No. It's "enemy uniform" = "enemy". Perfectly normal standard everywhere.
That might be a reasonable standard in a conventional war between uniformed armies—but Gaza is not that. And you know it.
Doesn't change the standard.
And that’s how massacres happen—how entire neighborhoods become “valid” targets in hindsight because someone nearby might have matched a profile. What you’re defending isn’t the law. It’s a rationale for abandoning it.
No, massacres happen because the people match the appearance of those who were shooting at the soldiers.
It's the marking of the enemy, that's all you need. Geneva requires soldiers to fight in readily distinguishable attire to prevent targeting mistakes, it says nothing about not shooting people in said attire. (It's not specifically uniforms, merely that they match. "Militia, we are expecting infiltrators. The uniform of the day is green over orange brassards.")
Then you’ve just proven the point—by flattening the legal standard into a visual cue, you’re erasing the entire foundation of civilian protection in asymmetric conflict.
Yes, combatants are required to distinguish themselves. But Geneva does not say that anyone who resembles a fighter—or wears something “green and orange”—can legally be shot. That’s a misapplication. The distinction goes both ways: if someone is not taking direct part in hostilities, then they retain full civilian protection—even if they’re dressed in a way you find suspicious.
Read more carefully. I said "green over orange
brassards". Not merely green and orange. It's a sufficiently uncommon word that my spell checker is flagging it.
That's relevant how??
The words you failed to quote: "because they live in Gaza, express political opinions, or wear a color associated with a group"
You are providing no evidence that they were targeted for any of these reasons. And you are providing no evidence one way or the other about those who were hit. Your argument simply amounts to "you didn't prove they were Hamas". You think Israel is going to reveal how it identifies people?! It's just their track record is very good--an awful lot of the "civilians" they kill later get Hamas funerals.
It’s relevant because it demonstrates a fundamental failure of the principle you’re defending—the requirement to distinguish between civilians and combatants, especially in pre-designated civilian safe zones. You can’t champion Israel’s “track record” while ignoring documented incidents where that track record collapses under scrutiny.
Documented incidents do not show probability. Tracking
all the dead "civilians" and seeing who gets a military funeral does.
The Al-Mawasi strike isn’t just a tragic accident—it’s a case study in the failure of precautionary obligations under Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Israel instructed civilians to move to Al-Mawasi, designated it a humanitarian zone, then conducted lethal strikes within it. Whether or not Hamas fighters were present does not absolve the legal burden. Under international law, the presence of combatants among a civilian population does not negate civilian protections. The obligation is on the attacking party to either avoid the strike or delay it if the collateral damage would be disproportionate to the expected military advantage.
And you once again fail to understand.
Israel was saying there wasn't any infrastructure in the zone they were going to target. That doesn't mean they're going to ignore Hamas operating in the zone.
Furthermore, your assertion that many of those killed “later get Hamas funerals” is not a reliable legal or evidentiary standard. Funerary affiliation is not a legal test for combatant status. Under customary IHL and ICC jurisprudence, the definition of a combatant includes those directly participating in hostilities, not those whose bodies are later draped in flags or given symbolic honors. The ICRC and legal scholars have repeatedly emphasized that posthumous political framing does not retroactively convert a civilian into a lawful military target.
And you fail to understand Geneva.
The military funeral shows the person was in the military. And being in the military in times of war makes one a valid target.
And no—states are not required to reveal operational intelligence, but that doesn’t exempt them from providing credible evidence that their strikes are lawful. Merely asserting “we believe a militant was there” without substantiation, particularly after civilians were directed to that location by the military itself, does not satisfy the legal threshold of distinction, proportionality, or precaution.
By itself, no. But given their track record I'm not going to figure the guy really was a civilian when Israel identifies him as a combatant.
In short, your argument hinges on presumed legitimacy and post-hoc rationalizations rather than adherence to legal principles. The laws of war were created precisely to avoid this kind of ambiguity—where civilians are killed, responsibility is denied, and every corpse is presumed guilty by association. That’s not a defense. It’s the breakdown of lawful conduct in armed conflict.
You continue to assume and then base your argument on your assumption.
Of course no real time evidence is offered before the strike. What are you smoking to think that they would do that??
And you realize that when an entire family is pulled from the rubble that almost always one of their senior commanders was in said rubble? There are typically fewer civilians around when someone is at home than when they are out somewhere.
And that’s precisely the danger of the logic you’re defending.
