Russian Invasion of Ukraine - tactics and logistics

[T.G.G. Moogly]

So the loss of the Moskva lessens Russia's ability to strike distant targets: supplies and airfields. It may also force Russia to reconsider how close to shore they choose to place the rest of their ships.

They've already pulled them back.

No one seems to know how many sailors perished. Turkey picked up 56 from the wreck. It's safe to assume the rest are dead.

 

[Jimmy Higgins]

Over 400 people on the ship... that'd be a pretty big loss. Only 20 Brits died on the HMS Sheffield.

Putin's War is costing Russia dearly. And getting ships into that theater... it isn't easy.

 

[Copernicus]

...As I mentioned, a global nuclear war is very improbable at this point. Putin's own change in strategy indicates that. Moreover, it's not even clear to me the orders would be followed.

But if it happened, chances are most people would survive. Do you think there is a significant chance that he would launch large numbers of nukes against China? India? Africa? South America? Iran, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, etc.? Every nuke used to kill non-enemies is a nuke not used to kill enemies (well, except when the enemies and the non-enemies live side-by-side, but my point is there is no significant incentive to attack countries that are not enemies of Russia, even if they are not allies either; there are some exceptions e.g., countries whose governments recently turned on Putin, but even then more than a limited strike would be a waste of nukes that could instead be used against the US, UK, etc. ).

I don't really have the energy to continue arguing with you over the state of Putin's mind, since my claim is essentially that we just don't know how rational he is. Neither of us is qualified to make such a judgement, even if we had access to information that would allow it. Maybe you are right, and I certainly hope so. But I fear that he is more in a bunker mentality than you suspect.

I agree that a global nuclear war seems improbable, but it seems less improbable when you consider that there have been close calls in the past, and I'm not just talking about the Cuban crisis. The potential for an accidental start to such a war has risen dramatically since the beginning of Putin's second invasion, and the Kremlin sent a formal note just yesterday warning the US of "unpredictable consequences" in retaliation against its military aid to Ukraine. Zelensky is claiming the the West needs to prepare for the imminent use of nuclear weapons, and Russia does seem to be pulling out all the stops, especially after it lost its flagship in the Black Sea to a missile attack. Putin and other Russians can't seem to stop mentioning nuclear weapons in their rhetoric, because they are looking for some kind of leverage to bully the world into giving in to their demands. The problem is that rhetoric can easily have a snowball effect that leads to action. That is why Putin's warning of "unpredictable consequences" needs to be taken seriously. He is obviously not deterred by the thought of committing mass murder on an international scale.

 

[Elixir]

my claim is essentially that we just don't know how rational he is

I have long agreed that determination of his rationality - by me at least - is a futile exercise. As this has progressed though, I'm more and more convinced that Pootey is like a bank robber cornered in the vault, holding The Girl in one arm and a grenade with the pin pulled in the other. The difference is, that scenario will resolve one way or another, usually within hours and with single digit if any casualties.
Maybe the outcome will be something entirely unforeseen. Might be a good time for China to declare a big swath of Russia to be historically part of Mongolia ...

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I don't really have the energy to continue arguing with you over the state of Putin's mind, since my claim is essentially that we just don't know how rational he is.

Actually, I do agree we do not know how rational he is. I argue that we do have information that allows us to put probable constraints on the degree of irrationality in his thought, in the specific matters under discussion. But the precise degree is unknowable.

I agree that a global nuclear war seems improbable, but it seems less improbable when you consider that there have been close calls in the past, and I'm not just talking about the Cuban crisis.

I was talking about the probability of global nuclear war. If we're talking about nuclear war in general, it is still improbable, but the probability is far greater. It just wouldn't involve the strategic nukes.

