for breakfast, you will say (under the compatibilist metaphysics) “That was inevitable! You had no choice but to order eggs!” But of course you’d say the same thing if I ordered pancakes. According to you, I think, an inevitable future precludes free will.

What does “inevitable” mean? It means an outcome that cannot be avoided — one that cannot be changed.

And yet, as I have pointed out (I do hope you read all of my posts), free will has nothing to do with changing the past, present, or future. So inevitability is a red herring.

Free will means I have the ability, in some small way, to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and future be what it will be. None of this involves changing or avoiding anything.

I happen to think that the Minkowski block spacetime is probably correct, and that the future exists along with the past and present. If this is so, then verily, the future is inevitable. But because changing or avoiding the future is not a precondition for compatibilist free will, there is no problem here for the compatibilist. To change the past, present or future would be to both do, and not do, something at the same time, which is a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

So how do you think you can freely choose something that can't possibly be any different?

 

[Jarhyn]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

Not if the result of that prediction is revealed to you prior to the breakfast and you intend to disprove any prediction - it's explained here: Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

So, you are saying that under those circumstances, a being that can't possibly be wrong would actually be wrong...?

More, you're proposing an entity that cannot possibly exist in a sensible way.

A god that looked at your future in the state of not telling you (they can't, and also won't look at the results of them telling you until they told you, on account of how time works and how mathematical systems progress), can only say what they saw, in their own past, and your (super-)past that you won't remember because it's isolated from your present, when they told you nothing and you chose for yourself.

They can play the video for you if you would like, take you there to watch it yourself as if a ghost, show you all the math of your own brain making the decision, and prove to you that it was your decision being made, but they can't even after all that tell you what you will order after seeing all that until you order it.

Because the way our system works, the way deterministic systems work in general, the past is inaccessible except in it's impacts on the present (and any saved instantaneous state images taken while in progress) and the future is inaccessible except through the operation of the present, and the present contains relationships which necessitate and are describable as "choices in progress" even by a transcendent being.

This has all been described repeatedly using actual immediate and tangible examples. I can reference and re-explain them, but TeChNoBaBbLe.

Would you rather I mansplain?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

Yes, it would be possible under those circumstances.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

So how do you think you can freely choose something that can't possibly be any different?

Determinism may not say what can or cannot happen. Determinism may only say what will and will not happen.

 

[bilby]

that nobody can choose to do otherwise,

People CAN absolutely choose to do otherwise and this is you yet again begging the question that they can't.

As it is, determinism only only means that people WON'T choose otherwise, not that they could not or can not.

Again, you have not answered the modal fallacy.

If they CAN but never DO, how do you know that they CAN?

Can in what context? Can if circumstances are different?

To test the logic of this, well, you can just spin up any deterministic mathematical system (like Dwarf Fortress) and ask that question, and then change circumstances in some particular way (essentially, inventing a new initial condition ala Last Thursday) and seeing if the engine of the system parses and continues parsing indefinitely, and the outcome you seek happens.

If the outcome you seek happens, you have in your hands an immediate state in which "can".

It doesn't matter what that state is.

CAN asks "of I load up a blank universe in some way, with some condition, will this result ever happen?"

Usually the question of "can I?" Assumes the condition being examined is going to be very similar to the condition present in the actual universe.

For many decisions we make, that condition examined contains the actual universe, as we process macrostates in general ways rather than microstates, and the macrostates describe a range of microstates.

When it does we call such wills, the situation where "Can I?" Is not "you may" but "you shall", "free".

You miss my point.

You are saying that if the starting point is different then the end result will be different.

I am saying that if the starting point is the same, then the end result can still be different because there are small random things which can have an effect.

That's lovely, but it has EXACTLY zero to do with whether or not a free choice is being made. Randomness cannot create freedom.

But it can eliminate inevitable outcomes. And inevitable outcomes destroy freedom.

No, they don't. But even if they did, ADDING RANDOMNESS CANNOT CREATE FREEDOM.

St George might be able to kill dragons, but even if he can, killing St George doesn't create dragons.

 

[bilby]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

I have very clearly described the paradox.

If God knows in advance that you will do A, then you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do Not-A.

To claim that you can do both A and Not-A is contradictory.

