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My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

The mind in Sydney is a component of the activity of the brain in Sydney.

I agree. But what does that have to do with what I said?

You said - ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney - and I pointed out that mind is not a component of 'mind' but a component of the activity of the brain in Sydney.

And, of course, the mind in Perth is a component of the activity of the brain in Perth, albeit a twin of the mind in Sydney....much the same as identical twins, they may look alike but are two separate identities.
 
Body (in Sydney) = body (in Perth).
No it doesn't. There are 2 "bodies". 2 identical flash drives are not the same dongle.

Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).
Data sets are equivalent. An exact copy of a data set is not the original, although an outside tracker would be used to track which is which (from the forgery example). If 2 identical copies are generated at the same time, one would just call them copies. If one copy is lost, you've got a back up.

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).

Copy 1 is not copy 2. They are stored on the 2 separate flash drives. The data sets are the same. The thing is, they are attached to unique material- the flash drive in Peru is not the same material as the flash drive in Sri Lanka (like 2 identical protons are not the same proton).
 
No, that didn't confirm that the original was killed. Just that an extra body was created from the original pattern.

That's up for interpretation I suppose, but I always interpreted it to mean that transporters are basically the same as food replicators. They don't need to reassemble people using the exact same material that goes in, which is why it was even possible to glitch out and make two Rikers. Either way, no human can survive being reduced to elementary particles, so whether they are remade with the same stuff or replicated stuff is moot. It will always be the case that a person who is disintegrated by a transporter will die, as all of their neural patterns and internal organs are utterly annihilated to a degree as severe as if they were at the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. A few seconds later, (or a minute later, or a year later, it should make no difference) another being is deliberately assembled to imitate the original down to every minute detail, and it is now that this new consciousness begins its life, albeit with the memories and birthmarks of the original person. But they are no more the same consciousness as the original than the two people in the OP's example are, and for the same reason: one of them is dead!
Except that in the Trek 'verse, they demonstrably have dualism.
If they didn't, then they couldn't have switched souls between bodies. They couldn't put someone's 'consciousness' into a bottle then decant it into Spock, Kirk an d Love Interest. They couldn't have Spock and Chapel sharing consciousness.

So there was, like ryan fantasizes, a non-physical element that WAS the person, that somehow traveled along the beam to be the real person when they put it back together.

It didn't travel in some methods that made copies (such as the android who retained Kirk's racist remark, and the sci3ntist who said: "I'm real, ask me the square root of your zip code! I mean, i can math like a real boy! No, wait, i mean..."), but the transporter allowed it to.

Otherwise Dr. Janet Lester would just have been crazied in her own head, no matter what the technology was trying to do.

It would have been interesting if they had an episode where the bad guy used one of those 'consciousness switching' technologies, and he was foiled because everyone who's been transportered was technically without a soul and immune. "Nener, nener, Doc. Now, get into the shuttle or well beam you to the brig."

But for the Trek verse, more likely would be the episode where the technology was working and the only people who were immune to the effect were Data and one of the two Rikers. Then a lot of self-indulgent dialogue about 'All this time i was sure _I_ was the real Riker.' The real one would, of course, be the one who became XO because there's no way the crew, Troi and the audience would have been made to reevaluate their feelings for suddenly-the-copy-Riker. That would have had ramifications far past the one and only episode, so they'd avoid it.
 
I agree. But what does that have to do with what I said?

You said - ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney - and I pointed out that mind is not a component of 'mind' but a component of the activity of the brain in Sydney.

And, of course, the mind in Perth is a component of the activity of the brain in Perth, albeit a twin of the mind in Sydney....much the same as identical twins, they may look alike but are two separate identities.

But what you said and what I said can both be true.

(P1) Mind is a component of your mind.

(P2) Your mind is a component of the brain.

(C1) Mind is a component of the brain.
 
No it doesn't. There are 2 "bodies". 2 identical flash drives are not the same dongle.