The potential for an accidental start to such a war has risen dramatically since the beginning of Putin's second invasion, and the Kremlin sent a formal note just yesterday warning the US of "unpredictable consequences" in retaliation against its military aid to Ukraine. Zelensky is claiming the the West needs to prepare for the imminent use of nuclear weapons, and Russia does seem to be pulling out all the stops, especially after it lost its flagship in the Black Sea to a missile attack. Putin and other Russians can't seem to stop mentioning nuclear weapons in their rhetoric, because they are looking for some kind of leverage to bully the world into giving in to their demands. The problem is that rhetoric can easily have a snowball effect that leads to action. That is why Putin's warning of "unpredictable consequences" needs to be taken seriously. He is obviously not deterred by the thought of committing mass murder on an international scale.

The behavior in the war does not indicate probable use of nuclear weapons, for the reasons I've mentioned. But still, if they fail to take the Donbas region with conventional weapons, chemical weapons seem like an option. If that fails - or, less probably but still realistic - they might use nukes. What I'm arguing against is the sort of nuclear war the argument is about, not just any nuclear war.

 

[Jayjay]

So, let's say Russia does use a "tactical" nuke on Kyiv. City wiped out, including Zelensky and most of Ukrainian leadership (I expect the military to be still able to function though, being non-centralized).

What happens next? Does the NATO or US respond in kind with a nuclear strike on Russia? Or will they finally enforce a no-fly zone in Ukraine and actively push Russian troops out, knowing it may lead to more nukes?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

So, let's say Russia does use a "tactical" nuke on Kyiv. City wiped out, including Zelensky and most of Ukrainian leadership (I expect the military to be still able to function though, being non-centralized).


What happens next? Does the NATO or US respond in kind with a nuclear strike on Russia? Or will they finally enforce a no-fly zone in Ukraine and actively push Russian troops out, knowing it may lead to more nukes?

I don't know, but why would Russia use tactical nukes in that manner?

In fact, Kyiv is an extremely unlikely target, for several reasons. Just for example:

1. Putin had the ability to target Zelensky and likely kill him, as he chose to stay openly in Kyiv, in a known location. He chose not to do so. Why? I don't know. Maybe he reckons targeting leaders is off-limits, lest he be personally targeted. But nuking Kyiv would have that effect.

2. Russia denies targeting civilians. Targeting a city would be obviously a case of targeting civilians.

3. They're now trying to get the Donbas region, not all of Ukraine. They've limited their territorial ambitions.


Here's a more realistic scenario, I think: Russia would only use nukes if they failed to win without them, and in that case, they would target front line troops first, not with a nuke but with dozens of them, several times - it would one barrage of nuclear rocket artillery after another, using very low yield nukes (their tactical nukes can very likely set the yield before firing).

What happens next? Chances are Russia takes the Donbas region using conventional weapons in cities, as Ukrainian forces have been severely weakened and can't reinforce the defenders.

But if that's not enough, then Russia can tell Ukrainian forces to surrender. If they do not, then it can tell them to leave cities, towns, etc., and get in the open, accusing them of using civilians as human shields if they stay put, or something along those lines. If the Ukrainian remain, Russia can use conventional weapons against those forces, who cannot easily be reinforced easily after the heavy losses resulting from nukes.

Now, if that is not enough, Russia can attack Ukrainian troops in civilian areas with chemical rather than nuclear weapons, so that they tell the Russian population it's the Ukrainian Nazis targeting Ukrainian civilians to blame Russia, while using the tactical nukes outside populated areas.

If even that is not enough to win, then Russia would consider further escalation, but it's hard to see how Ukrainian defenders could withstand half of that; they've proven much stronger than anticipated so far, but there is so much they can take.

What would the US and NATO do in the above scenario?

I do not know for sure, though I'm pretty sure one thing they would not do is resort to nuclear weapons. One probable option is impose further sanctions on Russia. Even stop buying gas (including Germany), despite the civilian hardships. They could use Russia's nuclear attacks to get more countries to impose sanctions, further isolating Russia, in order to increase the chances that someone will just kill Putin and replace him in their own interest. And of course, they'd give even more weapons to the remaining Ukrainian defenders.

