My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[PyramidHead]

ryan is assuming the identity of indiscernibles, a matter that is by no means settled in philosophy. Without it, his argument fails.

Thanks, I just read some of that entry. Near the top I saw, "Some would defend the Principle even in this case by claiming that there are properties such as being that very object A. Call such a property a thisness or haecceity". It is this "thisness or haecceity" that I put in bold that is at the heart of my argument.

Good for you. Can you support the existence of such a property, or was a cursory glance at a webpage enough to solidify your argument about the fucking nature of the universe? Could you try not presuming to have all the relevant information and just admit you don't know something for once?

 

[ryan]

Sydney has something in your body that Perth doesn't have. This something is your consciousness. Even though there is an identical consciousness in Perth. You are in Sydney.

2 Identical consciousnesses... I get that. I don't get how they are non-physical.

If the body in Sydney has your consciousness, and the body in Perth doesn't have your consciousness, then there is a difference. But the difference can't be physical because we said that they were physically identical.

I still don't see the nonphysical side, which is why I asked "Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?"

Forget this.

Ok... so the whole non-physical consciousness thing is no longer part of this conversation? Are you proposing substance monism in stead of dualism?

I definitely not arguing for monism. I am arguing for dualism.

 

[ryan]

Yes, if you only care about taking an objective account, then you will not miss any physical information (I will suspend my belief in free will for now). But you will be missing the information about subjectivity.

Why?

I have given you my best arguments, and I think they have stood the scrutiny.

 

[ryan]

Thanks, I just read some of that entry. Near the top I saw, "Some would defend the Principle even in this case by claiming that there are properties such as being that very object A. Call such a property a thisness or haecceity". It is this "thisness or haecceity" that I put in bold that is at the heart of my argument.

Good for you. Can you support the existence of such a property, or was a cursory glance at a webpage enough to solidify your argument about the fucking nature of the universe? Could you try not presuming to have all the relevant information and just admit you don't know something for once?

I can't even begin to tell how confused I am about this post. Of all of the possible combinations of words and letters that are possible here, this combination would certainly not be in the first thousand that I would expect to see as a response to my post.

Indeed, the nature of the universe continues to shock me.

 

[Kharakov]

2 Identical consciousnesses... I get that. I don't get how they are non-physical.

If the body in Sydney has your consciousness, and the body in Perth doesn't have your consciousness, then there is a difference. But the difference can't be physical because we said that they were physically identical.

Ehh.. location is a physical attribute, so you can't say they are physically identical, you can say they have the same physical properties except location in space.

So you have 2 bodies, with the same physical properties except location, which generate the same consciousness in 2 different physical locations. The only physical difference between the 2 consciousnesses being the location.

Still a physical difference. A proton on the moon does not behave like a proton on the earth for one very simple reason: it's interacting with different things due to its location.

I definitely not arguing for monism. I am arguing for dualism.

Why don't you go all the way to pluralism then?

 

[ryan]

If the body in Sydney has your consciousness, and the body in Perth doesn't have your consciousness, then there is a difference. But the difference can't be physical because we said that they were physically identical.

Ehh.. location is a physical attribute, so you can't say they are physically identical, you can say they have the same physical properties except location in space.

So you have 2 bodies, with the same physical properties except location, which generate the same consciousness in 2 different physical locations. The only physical difference between the 2 consciousnesses being the location.

Still a physical difference. A proton on the moon does not behave like a proton on the earth for one very simple reason: it's interacting with different things due to its location.

Those are all extrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties do not change for some entity. We are only concerned here with the defined entity and not the effects of its physical environment.

I definitely not arguing for monism. I am arguing for dualism.

Why don't you go all the way to pluralism then?

There is just so much time in a day.

 

[Juma]

Why?

I have given you my best arguments, and I think they have stood the scrutiny.

? Not one of your examples or though experiments or equations survived our scrutiny. Everything now boils down to one proposition from you: "subjectivity cannot be objectively observed"

 

[ryan]

I have given you my best arguments, and I think they have stood the scrutiny.

? Not one of your examples or though experiments or equations survived our scrutiny. Everything now boils down to one proposition from you: "subjectivity cannot be objectively observed"

I am not sure if that is everything, but I agree that is something I see as a problem.

Do you have an argument against your summary.

 

[Kharakov]

Ehh.. location is a physical attribute, so you can't say they are physically identical, you can say they have the same physical properties except location in space.

So you have 2 bodies, with the same physical properties except location, which generate the same consciousness in 2 different physical locations. The only physical difference between the 2 consciousnesses being the location.

Still a physical difference. A proton on the moon does not behave like a proton on the earth for one very simple reason: it's interacting with different things due to its location.

Those are all extrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties do not change for some entity. We are only concerned here with the defined entity and not the effects of its physical environment.

Ok, so 2 separate entities in different places, who have the exact same thoughts and thinking process (they are unaware they are in different locations). Physically (which includes mentally for most individuals, as mental states are part of physical states, or the other way around depending on whose turn it is to supervene) the same except for location.

