My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

And there is another differentiating property, the fact that it will eventually differ.

I already mentioned that (How about actually read my post before answering it?) and that is the same as saying that there are "two separate bodies" which I have bern specifically clear with in previous posts.

Yes, I said that so we would be in a similar thought process. The future state and the past state of the bodies are the difference.

 

[bigfield]

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

Could you clarify: when was there a physical difference between the original and the clone, and when does this difference cease to exist?

That doesn't matter. The point is that there is no physical difference between the two.

So when you say, 'there was a physical difference' what difference are you referring to?

Because I am unable to make sense of your response to my post, where you made that statement.

You claimed that the original brain gets the identity that existed previously, while the clone does not:

The reality is that you are not experiencing in Perth.

The simplest explanation for that claim is that you think that the mind supervenes the brain, and therefore there is no reason to postulate a supernatural essence/soul that exists independently of the brain.

But one supervenient mind has a true identity, and nobody can know this with a physical assessment.

Both have an identity, but only one is running on the brain that was not cloned. That is a physical difference.

That it takes omniscience to know that physical difference in your hyptothetical scenario does not mean that the physical difference does not exist.

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

 

[Juma]

I already mentioned that (How about actually read my post before answering it?) and that is the same as saying that there are "two separate bodies" which I have bern specifically clear with in previous posts.

Yes, I said that so we would be in a similar thought process. The future state and the past state of the bodies are the difference.

Good. So you agree that there need not to be any "non-physical" difference. That all that is needed is in the objectiv properties of the bodies?

 

[bilby]

By your logic, going to sleep and then waking up would be the exact same thing as dying and being replaced with a clone. Wouldn't it?

It is the exact same thing.

^ This.

How could you ever tell the difference?

Death holds no fear for me; I do it all the time.

Permenant death I do not welcome, because it would mean never finding out what happens next.

The process of dying permenantly might also be uncomfortable or painful; I would prefer to avoid that, but the society in which I live seems determined to make things as difficult as possible.

Death? Been there, done that. Probably close to 15,000 times. It's a doddle.

Death lasting an eternity? Did that too, ending when my brain first developed consciousness.

Worrying about death is a waste of life.

 

[Keith&Co.]

Would an alien from a totally different universe recognize that minds exist on sensory alone? No they wouldn't. .

Don't you love how thought experiments always end up proving what you want them to prove?

 

[PyramidHead]

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

ryan is assuming the identity of indiscernibles, a matter that is by no means settled in philosophy. Without it, his argument fails.

 

[Keith&Co.]

It is the exact same thing.

^ This.

How could you ever tell the difference?

Death holds no fear for me; I do it all the time.

In one of the Star Trek novels, McCoy starts to wonder if maybe the transporter process kills the subject. Maybe it releases the soul and just assembles molecules to create a zombie at the other end, memories intact but ultimately dead. Maybe they commit murder at the academy every time they transport a cadet for the first time.

Kirk's response: Just get onto the platform, Bones.

 

[PyramidHead]

^ This.

How could you ever tell the difference?

Death holds no fear for me; I do it all the time.

In one of the Star Trek novels, McCoy starts to wonder if maybe the transporter process kills the subject. Maybe it releases the soul and just assembles molecules to create a zombie at the other end, memories intact but ultimately dead. Maybe they commit murder at the academy every time they transport a cadet for the first time.

Kirk's response: Just get onto the platform, Bones.

Bones was right to worry. Later episodes, notably one of the Next Generation ones with a cloned Riker, pretty much confirm that everyone who enters a transporter is instantly killed and replaced with someone with all their memories and physical composition. This means that (1) from the point of view of the person entering the transporter, all of their experiences cease permanently, and (2) every main character in Star Trek is a replicated entity who never actually experienced any of events before their latest transporter usage, but the transporter has arranged the atoms in their brain to dupe them into believing they did.

 

[Juma]

In one of the Star Trek novels, McCoy starts to wonder if maybe the transporter process kills the subject. Maybe it releases the soul and just assembles molecules to create a zombie at the other end, memories intact but ultimately dead. Maybe they commit murder at the academy every time they transport a cadet for the first time.

Kirk's response: Just get onto the platform, Bones.

Bones was right to worry. Later episodes, notably one of the Next Generation ones with a cloned Riker, pretty much confirm that everyone who enters a transporter is instantly killed and replaced with someone with all their memories and physical composition. This means that (1) from the point of view of the person entering the transporter, all of their experiences cease permanently, and (2) every main character in Star Trek is a replicated entity who never actually experienced any of events before their latest transporter usage, but the transporter has arranged the atoms in their brain to dupe them into believing they did.

The difference being what, exactly?

 

[Juma]

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

ryan is assuming the identity of indiscernibles, a matter that is by no means settled in philosophy. Without it, his argument fails.

A question that is settled in philosophy alone is of no importance here. Reality rules.

 

[PyramidHead]

Bones was right to worry. Later episodes, notably one of the Next Generation ones with a cloned Riker, pretty much confirm that everyone who enters a transporter is instantly killed and replaced with someone with all their memories and physical composition. This means that (1) from the point of view of the person entering the transporter, all of their experiences cease permanently, and (2) every main character in Star Trek is a replicated entity who never actually experienced any of events before their latest transporter usage, but the transporter has arranged the atoms in their brain to dupe them into believing they did.

