me said:
3. With regard to the epistemological high ground, I'm not sure how that works: why would a self-identified Sunni Muslim be in a better epistemological position than a self-identified former Muslim, or a self-identified atheist who has studied philosophy of religion, history of Islam and the Quran, to assess whether a Shia Muslim is a Muslim, or whether the Quran entails that thieves deserve to have a hand (or both) cut off, or some other thing you're thinking about?
Jayjay said:
Anyone who thinks that Quran has supernatural origins and trying to interpret it through that premise is already in realm of theology, and doesn't mean anything for anyone who doesn't accept the same premise.
But the question I was trying to ask is basically: why would the self-identified Muslim would have an
epistemic high ground when it comes to ascertaining who's a Muslim and/or what Islam is and/or what the Quran entails?
Having an extra premise that is either false or not even false (namely, that the Quran has supernatural origins) does not the self-identified Muslim's epistemic position.
But now I see you've clarified your point. I will address your new point below.
Jayjay said:
Just to clarify, I wasn't saying that the self-identified muslims have the "epistemological high ground". It's the opposite: they lack the high ground because they view certain issues through glasses of divine revelation rather than any objective criteria.
Alright, that makes sense.
However, I don't understand your previous replies in light of that clarification, for the following reasons:
At first, you questioned non-Muslims position to judge what's Islam or not, when you said
"Who are non-muslims to judge what's Islam or not anyway?"
That expression looked like a moral assessment to me, but
I asked, and also raised a challenge in case my interpretation was correct.
I said:
me said:
Are you suggesting that only Muslims are morally permitted to say what Islam is?
But then, who judges who is a Muslim?
Your
reply was:
Jayjay said:
It's not about who has the moral high ground to judge other person's belief, but who has the epistemological high ground. Muslim A who thinks muslim B is not really a muslim is usually just making a religious statement that is meaningless outside the context of Muslim A's belief system. But at the same time muslims B might just as strongly feel the opposite, again in context of his own belief system. What's a person outside those belief systems to do? At best, we can take their self-identification at face value and agree that they are both muslims because they think they are.
To put it another way, it's not me that the moderate muslim needs to convince about what Islam is or isn't. That's a theological dispute and to an atheist about as relevant as how many angels can dance on a head of a pin.
So, your claim was epistemic, not moral.
But then again, in the context of your challenge to non-Muslims (i.e., "Who are non-muslims to judge what's Islam or not anyway?"), an epistemic challenge only makes sense is your claim is that Muslims are in a better epistemic position to assess what Islam is. If you hold that people who view certain issues through the glass of [alleged] divine revelation
lacl the epistemic high ground (and you're correct about that, all other things equal), then the epistemic challenge "Who are non-muslims to judge what's Islam or not anyway?" has the following answer:
"Non-Muslims are people whose capability to assess what Islam is has not been degraded by their false belief in Islamic divine revelation. Some non-Muslims also don't have that capability degraded by beliefs in any other divine revelation"