How would it continue?

I do not know. But that's still a good distance from global nuclear war. Russia has further military options. And Biden is not willing to sacrifice the existence of the US or at least tens of millions of US citizens over Russia's nuclear attacks on Ukraine. The same goes for Johnson and Macron.

 

[Copernicus]

NATO is looking at contingency plans, if Russia does use tactical nuclear weapons, although Putin has already used just about all of the other banned weapons. Gas is not a very effective weapon in war, because the wind can blow both ways. The use of tactical nukes would create small scale events that had all of the same effects we saw in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were horrendous. They are just scaled down strategic nuclear weapons, and any use of such weapons in Ukraine could easily balloon up into a wider war, possibly resulting in a global nuclear exchange. The potential for miscalculation is simply enormous, and we've already seen how miscalculation can lead to unpredictable disasters. Putin is still trying to punch his way out of his colossal mistake in starting a major invasion with conventional weapons in Ukraine. He just keeps failing and trying to escalate until something works, not realizing that his failures were the result of his own miscalculations. He doesn't appear able to stop himself from piling one blunder on top of another.

 

[bilby]

Advancing on foot building to building; not so much

… unless there is much looting and raping in the offing. Which there will be.

Yeah. I had a blurb about mercenaries in there but I edited it out. Your average kid conscripted in, pulled off the farm in Lower Slabbovia probably isn't this kind of person.

The history of warfare suggests that, when acting as a unit, soldiers raping and pillaging happens regardless of the kind of person any individual members of that unit might be.

The kind of person who has the strength to go against his peers, (who have literally risked their lives for him, and he for them) to defend a stranger who is labeled as an enemy, is very rare indeed.

Despite the fact that most people like to think of themselves as having that strength of character, in actual warfare it's almost never seen.

Our ability to rationalise such cruelty and evil as somehow justified, or as an aberration that doesn't count because it occurs in an unusual situation, is enormous.

And while it may well result in long term mental disorders after the fact, amongst soldiers who genuinely believe that they are not that kind of person despite having clear memories of actually being exactly that person, such later regrets don't un-rape their victims, un-burn their homes, or un-steal their belongings.

War is hell. Its participants are rarely angels.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Very true, but it's a mute issue. We'll see their missiles in air. We'll retaliate before their missiles hit the ground. No more Russia. But also, no more world. I don't know. I'm pessimistic right now. Haven't had my coffee. But if the world can't 100% unite to stop an imperialist invader, maybe we deserve a nuclear fate.

The world would keep going even if that happened. But it's very improbable to happen. Putin is not suicidal. And if he's removed, whoever replaces him is not suicidal, either.

Putin is not suicidal, but when people are faced with a situation where there is no good answer sometimes they end up grasping at straws and end up in a far worse position than they could have.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Disagree. Nuclear weapons aren't all that hard to build. The hard part is obtaining the U-235 (via isotope separation) or Pu-239 (via breeder reactor) to build it out of. You also need a nuclear physicist to design it. Neither of those will decay over time. The bomb itself will of course be subject to corrosion and the like and a few components will decay, but maintenance isn't that big a deal. I'd expect a lot more trouble with the delivery system than the bombs.

It's not the 1950s anymore. Nuclear weapons means H-bombs, not A-bombs; And Tritium decays fast enough to be a very important consideration when keeping a stockpile of weapons operational.

Lithium deutride will go boom quite well and doesn't decay.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Gas is not a very effective weapon in war, because the wind can blow both ways.

As far as I can tell, it was used effectively in several conflicts. And the direction of the wind isn't very important when they are deployed by missiles or planes and the attacker's ground troops are distant enough or inside tanks and other armored vehicles with adequate protection.

Still, I suggested that as an option among several, which Russia could use in combination with other weapons.

The use of tactical nukes would create small scale events that had all of the same effects we saw in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were horrendous. They are just scaled down strategic nuclear weapons, and any use of such weapons in Ukraine could easily balloon up into a wider war, possibly resulting in a global nuclear exchange.

