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My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

To be exact, they are neither the same matter nor are they different matter. They are the same kind of matter.
'Same kind of matter' does not equate to 'same matter'. The two brains are identical with respect to most their physical properties, but not all of them.
 
Yes it does. 10,000 kJ (kinetic energy of a truck) = 10,000 KJ (kinetic energy of an identical truck).
No, the 10,000 KJ mass/energy = 10,000 KJ mass/energy.
Why are you putting mass/energy?

They are not the same physical mass energy- they are 2 separate physical masses- 20,000 KJ.. or 20 MJ if you're lazy.

I am not saying that they are the same; I am saying that the energies are equivalent. They are the same type of physical quantity.


On the other hand, I have only ever read supervenience as something that is a global property spatially...
However, I do remember reading somewhere, probably on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website, that there may be a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa, but it would also have different properties, specifically their respective histories.
The article on supervenience at plato.stanford.edu might be pertinent to what you're trying to go for in this thread, however I still don't think anyone will take the claim that 2 identical objects are the same object seriously.

I have never claimed that.
 
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I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

To be exact, they are neither the same matter nor are they different matter. They are the same kind of matter.
'Same kind of matter' does not equate to 'same matter'.

That is what I said.

The two brains are identical with respect to most their physical properties, but not all of them.

They have identical intrinsic properties. That's all that matters.
 
No, supervenience is a global property/ies of another property/ies. Three marbles equally close together is an equilateral triangle that supervenes on the marbles.

And you have it backwards. If the mental supervenes on the physical, then the mental responds to changes of the physical.

No, he has it right. Take the example of the forged painting in the article: the image supervenes on the material of paint. If the images changes then the matter also must have changed.

A supervenes on B (Any change in A require change in B)
 
Yes: "subjectivity cannot be objectively observed" is not an observed fact.

They are different by definition. We use subjectivity to gain objectivity.

That they are different is not a problem. You are confusing observing subjectivity with experiencing that subjectivity.

But that said: why do you think it never will be possible experience another persons subjectivity?
 
But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".
What do you mean by "not equal"? By implication you're suggesting the bodies are "equal".

You can't mean that the two minds are not quantitatively identical (i.e. they're two distinct and separate entities) because the same could be said of the bodies - they're qualitatively (i.e. physically) identical but not quantitatively identical (i.e. they're two distinct and separate entities).

So precisely what do you mean when you say the minds are "not equal"? I think this is the point of confusion.

(I think Keith&Co. was making the same point but your response to him doesn't answer my question)
 
No, supervenience is a global property/ies of another property/ies. Three marbles equally close together is an equilateral triangle that supervenes on the marbles.

And you have it backwards. If the mental supervenes on the physical, then the mental responds to changes of the physical.

No, he has it right. Take the example of the forged painting in the article: the image supervenes on the material of paint. If the images changes then the matter also must have changed.

A supervenes on B (Any change in A require change in B)

Thanks for catching that for me.
 
They are different by definition. We use subjectivity to gain objectivity.

That they are different is not a problem. You are confusing observing subjectivity with experiencing that subjectivity.

But that said: why do you think it never will be possible experience another persons subjectivity?

You would have to be the system. How could something be something else? Two brain processes would have to be one brain process.

And even if you could be someone else, how could that not affect what the person would have been without you.
 
But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".
What do you mean by "not equal"? By implication you're suggesting the bodies are "equal".

You can't mean that the two minds are not quantitatively identical (i.e. they're two distinct and separate entities) because the same could be said of the bodies - they're qualitatively (i.e. physically) identical but not quantitatively identical (i.e. they're two distinct and separate entities).

So precisely what do you mean when you say the minds are "not equal"? I think this is the point of confusion.

(I think Keith&Co. was making the same point but your response to him doesn't answer my question)

Let me treat identity as a physical property even though I don't think it is.

We will only compare what I put in bold.

Body (in Sydney) = body (in Perth).

Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).
 
Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).


Assuming:

"Mind (in Sydney)" and "Your mind (in Sydney)." both refer to the same entity,

and

"mind (in Perth)." and "clone's mind (in Perth)." both refer to the same entity.


Then what you've stated is a straightforward contradiction. You're confused.
 
Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).


Assuming:

"Mind (in Sydney)" and "Your mind (in Sydney)." both refer to the same entity,

and

"mind (in Perth)." and "clone's mind (in Perth)." both refer to the same entity.


Then what you've stated is a straightforward contradiction. You're confused.

I said A. Then you said that assuming A is wrong, then contradiction. I can't argue there.

How about you explain why you think that '"Mind (in Sydney)" and "Your mind (in Sydney)." both refer to the same entity' because that is probably what you disagree with.
 
How about you explain why you think that "Mind (in Sydney)" and "Your mind (in Sydney)." both refer to the same entity' because that is probably what you disagree with.
I assumed that because I thought that was your intention.

If you're saying that they don't refer to the same entity then you need to explain what you're referring to when you say:

"Mind (in Sydney)"

and

"Your mind (in Sydney)."

Is there more than one mind in Sydney that we're talking about? :confused:
 
How about you explain why you think that "Mind (in Sydney)" and "Your mind (in Sydney)." both refer to the same entity' because that is probably what you disagree with.
I assumed that because I thought that was your intention.

If you're saying that they don't refer to the same entity then you need to explain what you're referring to when you say:

"Mind (in Sydney)"

and

"Your mind (in Sydney)."

Is there more than one mind in Sydney that we're talking about? :confused:

Mind (in Sydney) is a component of your mind.
 
I assumed that because I thought that was your intention.

If you're saying that they don't refer to the same entity then you need to explain what you're referring to when you say:

"Mind (in Sydney)"

and

"Your mind (in Sydney)."

Is there more than one mind in Sydney that we're talking about? :confused:

Mind (in Sydney) is a component of your mind.
That just doesn't make sense!

I can see why you have so much trouble successfully communicating with others.
 
Mind (in Sydney) is a component of your mind.

Can't be. Two separate and distinct bodies, albeit identical in structure.

I am talking only about the about the mind in Sydney; the mind in Perth is not relevant in this side argument. The mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney.
 
I am talking only about the about the mind in Sydney; the mind in Perth is not relevant in this side argument. The mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney.

The mind in Sydney is a component of the activity of the brain in Sydney.

I agree. But what does that have to do with what I said?
 
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