I agree with everyone else on this one- I don't see an argument for non-physical consciousness anywhere in your statements. Sometimes you need to put together a list of premises, describe how they are linked, etc. before you will realize your conclusions don't follow from your premises. Happens to everyone, accept reality. Except....

 

[ryan]

Those are all extrinsic properties. Intrinsic properties do not change for some entity. We are only concerned here with the defined entity and not the effects of its physical environment.

Ok, so 2 separate entities in different places, who have the exact same thoughts and thinking process (they are unaware they are in different locations). Physically (which includes mentally for most individuals, as mental states are part of physical states, or the other way around depending on whose turn it is to supervene) the same except for location.

I agree with everyone else on this one- I don't see an argument for non-physical consciousness anywhere in your statements. Sometimes you need to put together a list of premises, describe how they are linked, etc. before you will realize your conclusions don't follow from your premises. Happens to everyone, accept reality. Except....

Assume you are in Sydney and your clone is in Perth.

Body in Sydney = body in Perth
Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth

But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".

 

[Kharakov]

Ok, so 2 separate entities in different places, who have the exact same thoughts and thinking process (they are unaware they are in different locations). Physically (which includes mentally for most individuals, as mental states are part of physical states, or the other way around depending on whose turn it is to supervene) the same except for location.

I agree with everyone else on this one- I don't see an argument for non-physical consciousness anywhere in your statements. Sometimes you need to put together a list of premises, describe how they are linked, etc. before you will realize your conclusions don't follow from your premises. Happens to everyone, accept reality. Except....

Assume you are in Sydney and your clone is in Perth.

Body in Sydney = body in Perth
Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth

But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".

Your body in Sydney != Clone's body in Perth either.

Information on flash drive 1 is the same as information on flash drive 2 (even if the flash drives aren't identical).

"123" is the same as "123". Doesn't mean that either are nonphysical, or anything along those lines. The way things vene upon one another matters.

 

[ryan]

Assume you are in Sydney and your clone is in Perth.

Body in Sydney = body in Perth
Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth

But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".

Your body in Sydney != Clone's body in Perth either.

Yes it does. 10,000 kJ (kinetic energy of a truck) = 10,000 KJ (kinetic energy of an identical truck). Physically identical properties are equivalent. But one of the vehicles might be my truck. I guess this is where your supervenience comes in. The problem with supervenience, and the reason why it has been regularly rejected is because it is not complete.

On the other hand, I have only ever read supervenience as something that is a global property spatially. My concern is with differing temporal and spatial global properties.

However, I do remember reading somewhere, probably on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website, that there may be a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa, but it would also have different properties, specifically their respective histories.

Information on flash drive 1 is the same as information on flash drive 2 (even if the flash drives aren't identical).

"123" is the same as "123". Doesn't mean that either are nonphysical, or anything along those lines. The way things vene upon one another matters.

By "vene", do you mean "global property"?

 

[bilby]

No, that didn't confirm that the original was killed. Just that an extra body was created from the original pattern.

That's up for interpretation I suppose, but I always interpreted it to mean that transporters are basically the same as food replicators. They don't need to reassemble people using the exact same material that goes in, which is why it was even possible to glitch out and make two Rikers. Either way, no human can survive being reduced to elementary particles, so whether they are remade with the same stuff or replicated stuff is moot. It will always be the case that a person who is disintegrated by a transporter will die, as all of their neural patterns and internal organs are utterly annihilated to a degree as severe as if they were at the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. A few seconds later, (or a minute later, or a year later, it should make no difference) another being is deliberately assembled to imitate the original down to every minute detail, and it is now that this new consciousness begins its life, albeit with the memories and birthmarks of the original person. But they are no more the same consciousness as the original than the two people in the OP's example are, and for the same reason: one of them is dead!

So what? Riker himself is not the same person he was forty years earlier.

Continuity happens to correlate with identity in many areas of our experience; but identity resides in the pattern, not the materials. Make a sufficiently accurate copy and you create a new identity.

Change the pattern - for example by running your metabolism - and your identity changes.

You are not who you used to be. None of us are.

There is no 'essence of Riker' that is not included in the transporter pattern. Riker is carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen, with traces of other elements, all arranged in a very complex dynamic pattern.

There are no atoms of Rikerium that need to be present but cannot be included in the destination transporter because Riker himself is the universe's sole supply of the stuff.

 

[bilby]

^ This.

How could you ever tell the difference?

Death holds no fear for me; I do it all the time.

"I do it all of the time", what is this "I" that you seem to think makes it through your "death"? The "I" you are talking about is at the heart of my argument.

Access to my memories; and (to the extent that they support or help create my memories) recognition by my peers.

These are illusions, of course; but what experiences are not?

Permenant death I do not welcome, because it would mean never finding out what happens next.

The process of dying permenantly might also be uncomfortable or painful; I would prefer to avoid that, but the society in which I live seems determined to make things as difficult as possible.

