My New Argument for a Nonphysical Consciousness

[ryan]

Maybe it's both. Imagine seeing a curved line. But when rotated 90 degrees, it becomes straight. You are saying that the line is straight because you can only see one dimension. The truth is that it's both, curved and straight, depending on which dimension you observe it in.

Bullshit: look at the difference at time T. Period. That is what matters.

Okay, but that is like telling me that the y dimension only matters for the "straight" line, not the x dimension.

 

[Juma]

Bullshit: look at the difference at time T. Period. That is what matters.

Okay, but that is like telling me that the y dimension only matters for the "straight" line, not the x dimension.

No it isnt. You asked about the diference WHEN the clone was made. That is at time=T. That is also what matters for the mind. The mind cannot travel back in time...

 

[PyramidHead]

Good for you. Can you support the existence of such a property, or was a cursory glance at a webpage enough to solidify your argument about the fucking nature of the universe? Could you try not presuming to have all the relevant information and just admit you don't know something for once?

I can't even begin to tell how confused I am about this post. Of all of the possible combinations of words and letters that are possible here, this combination would certainly not be in the first thousand that I would expect to see as a response to my post.

Indeed, the nature of the universe continues to shock me.

It's just the cavalier way that you show up to an internet forum with some simplistic argument that you just thought of one day, and expect everybody to take it as a serious empirical claim about the fabric of reality. You appear know nothing, absolutely nil, about the centuries of academic and historical engagement with the mind/body problem. When shown the ongoing debate about an assumption that completely encapsulates your claim, you just pick out a snippet of text that sounds like what you're saying and go "yeah, that's what I meant" and move on. It's almost like you think that having thought about something a lot satisfies the prerequisite for making authoritative pronouncements on it. I mean, you do know that people actually go to grad school for this stuff, right? What exactly gives you the impression that you're equipped to discover something novel about the mind/body problem just by sitting at a computer and hashing it out with us? If you want to say you've solved that conundrum, you have to do your homework. The fact that this sentiment is so shocking to you tells me the vanishingly low probability of your success has rarely occurred to you.

 

[ryan]

I can't even begin to tell how confused I am about this post. Of all of the possible combinations of words and letters that are possible here, this combination would certainly not be in the first thousand that I would expect to see as a response to my post.

Indeed, the nature of the universe continues to shock me.

It's just the cavalier way that you show up to an internet forum with some simplistic argument that you just thought of one day, and expect everybody to take it as a serious empirical claim about the fabric of reality. You appear know nothing, absolutely nil, about the centuries of academic and historical engagement with the mind/body problem. When shown the ongoing debate about an assumption that completely encapsulates your claim, you just pick out a snippet of text that sounds like what you're saying and go "yeah, that's what I meant" and move on. It's almost like you think that having thought about something a lot satisfies the prerequisite for making authoritative pronouncements on it. I mean, you do know that people actually go to grad school for this stuff, right? What exactly gives you the impression that you're equipped to discover something novel about the mind/body problem just by sitting at a computer and hashing it out with us? If you want to say you've solved that conundrum, you have to do your homework. The fact that this sentiment is so shocking to you tells me the vanishingly low probability of your success has rarely occurred to you.

When we think that we know something, we usually will explain why we think what we do. It comes off as arrogant because it is just where we are at in our heads. I get this all of the time with certain people; they think I am telling them that they are wrong when really I am not.

I see this constantly with other people. One person believes one thing and the other believes the contrary. In the end, one will be wrong, and the other says, "why do you argue with me when I am right". They argue because they thought they were right even though they were wrong.

I always admit when I think I am wrong, so it is for anyone willing to bring me to the other side.

 

[Kharakov]

Is it wrong to deliberately make faulty arguments?

 

[ryan]

Is it wrong to deliberately make faulty arguments?

I am not doing it deliberately. I might have the right answer on my side.