Tell ya what, here's another yes/no question.

God comes to me today and says, "Kylie, you're going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow. This is absolutely guaranteed to happen because I am God, I am all-knowing, and I can't possibly be wrong." I decide to smash all my eggs and the following morning I sit down to a nice stack of pancakes.

Is there anything that will stop me from doing that?

Yes or no.

You have your first premise bass-ackwards.

If you will do A, then God knows in advance that you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do not-A.

If you freely choose to do not-A, then God knows in advance that you will do not-A.

God's knowledge can be defined by your choices. Your choices aren't necessarily dictated by God's knowledge. Assuming that you have free will, that is.

 

[The AntiChris]

So, you are saying that under those circumstances, a being that can't possibly be wrong would actually be wrong...?

No.

 

[fromderinside]

Modal logic depends on the validity of the logic model. Since it is not referenced as part of the Scientific method does not meet requirements for being materially inclusive. It is no different than ad hoc.

 

[DBT]

entails future events

Such as... Wait for it... Deterministic choice execution!

Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation

Strictly necessitating... That for any agent controlled by a central process to do anything... That central process has to look at options and actually choose one of them. If it does not, the bouncer puts them out on their ear for taking a table from paying customers.

Choices aren't irregular or spontaneous. They are regular, predictable occurrences, with ultimately regular and predictable outcomes.

Strict necessitation negates selection between options,

No, it necessitates selection between options.

There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs

That's lovely, but it has EXACTLY zero to do with whether or not a free choice is being made. Randomness cannot create freedom.

There are no choices where no alternatives exist;


''Determinism,in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

 

[Jarhyn]

the logic model. Since it is not referenced as part of the Scientific method

...

FDI, you'll want to think very hard here. In fact you'll even want to think about your thinking:

Determinism as a description necessitates that the logical model works. Science as a pursuit necessitates that the logical model works.

You used the logical model to get to determinism in the first place. You used it to speak determinism. You used it to describe determinism. You used it to understand determinism.

To not accept this is to fail to accept even so much of an axiom as "the universe exists", and "things can be known".

You are truly in the cave if you reject modal logic

There are no choices where no alternatives exist

You keep repeating this assumption. It's a bald assertion that there are no alternatives in deterministic systems.

Obviously there are alternatives that weren't selected, they just won't ever have been selected, because they weren't selected.

Choices are not created by randomness, they are created by uncertainty. Uncertainty and randomness are very different things.

You need to read the menu before you know the menu. You need to know the menu before you choose something from it. If you do not know the menu, you will never select something from it. Only once you have selected something from it will your choice be brought to you. If you never are able to pick one option of the many options presented, you will be ejected from the restaurant, also in and of itself a form of choice: default choice.

It has nothing to do with randomness and everything to do with the way deterministic events happen.

Let me ask you this:

switch (a){
case 1: do1(); break;
case 2: do2(); break;
default: break;
}

Let's say I compile this. Will this produce a code block representing case 2? Will there be a physical region of memory containing bits that amount to an "if (a == 2) goto case2;" in machine (not an image but a functional object)? The alternative is clearly there even if it is never exercised. In this case the "alternative" is a physical object.

Would you say the thing I created is not a switched choice function? Despite the language being developed as descriptions of what I built rather than what I built being an attempt to implement that language would you still say the language does not describe it? That it does not execute? That it does not have the phenomena we developed the names to reference?

 

[pood]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

I have very clearly described the paradox.

If God knows in advance that you will do A, then you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do Not-A.

To claim that you can do both A and Not-A is contradictory.

Tell ya what, here's another yes/no question.

God comes to me today and says, "Kylie, you're going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow. This is absolutely guaranteed to happen because I am God, I am all-knowing, and I can't possibly be wrong." I decide to smash all my eggs and the following morning I sit down to a nice stack of pancakes.

Is there anything that will stop me from doing that?

Yes or no.

Good Gob, do you even read what I write??? I have answered your entire post to me above repeatedly. Why in the world should I answer this yet again? Is it that you skip posts, or skim them over, or don’t understand them, or what?

 

[pood]

If we assume their existence, a paradox ensues - but so what? Gods are known to be paradoxical.