Death? Been there, done that. Probably close to 15,000 times. It's a doddle.

Death lasting an eternity? Did that too, ending when my brain first developed consciousness.

Worrying about death is a waste of life.

Similarly, you keep differentiating between permanent death and temporary death. How is permanent death any different?

Permenant death is the irrecoverable destruction of a sufficient fraction of memory to make it impossible for a future conscious entity to identify as continuous with my current identity.

My one year old self is probably permanently dead. I have no recall of anything from that time at all.

My self yesterday I recall in detail - even though my consciousness has a discontinuity in it between then and now.

 

[ryan]

"I do it all of the time", what is this "I" that you seem to think makes it through your "death"? The "I" you are talking about is at the heart of my argument.

Access to my memories; and (to the extent that they support or help create my memories) recognition by my peers.

These are illusions, of course; but what experiences are not?

Experiences are illusions, how so?

You seem to be going out of control. There is so much about these sentences that seems so strange.

Similarly, you keep differentiating between permanent death and temporary death. How is permanent death any different?

Permenant death is the irrecoverable destruction of a sufficient fraction of memory to make it impossible for a future conscious entity to identify as continuous with my current identity.

My one year old self is probably permanently dead. I have no recall of anything from that time at all.

My self yesterday I recall in detail - even though my consciousness has a discontinuity in it between then and now.

You are just mashing together a bunch of ideas. I think this thread is getting out of control.

 

[Keith&Co.]

Assume you are in Sydney and your clone is in Perth.

Body in Sydney = body in Perth
Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth

But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".

Did i miss the part where you define 'equivalent' in this use? I think your argument rests, now, on a fuzzy use of 'equals.'
Do you mean similar to or identical to or the same thing?
Because the body in Sydney is not the same thing as the body in Perth. They're two discrete objects. Any observer would note that they are not the same thing.

Are you using the same '=' for the two minds? They're the product of two different brains. So no matter how similar they are, they're not going to be the same thing for the same reason the two bodies they're inside are not the same thing.

 

[ryan]

Assume you are in Sydney and your clone is in Perth.

Body in Sydney = body in Perth
Mind in Sydney = mind in Perth

But "your mind in Sydney" does not equal "clone's mind in Perth".

Did i miss the part where you define 'equivalent' in this use? I think your argument rests, now, on a fuzzy use of 'equals.'

See post #372. I will use it the same way it is used in physics even though I will also have to use it for what I consider to be non-physical.

 

[Juma]

? Not one of your examples or though experiments or equations survived our scrutiny. Everything now boils down to one proposition from you: "subjectivity cannot be objectively observed"

I am not sure if that is everything, but I agree that is something I see as a problem.

Do you have an argument against your summary.

Yes: "subjectivity cannot be objectively observed" is not an observed fact. In fact: it probably cannot be observed but it can be falsified.

But i would say that subjectivity is just a relation between the agents self image and it world model. It doesnt cover experience at all.

 

[Kharakov]

Your body in Sydney != Clone's body in Perth either.

Yes it does. 10,000 kJ (kinetic energy of a truck) = 10,000 KJ (kinetic energy of an identical truck).

No, the 10,000 KJ mass/energy = 10,000 KJ mass/energy. They are not the same physical mass energy- they are 2 separate physical masses- 20,000 KJ.. or 20 MJ if you're lazy.

On the other hand, I have only ever read supervenience as something that is a global property spatially...
However, I do remember reading somewhere, probably on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website, that there may be a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa, but it would also have different properties, specifically their respective histories.

The article on supervenience at plato.stanford.edu might be pertinent to what you're trying to go for in this thread, however I still don't think anyone will take the claim that 2 identical objects are the same object seriously.

Information on flash drive 1 is the same as information on flash drive 2 (even if the flash drives aren't identical).

"123" is the same as "123". Doesn't mean that either are nonphysical, or anything along those lines. The way things vene upon one another matters.

By "vene", do you mean "global property"?

Not really, but there is a joke if you look in the Latin...

If mental supervenes upon physical, it means that if a mental state changes, physical state changes.
If mental is subvenient under physical, it means that mental is altered by physical.

If physical supervenes upon mental, it means that if a physical state changes, mental state changes.

Dot.dotetc.etcdot

 

[Kharakov]

There is no 'essence of Riker' that is not included in the transporter pattern. Riker is carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen, with traces of other elements, all arranged in a very complex dynamic pattern.

There are no atoms of Rikerium that need to be present but cannot be included in the destination transporter because Riker himself is the universe's sole supply of the stuff.

I was just watching an old season 2 episode that came on the TV, and the original doctor for TNG didn't like transporters (might have been a homage to McCoy). In addition, Riker acquires some parasite that can't be removed by the transporters filtration mechanisms. Not too mention it is supposedly the worst episode of the whole TNG series....

 Shades_of_Gray_(Star_Trek:_The_Next_Generation)

Anyway, I think the episode actually covers every topic in this thread, which may be the best thread in the history of Infidels.