By "same", do you mean "a single flash drive"? If so, please read the next paragraph. If not, then I don't understand your problem.

I said that I am using the equivalence that is used in physics. 10 joules of kinetic energy from a rolling rock = 10 joules of potential energy of a pen suspended above the ground. They are equal, but they are not the same thing.

Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).
Data sets are equivalent. An exact copy of a data set is not the original, although an outside tracker would be used to track which is which (from the forgery example). If 2 identical copies are generated at the same time, one would just call them copies. If one copy is lost, you've got a back up.
So are you saying that there wouldn't be a "you" if you clone was a perfectly identical twin from birth? If so, that is interesting. I agree because "you" wouldn't really mean anything that it does if the clone was mad after you have been alive.

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).

Copy 1 is not copy 2. They are stored on the 2 separate flash drives. The data sets are the same. The thing is, they are attached to unique material- the flash drive in Peru is not the same material as the flash drive in Sri Lanka (like 2 identical protons are not the same proton).

I couldn't agree more. I have never said the two minds were one mind.
 
So there was, like ryan fantasizes, a non-physical element that WAS the person, that somehow traveled along the beam to be the real person when they put it back together.

As much as I want to say "I told ya so", I must remember that this is god damn T.V. show. Why on Earth do people bring up Star Trak to help them make sense of reality?!
 
Mind (in Sydney) = mind (in Perth).
Data sets are equivalent. An exact copy of a data set is not the original, although an outside tracker would be used to track which is which (from the forgery example). If 2 identical copies are generated at the same time, one would just call them copies. If one copy is lost, you've got a back up.
So are you saying that there wouldn't be a "you" if you clone was a perfectly identical twin from birth? If so, that is interesting. I agree because "you" wouldn't really mean anything that it does if the clone was mad after you have been alive.
Ehh... ad&d clone rules do not apply to reality, despite how entertaining that would be.

Not saying that there wouldn't be a "me" either. If there are 2 copies of my consciousness, supported by 2 different physical substrates (that don't even have to be the same, as long as they create the same exact conscious experience), there are 2 mes. This doesn't mean that my consciousness is nonphysical, even if it is supported by 2 different physical substrates.

2 types of scaffolding holding up 2 identical billboards doesn't make the billboards nonphysical.

Your mind (in Sydney) does not equal clone's mind (in Perth).

Copy 1 is not copy 2. They are stored on the 2 separate flash drives. The data sets are the same. The thing is, they are attached to unique material- the flash drive in Peru is not the same material as the flash drive in Sri Lanka (like 2 identical protons are not the same proton).

I couldn't agree more. I have never said the two minds were one mind.
Yeah. You said they were nonphysical, which implies they are not part of physical reality. While I can imagine various incorrect scenarios in which the minds are nonphysical, yet causally related to physical reality, I have yet to see a valid argument in this thread, presented in syllogistic form for the existence of a nonphysical mind.

Can you present one, tying together all of your ideas?
 
Can you present one, tying together all of your ideas?

You have a clone made yesterday in Perth, and you are in Sydney:

What I put in bold is what we will compare.

Body (B) (in Sydney) = body (B*) (in Perth).

Mind (M) in Sydney = mind (M*) (in Perth).

Me (Y) (from your point of view in Sydney) does not equal him (X) (in Perth)


B = B*

M = M*

Y /= X
 
So there was, like ryan fantasizes, a non-physical element that WAS the person, that somehow traveled along the beam to be the real person when they put it back together.

As much as I want to say "I told ya so", I must remember that this is god damn T.V. show. Why on Earth do people bring up Star Trak to help them make sense of reality?!
I think it's more that people bring up fiction to make sense of your fiction.
 
Everyone is 'Me', and there is only one 'Me'.

This is not a contradiction; it is an artefact of the definition of the word 'Me', which includes a relative reference to the set of conscious individuals - the reference is dependent on the point of view of the speaker.

'Me' is a subjective characteristic.

Every point in space is the centre of the expanding universe.