How?

Suppose for example Russia uses the weapons as I described. How would that easily balloon up into a wider war, let alone a global nuclear exchange?

Ukraine has no nukes to fire back. The US, UK and France will not sacrifice their own populations over the Ukraine war, even if they are enemies of Russia. And the rest of the nuclear-armed countries (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) have no dog in the fight. What realistic mechanism do you propose would have that result?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Putin is not suicidal, but when people are faced with a situation where there is no good answer sometimes they end up grasping at straws and end up in a far worse position than they could have.

Okay, so how do you suggest it would happen?

I mean, what sort of realistic scenario? Putin still has plenty of further options short of that (see my scenarios, purely for example). And he seems to have understood he couldn't take everything, so he's scaled back to Donbas.

 

[Jayjay]

So, let's say Russia does use a "tactical" nuke on Kyiv. City wiped out, including Zelensky and most of Ukrainian leadership (I expect the military to be still able to function though, being non-centralized).


What happens next? Does the NATO or US respond in kind with a nuclear strike on Russia? Or will they finally enforce a no-fly zone in Ukraine and actively push Russian troops out, knowing it may lead to more nukes?

I don't know, but why would Russia use tactical nukes in that manner?

In fact, Kyiv is an extremely unlikely target, for several reasons. Just for example:

1. Putin had the ability to target Zelensky and likely kill him, as he chose to stay openly in Kyiv, in a known location. He chose not to do so. Why? I don't know. Maybe he reckons targeting leaders is off-limits, lest he be personally targeted. But nuking Kyiv would have that effect.

2. Russia denies targeting civilians. Targeting a city would be obviously a case of targeting civilians.

3. They're now trying to get the Donbas region, not all of Ukraine. They've limited their territorial ambitions.

1. I don't think Putin "chose" not to kill Zelensky. He tried and failed.

2. Russia has no actual problem targeting civilians. Putin can always blame Kyiv for provocations or even pretend that they nuked themselves. And even if Russia obviously does use a nuke, it could be spun that it was low yield to minimize civilian casualties or that it was absolutely necessary to stop the war and save lives in Donbas or some shit. We know that Russian propaganda has no connection to reality, and nukes wouldn't be any different. Russian people will believe anything Putin tells them.

3. Using nukes has the side effect of radioactive fallout. It doesn't make sense to use such a weapon in an area that Russia intends to occupy later.

Here's a more realistic scenario, I think: Russia would only use nukes if they failed to win without them, and in that case, they would target front line troops first, not with a nuke but with dozens of them, several times - it would one barrage of nuclear rocket artillery after another, using very low yield nukes (their tactical nukes can very likely set the yield before firing).

I heard somewhere that this may have been the USSR's plan for WW3.

However, I don't think it makes sense in this war. You can always rebuild the towns or cities destroyed with conventional shelling, but nuking them will leave radioactive fallout and even if you could clean it up, who's going to want to move back there? Besides, wind could carry the radioactive dust to places that are already occupied now, even over the border to Russia.

 

[crazyfingers]

However, I don't think it makes sense in this war. You can always rebuild the towns or cities destroyed with conventional shelling, but nuking them will leave radioactive fallout and even if you could clean it up, who's going to want to move back there? Besides, wind could carry the radioactive dust to places that are already occupied now, even over the border to Russia.

True. Unfortunately I suspect that Putin doesn't care about that. Even if it makes land he might have wanted to use unusable. And he can always make people go there anyway. Like his conscripts.

 

[bilby]

even if you could clean it up, who's going to want to move back there?

Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki are thriving and popular modern cities.

Cleaning them up was clearly far from impossible; And lots of people want to live there, for lots of reasons.

Radiation isn't a non-issue, but it is far from being the massive long-term issue that you appear to imagine.