 

[PyramidHead]

It's just the cavalier way that you show up to an internet forum with some simplistic argument that you just thought of one day, and expect everybody to take it as a serious empirical claim about the fabric of reality. You appear know nothing, absolutely nil, about the centuries of academic and historical engagement with the mind/body problem. When shown the ongoing debate about an assumption that completely encapsulates your claim, you just pick out a snippet of text that sounds like what you're saying and go "yeah, that's what I meant" and move on. It's almost like you think that having thought about something a lot satisfies the prerequisite for making authoritative pronouncements on it. I mean, you do know that people actually go to grad school for this stuff, right? What exactly gives you the impression that you're equipped to discover something novel about the mind/body problem just by sitting at a computer and hashing it out with us? If you want to say you've solved that conundrum, you have to do your homework. The fact that this sentiment is so shocking to you tells me the vanishingly low probability of your success has rarely occurred to you.

When we think that we know something, we usually will explain why we think what we do. It comes off as arrogant because it is just where we are at in our heads. I get this all of the time with certain people; they think I am telling them that they are wrong when really I am not.

I see this constantly with other people. One person believes one thing and the other believes the contrary. In the end, one will be wrong, and the other says, "why do you argue with me when I am right". They argue because they thought they were right even though they were wrong.

I always admit when I think I am wrong, so it is for anyone willing to bring me to the other side.

You're talking about admitting when you think you're wrong, which is a separate act from acknowledging that (1) the question of whether the mind is a different substance from the rest of the universe can't be answered solely by referring to imaginary scenarios, and (2) it certainly doesn't help to be casually ignorant of the sheer volume of peer-reviewed literature on the subject. This is the trap of armchair philosophy. If it were possible to dream up a thought experiment and settle the matter, don't you think it would have been done by now? Have you considered the possibility that you (nor me, nor anyone else) are simply not equipped to say anything meaningful or conclusive about the nature of consciousness?

 

[Kharakov]

Is it wrong to deliberately make faulty arguments?

I am not doing it deliberately. I might have the right answer on my side.

lol... let's get back to this one then:

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.

C(1) Physicalism is false.

You said P(2) is the most important premise. It doesn't indicate that the universes are different in any respect.
P(3) isn't true. For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be different from U in the fact that it is an additional universe.

Of course, C(1) is completely disconnected from the premises, doesn't follow from them. Maybe use that as a premise, and then use it as a conclusion? I'm sure someone can give you a link to creationist arguments for the EoG.

You know what though, if you could get creationists to argue against your statements, and realize the error of this form of argument, maybe they would see that their arguments are incorrect as well. The problem is that they may have no interest in valid argumentation.

 

[ryan]

Okay, but that is like telling me that the y dimension only matters for the "straight" line, not the x dimension.

No it isnt. You asked about the diference WHEN the clone was made. That is at time=T. That is also what matters for the mind. The mind cannot travel back in time...

The truth about what it is is preserved by where it is.

 

[Juma]

No it isnt. You asked about the diference WHEN the clone was made. That is at time=T. That is also what matters for the mind. The mind cannot travel back in time...

The truth about what it is is preserved by where it is.

Gobblywook to you too. Come again when you have something to say.

 

[ryan]

When we think that we know something, we usually will explain why we think what we do. It comes off as arrogant because it is just where we are at in our heads. I get this all of the time with certain people; they think I am telling them that they are wrong when really I am not.

I see this constantly with other people. One person believes one thing and the other believes the contrary. In the end, one will be wrong, and the other says, "why do you argue with me when I am right". They argue because they thought they were right even though they were wrong.

I always admit when I think I am wrong, so it is for anyone willing to bring me to the other side.

You're talking about admitting when you think you're wrong, which is a separate act from acknowledging that (1) the question of whether the mind is a different substance from the rest of the universe can't be answered solely by referring to imaginary scenarios, and (2) it certainly doesn't help to be casually ignorant of the sheer volume of peer-reviewed literature on the subject. This is the trap of armchair philosophy. If it were possible to dream up a thought experiment and settle the matter, don't you think it would have been done by now? Have you considered the possibility that you (nor me, nor anyone else) are simply not equipped to say anything meaningful or conclusive about the nature of consciousness?

I think you're taking this all too seriously. I like being on this forum because these discussions are intellectual candy, and I do learn things too.

Yes most of us would have probably have achieved a degree in philosophy by now, but you can't beat the financial cost or the freedom of this forum. Besides, I am only studying math and science now, and next year my art elective is going to be sociology.