The difference being what, exactly?

The difference is that if you are a member of Starfleet and you step into a transporter, you will be disintegrated and never experience anything ever again. The replicated version of you will have many new experiences (but no actual experiences prior to being created at that very moment).

 

[PyramidHead]

nm

 

[Keith&Co.]

In one of the Star Trek novels, McCoy starts to wonder if maybe the transporter process kills the subject. Maybe it releases the soul and just assembles molecules to create a zombie at the other end, memories intact but ultimately dead. Maybe they commit murder at the academy every time they transport a cadet for the first time.

Kirk's response: Just get onto the platform, Bones.

Bones was right to worry. Later episodes, notably one of the Next Generation ones with a cloned Riker, pretty much confirm that everyone who enters a transporter is instantly killed and replaced with someone with all their memories and physical composition.

No, that didn't confirm that the original was killed. Just that an extra body was created from the original pattern.

 

[Kharakov]

Sure. 2 exact physical copies, that are in some sort of isolation chamber in which they are exposed to the exact same circumstances, so evolve the same.

Sydney has something in your body that Perth doesn't have. This something is your consciousness. Even though there is an identical consciousness in Perth. You are in Sydney.

2 Identical consciousnesses... I get that. I don't get how they are non-physical.

I still don't see the nonphysical side, which is why I asked "Are you saying that mind is something in addition to physical reality, which is venient upon PR and PR is venient upon it?"

Forget this.

Ok... so the whole non-physical consciousness thing is no longer part of this conversation? Are you proposing substance monism in stead of dualism?

 

[PyramidHead]

Bones was right to worry. Later episodes, notably one of the Next Generation ones with a cloned Riker, pretty much confirm that everyone who enters a transporter is instantly killed and replaced with someone with all their memories and physical composition.

No, that didn't confirm that the original was killed. Just that an extra body was created from the original pattern.

That's up for interpretation I suppose, but I always interpreted it to mean that transporters are basically the same as food replicators. They don't need to reassemble people using the exact same material that goes in, which is why it was even possible to glitch out and make two Rikers. Either way, no human can survive being reduced to elementary particles, so whether they are remade with the same stuff or replicated stuff is moot. It will always be the case that a person who is disintegrated by a transporter will die, as all of their neural patterns and internal organs are utterly annihilated to a degree as severe as if they were at the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. A few seconds later, (or a minute later, or a year later, it should make no difference) another being is deliberately assembled to imitate the original down to every minute detail, and it is now that this new consciousness begins its life, albeit with the memories and birthmarks of the original person. But they are no more the same consciousness as the original than the two people in the OP's example are, and for the same reason: one of them is dead!

 

[ryan]

That doesn't matter. The point is that there is no physical difference between the two.

So when you say, 'there was a physical difference' what difference are you referring to?

Whatever blob of organic material the clone was is going to be physically different than the original person. But once the material gets turned into the clone, then there will no longer be a physical difference.

I agree that there was a physical difference, but there isn't a physical difference anymore.

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

To be exact, they are neither the same matter nor are they different matter. They are the same kind of matter.

 

[ryan]

Yes, I said that so we would be in a similar thought process. The future state and the past state of the bodies are the difference.

Good. So you agree that there need not to be any "non-physical" difference. That all that is needed is in the objectiv properties of the bodies?

Yes, if you only care about taking an objective account, then you will not miss any physical information (I will suspend my belief in free will for now). But you will be missing the information about subjectivity.

We automatically have to take subjectivity for granted because we have to use our subjective consciousness/mind to make an objective account of the universe.

 

[ryan]

It is the exact same thing.

^ This.

How could you ever tell the difference?

Death holds no fear for me; I do it all the time.

"I do it all of the time", what is this "I" that you seem to think makes it through your "death"? The "I" you are talking about is at the heart of my argument.

Permenant death I do not welcome, because it would mean never finding out what happens next.

The process of dying permenantly might also be uncomfortable or painful; I would prefer to avoid that, but the society in which I live seems determined to make things as difficult as possible.

Death? Been there, done that. Probably close to 15,000 times. It's a doddle.

Death lasting an eternity? Did that too, ending when my brain first developed consciousness.

Worrying about death is a waste of life.

Similarly, you keep differentiating between permanent death and temporary death. How is permanent death any different?

 

[Juma]

Good. So you agree that there need not to be any "non-physical" difference. That all that is needed is in the objectiv properties of the bodies?

Yes, if you only care about taking an objective account, then you will not miss any physical information (I will suspend my belief in free will for now). But you will be missing the information about subjectivity.

Why?

 

[ryan]

The two brains are not made of the same matter. They are different matter; it is only their configuration that is identical. I do not understand your reasoning for concluding that two materially different objects have no physical difference.

ryan is assuming the identity of indiscernibles, a matter that is by no means settled in philosophy. Without it, his argument fails.

Thanks, I just read some of that entry. Near the top I saw, "Some would defend the Principle even in this case by claiming that there are properties such as being that very object A. Call such a property a thisness or haecceity". It is this "thisness or haecceity" that I put in bold that is at the heart of my argument.