I believe I have shown, or have tried to show, that there is no paradox generated by an all-knowing God knowing what you will do, before you do it. You still have compatibilist free will.

Your choice for breakfast is eggs or pancakes. God knows in advance you will choose eggs, and sure enough, you choose eggs, because God can’t be wrong. But so what? You still could have chosen pancakes. But had you chosen pancakes, God would have foreknown THAT fact instead. There’s no paradox here. In these circumstances, you are free to do as you wish, you are just not free to escape God’s prior detection of your choice.

I have very clearly described the paradox.

If God knows in advance that you will do A, then you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do Not-A.

To claim that you can do both A and Not-A is contradictory.

Tell ya what, here's another yes/no question.

God comes to me today and says, "Kylie, you're going to have eggs for breakfast tomorrow. This is absolutely guaranteed to happen because I am God, I am all-knowing, and I can't possibly be wrong." I decide to smash all my eggs and the following morning I sit down to a nice stack of pancakes.

Is there anything that will stop me from doing that?

Yes or no.

You have your first premise bass-ackwards.

If you will do A, then God knows in advance that you will do A.

If you have free will, you are free to do not-A.

If you freely choose to do not-A, then God knows in advance that you will do not-A.

God's knowledge can be defined by your choices. Your choices aren't necessarily dictated by God's knowledge. Assuming that you have free will, that is.

Exactly effing right. How many times have I explaied this to her? And then she goes and asks me the same questions over and over as if I never wrote anything!

It’s fine to disagree with me. But please at least have the courtesy of reading and acknowledging what I write.

 

[pood]

Modal logic depends on the validity of the logic model. Since it is not referenced as part of the Scientific method does not meet requirements for being materially inclusive. It is no different than ad hoc.

So, the “scientific method” doesn’t follow the rules of elementary logic? That’s interesting.

By the way, what, exactly is “the scientific method”? Is it a detailed forumula for doing all science everywhere that was inscribed in stone by the Science God and brought down from the mountain by Moses?

 

[pood]

So, you are saying that under those circumstances, a being that can't possibly be wrong would actually be wrong...?

No.

I second AntiChris: No. But, the thing is, I have already gone over this with you, Kylie, in great detail. If you disagree with what I write, fine; just make your counterargument. But this is different. You simply seem to ignore what I write.

 

[pood]

No, I would not say that.

If you had bothered to try to understand my position, you'd know that I've been saying it didn't HAVE to be anything. The only reason it's pancakes is because I freely chose to have pancakes. My choice of pancakes isn't determined by the previous state of the universe. There's no way to have predicted ahead of time that I would choose to have pancakes.

Let’s delve into this a bit more closely.

You are a libertarian. You claim compatibilism cannot be a sufficient account of free will because it is deterministic. So if I order eggs for breakfast, you will say (under the compatibilist metaphysics) “That was inevitable! You had no choice but to order eggs!” But of course you’d say the same thing if I ordered pancakes. According to you, I think, an inevitable future precludes free will.

What does “inevitable” mean? It means an outcome that cannot be avoided — one that cannot be changed.

And yet, as I have pointed out (I do hope you read all of my posts), free will has nothing to do with changing the past, present, or future. So inevitability is a red herring.

Free will means I have the ability, in some small way, to make the past be what it was, the present be what it is, and future be what it will be. None of this involves changing or avoiding anything.

I happen to think that the Minkowski block spacetime is probably correct, and that the future exists along with the past and present. If this is so, then verily, the future is inevitable. But because changing or avoiding the future is not a precondition for compatibilist free will, there is no problem here for the compatibilist. To change the past, present or future would be to both do, and not do, something at the same time, which is a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

So how do you think you can freely choose something that can't possibly be any different?

Because your free choice made it be the thing that can’t possibly be any different? Ever think of that?

 

[pood]

I mean, I just explained my position in the very post you quote, and you ask me the same question. I don’t get it.

 

[pood]

Your cognitive dissonance is that you believe both of the following statements are true at the same time.

1. There is no way for the outcome of events to be any different.
2. The outcome of events could be one of several different possibilities.