 

[Copernicus]

It is foolish to take the Nagasaki and Hiroshima massacres as a measure of what the aftermath of a modern nuclear interchange would be. The way in which the bombs are exploded and the amount of explosive material can make a huge difference in terms of contamination on the ground and atmospheric fallout that can pollute the environment far away from explosion. Those two bombs were 15 (Hiroshima) and 22 (Nagasaki) kilotons, but, according to the Wikipedia page on  Tactical Nuclear Weapons:

There is no exact definition of the "tactical" category in terms of range or yield of the nuclear weapon.[2][3] The yield of tactical nuclear weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons, but larger ones are still very powerful, and some variable-yield warheads serve in both roles. For example, the W89 200 kiloton warhead was intended to arm both the tactical Sea Lance anti-submarine rocket-propelled depth charge and the strategic bomber-launched SRAM II stand off missile. Modern tactical nuclear warheads have yields up to the tens of kilotons, or potentially hundreds, several times that of the weapons used in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Specifically on the Korean Peninsula, with a nuclear North Korea facing off against a NPT-compliant South Korea, there have been calls to request a return of US-owned and -operated, short range, low yield nuclear weapons (called "tactical" by the US military) to provide a local strategic deterrent to the North's growing domestically-produced nuclear arsenal and delivery systems.[4]

As for more modern "clean fusion" H-bombs, every one in existence is triggered by a fission bomb, which supplies most of the radiation emitted by the explosions. It is not at all clear what kind of tactical nukes Putin would choose to deploy against the Ukrainians, but there would inevitably follow a response from the Western alliance, which could not let such an escalation go without more serious consequences than just a few more sanctions against oligarchs or boycotting Russian oil and gas sales. There would likely be a military retaliation of some kind that could provoke another, more serious escalation from the other side. The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons is madness, as is the idea that a global nuclear war would be survivable for either side. Yet people on both sides, including in our own little online discussion community, are openly speculating about actually engaging in such madness. I know that there is a lot of talk in Russia about using their nuclear weapons to teach NATO and the US a lesson, thinking that a nuclear exchange would somehow produce some kind of satisfying catharsis to the cycle of violence.

 

[Copernicus]

...

The use of tactical nukes would create small scale events that had all of the same effects we saw in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were horrendous. They are just scaled down strategic nuclear weapons, and any use of such weapons in Ukraine could easily balloon up into a wider war, possibly resulting in a global nuclear exchange.

How?

Suppose for example Russia uses the weapons as I described. How would that easily balloon up into a wider war, let alone a global nuclear exchange?

Ukraine has no nukes to fire back. The US, UK and France will not sacrifice their own populations over the Ukraine war, even if they are enemies of Russia. And the rest of the nuclear-armed countries (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) have no dog in the fight. What realistic mechanism do you propose would have that result?

There are so many ways it could spiral out of control as the cycle of violence keeps provoking stronger and stronger retaliatory responses to escalations. But there are also other countries armed with nuclear weapons besides NATO countries. China could see an opportunity to go for a blockade of Taiwan, and North Korea might be itching to take advantage of the distraction in Europe. And then there is the powder keg of nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India. Do you honestly think we can predict a safe scenario in which tactical nuclear weapons could be actually used? The whole purpose would be to produce a capitulation of the type that occurred in Japan at the end of WWII, but would that be the model for the aftermath of Putin's use of nukes in 2022? I don't think we can predict the outcome, and certainly not in an internet discussion group populated by non-experts such as ourselves.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

1. I don't think Putin "chose" not to kill Zelensky. He tried and failed.

Zelensky's location is well known. He is not in hiding. Russia could easily launch a Kinzhal or Iskander missile at the presidential palace, for example. Or several. But they haven't.

2. Russia has no actual problem targeting civilians. Putin can always blame Kyiv for provocations or even pretend that they nuked themselves.

No, it has a problem targeting civilians in a way that cannot be denied sufficiently for their purposes, mostly domestic + some coverage for its allies abroad. Using chemical weapons or conventional weapons allow them to deny the targeting in such manner. But Ukraine does not have nukes (sure, they can blame it on America, but it would be considerably more difficult).