If you ask the clone in Sydney, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Sydney, and the replica in Perth is not 'Me'.

If you ask the clone in Perth, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Perth, and the replica in Sydney is not 'Me'.

That's not a difference between the two copies; it is a similarity between them, and is EXACTLY what we should expect if consciousness is simply a property of the physical brain.

Every single person can truthfully say "There is only one consciousness that I can experience, and it is the one I am experiencing now". In exactly the same way, everyone can truthfully claim to be in the exact centre of the expansion of the universe. 'I am' does not exclude 'You are'.
 
Can you present one, tying together all of your ideas?

You have a clone made yesterday in Perth, and you are in Sydney:

What I put in bold is what we will compare.

Body (B) (in Sydney) = body (B*) (in Perth).

Mind (M) in Sydney = mind (M*) (in Perth).

Me (Y) (from your point of view in Sydney) does not equal him (X) (in Perth)


B = B*

M = M*

Y /= X

How is this an argument divorcing mental and physical? Try to make a  syllogism.
 
Everyone is 'Me', and there is only one 'Me'.

This is not a contradiction; it is an artefact of the definition of the word 'Me', which includes a relative reference to the set of conscious individuals - the reference is dependent on the point of view of the speaker.

'Me' is a subjective characteristic.

Strictly objectively speaking, subjective points of view do not exist.

Every point in space is the centre of the expanding universe.

If you ask the clone in Sydney, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Sydney, and the replica in Perth is not 'Me'.

If you ask the clone in Perth, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Perth, and the replica in Sydney is not 'Me'.

That's not a difference between the two copies; it is a similarity between them, and is EXACTLY what we should expect if consciousness is simply a property of the physical brain.

Every single person can truthfully say "There is only one consciousness that I can experience, and it is the one I am experiencing now". In exactly the same way, everyone can truthfully claim to be in the exact centre of the expansion of the universe. 'I am' does not exclude 'You are'.

I see what you are saying, but what you are saying has a duality to it. The universe is different for everyone, but it is also the same for everyone. Because of the former, physicalism is false. If there were only objectivity, then physicalism would rule.

You can't have two different universes simultaneously in physicalism even though they are also the same in every other way.
 
Strictly objectively speaking, subjective points of view do not exist.

Every point in space is the centre of the expanding universe.

If you ask the clone in Sydney, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Sydney, and the replica in Perth is not 'Me'.

If you ask the clone in Perth, he will tell you that 'Me' is in Perth, and the replica in Sydney is not 'Me'.

That's not a difference between the two copies; it is a similarity between them, and is EXACTLY what we should expect if consciousness is simply a property of the physical brain.

Every single person can truthfully say "There is only one consciousness that I can experience, and it is the one I am experiencing now". In exactly the same way, everyone can truthfully claim to be in the exact centre of the expansion of the universe. 'I am' does not exclude 'You are'.

I see what you are saying, but what you are saying has a duality to it. The universe is different for everyone, but it is also the same for everyone. Because of the former, physicalism is false. If there were only objectivity, then physicalism would rule.

You can't have two different universes simultaneously in physicalism even though they are also the same in every other way.

The universe is the same for everyone. But everyone is in a different location, and so has a different perspective.

It is objectively true that I am not in the same place as you, for all 'I' and all 'You'.

There is nothing in this that in any way causes problems for physicalism.
 
Strictly objectively speaking, subjective points of view do not exist.

I see what you are saying, but what you are saying has a duality to it. The universe is different for everyone, but it is also the same for everyone. Because of the former, physicalism is false. If there were only objectivity, then physicalism would rule.

You can't have two different universes simultaneously in physicalism even though they are also the same in every other way.

The universe is the same for everyone. But everyone is in a different location, and so has a different perspective.

You are reinforcing my argument without even realizing it.

There are no perspectives from an objective point of view. They simply don't exist unless you are one of them.

There is nothing in this that in any way causes problems for physicalism.