Ironically, those two statements are functionally identical. A "way for the outcome of events to be different" is a "possibility". So, your two statements become: 1. There is no possibility for the outcome of events to be any different. and 2. There is the possibility that the outcome of events could be different. And, of course, those two statements are contradictory. So, that's not what I'm saying.

Yes it is exactly what you are saying.

The two statements that I have made that are giving you the willies are:
1. There are multiple possible futures.
2. There is a single actual future.

Which are functionally equivalent to these two statements:
1. There are multiple things that can happen.
2. There is a single thing that will happen.

There is no contradiction between statement 1 and statement 2 in either of these pairs.

The fact that there is a single actual future does not contradict the fact that there are multiple possible futures. The actual future will exist in physical reality. And there's only room for one of them. The possible futures will only exist in our imagination. And there's plenty of room for lots of possibilities there.

The fact that a single thing will happen does not contradict the fact that there are multiple things that can happen. Things that can happen are possibilities. Things that will happen are actualities.

If there is a single actual future which is inevitable, it is incorrect to say there are multiple possible futures. Those other futures are not possible because one future has already been "locked in."

It is time for breakfast. We have eggs in the refrigerator. We have pancake mix in the cupboard. We can make scrambled eggs. We can make pancakes. That's two possible futures. In one future we have scrambled eggs for breakfast. In the other future we have pancakes. One of those possible futures will happen. The other possible future that will not happen.

The notion that one of these possible futures "has already been locked in" is useless, because it doesn't tell us which one is which. We could theoretically trace backward from this moment all the way to the Big Bang, just to see how we got here. But we would still only be here, at the moment of our uncertainty, with no clue as to which possible future was the actual one.

The only certain knowledge we have at this moment is that there are TWO different things that we CAN do, eggs and pancakes. One is supposed to be "locked in", but we don't know which.

The causal chain of events that will lock in the actual future is not finished yet. The most critical event has not yet happened. And that event is our CHOOSING which possible future we want most, the future with us eating scrambled eggs or the future with us eating pancakes.

Before we make our choice, we only know the TWO things that we CAN choose to do.
After we make our choice, we will know the ONE thing that WILL actually happen and the OTHER thing that COULD HAVE happened but NEVER WOULD HAVE happened.

After we have made our choice, we will know which possible future was always going to happen and which one was always not going to happen.

But there was no way to get to the After (the one actuality) without first going through the Before (the two possibilities). So, the two possibilities were just as "locked in" as the one actuality.

Let me ask a question I've asked several times now, and please just answer me with a yes or a no. One word, I beg you.

Is it possible for a sufficiently intelligent person with sufficiently complete knowledge about the state of the universe today and sufficient computing ability to be able to, at this moment, determine without error the outcome of your "choice" of breakfast tomorrow.

Yes or no only please.

No.

Actually, yes. The problem is that this person cannot exist within our universe as bound by it's systemic rules, and the easiest way to do this perhaps the only way, is for them to run forward a clone of the universe.

At this point it's the watching your choice for breakfast tomorrow happening though, not really a prediction but more of just a... Diction.

Kylie is mooting a Laplacean conception of deterministic prediction. But becaue of quantum mechanics, the world is not Lapleacean.

Even if the world were non-quantum, no computer would be sufficiently powerful to generate flawless prediction. But because QM introduces indeterminism into the scene, then no such flawless predictions could be made even in principle.

So now you are agreeing with me that the universe is not completely deterministic?

No!

As a matter of fact, the universe is NOT completely deterministic, because of quantum indeterminacy, but even if it were TOTALLY deterministic, there is no physical way to compute without error what will happen in the future, because to do that you would have to simulate the entire universe. There will never be sufficient computational power to do this.

 

[pood]

Moreover, as Bibly notes, QM is irrelevant to the free will debate, because introducing randomness into a system does not introduce free will. If you chose stuff randomly, you would be insane, not free.

 

[pood]

The upshot is that the universe could be totally determinstic (even though it is not) while at the same time never wholly predictable.

 

[Kylie]

@Jarhyn, @pood, and @Marvin Edwards, how about you all get your stories straight before you start telling me that I'm wrong, okay? Don't expect me to take any of you seriously when you are all telling me that each of you has the correct argument but those arguments aren't even good enough to convince each other.