You’re saying that because Israel doesn’t want to disclose evidence in real time, we should take its word on trust—while simultaneously dismissing all independent reporting from humanitarian organizations, UN bodies, or even allied governments as unreliable if it contradicts that narrative. That’s not just selective skepticism—it’s a double standard that places one side above verification and the other beneath credibility by default.
I'm saying their track record is good enough I'll take a wait and see approach. And it's usually not even needed--while Hamas always pretends the grunts are civilian they promise revenge when Israel gets someone of high rank. And Israel isn't going to intend civilian casualties for lesser people. Thus in practice when Israel hits an occupied house the terrorists typically call for avenging the fallen comrade and you know they were on target.
The law doesn’t say you can’t strike high-value targets. It says you must not do so in a way that knowingly causes disproportionate harm to civilians. And when strike after strike results in that exact outcome, it ceases to be “unfortunate.” It becomes policy.
Reality is 10 to 1. Except even if you accept the Hamas death toll it's still 1.5 to 1. I have a very hard time with the notion that a 6-fold decrease is an unacceptable increase.
I expect them to do what they feasibly can. I do not expect them to do the impossible. And I see them consistently being the world's best at avoiding civilian casualties. I also see the stuff with Hezbollah--human shield tactics aren't used much there, and we see 85-90% of deaths being combatants. Look at the beeper bombs--one death that was certainly civilian, but immediate family of the target. The other "civilian" deaths we get no details--nope, they weren't civilians.
Then what you’re defending isn’t law—it’s a moving target of excuses, defined by trust in one side’s claims and total skepticism toward any opposing evidence.
You “expect them to do what they feasibly can,” but ignore the legal definition of that standard. Feasibility isn’t whatever a military says it tried. It means taking all practicable precautions to verify the nature of the target, to choose means and methods that minimize civilian harm, and to refrain from the attack if that harm is excessive in relation to the anticipated military gain. That’s not opinion—it’s Article 57 of Additional Protocol I. And it’s binding.
You praise Israel as “the world’s best” at avoiding civilian casualties. But that’s not how legal accountability works. International law doesn’t say “do better than most,” it says follow the rules—always, and without exception. “We’re better than Russia or Syria” is not a defense under the Geneva Conventions.
I'm comparing them to the western powers, not to Syria.
As for Hezbollah: cherry-picking one front and one set of casualty ratios doesn’t prove anything about the legality of operations in Gaza. The terrain, density, and conditions are radically different—and so is the scale. Civilian death rates in Gaza aren’t some mystery. Over 70% of the reported dead are women and children, a claim now broadly accepted even by Israeli analysts. If you think that can be waved off by labeling them “immediate family of the target,” then you’re not applying international law. You’re dismantling it with euphemism.
It's not that it's widely accepted, it's that there's no competing data. We know the data is bogus, but we don't know how bogus.
And your dismissal of deaths where “we get no details” as not civilians is exactly the problem. Unknown is not guilt. Proximity is not guilt. Family is not guilt. If you reverse that burden—assuming civilian deaths are justified unless proven otherwise—you’ve erased the entire foundation of the law of armed conflict. That’s not justice. That’s rationalized brutality.
No. It's the dog that didn't bark. They'll jump on proving the civilians are civilians--thus when they don't give details figure they're most likely combatants or otherwise valid. (The beeper bombs got some in the Lebanese hierarchy that were working with Hezbollah.) They don't want to provide "details" that can be shown false, so they don't provide them.
This is completely unrealistic.
Unrealistic doesn’t mean unlawful.
The laws of armed conflict aren’t designed around what’s most convenient for a military. They exist precisely because in war, the temptation to cut corners and justify assumptions is overwhelming. If the only standard is what a military thinks is reasonable in the moment, then there is no law—only discretion. And discretion without external accountability is how atrocities happen.
Saying “we can’t wait for certainty” doesn’t grant permission to act on guesses. The legal requirement is not perfect knowledge—it’s due diligence. That means real efforts to distinguish combatants from civilians before using lethal force. It means avoiding strikes where the expected civilian harm is excessive compared to the military gain. That’s the legal bar. Calling it unrealistic is just another way of saying you don’t want to be bound by it.
If law only applies when it’s easy, then it isn’t law. It’s theater.
There is no certainty.
Read it again. "Civilians". Not members of the group. Identifying group membership is enough to pull the trigger.
(And there's a reason we didn't ratify that part of Geneva. That piece you are referring to is protecting two of the 10/7 butchers because they simply joined the attack without being members of a terrorist organization. The words "and for such a time as" are an abomination that does not belong.)
