The problem in 2008 wasn't the banks and it wasn't the regulations and it wasn't Bill Clinton or even the mortgage-backed securities themselves. The problem was the credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, the Fitch Group and, particularly, Moody's). If they had simply rated the securities properly, none of what followed would have ever happened.
Now, whether or not they knowingly conspired to give higher ratings is
another question (as well as whether or not they could do so again), but the fault lies entirely with them.
It was in part due to banks under govt policy giving home loans with abandon to those who could barely make payments. An economic downturn caused high levels of defaults.
The banking/finance industry created what they call a derivative product. Buying debt in form of mortgages and selling the paper at a profit. Unrestricted it led to a pyramid type of scheme that collapsed. Followed by another govt program to bailout homeowners who should never had gotten loans.
Yep, but, again, that all was the result of the credit rating agencies not properly rating the securities. All three agencies—separately—came to the conclusion that due to their diversity (i.e., bad amongst the good) that the “good” would mitigate the risks of the “bad” underlying mortgages and therefore gave them much higher ratings than they deserved.
Basically it was like if you have a hundred people in a room and 70 of them have excellent credit and 30 don’t, the 70 will make up for the 30 should any of them default and therefore it’s all good. Which made some sense, but of course was far too simplistic and did not dig down deep enough into the layers upon layers of structure into the various forms of these securities.
That was the essence behind the bundling theory, but what the credit ratings agencies did not take into consideration was the detachment of due diligence that resulted in the allowance of independent mortgage brokerage houses. Banks used to be on the hook for their mortgage loans—and thus performed due diligence on their clients to mitigate against risk of default—but they started farming that out to independent firms, many of which then lied about their due diligence.
So more and more risk accumulated without anyone paying attention until the bubble burst.
But, again, the fault lies exclusively with the credit ratings agencies for not doing their only job; properly assessing risk. If they had, no one would have bought the securities (except for high risk investors) and they never would have been bundled into money market vehicles that the rich used to park their money in for month-end investments and those independent mortgage houses would have all gone belly up (or never formed to begin with).
Iow, if the system had simply operated as it was supposed to, none of this would have happened. So the question really is whether or not the credit agencies were complicit or otherwise paid off, or were they just incompetent? Considering all three came to basically the same conclusion (though an argument was made that Moody’s was the worst of the three), it would appear incompetence was the primary culprit, at least initially.
The evidence of this came too late, but it can be found in the fact that prior to the full-on collapse the agencies did in fact adjust their ratings, but by that time too many people (rich and “middle class” alike) had their money in relatively high yield money market funds so the panic that ensued was far and wide and ultimately cataclysmic.