 

[ryan]

I am not doing it deliberately. I might have the right answer on my side.

lol... let's get back to this one then:

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.

C(1) Physicalism is false.

You said P(2) is the most important premise. It doesn't indicate that the universes are different in any respect.
P(3) isn't true. For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be different from U in the fact that it is an additional universe.

Assume that Jane is in pain and John isn't. Their respective reports at t(0) will be different about the universe. Jane sensed pain, but John didn't. However, they will agree on practically everything else that isn't mental.

 

[Juma]

I think you're taking this all too seriously. I like being on this forum because these discussions are intellectual candy, and I do learn things too.

If these posts are eatables your posts are rotting fast food.

 

[Kharakov]

I think you're taking this all too seriously. I like being on this forum because these discussions are intellectual candy, and I do learn things too.

If these posts are eatables your posts are rotting fast food.

Corruption does provide counterparts to purity. Ryan's antilogic does provide ample fertilizer for conversation.

 

[Kharakov]

lol... let's get back to this one then:

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.

C(1) Physicalism is false.

You said P(2) is the most important premise. It doesn't indicate that the universes are different in any respect.
P(3) isn't true. For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be different from U in the fact that it is an additional universe.

Assume that Jane is in pain and John isn't. Their respective reports at t(0) will be different about the universe. Jane sensed pain, but John didn't. However, they will agree on practically everything else that isn't mental.

They are 2 different beings, which you are well aware of, and their unique experiences have nothing to do with whether the universes are the same or not (technically if Jane (U)'s experiences are different from Jane (U*)'s experiences... U and U* are not identical copies).

Jane (U) is the same as Jane (U*), but different from John in U and U*. John in U is the same as John in U*, but different from Jane in U and U*.

 

[ryan]

If these posts are eatables your posts are rotting fast food.

Corruption does provide counterparts to purity. Ryan's antilogic does provide ample fertilizer for conversation.

Shut up and get back to the moldy cheeseburgers. You too Juma, they aren't going to eat themselves.

 

[Kharakov]

Corruption does provide counterparts to purity. Ryan's antilogic does provide ample fertilizer for conversation.

Shut up and get back to the moldy cheeseburgers. You too Juma, they aren't going to eat themselves.

I hope the burgers aren't moldy, I'm going to BBQ them in a couple hours. Although... I don't know if mold minds being eaten or not. Is it sentient, like shrooms?

 

[bilby]

Shut up and get back to the moldy cheeseburgers. You too Juma, they aren't going to eat themselves.

I hope the burgers aren't moldy, I'm going to BBQ them in a couple hours. Although... I don't know if mold minds being eaten or not. Is it sentient, like shrooms?

Ask a Stilton cheese.

 

[ryan]

lol... let's get back to this one then:

P(1) Universe U* is a copy of universe U.
P(2) Experience for John in U is different than experience for Jane in U*.
P(3) For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be the same as U in every way.

C(1) Physicalism is false.

You said P(2) is the most important premise. It doesn't indicate that the universes are different in any respect.
P(3) isn't true. For minimal physicalism to be true, U* has to be different from U in the fact that it is an additional universe.

Assume that Jane is in pain and John isn't. Their respective reports at t(0) will be different about the universe. Jane sensed pain, but John didn't. However, they will agree on practically everything else that isn't mental.

They are 2 different beings, which you are well aware of, and their unique experiences have nothing to do with whether the universes are the same or not (technically if Jane (U)'s experiences are different from Jane (U*)'s experiences... U and U* are not identical copies).

But that is just glossing over my point. The universe is different for Jane in U than it is for John in U. The only reason why I brought U* into all of this is to show the contradiction with the proper definition of physicalism.

Shrooms adds another universe U**

 

[bilby]

So you are saying that different people experience the universe differently? No shit, Sherlock.

Then you go on to say that even if two people were physically identical, they would still experience the universe differently.

But you can't support this; the only way to have them experience the universe differently is to introduce a physical difference.

If they are identical at the atomic level, and they are provided with identical sensory input, then they would not be different. Not in any way. Or at least, not in any way other than your desire that they should be.

As long as no physical difference is introduced, they would be exactly the same. Consciousness doesn't enter into this - this would be equally true of two identical rocks as it would of two identical humans.