Your interpretation dangerously rewrites the law to suit a rationale that strips civilians of protection by association—not by action. That’s not how international humanitarian law works, and it’s not a loophole the U.S. or any other state can simply invent by fiat.
Apparently you did not understand. Israel knows where two of the butchers of 10/7 are. But since they simply joined in the attack without being part of the terrorist organizations they are protected under that abomination and haven't been hit.
First, Article 51(3) protects all civilians, regardless of affiliation or ideology. The only condition under which that protection is suspended is direct participation in hostilities—not mere identification, group membership, or political sympathy. That includes members of non-state armed groups, unless they are actively engaged in a military function at the time. This isn’t controversial—it’s the consensus view of the ICRC, the International Criminal Court, and military manuals around the world.
Second, saying the U.S. didn’t ratify Additional Protocol I doesn’t erase the principle. Much of it, including Article 51, has been recognized as customary international law—binding on all states regardless of ratification. The U.S. Department of Defense even follows the “direct participation” standard in its own Law of War Manual.
Third, your framing turns suspicion into a death sentence. If “group membership” is enough, then anyone in Gaza who looks the part—teenagers, political supporters, aid workers accused by proxy—becomes a lawful target. That collapses the entire foundation of distinction, which is what separates combat from slaughter.
No. I'm not saying the people on the edges are valid targets. I'm saying two 10/7 murderers should be.
The law doesn’t exist to make war easy. It exists to prevent it from becoming total. You don’t get to declare that because some parts are inconvenient, the civilians cease being civilians. If that’s the argument, then you’re not upholding international law. You’re erasing it.
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities makes clear that civilians remain protected unless and only while they directly participate in hostilities. Simply identifying someone with a group—through clothing, symbolism, or political alignment—is not sufficient grounds for targeting. The standard is conduct, not affiliation.
This principle has been reinforced by international tribunals. In Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY affirmed that individuals must be targeted based on their active role in hostilities—not assumptions based on group membership or demographics. The law requires a functional assessment, not a symbolic one.
But you still don't get that membership in a military organization is enough.
The issue was whether it's possible for a "civilian" to be a combatant. It's relevant in that establishing that someone is a "civilian" isn't proof they are not a combatant. Multiple hostages were rescued that were being held by "civilians".
Then you’ve just illustrated the very principle you’re trying to sidestep.
Yes—some civilians may secretly engage in hostilities. That’s exactly why the law sets a high bar before lethal force can be used: it requires proof of direct participation, not assumption based on possibility. International humanitarian law accounts for the fact that conflict is murky—but it errs on the side of protection, not preemption.
Once again, you fail to understand. You continue to use "proof" that someone is a civilian as evidence they can't be a combatant. Nope. It's no data, not a proof.
The presence of a few civilians who violate their protected status does not justify treating all civilians as potential threats. That logic flips the burden of proof—turning a presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt by proximity or suspicion. That’s not how law works. It’s how massacres are rationalized.
So yes, a “civilian” can forfeit protection by taking up arms—but only for as long as they are actively doing so. You don’t get to rewrite that rule just because some hostages were guarded by people in plain clothes. That fact proves the need for care, not its abandonment.
People with civilian lives.
Fool me twice, shame on me.
Any symbol of noncombatant status that is repeatedly misused ceases to be an indication of noncombatant status. And all of them have been widely misused in Gaza.
Then what you’re advocating is the erosion of the very system that distinguishes war from massacre.
“Fool me twice” may work in personal grudges—but international humanitarian law is not built on vengeance or trust. It’s built on standards—precisely because war is chaotic, manipulated, and filled with bad actors. The moment you say that a vest, a symbol, a hospital, or a designation “no longer counts” because it’s sometimes abused, you make every protected status conditional. And once protection becomes conditional, it becomes meaningless.
If a press vest no longer shields a journalist because others lied while wearing one—then journalists become targets. If a hospital loses protection because an enemy used one—then patients become targets. That’s not accountability. That’s collective suspicion turned into lethal policy.
International law doesn’t require you to be naïve. It requires you to distinguish. You hold individuals accountable when evidence supports it. But you don’t erase protections for everyone because of the actions of some. That’s not “shame on me”—it’s shame on the world if we allow it.
It's not that it was misused once. It's that it's misused again and again. And it's not used for targeting, just not used to consider someone a noncombatant. Is that car a threat? In a proper world you would see the medical markings and figure it wasn't. In Gaza you ignore the markings and focus on behavior.
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