And even if Russia obviously does use a nuke, it could be spun that it was low yield to minimize civilian casualties or that it was absolutely necessary to stop the war and save lives in Donbas or some shit.

Sure, if they use it in Donbas. Or if they use many there. But Kyiv makes it much harder to spin it. And it also makes it much more risky for Russia. It would make little sense as a choice of target - there are plenty of military targets to hit.

We know that Russian propaganda has no connection to reality, and nukes wouldn't be any different. Russian people will believe anything Putin tells them.

Well, it has some connection to reality. It's full of lies, but they can't just say whatever they like; they have some constraints.

3. Using nukes has the side effect of radioactive fallout. It doesn't make sense to use such a weapon in an area that Russia intends to occupy later.

That is not a significant problem for Putin; nearly all of it goes away very quickly.

Q. Is there still radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? - 広島市公å¼ãƒ›ãƒ¼ãƒ ページ｜国際平和文化都市

There are some long-term effects, but nothing that would bother Putin (e.g., he's clearly not going to care if there is an increase in the incidence of some cancers many years down the road).

However, I don't think it makes sense in this war. You can always rebuild the towns or cities destroyed with conventional shelling, but nuking them will leave radioactive fallout and even if you could clean it up, who's going to want to move back there?

Two points:

First, as I mentioned, I think cities and towns would not be targeted first, but front line troops in open terrain. In cities and towns, they would likely use conventional weapons, plus chemical if not enough. If all of that failed, only then they would likely consider further escalation, but still short of targeting the cities or towns themselves, more like troops in the outskirts or things like that, again lowering the yield.

Second, the amount of radiation is not a significant consideration for Putin. For example, the population of Hiroshima increased by tens of thousands in 1946. In the 1950s, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were as populated as before the bombings. There would be some increased health problems in the long run, but Putin doesn't care much about that sort of thing.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

It is foolish to take the Nagasaki and Hiroshima massacres as a measure of what the aftermath of a modern nuclear interchange would be. The way in which the bombs are exploded and the amount of explosive material can make a huge difference in terms of contamination on the ground and atmospheric fallout that can pollute the environment far away from explosion

I am talking about low yield nukes, from .01 to 1 kt - call them whatever you like, that's the sort of weapon I have in mind.

As more modern "clean fusion" H-bombs, every one in existence is triggered by a fission bomb, which supplies most of the radiation emitted by the explosions. It is not at all clear what kind of tactical nukes Putin would choose to deploy against the Ukrainians, but there would inevitably follow a response from the Western alliance, which could not let such an escalation go without more serious consequences than just a few more sanctions against oligarchs or boycotting Russian oil and gas sales.

Probably they'd use the kind of small bombs that can be launched from their multiple rocket launchers in large numbers - or from some of their planes -, against battlefield targets for the most part. It's like a massively boosted rocket artillery and ground attack capability.

As for NATO's response, again, what sort of thing do you have in mind?

Ukraine has no nukes to fire back. The US, UK and France will not sacrifice their own populations over the Ukraine war.

There would likely be a military retaliation of some kind that could provoke another, more serious escalation from the other side.

Why do you think so? NATO would intervene if Russia uses tactical nukes? What would be the point in that, given the risk of further escalation?

The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons is madness, as is the idea that a global nuclear war would be survivable for either side.

The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons if the rest of the options I've been explaining were to fail - which is not likely - is murderous, but not necessarily mad given Putin's goals. It's murderous, but then Putin is already as murderous as he finds convenient. Even so, I think tactical nukes are still improbable. Just not too improbable to consider seriously.

Yet people on both sides, including in our own little online discussion community, are openly speculating about actually engaging in such madness.

Whom are you talking about?
In any event, regardless of whether it is madness to use them, there is no madness in discussing how they might be used by Russia.