Physicalism can't have identical universes that are also different.
 
You have a clone made yesterday in Perth, and you are in Sydney:

What I put in bold is what we will compare.

Body (B) (in Sydney) = body (B*) (in Perth).

Mind (M) in Sydney = mind (M*) (in Perth).

Me (Y) (from your point of view in Sydney) does not equal him (X) (in Perth)


B = B*

M = M*

Y /= X

How is this an argument divorcing mental and physical? Try to make a  syllogism.

Oops, I missed this post.

It isn't. This whole argument assumes mental states. Whether or not mental states exist is a whole other topic.

Mental can exist in minimal physicalism.

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.

P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.

P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.

C(1) Physicalism is false.
 
How is this an argument divorcing mental and physical? Try to make a  syllogism.

Oops, I missed this post.

It isn't. This whole argument assumes mental states. Whether or not mental states exist is a whole other topic.
Ohh... carry on. I thought you had a specific point in addition to carrying on the conversation.

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
I'll assume the experience for John in U* is the same as the experience of John in U, and the experience of Jane in U is different from the experience of John in U.
P(2*) Experience for John in U is the same as experience of John in U*
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.
Ok... it is so far.
C(1) Physicalism is false.

From which premise?
 
You said - ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney - and I pointed out that mind is not a component of 'mind' but a component of the activity of the brain in Sydney.

And, of course, the mind in Perth is a component of the activity of the brain in Perth, albeit a twin of the mind in Sydney....much the same as identical twins, they may look alike but are two separate identities.

But what you said and what I said can both be true.

(P1) Mind is a component of your mind.

(P2) Your mind is a component of the brain.

(C1) Mind is a component of the brain.

It's the wording;

Saying ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney'' is something like saying ''a brain is a component of a brain'' or ''a cat is a component of a cat.''

Mind is not a component of a mind, a mind is a mind is a mind...a mind being the activity of a brain, a brain is not a component of a brain, it is just a brain.

Two brains, identical or not, are two separate and distinct brains as in the form of object and location each generating its own mind, whether identical to the other, or not.
 
Oops, I missed this post.

It isn't. This whole argument assumes mental states. Whether or not mental states exist is a whole other topic.
Ohh... carry on. I thought you had a specific point in addition to carrying on the conversation.

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
I'll assume the experience for John in U* is the same as the experience of John in U, and the experience of Jane in U is different from the experience of John in U.
P(2*) Experience for John in U is the same as experience of John in U*
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.
Ok... it is so far.
C(1) Physicalism is false.

From which premise?

You need all three, but the most important is P(2).
 
But what you said and what I said can both be true.

(P1) Mind is a component of your mind.

(P2) Your mind is a component of the brain.

(C1) Mind is a component of the brain.

It's the wording;

Saying ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney'' is something like saying ''a brain is a component of a brain'' or ''a cat is a component of a cat.''

Mind is not a component of a mind, a mind is a mind is a mind...a mind being the activity of a brain, a brain is not a component of a brain, it is just a brain.

Two brains, identical or not, are two separate and distinct brains as in the form of object and location each generating its own mind, whether identical to the other, or not.

If A is your mind, then A must be a mind.

But if A is a mind, then A may not be your mind.

Your mind has your subjectivity.
 
It's the wording;

Saying ''the mind in Sydney is a component of your mind in Sydney'' is something like saying ''a brain is a component of a brain'' or ''a cat is a component of a cat.''

Mind is not a component of a mind, a mind is a mind is a mind...a mind being the activity of a brain, a brain is not a component of a brain, it is just a brain.

Two brains, identical or not, are two separate and distinct brains as in the form of object and location each generating its own mind, whether identical to the other, or not.

If A is your mind, then A must be a mind.

But if A is a mind, then A may not be your mind.

Your mind has your subjectivity.

Mind A is not 'your' mind.

Mind A is you.

Mind A is not mind B.

Sorry, but your syllogism is based on flawed premises.
 
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